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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the influence of company and executive characteristics on 
strategic alliance formation (decision to form alliances, alliance type selection and 
choice of alliance partners) and performance evaluation of alliances, in the Australian 
tourism industry sector of travel. The significance of forming strategic alliances as a way 
of achieving harambe is emphasised throughout this thesis. Harambe is a ki-Swahili 
term meaning “to pull together, or to work together or to pull the same rope together at 
the same time” in harmony (Murove, 2005). The idea here is that companies pool their 
resources together through strategic alliances to be able to achieve their strategic goals 
and objectives. 
 
 The research focuses on three travel sub-sectors – travel agencies, tour operators and 
wholesalers and how these sub-sectors relate with those of transport and 
accommodation. A behavioural framework for investigating strategic alliances was 
developed. This framework provides a unique approach to assessing both executive 
characteristics (see upper echelon studies) and company characteristics (see 
organisational studies) in one integrated model of tourism strategic alliances. The 
pragmatist research program adopted for the empirical research allows for s triangulation 
of results that enables a depth of theoretical understanding not currently available in the 
tourism literature. 
 
A survey of Australian travel sector businesses was undertaken followed by interviews 
with six executives. The results indicate high level of interaction through alliances 
between the three sub-sectors and the two sectors of accommodation and transport in the 
Australian tourism industry. Company and executives’ characteristics were found to be 
influential in taking strategic decisions of whether to form alliances or not, choice of 
strategic alliance types, choice of alliance partners and alliance evaluation. However, 
company characteristics were found to be more influential than executive characteristics. 
This marks the difference between this study and other upper echelon studies, which 
have found executives characteristics as fundamental in the adoption of organisational 
strategy. Choice of alliance partners was also found to be influential in executives’ 
assessments of alliance performance. 
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Preface 
 
In this thesis, I employ two styles of writing. The first style only in this preface I write in 
the first person, unusual for me but I have found it irresistible given the fact that this 
section is a reflection of my journey into the unknown - the decision to enrol for a PhD 
program and subsequently coming to Australia, to pursue this dream. However, from 
Chapter One until the end of this thesis, I write in the third person the style that I have 
been socialised since my academic childhood into this approach.  
 
This thesis is premised on the ideas of pragmatism. How I came to choose pragmatism 
as a philosophy for researching social life was a journey that began at the University of 
Essex in 1995/96 under the discipleship of Professor Richard Laughlin and Dr. Jane 
Broadbent, themselves committed Habermas scholars who were open minded to explore 
various research philosophies. They generated my interest in debates about the social 
world and reality. 
 
My interest in the social world as socially constructed fitted well with Herbert Blumer’s 
symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism has been a highly influential theory in 
sociology ever since it was coined by Blumer in 1937 when he wrote an article 
identifying Mead as a “Symbolic Interactionist.” Symbolic interactionism represents a 
“relatively distinct approach to the study of human group life and human conduct” 
(Blumer, 1969, p. 1) which “is concerned with the emergence of meaning in human 
interaction. Meanings are the definitions that individuals attach to the full range of 
objects (i.e. physical, social, cultural, political) that comprise their life world. Meanings 
emerge through social interaction with others and the self, and ultimately become the 
basis of human and collective action” (Burnier, 2005, pp. 501-502). Blumer (1969, p. 
35) argues that the social world is the actual group life of experience and consists of the 
action of human beings, and that it is the world of everyday experience of people as they 
meet the situations that arise in their respective worlds. According to this approach, the 
empirical world has a ‘real’ character, which appears in the ‘here and now’, and is 
continuously recast with the achievement of new discoveries, which is achieved through 
careful and honest study. Hence, for my Masters dissertation, I set forth on a short 
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journey of a symbolic interactionist study of teams in a bureaucracy called Teams in a 
Bureaucracy: A Case Study of A Local Borough Council in the South-East of London. 
 
Graduating from the University of Essex in 1996, I soon realised that my dissertation 
lacked basic statistical information that could have further enriched the qualitative data. 
To this end, I became more disgruntled with symbolic interactionism – both the two 
schools, the Chicago School with its emphasis on methodological purity that viewed 
qualitative data collection as the only means through which the social world can be 
accessed and understood, and the Iowa school’s emphasis on M.H. Kuhn’s twenty 
statements self attitudes test which cannot be used effectively to study complex areas 
like alliance formation and management.  
 
When I enrolled for my PhD, I set out to find a methodological philosophy that I could 
identify with. These included but were not limited to critical theory and critical realism. 
Going back to Laughlin’s (1995) methodological themes, in one of his diagrams a link 
was made between symbolic interactionism and pragmatism. Laughlin (1995) made a 
claim that pragmatism’s ideas are essentially premised on the reflections of the 
Kantean/Fichte/Dilthy philosophical thought of the ‘projection of our minds.’ Laughlin 
(1995, p. 69) says this about pragmatism: 
that “typically American” (Kolakowski, 1972, p. 182) school of thought, following 
the thinking of Mead, James and Pierce, with its “getting-on-with-life” approach 
and its heavy borrowing from all and every way of thinking if it is deemed to be 
“relatively attractive” (Rorty, 1982) to the inquirer, can be seen to be located in this 
branching with its apparent belief in both subjective and objective dimensions to 
knowledge.  
 
The link between pragmatism and symbolic interactionism is rooted in the social theory 
of the pragmatist George Herbert Mead (1853-1931), a philosopher who has remained a 
marginal figure in the circles of pragmatists. Herbert Blumer’s symbolic interactionist 
approach was formed out of parts of Mead’s work (Joas, 1990) as an attempt at 
providing symbolic interactionism with a legitimate symbolic figure (da Silva, 2006). 
Blumer was one of Mead’s ex-students and perhaps the most prominent interpreter and 
devotee of Mead’s philosophy. My masters dissertation was premised on Blumer’s 
(1969) reconstruction of Mead’s ideas from the point of view of a social scientist 
concerned with empirical research. Some of these ideas have had a strong impetus in this 
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thesis and are reflected in Chapter Six, particularly Blumer’s ideas on meanings and how 
they are handled through an interpretive process. The issue of methodological 
philosophy was therefore concluded with a firm understanding of the historical roots of 
pragmatism and how my previous work fitted in.  
 
In my search for a methodological identity, I also came across mixed methods writers in 
the social sciences, psychology and education (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; 2003; 
Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003; Creswell, 2003; Creswell, Clark, Gutmann & Hanson, 
2003a; Creswell, Trout & Barbuto, 2003b). Most of these authors emphasised the fact 
that mixed methods are best employed under pragmatism. My first impression with the 
few books and articles I read on pragmatism was that it was a confused philosophy 
without any direction. At first, I agreed with Downward and Mearman’s (2004) view of 
pragmatism as a ‘vague’ philosophy that should not be relied upon, a view I later 
challenged. Rorty’s (1991, p. 27) definition of pragmatism as “the claim that the 
function of inquiry is, in Bacon’s words, to ‘relieve and benefit the condition of man’ – 
to make us happier by enabling us to cope more successfully with the physical 
environment and with each other” was an indication that there is something about this 
philosophy that is good for mankind. Recent debates between Powell’s (2001, 2002, 
2003) pragmatist views and those of essentially positivist scholars, Durand (2002) and 
Arend (2003) on the logical and philosophical foundations of competitive advantage 
helped me to set the scene for a pragmatist agenda in both tourism and management 
research.  
 
The idea of pragmatism’s emphasis on making social life better elated me. My values of 
‘making social life better’ date back to my childhood. I grew up in rural Botswana where 
the principle of botho/ubuntu was a mind-set that glued communities together, even in 
times of unimaginable hardships. I was always reminded at home, to the point of 
indoctrination, that, ‘A person is a person through other persons’. This ideal has shaped 
a great deal of my life. In the words of the former Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond 
Mpilo Tutu (1999, p. 31), botho/ubuntu  
…speaks of the very essence of being human …It is to say, ‘My humanity is 
caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.’ We belong in a bundle of life. We 
say, ‘A person is a person through other persons’. It is not ‘I think therefore I am.’ 
It says rather: ‘I am human because I belong. I participate, I share’. A person with 
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ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened 
that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes 
from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when 
others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or 
treated as if they were less than who they are. 
 
Pragmatism emphasises social harmony as the main essence for inquiry (Rorty, 1999), 
but I was shocked by the absence of research in both tourism and management based on 
this paradigm. I am yet to come across a paper in tourism, which claims to have used 
mixed methods with a pragmatist’s lens. In 2005, I set the scene through my publication 
"Pragmatism: A methodological approach to researching strategic alliances in tourism", 
which appeared in Tourism and Hospitality: Planning & Development, Vol. 2, No. 3. Its 
objectives were not only to serve as a critique of Downward and Mearman’s (2004) 
views concerning pragmatism but also to set an agenda for mixed methods research in 
tourism and management inspired by pragmatism.  
 
My research topic started as “Strategic alliances in the tourism industry: enhancing 
competitiveness in the tourism industry in Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.” The 
idea came out of a family trip in December 2002 to the Chobe Game Reserve, a major 
tourist destination in Botswana. The tour operator drove along the great Chobe River to 
a spot where wildlife was visible from a distance. There, he stopped to explain one of 
Southern Africa’s colonial legacies, the creation of artificial boundaries that today the 
region’s inhabitants have accepted as permanent and almost natural. His talk became the 
source of inspiration for me to find reason to study this topic. He said, “[t]hat head of 
buffalos over there is in Namibia, those animals there, they look like elephants from 
where I stand, are in Zambia. If you were to move just a little by boat, you see those 
trees over there, that is Zimbabwe, you guys must go to the Victoria Falls to see one of 
the world’s wonders. It is only 78 kilometres from here. Of course, we are all watching 
this spectacle of nurture from the country of my birth – Botswana. This is the place our 
four countries constantly nurture each other through wildlife tourism, of course this 
glorious river provides life for all of us.”  
 
As I pondered more on “the place our four countries constantly nurture each other 
through wildlife tourism”, the more I reflected on my fourth year strategic management 
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course – a particular topic I just taught at the end of the semester – strategic alliances. 
The rest became a journey to further my understanding of strategic alliances and their 
significance. The second chapter of this thesis reflects this review. However, my ideas of 
the research site changed when I arrived in Australia, as I reflected more on ‘the tyranny 
of distance’. Researching on a place more than 13000 kilometres away could be difficult 
to one’s attempt to collect data. Hence, the choice to make my study Australian based. 
However, the idea of “the place our four countries constantly nurture each other through 
wildlife tourism” still vibrates in my mind. After graduating, I am going back to the 
place where my dream began “the place our four countries constantly nurture each other 
through wildlife tourism”. There I will follow up this research agenda with and among 
the people who live it. 
 
I had hoped that my reading of the tourism literature would be coherent and straight 
forward. I must confess, 2003 was the first time I have ever read a tourism book. My 
thoughts were that just like the ‘mining industry’ (coming from one of the world’s 
largest diamond mining countries myself), the ‘tourism industry’ was a conceptually 
agreed upon industry. I was shocked by the level of disagreement on the concept. At first 
the terminologies of ‘tourism industry’ and ‘tourism industries’ were confusing. In my 
research proposal, a document submitted for PhD confirmation, I had consistently used 
‘tourism industry’.  
 
The 16th Annual CAUTHE Conference, held in Melbourne in 2006 completely changed 
my understanding. It was at this conference where Neil Leiper, one of Australia’s 
outstanding tourism management scholars, presented his paper "Why 'the tourism 
industry' is misleading as a generic term, and why the plural variant - 'tourism industries' 
- is preferable". His explosive attack on those who hold the view of ‘the tourism 
industry’ particularly Stephen L. J. Smith and big tourism bodies such as the World 
Tourism Organization was deeper than religious conviction. At the Cutting Edge 
Research in Tourism Conference held at the University of Surrey, UK, on the 6 – 9th 
June 2006, I shared a table with Neil Leiper’s prolific academic antagonist, Stephen L. J. 
Smith during a dinner session. Much of our discussion evolved around Leiper’s critique 
and I was shocked by the fact that throughout the thirty years of debate on the concept, 
they have never met but remain “good friends”. His keynote address “Duelling 
Definitions: Challenges & Implications of Conflicting International Concepts of 
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Tourism” addressed the same issues that Leiper focused on at the CAUTHE conference. 
Only this time, the emphasis was on tourism as an ‘industry’ though not in the 
‘conventional sense’. I understood why the two most influential scholars in tourism have 
never met and why they have never been invited to an international tourism conference 
as keynote speakers at the same time. Tourism researchers and conference organisers 
have a high respect for these two figures and their ideas are held in high esteem. 
However, if this debate is to move towards a consensus, there is need for these scholars 
with differing views to share one forum where this issue can be aired.  
 
This is how my topic “Harambe: Strategic alliance formation and performance 
evaluation in the tourism sector of travel” evolved. This thesis acknowledges the role 
played by company and executive characteristics in their quest to practice harambe. 
Harambe is a ki-Swahili term meaning “to pull together, or to work together or to pull 
the same rope together at the same time” in harmony (Murove, 2005, p. 169). The idea 
here is that companies pool their resources together through strategic alliances to be able 
to achieve their strategic goals and objectives. Even in the face of aggressive 
competition, botho/ubuntu – that idea of being ‘intractably bound up’ in a network of 
interdependence (Tutu, 1999) is enhanced through harambe. In the corporate world, this 
togetherness is effectively achieved through strategic alliances. 
 
The last chapter of this thesis points to the fact that choice of alliance partners based on 
compatibility, commitment, control and trust enhances the benefits of ‘pulling together’, 
shown through alliance performance. 
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_________________________________________ 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
The ‘tourism industry’ is operating in a complex, turbulent and dynamic environment 
with pressure to adapt and change in order to survive. In the last few years, tourism has 
been negatively affected by a barrage of problems, leading to international tourism 
arrivals falling by 1.2 per cent in 2003, the biggest annual drop ever (World Tourism 
Organization, [UNWTO] 2004). Some of these problems include the threat of 
international terrorism, the Iraq conflict, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 
and a persistently weak world economy (UNWTO, 2004). In addition to the above, 
many tourism-based businesses are facing increasing competition that forces them to 
seek competitive advantage, efficiency and profitable ways to differentiate themselves 
(Atilgan, Akinci & Aksoy, 2003). Some of these ways have been through strategic 
planning, transformational style of leadership, human resource management, franchising, 
and good financial management (Costa, Eccles & Teare, 1997); delivery of high-quality 
service to consumers (Atilgan et al., 2003); adoption of new information technologies 
(Gray, Matear & Matheson, 2002), and strategic alliances (Evans, 2001; Telfer, 2001).  
 
The many challenges and the ways in which organisations are responding to them need 
persistent investigation with a will to enhance organisational efficiency, yet they cannot 
all be investigated at the same time. For this reason, this study endeavours to concentrate 
only on strategic alliances. A strategic alliance is defined as a purposive strategic 
arrangement between two or more independent organisations that forms part of, and is 
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consistent with the organisation’s overall strategy, and contributes to strategically 
significant objectives that are mutually beneficial (Pansiri, 2005a). 
 
There is a plethora of studies in strategic alliances extending over two decades ( such as 
Killing, 1982; Astley & Fombrun, 1983; Faulkner, 1995; Evans, 2001; Chung, Luo & 
Wagner, 2006). The concept of collaborating with partners through the formulation of 
strategic alliances has been an aspect of business strategy for many decades, and the 
scale of attention devoted to these alliances since the late-1980s has been significant 
(Johnson & Scholes, 1999; Evans, 2001). Modern organisations, both large and, small-
to-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) cannot always cope with increasingly complex 
environments characterised by global competition, information technology and increased 
customer sophistication from internal resources and competencies alone. There is need 
that they obtain materials, skills, innovation, finance or access to markets which may be 
done more effectively through cooperation (Johnson & Scholes, 1999).  
 
Pressure to survive in an increasingly competitive, dynamic and complex environment 
with limited resources has led organisations to explore various forms of collaborations 
mainly strategic alliances, networks, and other hybrid organisational arrangements as 
alternatives to the more traditional internal development, diversification, merger and 
acquisition approaches (Dev, Klein & Fisher, 1996). Ohmae (1989a, p. 143) observes 
that “…companies are just beginning to learn what nations have always known: in a 
complex, uncertain world filled with dangerous opponents, it is not best to go it alone.” 
In Doz and Hamel’s (1998, p. 4) view, as “…princes and warriors have observed 
through the centuries, often the most painless way to neutralise potential foes is to bring 
them into one’s own camp. Both competitors and ‘complementers’ need to be co-opted 
into coalitions.” Therefore, organisations enter into strategic alliances in order to match 
and respond to the uncertainties and complexities of today’s highly competitive 
globalised and technological driven business environment. Morrison and Mezentseff  
(1997, p. 351) maintain that:  
As companies are becoming aware of international competitiveness, organizations 
are striving to achieve sustainable competitive advantage through the initiation of 
strategic alliances... it is becoming more difficult for organizations to remain self-
sufficient in an international business environment that demands both focus and 
flexibility. 
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The underlying reasons motivating companies to enter into alliances are varied and 
complex, and will be assessed in Chapter Three. Strategic alliance formations have been 
evident in many industries including manufacturing (Golden & Dollinger, 1993; 
Whipple & Gentry, 2000); banks (Lawrence & ul-Huq, 1998); retailing (Clarke-Hill, 
Robinson & Bailey, 1998); pharmaceuticals and vehicle manufacturing (Evans, 2001); 
R&D consortia (Doz, Olk & Ring, 2000); technological alliances (Tyler & Steensma, 
1998); biotechnology (Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000; Gulati & Higgins, 2003); 
engineering, software, bio-science technology, instrumentation electronics, analytical 
geological services (Sulej, Stewart & Keogh, 2001); software industry (Taylor, 2005); 
management consultancy (Chung et al., 2006) and information technology (Drago, 1997; 
De Laat, 1999). 
 
A number of studies have considered the growth of collaborative arrangements in the 
tourism field in general (Poon, 1993; Go & Hedges, 1994; Morrison, 1994; Tremblay, 
1998; Medina-Munoz & Garcia-Falcon, 2000; Evans, 2001). The natural synergy, which 
exists between tourism sectors of transport, accommodation, travel agencies, tour 
operators, entertainment, food, and beverages, makes it necessary for integration, 
collaboration and the formation of strategic alliances and networks through the 
consumption patterns of travellers (Garnham, 1997; Lafferty & Fossen, 2001). The 
various actors involved in the tourism industry “…tend to judge the destination 
according to the relationships that develop consciously or subconsciously, with other 
actors and their representatives at the destination” (Grängsjö, 2003, p. 430). Grängsjö 
further argues that tourists choose a destination according to which attractions it can 
offer and facilities provided, such as transport services to and from the destination, 
accommodation, restaurants and physical setting. While Grängsjö argues for a unified, 
holistic perspective concerning organisation at tourist destination level, she confirms that 
many companies are involved in widely different activities and as a result, some of them 
do not want to identify themselves with the tourism industry, and this makes it hard for 
them to co-operate in developing the image of the destination. This view is shared by 
Telfer (2001) who maintains that the tourism industry has been criticised for lack of 
communication between organisations.   
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A growing number of studies have concentrated on strategic alliances in diverse tourism 
sectors, majority of these considering airline alliances (Glisson, Gunningham, Harris & 
Di Lorenzo-Aiss, 1996; Chan, 2000; Evans, 2001), alliances in the wine tourism industry 
(Telfer, 2001); hotels (Morrison, 1994; Brown & Pattinson, 1995); tourism channels 
(Buhalis, 2000b; March, 2000); tourism and agriculture (Telfer, 2000) and travel agents 
(Deng, Lawson & Moutinho, 2000; Raymond, 2001). The very few studies that have 
looked broadly at strategic alliances in the tourism industry have a variety of limitations. 
For example, while the study by Dev et al. (1996) is broadly based - looking at alliances 
in the travel and tourism industry in the United Stated of America [USA], with emphasis 
on hotel brands, car rental brands and airline brands, its limitation is that it focuses only 
on one particular type of strategic alliances – marketing alliances. A study by Watkins 
and Bell (2002) examines the formation of business relationships between tourism 
organisations. This study’s importance lies in its broad scope of the tourism industry. 
For example, it included commercial owner-operators drawn from the accommodation, 
attractions and travel sectors, executive officers of local, regional and state-level tourism 
industry associations, and tourism representatives within local government authorities 
and community groups with interest in tourism. While this study is important in 
informing scholars and practitioners in the field of tourism on how managers’ 
experiences can be developmentally ordered on a continuum of relationships that 
demonstrate progressively more complex and inclusive approaches to forming 
relationships, its fundamental limitation is that it was a study limited only to regional 
tourism organisations in Queensland, Australia.  
 
A qualitative empirical study by Riege, Perry and Go (2002) investigates international 
partnerships between travel and tourism organisations, airlines and their intermediaries 
such as wholesalers and travel agents. Their definition of partnerships encompasses 
strategic alliances, strategic co-operation, strategic networks and collaboration. They do 
not distinguish these concepts and seem to suggest that the four concepts could be used 
interchangeably. Despite this limitation, Riege et al. (2002) acknowledges the 
fragmentation of the tourism industry and the subsequent lack of linkages between its 
sectors. They argue that partnerships are important because tourism is becoming more 
international and most destinations have to compete at a global level. “Moreover, both 
producers and intermediaries are increasingly using information technology to increase 
their knowledge and relationship with customers” (Riege et al., 2002, p. 59). Their 
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research involved 19 case studies based on in-depth interviews with 41 key players in 
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany representing travel 
and tourism organisations, airlines and their intermediaries such as wholesalers and 
travel agents with a view to answering four research questions: (1) who are the partners 
and how are they linked together, (2) why do partnerships form, (3) what is the scope for 
further development of partnerships, and (4) how has the emergence of new 
communication technologies affected the development of the partnerships?  
 
Their findings indicate that there are several ways of interaction and co-operation 
between industry partners on different levels in overseas markets. They also emphasise 
the importance of establishing, maintaining and managing industry partnerships. While 
there are many reasons for establishing partnerships, they found that tourism industry 
players try to see themselves ‘as one big family’, with partnerships rarely based on 
formal written agreements. “They were often perceived as informal partnerships based 
on trust rather than strict commitments based on a financial or commercial agreement, 
and varied considerably in function, complexity and length” (Riege et al., 2002, p. 70). 
They also found future scope for more cooperation with industry partners in overseas 
markets to enhance the level of effective marketing communication activities, which 
could be further enhanced by communication technologies. 
 
While Riege et al. (2002) remains an important springboard upon which future research 
on strategic alliances could be based, its limitation is that the behaviours and diverse 
needs of different industry sectors are not shown, together with various alliance types in 
which industry players participate.  
 
While there are a number of studies on strategic alliances in general and tourism in 
particular, much needs to be done particularly in understanding diverse alliances in 
tourism broadly, not limited to a specific sector of the industry, one type of strategic 
alliance (e.g. marketing alliances), or limited to a specific region. However, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that it is almost impossible to study strategic alliances in the 
whole tourism industry given the number of industry sectors, which form the tourism 
industry. One such sector that is central to the success of the tourism industry in any 
country is the travel sector. While the travel sector has played a significant role in 
Australia’s economic development (Hall, 2003), not much has been done to find out the 
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extent to which it has embarked upon and benefited from alliance formations. There is 
therefore a need to understand these alliances from the position of executives and 
managers since alliances are human constructs and not self-existing entities with 
intrinsic nature. For this reason, companies enter alliances depending on the meaning 
that the dominant actors in the firm (executives and managers) view as the importance of 
these alliances, largely influenced by their characteristics and perceptions.  
 
 
1.1  Broad approach to the study  
 
The significance and contribution of this study is twofold: firstly, to understand strategic 
alliance formations in the tourism industry in Australia with emphasis on the travel 
sector, and Secondly, to understand these formations in terms of company and executive 
characteristics, which only a few studies in strategic alliances have done. One such study 
is that by Tyler and Steensma (1998). This thesis borrows from the Tyler and 
Steensma’s study of technological alliances that uses cognitive orientations of executive 
officers in assessing technological alliances to understand how top executives’ 
behavioural orientations influence their attitudes toward strategic alliances formation in 
the tourism industry in Australia. The kinds of information they attend to when 
individually assessing potential and currently operational alliances their organisations 
are involved in will also be of major concern. The study investigates factors and/or 
elements, which may be considered most relevant in creation and maintenance of 
strategic alliances in the travel sector by taking into account companies and executives 
characteristics.  
 
 
1.2  Research objectives 
 
The research objectives of this study are in four interrelated phases: 
a) To review related literature on strategic alliance formations in the tourism 
industry (and where relevant, in other industries) with a view of identifying 
common alliance formation practices and how they are formed. 
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b) To establish which drivers or motives (both internal and external to the 
organisation) as identified in the literature, influence the formation of 
strategic alliances in the tourism sector of travel in Australia. 
c) To find out the role of company and executive characteristics in strategic 
alliance type selection, choice of alliance partners, and alliance performance 
outcomes in the travel sector. 
d) To establish whether significant relationships exist between strategic alliance 
performance evaluation and choice of strategic alliance partners. 
 
 
1.3  Research question 
 
What are the effects of company and executive characteristics, on strategic alliance 
formation - strategic alliance selection, choice of alliance partners and alliance 
performance evaluation in the Australian travel sector?  
 
 
1.3.1  Subsidiary questions 
 
A number of sub-questions are also addressed:  
a) What are the major motives for strategic alliance formation? 
b) What are the relationships between company and executive characteristics 
with alliance decisions and alliance type selection? 
c) What are the relationships between company and executive characteristics 
and choice of alliance partners?  
d) Are strategic alliances in the travel sector effective? 
e) What are the relationships between company and executive characteristics 
and strategic alliance performance evaluation? 
f) What are the relationships between choice of alliance partners and alliance 
performance evaluation?  
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1.4  Significance of the study 
 
This study’s findings are important for a number of reasons. The study develops and 
tests a unique strategic alliance behavioural model, which may be applicable in other 
countries and industries. In addition, it attempts to broaden the very limited research into 
strategic alliances in the tourism industry. Most researchers have focused more on a 
particular type of strategic alliance, mostly marketing alliances, frequently, 
concentrating on a single sector of the tourism industry. Emphasis in research has been 
on the accommodation and airline sectors. Therefore, this study’s second contribution 
lays in its broad empirical analysis of the travel sector (travel agencies, tour operators 
and wholesalers) of the tourism industry and its relationship with tourism sectors of 
accommodation and transport, taking into account different types of alliances.  
 
In carrying out this research, dominant alliance types in the industry were identified, 
raising issues of industry dynamics and participants’ behaviour. Emphasis is also placed 
on company and executive characteristics. Therefore, the findings of this study can be 
used in a variety of ways; firstly, the importance of alliances in small-to-medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) is brought to the fore. Recently, Chung et al. (2006) have made an 
appeal that time has matured for the research community to examine and ascertain the 
potential of strategic alliances among small firms because alliances can be used to help 
SMEs to overcome the disadvantages stemming from their limited size and scope. They 
observe that this would help small companies to compete with their counterparts, namely 
larger and more equipped firms as well as other small firms that do not participate in 
such alliances. Although this appeal is made in the light of knowledge-based firms, the 
same can be extended to SMEs in the travel sector. This study does just that. It identifies 
structural and behavioural elements, which SMEs could use effectively for 
competitiveness. Secondly, this study can be used as a basis for the preparation of 
executive training manuals/materials and modules with particular emphasis on SMEs. 
After all, 99 per cent of all Australian business fall under this category when the number 
of employees is used as a measure of size (Australia Bureau of Statistics, [ABS], 1997). 
Thirdly, this study can be used as a stepping-stone for further study in relation to the role 
of company and executive characteristics in the field of strategic alliances. Fourthly, 
both graduate and undergraduate students may find the study relevant for academic work 
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related to tourism and cooperative strategies. Lastly, governments (both local, state and 
federal) and other parties involved in the development and promotion of tourism may 
use the findings of this study as additional information regarding how to make the 
industry in Australia more competitive in the global market. 
 
 
1.5  Study organisation 
 
This chapter briefly outlines the focus of this thesis, setting out the research objectives 
and questions, and further sets the parameters of the work to be covered. This study as a 
whole is multidisciplinary. It integrates three broad streams of strategic management 
research areas – Strategic alliances, Upper Echelon perspective to understanding 
strategic decision making, and company characteristics. It further integrates issues by 
looking at three travel sub-sectors, which previous studies have studied in isolation – 
travel agencies, tour operators and wholesalers, and relates them to two broad tourism 
sectors of accommodation and transportation. This study’s contribution to tourism 
studies should be understood from this background. To contribute further to the 
understanding of tourism businesses, this study investigates strategic alliance formation 
and evaluation by reflecting upon SMEs as a unique field of study. This helps to place 
the study in its proper context as 97 per cent of travel businesses could be classified 
under this category (Bolin & Greenwood, 2003). The methodological philosophy 
chosen, further reflected by the exploratory sequential mixed methods approach, 
attempts to make this study as robust as possible. Figure 1.1 shows the organisation of 
the thesis from the first chapter to the last.  
 
Chapter Two is an overview of the tourism literature, with particular emphasis on 
Australia. In this overview, a definition of ‘tourism’ is offered. From this definition, two 
broad arguments in relation to whether tourism is an ‘industry’ or a collection of 
‘industries’ are evaluated. From this debate, the three sub-sectors of travel (travel 
agencies, tour operators and tour wholesalers) are identified as the focus of this study. 
The selection of these sectors is made from the debate of ‘tourism as an industry’ and 
‘tourism as a collection of industries’. These two approaches agree on the central 
tourism ‘sectors’ or ‘industries’. From the definition of tourism, two important concepts 
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central to the scope of this study are defined – ‘tourism characteristic’ and ‘tourism 
connected’ industries. A brief evaluation of transport and accommodation sectors is also 
made. In this chapter, it is further argued that because of the complexity of the tourism 
industry, this study concentrates on ‘tourism characteristic’ industries in the travel 
sector. Reasons are advanced as to why this particular sector has been chosen, such as 
the fact that the travel sector would either cease to exist in its present form, or would be 
significantly affected if tourism were to cease (Bolin & Greenwood, 2003) and its 
centrality to tourism success taking into account the general consensus that tourism 
activity involves three elements – transport, hospitality and activities (Howard & Harris, 
2001). The fact that the use of information technologies does profoundly affect the 
nature and form of this sector is also argued. This chapter further looks at the impact of 
tourism in the Australian economy and concludes with a discussion of travel agencies, 
tour operators and wholesalers.  
 
Chapter Three develops a framework to study strategic alliances in the tourism industry 
from six broad perspectives - drivers [internal and external], alliance types, choice of 
alliance partners, alliance structure, and alliance performance outcomes. This 
framework, based on the work of Evans (2001) forms the basis of this chapter, which 
reviews the literature on strategic alliances. The assumption behind the framework is 
that to understand alliance types and choices of alliance partners, for example, there is a 
need to recognise the drivers influencing organisations to embark on such alliances. 
Furthermore, it assumes that the choices made (both of alliance types and partners) 
influence the type of alliance structures adopted, leading to certain levels of success 
(measured in terms of executives’ assessments). Depending on analysis of alliance 
performance, organisations decide to continue or terminate the alliance, forge new 
alliances, embark on mergers and acquisitions or ‘go it alone’. It is this dynamic 
complexity of collaborative strategic management process, based on feedback analysis, 
which leads to development and growth of the tourism industry. The variables that are 
considered in this framework are wide and varied. It is therefore beyond the scope of this 
work to study all these factors. Only thirteen drivers are studied. In addition, eight 
strategic alliances types are considered. Factors that influence the choice of alliance 
partners are also evaluated. Four types of alliance structures are evaluated in the 
literature review. Strategic alliance evaluation is assessed with a view of finding out 
whether alliances organisations are embedded in help these organisations to achieve the 
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objectives they have set beforehand. This chapter concludes with a discussion on 
strategic alliances in the tourism industry. Using Tremblay’s (1998) framework, various 
possible alliance formations are discussed. 
 
Figure 1.1 Structure of thesis 
 
 
 
Chapter Four develops the theoretical relationships between strategic alliance theory and 
executive, and company characteristics. In this chapter, the premise informing the 
research objectives, question and sub questions is set out. A framework is developed 
where it is argued alliance practices are highly influenced by executive and company 
characteristics. A review of the upper echelon (executive) perspective is conducted 
linking it into strategic alliance formation. Further, review of the company 
characteristics perspective links certain strategic decisions to company profiles. Based 
on these, a theoretical understanding of how these differing factors influence strategic 
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alliances is discussed. The chapter concludes with an identification of a number of 
company characteristics, which are central to this study. 
 
Chapter Five begins with an evaluation of methodologies used in both management and 
tourism research. From this appraisal, pragmatism is identified as a philosophy to guide 
this research process, using mixed methods of data collection. A framework is also 
developed to link the research process to the theories under investigation. This framework 
ensures the structure of the study sits within the relationships between company and 
executive characteristics, and strategic alliances. This chapter also outlines the methods 
used to collect both quantitative and qualitative data together with challenges, which were 
faced by the research when collecting data.  
 
Chapter Six begins with an outline of the statistical tools and qualitative data analysis 
techniques used to analyse data. Survey data are further reduced through factor analysis to 
manageable size to allow for analysis. Relationships within and between travel agencies, 
tour operators and wholesalers are assessed. Further assessment of relationships between 
these three sub-sectors and the transport and accommodation sectors is completed. 
Relationships between company and executive characteristics and alliance factors is 
assessed with a view to answering the six subsidiary questions asked in Chapter One. 
Study results indicate high level of interaction through alliances between the three sub-
sectors. The findings point to the fact that companies enter alliances for a variety of 
reasons and strategic alliances are important for competitiveness. The findings also show 
that both company and executive characteristics influence strategic alliance processes 
though company characteristics were more influential than the latter. Choice of alliance 
partners was found to be influential in managerial assessments of alliance performance.  
 
Chapter Seven presents the conclusions for the study and discusses the wider 
implications of the findings for tourism businesses and future directions in research and 
management practice, SMEs and policy makers. This is argued within a new framework 
that accommodates all the factors under study. In discussing the conclusions, the 
contribution this study makes to strategic alliances literature and practice is assessed. 
Limitations of the study are also discussed. The chapter ends with an assessment of 
avenues for future research and directions relating to strategic alliance practice.
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_________________________________________ 
Chapter Two 
 Review of the literature on tourism 
 
 
2.0  Introduction  
 
This study is conducted in the Australian ‘tourism industry’. This chapter defines 
‘tourism’, and from this definition, the ‘tourism industry’ is conceptualised as a wide 
and complex collection of ‘industries’. Furthermore, the impact of tourism to Australia’s 
economy is assessed. The travel sector (travel agencies, and tour operators and 
wholesalers) is then singled out as the sector on which this study is based. Its impact is 
assessed and two other sectors, those of accommodation and transport, are briefly 
outlined as this study also investigates from the relationships these two latter sectors 
have with that of travel.  
 
 
2.1 Definition of tourism  
 
There is no single definition of tourist that is accepted by the majority of researchers 
interested in tourism (Smith, 1995; Leiper, 2004; Harris & Howard, 1996). Yet it is 
apparent that the definition of tourism depends largely on how a tourist is defined 
(Weaver & Lawton, 2002). The case of Cowan v. Tresor Public as cited by Bill and 
Pepper (2006, p. 266) attempted to define a tourist by arguing that  “whether or not a 
person is a tourist, depends on the general manner of the services received during the 
journey, which is determined at the beginning of the journey.” Hence a tourist is defined 
as a person who travels temporarily away from his/her usual environment (usually 
defined by some distance threshold) for at least one night for certain qualifying purposes 
which include a search for leisure experiences from interactions with features or 
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characteristics of places they choose to visit (Weaver & Lawton, 2002; Leiper, Stear & 
Hing, 2004). 
 
Tourism has therefore been conceptualised from the activities of tourists and institutions 
which seek to give tourists experiences they seek to achieve. Lavery (1989, p. 1) quotes 
Airey’s (1981) definition of tourism as “…the temporary short-term movement of 
people in destinations outside the places where they normally live and work, and their 
activities during the stay at these destinations; it includes movement for all purposes as 
well as day visits or excursions.” Burkart and Medlik (1981) broadened the above 
definition to include various forms of business and vocational travel, which do not lead 
to permanent residence or to employment remuneration from within the destination 
visited.   
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] (1996, p. 136) argues that: 
…tourism is best seen statistically as a ‘demand’ side activity; defined in terms of 
the activities of a particular type of consumer. It involves the purchase or 
consumption by visitors of any commodity. It is therefore not confined to 
particular commodities or to particular economic activities on the ‘supply’ side. It 
could include for example purchases of services from transport and tour operators, 
accommodation establishments, theme parks and attractions, entertainment and 
arts venues, museums and historical sites, cafes and restaurants, casinos, travel 
agents and retailers. Because of this it is not an industry in the traditional sense of 
an industry comprising businesses mainly undertaking a similar economic activity. 
 
The Commonwealth of Australia (2002; 2003; 2003) looks at tourism from the elements 
of tourism described in conventional terms of ‘supply’ and ‘demand.’ ‘Supply’ is seen as 
involving companies, which deliver tourism products and services, including tour 
operators and travel agents, and companies for which tourism is not the main focus of 
business, but a component, such as accommodation, restaurants and cafes. From this 
perspective, whether a product qualifies as a tourist product depends on whether the 
product qualifies for inclusion as a tourist product, depending on the nature of the 
consumer.  
 
From the ‘demand’ perspective, the defining element of tourism is not the type of 
commodity product but the status of the consumer as visitor. Therefore the supply of any 
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product to a person who is a tourist is perceived as a tourist activity, while the supply of 
the same product to a person who is not a tourist is not a tourist activity  (ABS, 1999a; 
2003b). 
 
Weaver and Lawton (2002, p. 3) place tourism in a broader stakeholder context and see 
it as “…the sum of the phenomena and relationships arising from the interaction among 
tourists, the tourism industry, host governments, host communities, origin government, 
universities, community colleges and non-governmental organisations, in the process of 
attracting, transporting, hosting and managing these tourists and other visitors.” Leiper 
(1981) takes an open systems definition of tourism in terms of five elements - a dynamic 
human element; tourists; three geographical elements: generating region, transit route 
and destination region; and an economic element, interacting with the broader 
environment (physical, technological, social, cultural, economic and physical factors). 
He argues that this dynamic element comprises persons undertaking travel which is to 
some extent leisure-based, and which involves a temporary stay from home of at least 
one night.  
 
This thesis takes a broad perspective by placing tourism in the broad and complex 
relationships between tourism and diverse stakeholders. Such a definition is essential not 
only in investigating relationships between diverse travel sector players in the process of 
attracting, transporting, hosting and managing tourists but also in the conceptualisation 
of tourism as an industry.  
 
 
2.2  The tourism industry  
 
The concept ‘tourism industry’ has been a source of debate for many decades. The 
debate has centred on what constitutes the ‘tourist industry’ since it is fragmented. Some 
authors have even argued that to say tourism is an industry is a misconception since it is 
“…an agglomeration of land development and programs designed to meet the needs of 
travellers” and is made up of more than one business sector (Gunn, 1994, p. 6). Leiper 
(2006) identifies three positions among academics which differ regarding whether 
tourism is an industry. The first group is made up of those who reject the idea of any 
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industry directly linked with tourism, the second, who are in the majority argue that 
there is an industry, a very large one, while the third group is catching on and argues that 
there are multiple tourism industries.  
 
The debate and conceptualisation of tourism as an ‘industry’ or collection of ‘industries’ 
is best understood with the argument between Smith (1988; 1991; 1993; 1995; 1998) 
and Leiper (1979; 1990; 1993; 2006). Smith’s supporters include but are not limited to 
Burkart and Medlik, (1981); Lavery (1989); Gunn (1994); Goeldner, Ritchie and 
McIntosh (1995); and Bennett (2000). Their view of tourism as a single industry is 
widely supported by newspapers, magazines, governments, tourism bodies (both 
governmental and non-governmental), and business. Higgins-Desbiolles (2006) observes 
that people are more readily accepting the notion of tourism as an industry following 
years of hearing the term repeatedly. 
 
Smith (1998) sums up the debate between himself (1991; 1993) and Leiper (1993) as 
follows:  
The positions are, in a nutshell: Smith asserts that, while tourism is not a 
conventional industry, it can be defined and measured in a way that is consistent 
with other industries; Leiper counters that tourism is best viewed as a mix of 
industries that have varying involvement in the provision of services to visitors, 
and should not be characterized as a single industry, conventional or otherwise. 
 
Hall and Kearsley (2001, p. 107) argue that the pursuit to define ‘the tourism industry’ 
and its scope is not just a dry academic exercise but has significant implications for how 
tourism’s economic impact is measured, its influence on government, and its 
organisation. They cite Williams and Shaw who noted that: 
…the definition of tourism industry is crucially important. In most countries 
tourism is ‘statistically invisible’ and usually, only the most obvious sectors or 
those exclusively devoted to tourists are enumerated in official tourism data. 
Inevitably, this tends to be the accommodation sector and, perhaps cafés and 
restaurants. Yet the tourism industry is far larger than this. Tourists also spend 
money directly on recreational facilities, tourist attractions, shops and local 
services. In turn, these have indirect effects on agriculture, wholesaling and 
manufacturing, while secondary rounds of spending of tourism create induced 
linkages in the economy. 
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Smith (1988, p. 145) defines tourism as “the aggregate of all businesses that directly 
provide goods and services to facilitate business, pleasure, and leisure activities away 
from the home environment.” Smith (1998, p. 32) argues that the implication of a 
supply-side definition is that “such a definition would be fundamental to any 
consideration of tourism as an industry”. Smith’s attempt is to have the industrial 
definition of the ‘tourism industry’ comparable with all industries by focusing on the 
“supply side” of the definition, paying particular attention to the commodities that 
tourism produces. Hall and Kearsly (2001, p. 107) observe that:  
Three key features emerge in an examination of Smith’s definition which combine 
to provide a conceptualisation and measurement of tourism that is consistent with 
that applied to other industries: 
• The tourism industry is regarded as essentially a service industry 
• The inclusion of business, pleasure, and leisure activities emphasises ‘the 
nature of goods a traveller requires to make the trip more successful’ 
(Smith 1988: 183) 
• The notion of a ‘home environment’, referring to the arbitrary delineation 
of a distance threshold or period of overnight stay. 
 
This supply side approach is related to current attempts by governments to develop 
Tourism Satellite Accounts [TSA] (Hall & Kearsly, 2001), a system developed by the 
UNTWO department of Statistics and Economic Measurement of tourism (Libreros, 
Massieu & Meis, 2006). In adapting TSA, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has 
taken a more practical approach to resolving definitional issues. The ABS is less 
academic in its definitions and conceptualisation of tourism as an ‘industry’. The latest 
version of the Framework for Australian Tourism Statistics (ABS, 2003a) observes that 
the framework provides not only guidelines which encourage consistency and 
compatibility in the collection and publication of tourism statistics in Australia but also a 
‘common language’ for all users and collectors of tourism statistics which, it is hoped, 
will increase the value of the available ABS data by enabling compatibility and 
comparability of results from all tourism statistics collections. In adopting this ‘common 
language’, the ABS refers to tourism as an ‘industry’ but acknowledges the fact that 
while other industries are classified in accordance with the commodity that they 
produce, the ‘tourism industry’ depends on the status of the consumer as visitor. The 
ABS (2003a, paragraph 17) argues that:  
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[t]he supply of any product to a person who is a tourist is a tourism activity, 
while the supply of the same product to a person who is not a tourist is not a 
tourism activity. This is a demand concept in national accounting terms. This 
means that tourism is not an industry in the traditional sense. 
 
The ABS maintains that although tourism is commonly thought of and referred to as an 
industry, it does not fit within the traditional classification of industries in accordance 
with the goods and services that they produce (Bolin & Greenwood, 2003; ABS, 2003b), 
because it embraces a diverse range of providers and users of a variety of goods and 
services, and overlaps with other sectors of the economy. The ABS (2003a; 2003b) also 
refers to various tourism suppliers as ‘industries’. Though practical, the ‘common 
language’ that the ABS has adopted is problematical because it refers to tourism as an 
‘industry’, made up of different ‘industries’. Logically it falls short of common sense but 
it is probably the best practical ‘common language’ that could be able to explain the 
level to which tourism is difficult to deal with. This classification may in the end leads to 
problems in aggregating the contribution of different industries (tourism included) to 
Australia’s economic development. Despite these logical problems, this thesis adopts the 
ABS definition of tourism since it enables usage of ABS data and the long run problems 
do not affect the nature of this study. 
 
The ABS (2003b) further developed the concept of ‘tourism related’ industries. These 
industries are defined as those industries whose products are strongly associated with 
tourism and are classified into ‘tourism characteristic’1 industries (at least 25 per cent of 
output is purchased by visitors) and ‘tourism-connected’2
 
 industries (less than 25 per 
cent of its output is purchased by visitors, but a significant proportion of output is 
consumed by locals).  
Tourism-characteristic industries have been listed to include travel agency and tour 
operators, taxi transport, air and water transport, motor vehicle hiring, accommodation, 
and cafes, restaurant and takeaway food outlets. Tourism connected industries include 
                                                 
1 Those industries that would either cease to exist in their present form, or would be significantly affected 
if tourism were to cease. For an industry to be classified as ‘characteristic’, at least 25 per cent of its 
output must be consumed by visitors  (ABS, 2003b,  p. 5) 
2 Those industries other than those classified as ‘tourism characteristic’ for which a tourism related 
product is directly identifiable, and where the products are consumed by visitors in volumes which are 
significant for the visitor and/or the producer (ABS, 2003b, p. 5). 
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clubs and pubs, food manufacturing, automotive fuel retailing, casinos and other 
gambling services, libraries, museums and arts, and education (ABS, 2003b; 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, pp. 4-5).  
 
The ABS (2003b) further notes that there are a number of significant-tourism sectors 
such as attractions and meetings and incentives, conventions and exhibitions which do 
not neatly fall into the above definitions but consume products from a number of tourism 
related industries, together with many other businesses which may derive a smaller, but 
nonetheless significant, component of their returns from visitors or visitor activities. All 
of those businesses form part of the wider ‘tourism industry.’ From this perspective, the 
Australian tourism industry is therefore made up of the following sectors: 
accommodation, travel and tour operators, national, regional and local tourism bodies, 
attractions, casinos and gaming, manufacturing, business travel, eating and drinking 
establishments, and education. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the total number of tourism businesses in Australia in 1998. Of the 
353473 total tourism related businesses, only 17 per cent of them are tourism 
characteristic industries. This table also shows that the majority of businesses in tourism 
are SMEs, accounting for 91 per cent of the total tourism related businesses. What this 
means is that any research on these businesses must take into account firstly, the fact that 
they are SMEs behaving differently from large companies. Secondly, there is a great 
deal of interdependence between sectors, for instance, unavailability of transport to bring 
people to a destination means that other service can not function, and inadequate 
accommodation and food services or tour operators means that other sectors i.e. 
transport will wither. For this reason, the definition of tourism should take into 
consideration the various groups, composite of activities, services, and industries that 
deliver a travel experience; transportation, accommodation, eating and drinking 
establishments, shops, entertainment, activity facilities, attractions (both natural, man-
made and socio-cultural), the tourist, the government of the host community and the host 
community, and other hospitality that participate in and are affected by the tourism 
industry, and the relationships arising from their interaction in the process of attracting 
and hosting tourists and other visitors.  
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Table 2.1: Number of businesses by industry classification and business size in 
Australia, 19983
ANZSIC industry a 
 
Micro 
businessb  
Small 
Businessc 
Medium to 
large 
businessesd 
Total 
businesses 
Micro and 
Small 
businesses 
as a 
percentage 
of total 
Proportion 
of total 
tourism 
related 
businesses 
(per cent) 
Tourism Characteristic industries 
Travel agency and tour 
operator services 
3968 1226 152 5346 97 2 
Taxis transport 2040 377 55 2472 98 1 
Air and water transport 1421 510 237 2168 89 1 
Motor vehicle hiring 732 207 51 990 95 0 
Accommodation 5478 2850 830 9158 91 3 
Cafes and restaurants 10501 9271 1721 21493 92 6 
Takeaway food retailing 11528 5135 1764 18427 90 5 
Total tourism 
characteristic industries 
35668 19576 4810 60054 92 17 
Tourism connected industries 
Clubs, pubs, taverns and 
bars 
3289 4686 2043 10018 80 3 
Other road transport 22805 4160 918 27883 97 8 
Rail transport 1310 286 210 1806 88 1 
Food and beverage 
manufacturing 
1813 1837 1411 5061 72 1 
Transport equipment and 
other manufacturing 
31686 19075 7551 58 312 87 16 
Automotive fuel retailing 3936 3866 208 8010 97 2 
Other retail trade 90390 36548 5218 132156 96 37 
Casinos and other 
gambling services 
1862 790 57 2 709 98 1 
Libraries, museums & arts 4198 1130 387 5715 93 2 
Other entertainment 
services 
10606 3541 1327 15474 91 4 
Education 9620 6878 5912 22410 74 6 
Ownership of dwellings 3417 337 111 3865 97 1 
Total tourism connected  184932 83134 25353 293419 91 83 
Total tourism related 220600 102710 30163 353473 91 100 
a. Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification. 
b. Micro businesses are businesses employing four or less persons. 
c. Small businesses are businesses employing between 5 and 19 persons. 
d. Medium to large businesses are businesses employing 20 or more persons. 
Source: Bolin and Greenwood (2003, p. 5).  
 
It is from this classification that the total number of tourism related businesses has been 
calculated. However, what is not clear is whether the contribution of tourism to 
Australia’s economic development is solely calculated from these industries, or whether 
the multiplier effect (to be discussed in the next section) is taken into account. If 
                                                 
3 There are no recently compiled figures to show this classification. 
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multiplier effect has been taken into account then the formula on which the figures on 
the economic contribution of tourism have not been fully explained.  
 
 
2.3  The impact of tourism in Australia 
 
Tourism has been recognised as an engine of growth for many countries (Sharpley, 
2002; Vanegas & Croes, 2003). Proponents of this school of thought claim that tourism 
provides much-needed foreign exchange, creates jobs and generates government revenue 
(Vanegas & Croes, 2003). Tourism has played a major role in Australia’s economic 
development. Both inbound and domestic tourism have contributed significantly to the 
national and regional economies. However, measuring the impact of tourism on the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and economic growth is problematical because of 
leakages and the difficulty of estimating the multiplier4 (Ayres, 2000), and the fact that 
tourism statistics are estimates subject to several errors and produced with differing 
levels of accuracy (Lundberg, Krishnamoorthy & Stavenga, 1995). Lundberg et al. 
(1995) also argue that tourism statistics are further fraught with problems of definition 
because tourism is a composite industry made up of several other industries. 
Notwithstanding these problems, Ayres argues that estimates from planning and 
statistics bureaus can still be used to indicate the impact of tourism in an economy. 
Briefly, since 1997/89, the ABS has published annual Australian Tourism Satellite 
Account (ATSA)5
 
, which contain estimate of tourism’s direct economic contribution to 
the national economy.  
Table 2.2 provides a summary of figures showing the total contribution of tourism from 
1997/98 to 2001/02. Tourism accounted for nearly $32.5 billion of total GDP6
                                                 
4 The ‘multiplier effect’ is concerned with the process in which expenditure on tourism filters throughout 
the economy, stimulating other sectors as it does and can be regarded as “a coefficient which expresses the 
amount of income generated in an area by an additional unit of tourist spending. …It is the ratio of direct 
and secondary changes to the initial change itself” (Hall, 2003, p. 236). 
 of $891.5 
billion in 2004-05. This represents a 3.7 per cent share of GDP and is the lowest share of 
GDP since the ATSA was first compiled in 1997-98.  The tourism industry share of total 
5 TSA is part of a worldwide effort by national statistics organisations to quantify tourism’s contribution to 
the national economy.  
6 ABS (April 2006, p. 3) notes that “tourism GDP represents the total market value of Australian produced 
goods and services consumed by visitors after deducing the cost of goods and services used in the process 
of production.” 
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industry Gross Value Added7
 
 (GVA) declined from 4.5 per cent in 1997-98 to 3.9 per 
cent, representing the lowest share since the ATSA was first compiled.  
Table 2.2: Tourism industry share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
 
 
Direct contribution 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Tourism gross value 
added at basic prices 
($m) 
 
 
21 894 
 
 
23 054 
 
 
23 994 
 
 
25 044 
 
 
25 250 
 
 
25 939 
 
 
26 016 
 
 
26 479 
plus Net taxes on 
tourism products ($m) 
 
3 048 
 
3 213 
 
3 321 
 
5 817 
 
5 637 
 
6 041 
 
5 935 
 
6 083 
equals tourism GDP 
($m) 
 
24 942 
 
26 267 
 
27 316 
 
30 861 
 
30 887 
 
31 980 
 
31 952 
 
32 562 
Gross domestic product 
($m) 
 
577 422 
 
607 863 
 
645 153 
 
689 340 
 
735 783 
 
782 798 
 
838 251 
 
891 524 
Tourism share of gross 
value added a (%) 
 
4.1 
 
4.1 
 
4.0 
 
4.0 
 
3.8 
 
3.6 
 
3.4 
 
3.2 
Tourism share of gross 
domestic productb (%) 
 
4.3 
 
4.3 
 
4.2 
 
4.5 
 
4.2 
 
4.1 
 
3.8 
 
3.7 
a. Only the direct tourism shares are included here. For an activity to be included as tourism, there must be a direct 
relationship between the visitor and the producer of the good or service. 
b. Percentage change on preceding year. 
Source: ABS (April 2006, p. 10). 
 
 
 
 
2.3.1  The inbound tourist market 
 
The number of international tourists visiting Australia has risen rapidly in the past thirty 
years (Hall, 2003, p. 86). The major area of significant growth for short-term arrivals has 
been New Zealand, Japan, the UK and North America. Table 2.4 shows the major 
Australian tourism market between 1995 and 2004. Combined, Asia (China, Japan, 
Singapore, South Korea and other Asian countries) remains the largest major Australian 
tourism market, accounting for 40.7 per cent of international tourist arrivals in 2004. 
These figures also show that international tourism arrivals have increased from 3,726 
million in 1995 to 5,215 million in 2004. Hall, (2003) argues that although still 
significant, the ‘traditional’ markets of New Zealand, UK and Ireland, Europe, and the 
USA are declining in relative importance as Australia becomes more closely integrated 
with the economies of the Pacific Rim.  
 
                                                 
7 The DVA is calculated as the value of output at basic prices minus the value of intermediate 
consumption at purchasers’ prices. 
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Faulkner and Walmsley (1998) argue that the growing significance of inbound tourism 
in the Australian economy is a corollary of a combination of factors operating at the 
global, regional (Asia-Pacific), and local levels. At the global level, they argue that there 
has been widespread and sustained economic growth particularly in North America, 
Western Europe and East Asia, which has resulted in increasing levels of affluence and 
thus an increasing interest in, and the ability to undertake travel. They further argue that 
this growth has been accompanied by general improvement in conditions of 
employment, with such benefits as paid annual leave, incentive travel packages, and 
generous retirement conditions. According to Faulkner and Walmsley, innovations in 
transport and communication technology, and advances in information technology such 
as computerised reservation systems (CRS) have made it easier for overseas travel 
itineraries to be organised.   
 
At a regional level, Faulkner and Walmsley see Australia’s geographical proximity to 
emerging markets (South Asia and East Asia-Pacific regions which have experienced 
very strong growth in tourism since 1950) as an important contributing factor to the 
country’s spectacular growth in international visitor arrivals (see Table 2.4). Faulkner 
and Walmsley (1998, p. 94) also maintain that there are several local factors which have 
made it possible for Australia to take advantage of relative proximity to “the 
bourgeoning Asian market.” These include Australia’s move in expanding tourism 
infrastructure and upgrading services to internationally competitive standards - making 
Australia gain a competitive edge over many of her Asia-Pacific neighbours, 
depreciation of the Australian dollar against major currencies - making the Australian 
tourism products cheaper in world markets, aggressive marketing, and ‘hallmark’ events 
(i.e. the 2000 Olympic Games).  
 
 
2.3.2  Domestic tourism 
 
The domestic tourism market in Australia is the main driver of growth for the industry, 
accounting for at least 75 per cent of the total tourism sector in terms of visitor nights 
and contribution to GDP (Fairweather, 2002, p. 15; Department of Industry Tourism and 
Resources, 2003, p. 2). Australia’s domestic tourism market consists of two main 
segments, namely overnight travel, which accounts for 75 per cent of the domestic 
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tourism market and day travel (Fairweather, 2002, p. 15). Table 2.3 shows the total 
inbound and domestic economic value based on ABS ATSA consumption estimates. 
This table shows that the main driver of growth for the industry is domestic tourism, 
contributing $56.5 billion compared to $17.7 billion of inbound tourism in 2004. The 
Tourism Forecasting Committee [TFC] (2005, p. 66) observes that there are  varying 
economic and social factors driving the downward trend in domestic activity and, 
subsequently, economic value and the recent and forecast strong growth in outbound 
travel. These factors include but are not limited to: actual and anticipated interest rate 
rises; asset price bubbles; increases in household savings; changes to the labour market; 
busier lifestyles; competition from other goods and services and tourism’s declining 
share of ‘wallet’; increasing fuel costs; solid growth in Australian inbound tourism; 
continued strong demand for outbound travel; and recent strength of the VFR market.  
 
     Table 2.3: Total inbound and domestic economic value 
Year TIEVa 
Realc 
$b 
TIEVa 
Change per 
cent 
TDEVb 
Realc 
$b 
TDEVb 
Change 
per cent 
Total 
realc 
per cent 
Total 
change 
$b 
1998 - - 56.5 - - - 
1999 16.8 - 58.8 4.2 75.6 - 
2000 18.2 8.5 60.6 3.1 78.9 4.3 
2001 19.0 4.2 59.7 1.5 78.7 0.2 
2002 18.6 2.1 59.4 0.6 78.0 0.9 
2003 17.1 8.3 57.0 3.9 74.1 5.0 
2004 17.7 3.6 56.5 1.0 74.1 0.1 
2005 18.4 4.3 55.5 1.8 73.9 0.4 
2006 19.4 5.5 56.5 2.0 76.0 2.8 
2007 20.6 6.2 57.7 2.0 78.3 3.1 
2008 21.8 5.5 58.6 1.6 80.3 2.6 
2009 23.0 5.6 59.4 1.5 82.4 2.6 
2010 24.4 6.3 60.5 1.8 85.0 3.1 
2011 26.1 6.7 61.0 0.7 87.0 2.5 
2012 27.9 6.8 61.6 1.0 89.5 2.8 
2013 29.9 7.3 62.0 0.6 91.8 2.7 
2014 32.2 7.9 62.3 0.6 94.6 3.0 
 Growth in economic value ($b) 
00 -0.6  -4.2  -4.7  
05 4.6  4.0  8.5  
10 7.8  1.8  9.6  
 Growth in economic value (per cent) 
00 -3.1  6.9  -6.0  
05 23.3  3.7  8.4  
10 31.9  3.0  11.3  
 Average annual growth (per cent), 2005 to 2014 
 6.4  1.3  2.8  
Numbers in bold are forecasts 
aTotal inbound economic value: based on ABS ATSA consumption estimates 
bTotal domestic economic value: based on ABS ATSA consumption estimates 
cconstant dollars, inflation adjusted 
         Source: TFC (2005, p. 80). 
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    Table 2.4: International tourist arrivals 1995-2004 
 
 
 
New 
Zealand Japan UK USA Singapore China 
South 
Korea 
Other 
Asia 
Other 
Europe 
Rest of the 
World 
TOTAL 
‘000 
% 
Annual 
Change 
             
1995 538 783 348 305 202 43 168 676 404 259 3726  
1996 672 813 368 317 223 54 228 772 431 287 4165 11.82 
1997 686 814 411 330 239 66 234 775 464 299 4318 3.72 
1998 709 751 468 374 247 77 67 647 483 344 4167 -3.52 
1999 729 707 528 417 267 93 109 691 543 375 4459 7.02 
2000 817 721 580 488 286 120 157 735 614 413 4931 10.62 
2001 815 674 617 446 296 158 176 713 563 398 4856 -1.52 
2002 790 715 643 434 287 190 190 696 539 357 4841 -0.32 
2003 839 628 673 422 253 176 207 653 539 355 4745 3.6 
2004 1033 710 676 433 251 251 212 699 568 382 5215 9.92 
2005 1110 689 717 456 274 286 250 751 603 412 5548 6.42 
2006 1140 720 749 485 283 335 271 800 632 445 5860 5.62 
2007 1171 737 779 515 293 401 294 852 672 475 6189 5.62 
             
Number in bold are forecasts 
Other Asia includes all Asian countries except Japan, Singapore, China, and South Korea. 
Other Europe includes all European countries except the UK. 
Rest of World comprises countries not included in the above two groups and not individually listed in the table. 
 
Source: TFC (2005, pp. 10-11). 
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2.4 The travel sector  
 
Due to the definitional complexity of the tourism industries as discussed above, this study 
centres on the ‘tourism characteristic’ sector of travel (travel agency, tour wholesalers and 
tour operator services). These are organisations with business strategies for tourism (Leiper 
et al. 2004) and are central to tourism. This discussion further links these three sub-sectors 
to the other two ‘tourism characteristic’ industries or sectors of accommodation and 
transport. The discussion on this section concludes by arguing that for these sectors, and 
indeed the whole tourism industry in Australia to be more competitive, there is need for 
more cooperation, collaboration and networking, which in practice has taken many forms 
including formation of strategic alliances. The choice for these industries has been 
influenced by various considerations, which include the fact, that: 
a) These industries would either cease to exist in their present form, or would be 
significantly affected if tourism were to cease (Bolin & Greenwood, 2003). The TSA as 
developed by the ABS in 2000 lists these industries as having at least 25 per cent of 
their output being consumed by visitors (ABS, 2000). 
b) Travel agency and tour operator services are central to tourism given their role as 
intermediaries located on the consumer product interface. They influence the 
development of tourism systems with the destination region (Weaver & Lawton, 2002). 
Tour operators (wholesalers) provide a package of services for the consumer, including 
some combination of accommodation, transportation, restaurants, attraction visits which 
are then sold directly to customers, indirectly through other intermediaries like travel 
agents, or both (Weaver & Lawton, 2002; Hall, 2003). Travel agents (retailers) sales 
provide retail services to customers for commission on behalf of various tourism 
principals. Weaver and Lawton (2002) also argue that travel agents’ other important role 
in shaping tourist systems is through providing undecided consumers with information 
and advice about prospective destinations while on the other hand consolidating, 
wholesale or ‘net’ airfares at less than the published price to a retailer who will then 
resell them to the end consumer. 
c) It has been argued that tourism would not exist to the extent that it does today if it were 
not for people able to travel with relative speed and efficiency, either from the 
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generating destination to the host destination and return, between host destination, with 
host destination or both (French, Craig-Smith & Collier, 2000). 
d) Travel agencies serve as key facilitators for travellers and travel services suppliers and 
are seen as the gateway for many services offered to travellers by airlines, hotels, tour 
packagers, cruises and excursions (Heung & Chu, 2000, p. 52). However, Lewis, 
Semeijn and Talalayevsky (1998) maintain that the role of travel agents as information 
brokers, passing information between buyers and suppliers of travel products, and 
processing  transaction by printing tickets or forwarding money has been profoundly 
affected by information technology which has revolutionised communication and 
information channels between enterprises and consumers (Buhalis, 2000a; Wilson, 
2000). The competitiveness of travel agencies in the face of challenges by information 
technology depends on these agencies’ abilities “to capture the market’s loyalty, ensure 
access to travel information while providing value-added services and develop winning 
product strategies supported by information technology” (Lewis et al., 1998, p. 25). 
These strategies depend on the extent of partnerships between information coordination 
intermediaries such as wholesalers and travel agents, tourism organisations, airlines and 
other tourism suppliers. Therefore, strategic alliances could be a way of enhancing this 
coordination. 
e) Hospitality, transport and organised tours constituted 55 per cent of all international 
visitor expenditure in Australia in 1999 (BTR, 2001). BTR figures show that these 
sectors accounted for 50 per cent ($31117 million out of $62538 million) of all 
expenditure by both international visitors, overnight and day visitors in 2002 (BTR, 
2002a; 2002b), and it is also obvious that all other expenditures by international visitors 
e.g. on shopping, entertainment and gambling, education fees and others depended 
largely on the availability of transport and effective use of travel agencies and tour 
operators. 
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2.4.1  The role of tour operators, wholesalers and travel agents 
 
Travel agents, tour operators and wholesalers are distinct sectors of tourism (King and 
Hyde, 1989, p. 41). The terms “tour operator” and “wholesaler” are often used 
interchangeably. However, Howard and Harris (2001) argue that in tourism industry jargon, 
the two denote different types of businesses.  
 
Tour wholesalers 
 
A tour wholesaler is defined as a firm that purchases travel and tourism services in bulk and 
combines two or more of these services into a ‘package of travel’, often called a tour for 
sale through travel agencies or direct to consumers (King & Hyde, 1989; Howard & Harris, 
2001). These services include airline seats, car rental, hotel rooms, sight seeing tours etc. 
Tour wholesalers play a prominent role in the tourism industry by developing package tours, 
which normally include viable destinations and combinations of attractions, accommodation 
and transport (Dickman 1989, p. 144). They have a responsibility of ‘selecting’ and 
‘combining’ services in a manner that would appeal to a target market. Packages provided 
by these tour wholesalers therefore vary considerably depending on the number and nature 
of ingredients included. Howard and Harris (2001, p. 359) argue that by providing ‘ready 
made’ travel and tourism packages “tour wholesalers make it easier for individuals, or 
groups, to travel to and experience other areas or countries.” They also secure substantial 
price discounts by buying in bulk from different service providers and then design a 
brochure to promote the package and distribute it for sale either through travel agencies or 
to consumers. 
 
Tour wholesalers do not usually own the services they package. However, evidence exists to 
the effect that some companies employ their own tour escorts or managers rather than 
purchasing these services from specialist companies or individuals (Howard & Harris, 
2001). Through forward integration, some airlines, particularly QANTAS, Jetstar and the 
now defunct Ansett operated wholesaling and travel agents divisions as a way of increasing 
the sales of their seats (King & Hyde, 1989; Howard & Harris, 2001). For example, 
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QANTAS runs its wholesaling division QANTAS Holidays while Ansett used to own 
Traveland, one of Australia’s biggest travel agents chains. In Australia tour operators such 
as Jetset, Thomas Cook and Express also act as travel agents, prepared to book their own or 
other tours for a customer. Traditionally they have been classified as domestic, inbound and 
outbound tour operators.   
 
 
Tour operators 
 
A tour operator is a “company or individual that provides tours within a particular 
destination area. These tours can range from simple sightseeing journeys (e.g. harbour 
cruises) to extensive journeys of many weeks” (Harris & Howard, 1996, p. 153).  
 
There are two broad types of tour operators, namely Local tour operators and Inbound tour 
operators. Local tour operators are tour operators that conduct tours within a particular 
destination and are located primarily in a traveller’s or tourist’s destination region. Howard 
and Harris (2001) argue that these operators’ services might also be used while en route to 
these areas by inbound tourists. Howard and Harris (2001, p. 361) further observe that while 
most local tour operators sell directly to consumers as well as through travel agents, many 
of them also “seek to have their services incorporated into the packages out together by tour 
wholesalers and inbound tour operators. In acting this way they are able to greatly increase 
their ability to sell their services to interstate and overseas travellers.”  
 
Inbound tour operators are organisations, which arrange and oversee tour packages bought 
by inbound tourists to Australia. They do not only put together packages of services for use 
in a destination area by overseas travellers but also coordinate travel arrangements in 
Australia for overseas wholesale tour operators and retail travel agents. Their services 
include planning an itinerary in Australia, operating the tour, costing the tour components - 
including transfer, accommodation, sight-seeing, domestic transport, airport transfers, 
entertainment and meals (Stirling, 1993). Howard and Harris (2001) observe that service 
packages developed by Inbound tour operators in Australia are not sold directly to overseas 
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travellers but are purchased by tour wholesalers, travel agents and incentive houses located 
in the traveller’s home country who in tern would incorporate the packages into their own 
product offerings which they would then sell directly or via travel agencies, to consumers.  
 
 
Travel agents 
 
Travel agencies are intermediaries between principals (airlines, coach companies, hotel, 
vehicle, rental firm, tour wholesalers and cruise lines) and consumers (tourists). Travel 
agents evolved from pioneer travel agents such as Stewart Moffat Travel in Melbourne and 
World Travel Headquarters in Sydney in the 1950s even though there were a handful of 
agencies set up just to handle travel much earlier (Richardson, 1999). These pioneers were 
both wholesalers, retailers and inbound operators at the same time, and “…as time went on 
and markets became bigger, specialists developed either as separate companies or as 
subsidiaries or divisions of large ones” (Richardson, 1999, p. 252). Travel agents became 
more important when air travel increased popularity. Airlines viewed the use of travel 
agencies as a cheap and effective method of widening their distribution network in order to 
reach new and expanding markets (Vasudavan & Standing, 1999, p. 214). Furthermore, as 
more people travelled greater distances it became essential to have someone who knew 
about overseas destinations and regulations which became important to the overseas 
traveller (Dickman, 1989, p. 140). This led to the use of travel agents as brokers between 
tourism industry operators (principals) and consumers. Howard and Harris (2001, p. 24-26) 
argue that travel agencies in Australia can be grouped into four types, namely independent 
travel agencies, corporate chains, franchise agencies, and corporate buying groups.  
 
Travel agents act not only to assist principals to distribute their services to those people who 
wish to purchase them (Howard & Harris, 2001), but also provide information, promotion 
and booking service to the market place (Stirling, 1993) in return for a commission “which 
is generally expressed as a percentage of the sale price of the travel product” (Howard & 
Harris, 2001, p. 18). They also offer their clients a range of consulting services, including 
advice on travel services to purchase, and assisting clients in organising their trips. French et 
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al. (2000, p. 75) see agents as assuming a dual role. The first role being contractual between 
the agent and the principal8 and the second being responsibility to the client in offering a 
service9
 
.  
Leiper  (2003) sees travel agents as performing a number of responsibilities to their clients: 
motivating sales prospects, informing consumers, making and confirming reservations, 
selling, planning clients’ trips, organising clients’ trips and supporting the management of 
clients’ trips; and principals: representing principals, selling and other promotional roles for 
principals, collecting information on booking, providing financial services and gathering 
market data. They also play an important intermediary role in the Australian tourism 
system. Given this duality of roles, Howard and Harris (2001, p. 18) argue that travel 
agencies are best defined as intermediary firms that derive financial gain (in the form of 
commission) by linking suppliers of tourism services with consumers through the provision 
of reservation, ticketing and other services. 
 
 
2.4.2  Contribution of the sector 
 
The most recently published figures relating to travel agency services sector (ABS, 1998) 
show that there were 3 266 businesses in the travel agency services industry of which 2 842 
(87 per cent) were engaged primarily in the retailing of travel products in Australia. The 
remaining 424 businesses (13 per cent) were shared between wholesalers (158), ticket 
                                                 
8  French et al. (2000, p. 75) summarises these responsibilities as providing for the principal a location where 
the potential consumer may acquire information on the product(s) or service(s) being offered by the principal; 
a location where the consumer can purchase the services or products of the principal and a revenue collecting 
service. 
9 French et al. (2000, p. 75) summarises these responsibilities as providing for the client a location where the 
potential tourist may seek information on various travel options; advice on the various options available; 
quotations for individualized itineraries and programmes; a booking or reservation system for various aspects 
of the tourism product such as transport, accommodation, excursions and attractions, transfers and insurance; 
advice and help in procuring the necessary travel documents, visas, health and vaccination requirements; an 
implied undertaking that any advice given to, or action taken on behalf of, the client will be given or 
undertaken with due skills and care, that is, without negligence; and an itinerary planning service, particularly 
to FITs, special-interest groups, conference groups, incentive groups and corporate accounts. 
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consolidators (16), tour operators (170) and tourist bureaus (80).10 Of the 2,842 distributors, 
2,393 (84 per cent) were specialising in the leisure market, compared to 325 in the corporate 
sector, 50 in the conference sector and 74 general sales agents.11
 
 Most of these businesses 
were SMEs employing less than 20 persons (97 per cent), and 55 per cent of all the 
businesses were by working proprietors and partners.  
Table 2.5: Size and contribution of the travel sector in Australia 
 Value 
Businesses at end June 1997 (no.)  3 266 
  
Employment at end June 1997  
Full-time (no.)  19 502 
Part-time (no.)  4 949 
Total (no.)  24 451 
  
Income from ticket sales ($m)  1 570.8 
Other travel income ($m)  194.5 
Other income ($m)  214.2 
Total income ($m)  1 979.5 
  
Labour costs ($m)  647.9 
Rent, leasing and hiring expenses ($m)  126.6 
Other expenses ($m) 1 158.6 
Total expenses ($m)  1 935.6 
  
Operating profit before tax ($m)  37.3 
Operating profit margin (%) 2.0 
Industry gross product ($m)  750.6 
Source: (ABS, 1998) 
 
Table 2.5 shows the total number of businesses, total employment, of which 80 per cent are 
full-time, and total industry income of $1 979.5 million, 79 per cent of which came from 
ticket sales. The table also shows total industry expenses of $1 135.6 million, leaving an 
operating profit before tax of $37.3 million. Retail travel agencies sold $8 503 billion worth 
of travel products of which 62 per cent were international travel sales. The 3 266 businesses 
in the travel agency services sector also generated total income of $1 979.5 million of which 
65 per cent was mainly in commissions on tickets. According to ABS (1998), retail travel 
                                                 
10  Subject to sampling variability because the figure was found to be too high for most practical purposes. 
11 ABS (1998, p. 19) observe that “these are businesses that have an exclusive license to sell another travel 
provider’s product. For example a GSA might have the license to sell tickets on behalf of an international 
airline. These businesses are considered to carry out retail activities.” 
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agency businesses accounted for $787 million of these commissions and sales while 
wholesale/ticket consolidators accounted for $341 and inbound tour operators $149 millions 
each respectively. With total expenses of $1 936 million, the sector recorded an operating 
profit before tax of $37 million for the 1996-97 financial year, which represented an 
operating profit margin of 2 per cent. The ABS (April 2006) ATSA shows that travel 
agency and tour operators services contribution to total tourism GVA has decreased from 
$835 million (3.81 per cent) in 1997-98 to 961 (3.63 per cent) in 2004-05. 
 
The above observations show the significance and centrality of the travel sector to tourism 
in Australia. These businesses play a very important role in providing services to tourists, at 
the same time contributing significantly to the Australian economy. This section further 
provides sufficient information as to why the sector was identified as the focus of this thesis. 
Better organisational and cooperative arrangements should be identified if this sector is to 
develop further.  
 
 
2.5 Scope of the research 
 
The objectives of this study are to establish motives that influence the formation of strategic 
alliances in the tourism industry and to find out the role of company and executive 
characteristics in strategic alliance type selection, choice of alliance partners, and alliance 
performance outcomes. Since the tourism industry is ‘wide’ and ‘complex’, the travel sector 
has been identified as an area where such an investigation is to be conducted. Reasons for 
such a choice have been advanced. This investigation is also done in relation to the tourism 
sectors of travel and transportation. It is important to note that the two tourism sectors of 
accommodation and transport are only investigated from the perspective of travel agents, 
tour operators and wholesalers with a view to understand the extent to which these sectors 
are integrated through alliances.  
 
Travel agents, tour operators and wholesalers are all intermediaries and part of the tourism 
distribution channel (Richardson, 1996) and their development is intractably linked to other 
 34 
travel and tourism industry players such as transportation, accommodation and attraction 
sectors. Howard and Harris (2001, p. 4) argue that as people travel they create a demand for 
service that will assist them in moving between places and provide for their needs once they 
have arrived. Such a demand is met by the travel, transportation and accommodation sectors 
besides others. 
 
The accommodation sector in Australia has enormous variety in terms of the types of 
accommodation available, facilities offered and standard of service provided (French et al., 
2000). These facilities include hotels, motels, resorts, apartments and units, guest house, 
caravan parks, hostels, bed and breakfast, accommodation on various transport modes such 
as houseboats, trains and cruise ships, and accommodation by non-profit making 
organisations like scouts, church properties, ski club lodges, trade union holiday camps and 
corporate training centres (Commonwealth of Australia, 1996, pp. 85-91). For the purpose 
of this study, accommodation businesses refers to those organisations as classified by the 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC). These 
organisations are hotels, resorts, motels and guesthouses, self-catering accommodation, and 
caravan parks.  
 
Transport is a fundamental element of all economies, connecting businesses to markets and 
to supplies of inputs. Transport has been defined by ABS (1999b) as the movement of 
goods or persons from an origin to a destination (excluding electronic transfer of data such 
as on the Internet). The importance of the transport sector to the tourism industry is that it 
links home, destination, accommodation, attraction and all other locales of tourism. Gee and 
Fayos-Solá (1997, p. 45) underscore the significance of this sector by referring to a direct 
relationship that exists between advances in transportation and growth in the tourism 
industry, such that transport’s efficiency, comfort and safety determine, to a large extent, the 
quality of the tourism experience. Transport services for passengers cover a very broad 
industry included under industry classifications 4621 – 4623, 4820, 4900 and 5010 of 
ANZSIC (Australian Bureau of Statistics/Statistics New Zealand, 2006).  It would be very 
difficult for a study of this nature to cover all the modes of transport for passengers. The few 
that were included in the survey were airlines, cruise, coach or bus transport, taxi services, 
 35 
and rental services of passenger cars. These were included because of their possible linkage 
with the tour operators, wholesalers and travel agents. 
 
Since the focus is on strategic alliances in the travel sector, respondents from the three sub-
sectors of travel (travel agencies, tour operators and wholesalers) were asked to indicate the 
level to which their businesses were involved in strategic alliances with accommodation and 
transport organisations.   
 
 
2.6  Chapter conclusions 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the tourism literature and the contribution tourism 
makes to the Australian economy. The latter part of the chapter discussed briefly the three 
sub-sectors of tourism, which are at the centre of this study – travel agencies, tour operators 
and wholesalers, and briefly accommodation and transport sectors. The discussion focused 
on these sectors as though they are distinct and independent of one another. In reality, these 
are integrated sectors which are increasingly moving away from adversarial models of 
operation, discovering the power of collaboration (Telfer, 2001). One form of collaboration 
between tourism businesses is strategic alliances (Go & Hedges, 1994; Chen & Tseng, 
2005). Literature on strategic alliances is reviewed in the next chapter.  
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____________________________________________ 
Chapter Three 
Review of the literature on strategic alliances 
 
 
 
3.0.  Definitions of strategic alliances  
 
Strategic alliances have become one of the most important organisational forms in modern 
society and they are well-known tools available to, and used by, multinational business 
managers (Mockler, 2001), as well as organisations competing in domestic markets 
(Morrison, 1994). Strategic alliances have been used by organisations of all sizes – large 
and small (Golden & Dollinger, 1993; Etemad, Wright & Dana, 2001) and are of 
considerable interest to both industry practitioners and academics (Clarke-Hill et al., 1998; 
Zeng & Chen, 2003). With the increase of strategic alliances in number and variety, many 
scholars from different fields have sought not only to define and identify explanations for 
the phenomenon but also to find ways organisations might better manage these collaborative 
arrangements. The result has been a diversity of definitions and disagreements about which 
forms of inter-organisational cooperative arrangements can be said to constitute strategic 
alliances.  
 
Consensus on what strategic alliances are and what forms they take is far from being 
achievable. However, common themes emerging from these definitions are that  strategic 
alliances are a variety of purposive inter-organisational relationships between two or more 
organisations (Howarth, Gillin & Bailey, 1995; Faulkner, 1995) that share compatible goals, 
strive for mutual benefits, and acknowledge a high level of mutual dependence (Kale, Singh 
& Perlmutter, 2000; Mohr & Spekman, 1994). According to Tyler and Steensma (1998), 
alliances are any arrangements where two or more partners contribute differential resources 
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and technological know-how to agreed complementary objectives. Tyler and Steensma 
further argue that alliances are not just limited to one-way transfers of know-how, such as 
licensing and marketing agreements, but are arrangements where partners share their 
expertise and output. They represent a spectrum of inter-organisational cooperative 
arrangements with a variety of governance mechanisms where organisations may or may 
not have legal contracts, and may or may not have provided equity funding for a separate 
entity (e.g. joint venture and non-equity ventures). What is common to all of these 
relationships is the commitment of these organisations to develop technology, market 
products cooperatively, share costs, access assets, resources and competencies, thus 
strengthening their ability to keep pace with emerging requirements in the market place and 
global competition.   
 
Clarke-Hill et al. (1998) also perceive a strategic alliance as a coalition of two or more 
organisations to achieve strategically significant goals and objectives that are mutually 
beneficial. They argue that ‘mutual beneficial’ does not imply equality but should be 
understood within the concern for all parties to the alliance to receive benefit from it in 
proportion to contributions made. They further argue that strategic alliances differ from 
other types of collaborative arrangements because they occur in the context of a company’s 
long-term plans and seek to improve an organisation’s competitive standing in either 
domestic or international markets.   
 
The lack of consensus on what constitutes strategic alliances makes their conceptualisation a 
challenging undertaking. While some authors consider both vertical and horizontal linkages 
to be within the domain of strategic alliances, others consider only horizontal linkages to be 
true strategic alliances because they consider vertical linkages to be part of the traditional 
buyer-seller, or principal-agent relationship (Townsend, 2003). While others consider 
mergers, (Clarke-Hill et al., 1998); licensing and franchising (Buttery & Alan, 1994; 
Johnson & Scholes, 1999); and outsourcing, as strategic alliances, Yoshino and Ranjan 
(1995); Mockler et al. (1997); and Mockler (2001) refute such claims. Yoshino and Rangan 
(1995) argue that while strategic alliances can take a variety of forms, cooperative 
arrangements such as joint ventures, licensing and franchising agreements, for example, 
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should not be classified as strategic alliances. As for joint ventures, their argument is that 
the jointness of a venture is frequently a compromise rather than a goal. They also take issue 
with licensing and franchising agreements because, according to them, such agreements do 
not call for continuous transfer of technology, products, or skill between partners. Yoshino 
and Rangan’s (1995, p. 5) argument which has also been partially adopted by Mockler et al. 
(1997) and Mockler (2001) is that a strategic alliance should possess simultaneously three 
necessary and sufficient characteristics which are:   
1. The two or more firms that unite to pursue a set of agreed upon goals remain independent 
subsequent to the formation of the alliance. 
2. The partner firms share the benefits of the alliance and share control over the performance of 
assigned tasks (perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of alliances and the one that makes 
them so difficult to manage). 
3. The partner firms contribute on a continuing basis in one or more key strategic areas, e.g., 
technology, products, and so forth 
  
What is common to all of these relationships is the commitment of these organisations to 
develop technology, market products cooperatively, share costs, access assets, resources and 
competencies, thus strengthening their ability to keep pace with emerging requirements in 
the marketplace and global competition. While the subject of strategic alliances is very wide 
in scope, this thesis adopts the three necessary and sufficient characteristics, which 
according to Yoshino and Rangan (1995), strategic alliances must possess. These three 
characteristics fully capture what strategic alliances are and why they are formed. Therefore 
for the purpose of this thesis, strategic alliances are defined as purposive strategic 
arrangements between two or more independent organisations that form part of, and is 
consistent with their overall strategy, and contribute to the achievement of their strategically 
significant objectives that are mutually beneficial (Pansiri, 2005a). 
 
 
3.1  Strategic alliance framework 
 
Pansiri (2005a, pp. 1099-1100) adapted Evans’ conceptual five-stage process model of the 
strategic management processes involved in the formation and evaluation of strategic 
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alliances in the airline sector, which can also be used to analyse strategic alliances in the 
tourism industry. This framework is shown in Figure 3.1, which explains a process that 
involves:  
1. The strategic analysis of internal organisational and external environmental “drivers”.  
2. Strategic formulation which involves postulating and evaluating alternative strategic options, and 
choosing the option of strategic alliance formation (either with or without equity) participation.  
3. Consideration of implementation issues including the choice of appropriate partners, structure 
and scope of the alliance.  
4. Evaluation of the strategic alliance against selected criteria purporting to measure the success of 
the alliance.  
5. The evaluation of the strategic alliance is fed back into the analytical phase so that any changes 
based upon experience can be incorporated (Evans, 2001 pp. 231-233).  
 
Figure 3.1: The behavioural collaborative strategy process framework 
 
Source: Pansiri (2005a, p. 1100). 
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To Evans’ model, Pansiri (2005a) includes executives characteristics and perceptions in 
order to acknowledge behavioural orientations which influence executives’ attitudes toward 
strategic alliances formation and the kinds of information they attend to when individually 
assessing potential and currently operational alliances their organisations are involved in. 
This framework will form the basis for research of strategic alliances in this study. 12
 
  
 
3.2  Reasons why organisations form strategic alliances 
 
A number of studies have identified several drivers (motives) leading to formation of 
strategic alliances (Faulkner, 1995; Howarth et al., 1995; Dussage & Garrette, 1999; Evans 
& Peacock, 1999; Evans, 2001; Contractor & Kundu, 1998a). These drivers or motives as 
shown in Figure 3.1, have been classified as ‘internal organisational’ and ‘external 
environmental’ drivers (Faulkner, 1995; Howarth et al., 1995; Evans, 2001), which Evans 
(2001, p. 231) argues “…act as the underlying motivating reasons for alliance formation”. 
The ‘internal driver’ view is built on the perception or recognition that the organisation 
cannot achieve its objectives alone due to a scarcity or lack of access to resources (Howarth 
et al., 1995). This view is strongly supported by the ‘resource based view’ of the firm, 
which sees organisations as collections of heterogeneous resources (see discussion on 
access to assets, resources and competencies in section 3.2.2). Alliance motives from this 
perspective include reducing internal organisational uncertainty (Drago, 1997); shaping 
competition (Drago, 1997; Doz & Hamel, 1998; Colombo, 2003); economies of scale 
(Evans, 2001; Hill & Jones, 2004); economies of learning - alliances are often aimed at 
expanding a firm’s set of distinctive capabilities through inter-organisational learning 
(Kotabe, Martin & Domoto, 2003; Tsang, 2002); access to assets, resources and 
                                                 
12 This framework informs the research framework developed in Chapter Four of this thesis. The strategic 
alliance process developed and followed in this thesis suggest among others, the choice of appropriate 
partners. This is generally agreed in the alliance literature as evidenced by the work of Evans (2001), Pansiri 
(2005), Kanter (1994) and many others cited in section 3.6 of this thesis. However, most of the dimensions 
that have been used for choice of alliance partners have also been used for assessing characteristics of alliance 
partners that are maintained or developed during in on-going inter-organisational relationships (i.e. Medina-
Munoz and Garcia-Falcon, 2000). In a paper that is currently under second review in Tourism Management 
journal, written by the author of this thesis, “The effects of characteristics of partners on strategic alliance 
performance in the SME dominated travel sector”, choice of alliance dimensions are treated as characteristics 
of alliance partner, to acknowledge the fact that the partnerships are on-going..  
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competencies (Hitt, Ireland & Hoskisson, 1996; Olivera, 1999; Beverland & Bretherton, 
2001; Mockler, 2001; Ray, Barney & Muhanna, 2004); and risk sharing (Colombo, 2003). 
The ‘external driver’ perception or recognition is built on the understanding that in order to 
achieve certain objectives the organisation must submit to the pressure of external forces. 
These forces include government regulations and barriers to trade, (Howarth et al., 1995); 
technology capabilities (Doz & Hamel, 1998; More & McGrath, 1999; Go, Govers & 
Heuvel, 1999; Sakakibara, 2002; Colombo, 2003); globalisation (Dussage & Garrette, 1999; 
Chan, 2000; Erdly & Kesterson-Townes, 2003); and market entry and development of new 
markets (Ohmae, 1989a; 1989b; Howarth et al., 1995; Whipple & Gentry, 2000; Beverland 
& Bretherton, 2001). The following is a further discussion of these drivers. 
 
 
3.2.1  External drivers 
 
It is generally accepted that there are various ‘external drivers’ that influence firms into 
entering cooperative agreements. Various authors have discussed a number of these external 
driving forces, but Faulkner (1995) argues that their impact varies from situation to 
situation. These include globalisation, technology and economic restructuring. 
 
 
Globalisation 
 
Globalisation is a “concept with consequences” (Hall, 2001, p. 22) not only for tourism but 
also for all industries, governments and their communities worldwide (Cooper & Wahab, 
2001).  It has been suggested that globalisation “…can refer to an increase in: (a) cross-
border relations (or internationalisation); (b) open-border relations (or liberalisation); and 
(c) trans-border relations (or the relative uncoupling of social relations from territorial 
frameworks)” (Sum, 1999, p. 129). This view is also held by Wahab and Cooper (2001) 
who see globalisation as an all embracing term that denotes a world which, due to many 
politico-economic, technological and informational advancements and developments, is on 
its way to becoming a borderless and interdependent whole. Jessop (1999) sees it as a 
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complex, chaotic, and over-determined outcome of a multiscalar, multitemporal, and 
multicentric series or processes operating in specific structural contexts. Whilst each social 
science and business discipline adopts a different stance vis-à-vis globalisation, Cooper and 
Wahab (2001) argue that it is possible to draw together these disparate threads by 
considering globalisation as boundary-lessness and the various organisational responses to 
it, which could be summed up as follows:  
1. The process of globalisation reduces borders and barriers for trade between 
nations (Ohmae, 1989a; Cooper & Wahab, 2001; Wahab & Cooper, 2001).  
2. This process also renders these boundaries permeable both within and between 
organisations (Cooper & Wahab, 2001).  
3. The increased permeability of boundaries has been brought about by a series of 
drivers operating at all scales, not simply at the global scale, and these drivers 
include technology, economy, politics, culture, natural environment, and 
managing business globally (Ohmae, 1989a; Cooper & Wahab, 2001).  
 
From this background, Ohmae, (1989a) argues that success or failure of large businesses in 
the future will depend upon their ability to compete effectively globally (Ohmae, 1989a), 
and alliances have been used as one of the means through which expansionism is being 
done.  
 
The idea that competition in international markets is the realm of large companies only has 
been challenged since it is now difficult for SMEs to thrive on their own unless they are 
globally competitive. Therefore, Etemad et al. (2001) argue that to increase their global 
competitiveness SMEs need to form cooperative relationships with larger companies in 
order to reach global markets. No company is immune to globalised competition, 
particularly in the tourism business (Dev et al., 1996). While globalisation is well advanced 
in industries such as motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, soft drinks and financial services, 
Evans (2001) emphasises that international tourism has made globalisation one of the major 
driving forces in tourism.   
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Tourism is one of the leading global industries (Walle, 1996; Apostolopoulos & Sönmez, 
2000) since it broke away from its beginnings as a relatively minor and ephemeral ritual of 
modern national life to become a significant modality through which transnational modern 
life is organised (Hannam, 2002). Whilst tourism organisations are affected by 
globalisation, they also enhance and sustain the process of globalisation in terms of their 
own responses to the phenomenon (Cooper & Wahab, 2001). Hannam (2002) refers to 
Lofgren’s (1999) historical study of tourism development, which notes how globalisation 
has transcended sand, sun and sea to create the notion of the ‘global beach’. In addition, 
various sectors within the broad tourism industry have been globalised. For example, Pine, 
Zhang and Qi, (2000) point out that globalisation has become the strategy of many 
companies in the hotel industry, with most of these companies holding the idea that they 
must reach across continents and carry their product right around the world to succeed and 
prosper. Pine et al. (2000) cite Holiday Inn, Shangri-la, Marriott, Accor, and Starwood as 
some of the global hotel industry participants, which have made their presence in China. 
Hannam (2002) makes reference to globalisation of mass-market cruise companies, while 
Apostolopoulos and Sönmez (2000) argue that the only way Mediterranean countries can 
maintain a competitive edge in the global tourist market is to form strategic alliances that 
would make them respond to globalisation pressures more meaningfully.   
 
In general it can be argued that tourism has been rigorously globalised, with the number of 
international tourist arrivals in the world rising from 441.0 million in 1990 to 763.2 million 
in 2004 (UNWTO, 2005) accompanied by an increase in international tourism receipts from 
263 billion (US$) in 1990 (UNWTO, 2001b) to 623 billion in 2004 (UNWTO, 2005).  
 
The globalisation of tourism is also reflected in the formation of international institutions 
formed to promote tourism as a global phenomenon. For instance, the UNWTO, a 
specialised agency of the United Nations is composed of 145 countries, seven territories and 
some 350 affiliate members, representing the private sector, educational institutions, 
tourism associations and local tourism authorities serves as a global forum for tourism 
policy issues and practical source of tourism know-how  (UNWTO, 2006). In the same vein, 
the World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC) serves as a “forum for global business 
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leaders comprising the presidents, chairs and CEOs of 100 of the world's foremost 
companies. It is the only body representing the private sector in all parts of the Travel & 
Tourism industry worldwide” (WTTC, 2006, paragraph 1). Its global mandate is to raise 
awareness of the full economic impact of tourism as the world's largest generator of wealth 
and jobs. These institutions are an indication of how globalised tourism has become.  
 
 
Technology 
 
Companies are driven to form strategic alliances by lack of sufficient internal resources 
(Colombo, 2003). Often this lack of resources resides in technological capabilities (Whipple 
& Gentry, 2000), therefore competitive advantage is believed to be achievable through 
forming alliances with partners who offer new technologies particularly in R&D. 
Furthermore, as businesses are increasingly relying on instantaneous information exchange, 
it is difficult for firms to stay on the forefront of technological advances. Hence, the 
necessary R&D skills and facilities may be lacking to undertake R&D internally. Therefore, 
a goal of many organisations is to ally with a partner that has sophisticated information 
capabilities, (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Whipple & Gentry, 2000). In addition, firms desire to 
gain access to a partner’s R&D expertise, which could result in improvement of its product 
development process as well as shorten critical lead-times to bring new products to market 
faster. Alliance partners may bring new ideas for product and process improvements.  
 
Technology based strategic alliances have also been associated with spreading the risk of 
developing new products. Howarth et al. (1995) maintain that a typical example of strategic 
alliances that provide benefits to member organisations by spreading the risk of developing 
new products and processes are consortia because they involve many organisations across 
different industries. Doz and Hamel, (1998) and Sakakibara, (2002), support this. Doz and 
Hamel (1998, p. 3-4) observe that in order to develop and build a global satellite-based 
mobile communications network, Motorola needed funds and complementary capabilities 
(particularly for space technologies). To secure these, it brought together an exceptional 
coalition of seventeen equity-holding partners to form Iridium in the 1990s. Sakakibara 
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(2002, p. 1034-1035) argues that the primary motives for forming R&D consortia are 
sharing of fixed costs among R&D participants, realising economies of scale in R&D and 
avoiding ‘wasteful’ duplication.  
 
One of the characteristics of dynamic networks is the broad availability of open information 
systems which all network members can access through computerised systems that handle 
the communication and information flows within the network (Go et al., 1999). Bentley 
(1996) as cited by Go et al. (1999, p. 15) explains that, “…technologies first penetrated 
sector by sector – airlines, hotels, car rentals, travel agencies, now destinations. The second 
stage is integration of the sectors, which is on going… The third stage is delivery of these 
technologies to the retail trade, also under way. The fourth is integrating the individual 
consumer into the use of information technology.” The tourism industry has embraced 
technology because of its opportunity to improve companies’ interactivity with their 
consumers and stakeholders because more people use Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) (including Computer Reservation Systems [CRS], Global Distribution 
Systems [GDSs] and the internet) to locate and purchase tourism and accommodation 
products (Buhalis, 1999).  
 
A number of studies have indicated the use of technology by tourism businesses, 
particularly the adoption of ICT. Daniele and Mistilis’ (1999) study indicates a very high 
need for information technology by tourism organisations in Australia. These organisations 
included transportation (airline and car rental firms), travel intermediaries (travel agencies 
and tour operators) accommodation establishments and government organisations. A similar 
study was done by Evans and Peacock (1999), assessing the extent of awareness and 
development of ICT applications in comparison to both the global tourism system and 
national, regional and local tourism information and promotion. The study encompassed a 
wide range of tourism organisations including museum, gallery or heritage sites, arts and 
entertainment venues, hotel and accommodation providers, visitor attractions, tour 
operators, restaurants, travel agencies, tour guides and tourist information centres in the UK 
who participated by responding to a questionnaire. While the study found a very high 
domination of ICT and online reservation systems by major travel and tour operators and 
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integrated chains (e.g. hotels, car hire, tour operators, travel agents and transport carriers) 
and the problems of accessing such systems by SMEs, the study found that most 
organisations used teletext, telephone, fax, email and internet/web for reservation/booking 
by customers.   
 
Brown and Pattinson (1995) studied alliance relationships and communication technologies 
used by Radisson Hotel Australia (RHA) operating in the Australian travel and hotel 
environment. RHA is licensed by Radisson Hotels International (RHI) whose brand was 
developed in the 1960s in the USA to provide hotel management services to hotel property 
owners using the Radisson name and systems in Australia, New Zealand and South West 
Pacific, including selected Asian countries (Brown & Pattinson, 1995). The study found that 
RHA is linked to RHI through RHI’s centrally managed global reservation system, which 
links RHI with the Radisson hotels. Brown and Pattinson (1995) also found that RHA and 
its alliance partners (Qantas, Ansett, Telecom, suppliers, property owners, Radisson Hotel 
Philippines, Indonesian partners, Radisson Hotel Malaysia, RHI, and Fantasia/Southern 
Cross) use e-mail, Pierre reservation system, telephone, facsimile and Interactive linkage as 
their communication media.  
 
Research in the travel agency sector has produced mixed results with respect to ICT usage. 
For example, Luk (1997) examined the relationship between marketing culture and 
perceived service quality and its implications for managing service quality in the tourism 
industry. He found that all the travel agencies in Hong Kong which participated in the study 
placed a greater emphasis on “service quality” but a moderate emphasis on “organisation” 
while at the same time giving lower priority to fostering “international communication” and 
“innovation.” Luk’s findings are supported by Vasudavan and Standing (1999, p. 225) who 
found that the travel agency sector in Australia does not create a dynamic environment for 
change and is characterised by low levels of motivation and innovation. Vasudavan and 
Standing studied travel agencies in the Perth Metropolitan region of Western Australia and 
found that only 45 per cent of the respondents had access to the internet from their offices, 
mostly using technology such as electronic mail, electronic file transfer, World Wide Web 
browser and World Wide Web. Deng et al. (2000) did an exploratory study on travel agents’ 
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attitudes toward automation in Canada and New Zealand and found that there are four 
distinct groups of agents whose attitudes towards automation differ quite substantially, and 
these attitudes are related not much to the current use of technology but more to perceived 
future usage. They found that: 
Attitudes toward automation are characterized by insecurity in the threats that they 
perceive from direct selling and potential control by operators. They also perceive 
fewer benefits in automation in terms of its contribution to specific aspects of 
service, though they apparently recognize its contribution to overall quality (Deng 
et al., 2000, p. 66). 
 
Notwithstanding the above, Deng et al. (2000, p. 60) argue that modern society is 
embarking on a new era – the “high tech/high touch” society. In most industries technology 
has become one of the key driving forces influencing the competitive process (Deng & 
Ryan, 1992; Erdly & Kesterson-Townes, 2003). Similarly, the travel industry is essentially 
an information-based industry and information technology has become an integral part of 
the communication process to the extent that it is practically impossible to survive and attain 
a substantial competitive advantage as principal, carrier or agent without investing in 
automation (Deng et al., 2000). Erdly and Kesterson-Townes, (2002, p. 15) add that the 
internet and new technology applications are transforming global business through the 
formation of e-markets, on-line exchanges, and networked business communities which are 
creating tremendous opportunity for companies to transition their business models towards 
de-capitalised external networks – using alliances and outsourcing arrangements, for 
example – rather than owning and operating every aspect of the value chain. They argue that 
hospitality and leisure companies will turn to networks that more efficiently deliver 
capabilities in non-core functions, including certain parts of the supply chain, finance, 
human resources, ICT, and other areas with a view to offering better quality product and 
more customised guest service with lower structure. This is supported by Raymond (2001, 
p. 411-412) who regards the travel industry as a prime example of a sector that has been 
profoundly impacted by information technology through applications such as CRS, 
Destination Information Systems [DIS], GDS, and Web-based applications that allow 
consumers and corporations to obtain travel information and advice, compare prices, and 
book their own transportation, lodging, and other services. 
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Technology provides marketing, creation and distribution of tourism products. Tourism 
companies most of which are SMEs lack capital investments and specialist training to 
acquire and manage technologies successfully. Therefore, forming strategic alliances either 
with partners who are able to offer new technologies (i.e. on line reservation systems by 
major travel and tour operators and integrated chains like travel agencies) or with other 
SMEs with a view to bringing together scarce resources is  an important aspect of achieving 
technologies by companies which on their own would be unable to.  
 
 
Economic restructuring and the role of government 
 
The role of national or regional policies has been viewed as an important external 
environmental factor that impacts on the decision to form an alliance (Horton & Richey, 
1997). The literature on this topic has been discussed in terms of both domestic and 
international strategic alliances. In respect to domestic alliances,  Horton and Richey (1997) 
observe that prior to the 1980s, national policies toward alliances (particularly research 
alliances), might have been conceived of as clearly divided between the U.S.A. approach, in 
which coordination between firms was viewed with a great deal of suspicion, and the 
Japanese model, in which the government was actively promoting meetings between 
industry leaders both to set technical standards and to coordinate joint research projects. 
This view is shared by Harrigan (1985) who argues that some industrialised nations, such as 
the U.S.A. have enforced strict antitrust laws that prohibit cooperative strategies when they 
appeared to function as monopolies or behaved collusively. However, Harrigan finds 
evidence of increased tolerance of alliances, particularly joint ventures, by U.S.A. officials 
since the mid 1980s if efficiency gains offset the harm to competition that such 
arrangements had previously been assumed to create. In respect to multinational enterprises, 
(MNEs) various authors on the subject do not only reveal different policies by various 
countries towards promoting and protecting local businesses but also the changes of 
government policies over time in respect to the subject.  
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Bell, Barkema and Verbeke (1997) argue that host governments may restrict the level of 
activities by foreign MNEs. However, studies by Gomes-Casseres (1990) indicates that 
some MNEs are able to establish wholly owned subsidiary companies depending upon their 
bargaining power. Gomes-Casseres further argue that if MNEs ownership preferences 
conflict with those of the government, they are faced with the choice of either negotiating a 
compromise or declining to invest in that particular country. Previous research has shown 
that companies taking the former route use strategic alliances particularly joint ventures as 
the most preferred mode of entry (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Bell et al., 1997). Alliances allow 
firms to overcome a country’s protectionist measures (Horton 1998), and have been used as 
a way of gaining entry into particular markets where governments impose tariffs, barriers 
and conditions of entry. Howarth et al. (1995, p. 20) make reference to the Australian 
Government program, “Partnerships for Development”, which requires technology sharing 
as a condition of entry into the Australian market: 
This program encourages transnational companies to develop Australian activities 
as part of their global R&D programs by forming partnerships with Australian 
organisations. The transnational organisations are then exempt from the 
requirements of the Australian Civil Offsets Program. (Under the initial terms of 
this program, a transnational organization was required to spend 5 per cent of its 
local turnover annually on R&D activities in Australia, export goods or services to 
50 per cent of its imports into Australia annually and average across all exports by 
year 7 of 70 per cent of the local value-added content). 
 
There is a move towards more relaxation of restrictive policies. Bell et al. (1997) tested 
among others, the hypothesis that a restrictive host government policy increases the 
likelihood of a joint venture being used to enter a new market. Their findings suggest that 
“… for Dutch firms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the policy of host country 
governments was no longer a decisive factor for the formation of JVs” (Bell et al., 1997, p. 
149). However, in the U.S.A. there are still calls for government to emulate the Japanese 
and Korean governments by reassessing tax and anti-trust laws in order to facilitate global 
cooperative ventures (Vyas, Shelburn & Rogers, 1995). Australia has been commended for 
a variety of federal and state programs which provide vehicles through which government 
has promoted inter-firm cooperation. These programs as cited by More and McGrath (1999) 
include the Partnerships for Development Program and the Collaborative Research Centres.   
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In relation to the tourism industry, studies exist that look at deregulation of the airline 
industry and its subsequent influence on the international alliances within the industry. The 
movement towards deregulation began in the U.SA. in the mid 1970s (Dearden, 1994; 
Chan, 2000), and the U.K. government followed the U.SA. experiment in domestic 
deregulation in its 1980 Civil Aviation Act which required its Civil Aviation Authority to 
encourage competition on domestic routes (Dearden, 1994). Dearden reports that the U.K. 
was to later further deregulate its domestic air fares and make liberalising agreements with 
the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Ireland. This later process of liberalisation 
encompassed the whole of the European Union (E.U.) from 1993 after long processes of 
negotiations. In Australia, deregulation of the industry put an end to the then two-airline 
system, which had allowed Australian Airways and Ansett to operate virtually unopposed 
on the major truck routes. Glisson et al. (1996) argue that deregulation caused a lot of 
changes within the airline industry which faced losses exceeding 2 billion dollars (USA). 
Hence USA carriers responded by establishing strategic alliances with foreign partners for 
financial assistance and profitable routes 
 
Formation of strategic alliances because of deregulation was reported in healthcare 
(Beverland & Bretherton, 2001), financial services (Kauser & Shaw, 2004; Kiriazidis & 
Tzanidakis, 1995) and the airline industry (Chan, 2000; Glisson et al., 1996). Minimal 
research has been undertaken to find out the impact of deregulation or economic 
restructuring by governments on strategic alliance formations in the tourism sector of travel.  
 
 
3.2.2  Internal drivers 
 
It is generally accepted that there are various ‘internal drivers’ that influence firms into 
entering cooperative agreements and these include risk sharing, shaping competition, 
economies of scale and scope, inter-organisational learning, and market entry and 
development of new markets.  
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Shaping competition  
 
Organisations enter into alliances for competitive reasons connected with collusion and 
other motives aimed at reducing rivalry, e.g. teaming up with a competitor, exerting market 
power on customers and suppliers, tightening entry barriers through the definition of new 
standards (Colombo, 2003). Alliances can also reduce competitive uncertainty - caused by 
competitive interdependence where the actions of one firm have a direct significant effect 
on market positions of others in the industry (Drago, 1997). Doz and Hamel (1998) argue 
that alliances play an important role of co-option of potential rivals. According to Doz and 
Hamel (1998), co-option turns potential competitors into allies and providers of 
complementary goods and services that allow new business to develop. They observe that 
through co-option, potential rivals are effectively neutralised as threats by bringing them 
together into the alliance, and firms with complementary goods to contribute are wooed, 
creating network economies in favour of the coalition. No literature on tourism has been 
found that deals with this subject. 
 
 
Economies of scale and scope  
 
A prime driver for alliance formation is to achieve cost economies, which can be 
categorised as economies of scale and scope (Evans, 2001; Taylor, 2005; Chung et al., 
2006). Economies of scale are unit cost deductions associated with a large scale output or 
cost advantages that would not be possible to obtain if the single companies acted 
independently (Abdou & Kliche, 2004).  According to Hill and Jones (2004), economies of 
scale arise out of two fundamental sources, namely: (1) the company’s ability to spread 
fixed costs over large production volume, e.g. manufacturing facilities, distribution 
channels, advertising campaigns, and (2) the ability of firms to produce in large volumes to 
achieve a greater division of labour and specialisation.  
 
Hill and Jones further argue that there are cost reductions associated with sharing resources 
across businesses and these have two major sources across businesses. Firstly is the 
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assumption that organisations that can share resources across businesses have to invest 
proportionately less in the shared resource than companies that cannot share, and secondly 
that resource sharing across companies may enable such companies to use shared resources 
more intensively, thereby realising economies of scale. Furthermore, a firm can reduce its 
fixed costs by sharing costs through an alliance (Ohmae, 1989a).  
 
Abdou and Kliche, (2004) cite Global One (established by Deutshe Telekom, France 
Telecom, and Spirit, which offer integrated global solutions) and Lectrix LLC (formed by 
American Electric Power, Bechtel Enterprises Holding and Siemens Power Transmission 
and Distribution, Inc) as examples of alliances which have managed to exploit economies of 
scale. Gomes-Casseres (1994) also makes reference to competition between Mips Computer 
Systems, Sun Microsystems, IBM and Hewlett-Packard (HP) in the 1990s in the reduced 
instruction-set computing (RISC) industry, a field where production scale and market 
penetration were critical to commercial success. He argues that Mips and Sun used strategic 
alliance partners to reach the scale, scope, and, market impact they could never have hoped 
to achieve on their own. Mips and Sun, argues Gomes-Casseres, used their alliances to 
approximate the scale of operations of the much-larger HP and IBM businesses.   
 
Go and Hedges (1994) maintain that the investments in aircraft, CRSs, frequent flyer 
programs, labour and fuel are very high. Therefore, airlines form strategic alliances in order 
to create economies of scale necessary to defray costs over a wider base, and to reach the 
critical mass convenient for passengers to use the airlines extensive network. “Size allows 
carriers to improve their marketing and operations through better computer reservation 
systems, frequent flyer plans, more hubs, vertical integration  of feeder airlines and access 
to airports, and also allows them to develop extensive routes” (Go and Hedges, 1994, p. 
185). This is supported by Morrison’s (1994, p. 26) study which found that small hotel firms 
form strategic alliances in order “…to gain strength in competing against the corporate 
chains by achieving advantages through economies of scale and the fashioning of common 
brand identity, thus seeking to replicate the strength of the corporate chains.” 
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Access to assets, resources and competencies  
 
The basis of this internal driver is the ‘Resource-based view of the firm’. This approach 
assumes that each organisation is a collection of unique resources and capabilities that 
provide the basis for its strategy and is the primary source of its returns on profit (Hitt et al., 
1996). This view, which originates from Edith Penrose’s work in 1959 became a contending 
theoretical understanding of organisational performance to the more traditional ‘industrial 
organisation view’ which was dominant in the field of economics in the 1960s through to 
the 1980s. The ‘industrial organisation view’ perceives the external environment as the 
primary determinant of strategies that organisations select to be successful. It largely 
assumes that organisational strategically relevant resources are relatively homogeneous 
within industries and that firms deviating from industry norms would experience 
performance decline – and not enhancement (Hitt, Nixon, Cliford & Coyne, 1999). Arising 
from this was the pursuance of similar strategies by organisations within the same industry, 
more so that these resources were also seen as highly mobile across organisations, hence 
resource differences that might develop between firms would be short lived.  
 
In contrast to the industrial organisation view, the resource-based view is premised on the 
view that an organisation’s internal environment, in terms of its resources and capabilities, 
is more critical to the determination of strategic actions than is the external environment. 
Therefore, organisations are seen as possessing heterogeneous and idiosyncratic resources 
on which their individual strategies are based. “When these strategies are successful in 
leveraging firm resources to gain a competitive advantage that is then sustained over time, 
the firms achieve higher economic returns than others” (Hitt et al., 1999, pp. 1-2).  
 
Resources may be tangible13 or intangible14
                                                 
13 Tangible resources are assets that can be seen and quantified. Hitt et al. (1996) categorise these resources 
into four typologies, namely: financial resources (firms borrowing capacity and its ability to generate internal 
funds); physical resources (sophistication and location of a firm’s plant and equipment, and its access to raw 
materials); human resources (training, experience, judgment, intelligence, insights, adaptability, commitment, 
and loyalty of a firm’s individual managers and workers); organisational resources (firm’s formal reporting 
structure and its formal planning, controlling, and coordination system).  
 (Hall, 1992; Hitt et al., 1996). Strategic alliances 
permit organisations to access resources that other organisations have. For example, 
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alliances may focus on motives that reduce costs and increase profit in the supply process 
(joint investment, reduced inventory, stable supply prices). It has also been argued that 
additional financial motives result from sharing risk, such as joint investment in capital and 
joint product development (Whipple & Gentry, 2000, p. 303).  
 
Further to this, collective resource utilisation through strategic alliances has been associated 
with creation of synergy (value created by business units working together, exceeding the 
value those same units create when working independently), thereby creating joint 
economies of scope between alliance members (Hitt et al., 1996). In Doz and Hamel’s 
(1998) view, such moves lead to co-specialisation as alliance members refocus on narrower 
range of core skills and activities and as opportunities become systems and solutions rather 
than discrete products. They see co-specialisation as the synergistic value creation that 
result from the combining of previously separate resources, positions, skills, brands, 
tangible assets, and knowledge sources. They argue that contribution of such unique and 
differentiated resources by alliance members leads “…to the success of their alliances, and 
alliances create value when those resources are co-specialised. That is, they become 
substantially more valuable when bundled together in a joint effort than when kept separate” 
(Doz and Hamel, 1998, p. 5). 
 
Specific to the tourism (hotel) sector, Morrison’s (1994, p. 27) study found that 
organisations formed alliances because of various reasons based on two fundamental 
strategic issues: accessing strategic resources and strategic benefits accruing from these 
alliances. Accessing strategic resources included: local access to a centralised international 
network; overseas marketing; facility of package and sell components of tourism products; 
videotext interactive system for member information update and comprehensive product 
information database. Strategic benefits involved: access to highly sophisticated 
computerised systems; participation in a global marketing network; training and support 
                                                                                                                                                     
14 Intangible resources are less visible and Hall (1992) classifies them into two, namely: ‘assets’ – these are 
obvious things which one owns, including the intellectual property rights of: patents, trademarks, copyright 
and registered designs, contracts, trade secrets, data bases, reputation and networks; and ‘skills’, or 
‘competencies’, which include the know-how of employees, suppliers, distributors; organisational culture.  
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programmes; operational efficiencies; all this while members retain independence of 
business ownership.  
 
 
Organisational learning 
 
Writers on strategic alliances indicate organisational learning as one of the major 
motivations for alliance formation (Kotabe et al., 2003; Tsang, 2002; Colombo, 2003; 
Taylor, 2005; Tsang, 1999). Organisational leaning has been an issue for discussion for 
many decades from both organisational theory and psychology (Cohen, 1991; Simon, 1991; 
Huber, 1991; Argyris, 1993; 1994; Argyris & Schön, 1978; 1996; Pansiri, 1996) and is seen 
as the focal tool for future competitiveness in strategic relations (Morrison & Mezentseff, 
1997). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer a detailed examination of organisational 
learning. Organisational learning is complex and multidimensional (Tsang, 1997), and is 
concerned with enhancing progress of learning in order to improve individual and collective 
organisational actions via improved knowledge and understanding (Love & Gunasekaran, 
1999), and has been seen as a more rational process within the domain of decision making 
and choice (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003).  
 
Strategic alliance literature suggests two forms of learning. The first type of inter-
organisational learning involves a process of adaptation (Tsang, 1999; Varadarajan & 
Cunningham, 1995). Tsang (1999, p. 215) refers to this process as “…learning from 
strategic alliance experience” which involves “…implementing technology transfers, 
managing the alliance per se and knowing about a new business environment” where the 
alliance is located. According to Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995), a firm’s accumulated 
learning from its past involvement in strategic alliances is likely to have an impact on the 
effectiveness of its future alliances.  
 
The second type of inter-organisational learning through strategic alliances is the absorption 
of deeply embedded knowledge from an alliance partner (Hamel, 1991). It is argued that 
alliances provide a platform for organisational learning, giving firms access to scarce 
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knowledge, skills and competencies of their partners (Tsang, 2002; Taylor, 2005). Doz and 
Hamel (1998) also argue that alliances may be an avenue for learning and internalising new 
skills, in particular, those which are tacit, collective, and embedded (and thus hard to obtain 
and internalise by other means). 
 
Strategic alliances should be able to achieve both types of inter-organisational learning. The 
first type is important for future inter-organisational relationships, while the second is 
essential for a company’s internal operations. In the tourism literature, there is evidence of 
the two forms of inter-organisational learning. For instance, a study by Medina-Munoz and 
Garcia-Falcon (2000) suggest that knowledge of factors contributing to the success of the 
relationship between hotel companies and travel agencies is central to the management of 
ongoing relationships as well as in the selection of future partners. This supports the first 
type of inter-organisational learning. On the other hand, Go and Hedges (1994) argue that 
strategic alliances tend to blur the boundaries of firms and permit knowledge to move easily 
across boundaries, giving an organisation accessibility to stores of information that another 
organisation may have. This supports the second type of inter-organisational learning. Go 
and Hedges further maintain that information and knowledge is contained in the workers, 
the systems, and controls, and the technology of the firm which are too costly for an 
organisation to develop, but could be accessed through forming alliances.  
 
 
Market entry and product development 
 
In today’s fast-paced world economy, it is true to say that companies lack the time to 
establish new markets one-by-one. Therefore, companies form strategic alliances in order to 
develop new markets/products, get a ‘toehold’ in a growing business, and enter into a new 
geographic market. Howarth et al. (1995, p. 14) support the above, by arguing that strategic 
alliances are an effective mechanism for gaining access to more customers. “A strategic 
partner may be able to provide access to extensive distribution channels, access to new 
markets and access to advanced supplier networks” (Howarth et al., 1995, p. 14). This is 
even more important when alliances are formed globally (Whipple & Gentry, 2000).   
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Market entry has been perceived as an important factor especially for organisations whose 
major products have short life cycles (Howarth et al., 1995). Uncertainty in these markets is 
high and the risk associated with uncertainty can be reduced by sharing them with a 
strategic alliance partner. Benefits occur due to the sharing of costs, the gaining of access to 
the partner’s technology and learning, the pooling of limited resources and skills thus 
avoiding redundancy in activities, and the gaining of access to new markets and distribution 
channels (Howarth et al., 1995).  
In the early stages of the product-life cycle (particularly for short life-cycle 
products) it is important to introduce a product into the market quickly. Thus a 
reduction in time taken in the design, engineering and development phases will 
allow for more effective handling of competition… through the sharing of 
competencies and resources, a strategic alliance can provide a means to getting the 
product to the market rapidly and beating the competition to the starting line 
(Howarth et al., 1995, p. 16). 
 
The Coopers and Lybrand (1997) study, cited by Elmuti and Kathawala (2001) found that 
50 per cent of firms involved in alliances market their goods and services internationally 
versus 30 per cent of non-allied participants. The advantage of an alliance is that it allows a 
firm to market a full range of products to consumers around the world, without incurring the 
expense, both monetary and time, associated with other forms of business strategies of 
“going it alone” (Horton, 1998, p. 5). Strategic alliances have been identified as ways 
through which organisations can move into markets quickly, without the need for large 
direct investments. Howarth et al. (1995) argue that such agreements with foreign 
distributors provide a successful way for organisations to gain quick access to international 
markets.  
 
Strategic alliances by tourism businesses have been associated with accessing new markets 
by new airlines (Go & Hedges, 1994) and market penetration (Dev et al., 1996). A study by 
Dev et al. (1996) of nine hotel brands, four car rental brands, and four airline brands show 
that tourism businesses which wish to follow a market penetration strategy seeking to 
increase their market share can effectively use strategic alliances to fulfil their strategies. 
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Watkins and Bell (2002) also found that organisations in the tourism industry in Australia 
collaborate in order to achieve stronger position in the market place. Contractor and Kundu 
(1998b) show that hotel firms listed in the International Hotel Group Directory have more 
than half a million rooms outside their home nation, and most of them had used equity joint 
ventures  (15.8 per cent), and other non-equity strategic alliances like franchising (28.4 per 
cent) as entry modes. Contractor and Kundu (1998a) examined the internal (company 
characteristics and strategy) as well as external (country or locational) factors that lead 
international hotels to choose franchising instead of direct market entry. Their findings 
reveal that the propensity to franchise reflects a mix of factors related to both the nation 
where the hotel is located, as well as characteristics and strategy of the global hotel 
company. These factors include level of development of the intended foreign market; the 
extent of globalisation and international experience of the firm; and strategic factors such as 
the degree of investment in a hotels global reservation system and brand, as well as the size 
of its overall operations. Contractor and Kundu (1998a) further indicate that because of the 
difficulties in transferring skills and protecting intellectual property such as the brand name, 
franchising is easier in developed or advanced nations, but they also indicate opportunities 
in emerging markets where competition is initially weak.   
 
 
3.3  Conclusion on strategic alliance motives 
 
In order to address sub-questions (a) and (b) in Chapter One, this section sought to identify 
from the literature the major motives and how these motives have been addressed in the 
literature. This section has underscored the importance of internal and external drivers in 
strategic alliance formation. This thesis investigates internal and external drivers for alliance 
formation with a view to identify the most critical factors (sub-question a) and relate them 
to company executive characteristics (sub-question b). 
 
Past research on organisations’ motives to join or take part in strategic alliances is illustrated 
in Table 3.1. These motives are ranked according to the highest mean. What is notable is 
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that these motives are varied. In the empirical study of motives to form alliances by 
industrial manufacturers, Whipple and Gentry (2000) tested 16 possible motives on three 
types of alliances: manufacture-material supplier, manufacturer-customer, and 
manufacturer-service supplier. Their five most important motives were: Increased customer 
service; Increased supplier/customer involvement; Improved quality; Reduced cycle 
time/lead time; and Stabilised supply/demand. All five emphasise firms’ ‘reputation and 
corporate image’. Glaister and Buckley (1996) tested 16 possible motivations for the 
formation of international strategic alliances and the five most important ones as indicated 
in Table 3.1 were: Gain presence in new market; Faster entry to market; Facilitate 
international expansion; Compete against common competitor; and Maintain market 
position. All five are concerned with relative competitive positions in either new or existing 
markets. Although statistical findings have not been provided, Faulkner (1995) investigated 
11 possible motivations for the formation of international strategic alliances. There motives 
were: Turbulence in markets; Economies of scale and/or scope; Globalisation of the 
industry; Regionalisation of the industry; Fast technological change leading to ever-
increasing investment requirements; Shortening product lifecycle; High economic 
uncertainty; Complementary assets; Existence of synergies between the companies; 
approximate balance in size and strength; and Compatible cultures.  
 
The conclusion drawn from the above analysis is that no single study can capture all the 
motives for strategic alliance formation. Many of the above motives matter and need to be 
incorporated into any research framework because some of them are more important than 
others. The crucial ones, which this thesis investigates, are: Globalisation of the tourism 
industry; Rapid technological change; Legal requirements; Reputation and corporate image 
economies of scale; Strength of personal relationships; Developing/creating new markets; 
Volatility in the tourism market; Learning from each other; Brand names; General economic 
uncertainty; Entering new domestic markets; and Entering new international markets. Most 
of these motives have been studied before but not necessarily in one single study.  
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Table 3.1: Motives to participate in alliances 
 
Glaister and Buckley (1996)   Whipple and Gentry (2000)   
Motivation Mean SD Motivation15 Mean  SD 
Gain presence in new market 2.46 0.73 Increased customer service 3.91 0.74 
Faster entry to market 2.39 0.78 Increased supplier/customer involvement 3.65 0.91 
Facilitate international expansion 2.35 0.84 Improved quality 3.61 0.93 
Compete against common competitor 1.80 0.77 Reduced cycle time/lead time 3.59 1.00 
Maintain market position 1.69 0.76 Stabilised supply/demand 3.45 0.92 
Exchange of complementary technology 1.60 0.69 Increased customer loyalty 3.44 1.02 
Economies of scale 1.59 0.71 Internal cost savings 3.38 1.00 
Product diversification 1.53 0.71 Reduced inventory 3.36 1.03 
Faster payback on investment 1.50 0.68 Achieved core competency 3.31 1.00 
Concentrate on higher margin business 1.50 0.69 Access to information technology 3.22 1.15 
Share R&D costs 1.46 0.67 Reduced price/costs 3.21 1.15 
Spread risk of large project 1.46 0.68 Reduced supplier/customer base 3.13 1.06 
Reduce competition 1.34 0.60 Increased utilisation of equipment/capacity 3.11 1.09 
Produce at lower costs location 1.28 0.56 Access to R&D expertise 2.72 1.12 
Exchange of patents/territories 1.25 0.48 Access to new markets 2.57 1.11 
Conform to foreign government policy 1.13 0.42 Leverage capital investment 1.87 1.19 
Notes: M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation 
Source: Glaister and Buckley (1996, p. 315) and Whipple and Gentry (2000, p. 312) 
 
The discussion so far has centred on the first part of the framework for conceptualisation of 
the collaborative strategy process as depicted in Figure 3.1 - reasons (drivers) that motivate 
organisations to form strategic alliances. While not much work has been done on this 
subject with particular reference to the tourism industry, a wealth of knowledge has been 
drawn from the general literature with a view to understanding further these factors. This 
review of the literature underscores the need for further research particularly in tourism in 
order to understand how strongly tourism industry participants identify with these drivers 
when forming strategic alliances, rather than just using findings of research from different 
industries. 
 
 
3.4  Types of strategic alliances 
 
Although a number of studies attest that there are different forms of strategic alliances, there 
is lack of any consistent method for their classification (Faulkner, 1995). Table 3.2 
represents a précis of different arrangements, which various researchers identify as strategic 
                                                 
15 The means and standard deviations shown here are calculated averages of the three types of alliance 
descriptive statistics in Whipple and Gentry (2000, p. 310). 
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alliances. For the purposes of this thesis, strategic alliances have been classified into three 
forms: (a) Functional strategic alliances – Those alliances that involve a single functional 
area of the business and are narrower in scope. These include the first three of Buttery and 
Alan, (1994), Howarth et al. (1995) and, Elmuti and Kathawala (2001) strategic alliance in 
Table 3.2. (b) Structural vertical/horizontal alliances – Those alliances, which integrate 
organisations in the same industry/sector or suppliers and distributors or across industries. 
Examples of such alliances are those presented by Klint and Sjöberg (2003) and, Dussauge 
and Garrette (1999) in Table 3.2. (c) Legal form of alliances, i.e. franchise, joint venture or 
subcontracting. This include alliances listed by Buttery and Alan (1994), Clarke-Hill et al. 
(1998) and, Johnson and Scholes (1999) in Table 3.2. The following discussion considers 
some of the frameworks, which seek to classify strategic alliances.   
 
Ghemawat et al. (1986) cited by Faulkner (1995) classify all alliances as either X, i.e. 
vertical coalitions (alliances between partners carrying out different activities in the value 
chain) or Y, i.e. horizontal coalitions (partners carrying out the same activity in the value 
chain) and by their legal nature (joint ventures, licenses, supply agreements).   
 
Howarth et al. (1995) draw their framework from Moss Kanter’s (1989) classification of 
strategic alliances into three broad groupings namely: 
1. Service alliances: the cross-country consortium, referring to a group of 
organisations with similar need, often in the same industry, who band together to 
create a new entity to fill that need for all of them.  
2. Opportunistic alliances (joint ventures) formed by organisations which have seen 
an opportunity to gain an immediate, though perhaps temporary, competitive 
advantage through an alliance that gets them into a new business or extend an 
old business.   
3. Stakeholder alliances, defined as ‘complementary’ between a number of 
stakeholders in a business process who are involved in different stages of the 
value-creation chain.  
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To this classification, Howarth et al. (1995) incorporated four additional dimensions that 
they argue; strategic alliances can differ on. These are: 
1. The local/transnational dimension - this indicates whether the alliance spans 
national boundaries. 
2. Formal vs. informal linkages - differentiated on the amount of binding 
contractual arrangements. 
3. Equity vs. non-equity partnerships - differentiated on the basis of financial 
investment by one partner in the other’s business. 
4. The single purpose/multi-purpose dimension - which separates those alliances 
that are formed for a single, generally short-term objective, from those that 
involve several potentially complex resource flows between the partners.  
 
Another model of alliance classification is one developed by Faulkner (1995). Strategic 
alliances are classified along three axes, namely; the scope of the alliance, (i.e. focused or 
complex); the creation or otherwise of a new corporate legal entity, (i.e. a joint venture or 
more flexible collaboration); and the number of alliance partners, (i.e. two partners or a 
consortium). From this classification Faulkner came up with eight possible combinations of 
strategic alliances namely:  
1. Focused joint venture [focused/joint venture/two partners]. 
2. Focused consortium [focused/joint venture/consortium]. 
3. Focused collaboration [focused/non-joint venture/two partners]. 
4. Focused multi-partners collaboration [focused/non-joint venture/consortium]. 
5. Complex joint venture [complex/joint venture/two partners]. 
6. Complex consortium [complex/joint venture/consortium]. 
7. Complex collaboration [complex/non-joint venture/two partners]. 
8. Complex multi-partner collaboration [complex/non-joint venture/consortium]. 
 
Faulkner (1995) concluded that some alliances are simpler and less committing than others 
and that some types will develop out of others. For example, a focused collaboration 
alliance where two partners agree to work together on a defined project (simplest type), may 
develop into a complex type of alliance.  
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Table 3.2: Types of alliances 
 
Clarke-Hill et al.  (1998):  Hierarchy 
of alliance types 
• Controlling interest or full merger 
with retained identity of subsidiary 
• Partial acquisition and equity 
participation 
• Joint ventures 
• Equity participating alliances 
• International alliances with central 
secretariats 
• Co-marketing agreements 
• National buying clubs 
• Loose affiliations 
 
 Buttery and Alan, (1994): Categories 
of collaborative arrangements. 
• Benchmarking 
• Licensing and franchising 
arrangements 
• Supplier-buyer relationships 
• Joint ventures 
• Technological alliances 
• Consortia 
Howarth et al. (1995): Framework 
• Service cross-country consortium 
(R&D groups; keiretsu; chaeobols) 
• Opportunistic (joint venture, 
licensing, venture capital; 
specialisation) 
• Stakeholder (share value-adding, 
franchising, customers suppliers, 
employee/management) 
 
Johnson and Scholes (1999): Types 
of strategic alliances 
• Networks 
• Opportunistic alliances 
• Subcontracting  
• Licenses  
• Franchises 
• Consortia 
• Joint ventures 
• Acquisitions 
• Mergers 
 
Elmuti and Kathawala (2001): Types 
of strategic alliances 
• Joint marketing/promotion 
• Joint selling or distribution 
• Production alliances 
• Design collaboration 
• Technology licensing 
• Research and development 
contracts 
• Outsourcing 
 
Klint and Sjöberg (2003): 
Classification of strategic networks 
• Vertical networks 
• Horizontal networks 
• Lateral networks 
• Virtual networks 
• Open networks 
• Permeable networks 
• Closed networks 
• Business opportunity networks 
• Hollow networks 
• Institutional networks 
 
Faulkner (1995): Different forms of 
alliances 
• Technology development coalitions 
• Marketing and distribution 
agreements 
• Options and logistics coalitions 
• Single-country and multi-country 
alliances 
• Joint ventures creating a daughter 
company from two or more parent 
partners 
• Minority share exchange agreements   
• Licensing 
Dussauge and Garrette (1999): 
Types of alliances 
• International expansion joint 
ventures 
• Upstream vertical partnerships 
• Downstream vertical partnerships 
• Cross-industry agreements 
• Complementary alliances 
• Shared-supply alliances 
• Quasi-concentration alliances 
 
Dussauge and Garrette (1999) present a general typology of strategic alliances. Their point 
of departure is that alliances can be divided into several clearly distinct categories. At a first 
level, they distinguish strategic alliances forged between non-competing firms (those 
companies from different industries), which are not in direct competition with one another, 
from alliances between rival firms. They argue that alliances between rival firms raise 
problems “both from an anti-trust point of view and in terms of managing the relationship 
between the allied competitors” (p. 47). Dussauge and Garrette further observe that at the 
second level there are different types of alliances within those two broad categories. The 
non-competing firms’ category of strategic alliances include international expansion joint 
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ventures, vertical partnerships and cross-industry strategic alliances. On the other hand, 
Dussauge and Garrette argue that strategic alliances forged between rivals take on three 
different forms namely: shared-supply alliances, quasi-concentration alliances and 
complementary alliances.   
 
The various types of alliances discussed above can be consolidated as in Figure 3.2. This 
proposed framework also borrows from Bierly and Kessler’s (1998) argument that generally 
strategic alliances can be classified into three broad categories - joint ventures, non-equity 
(contractual) alliances and equity alliances. Figure 3.2 presents three dimensions for 
understanding strategic alliances as follows which will further be discussed:  
• ‘Tight’ to ‘loose’ dimension - strategic alliances can range from ‘tight’ to ‘loose’ 
in terms of the degree of alliance partners’ commitment and infrastructure 
linkages. Within this continuum, strategic alliances can vary from joint ventures 
to non-equity ventures alliances. 
• Complex/organic or focused. 
• Two party or multi party alliances.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Strategic alliance options  
 
                                                  
 
 
          Complex/ 
         Organic 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        Consortium 
 
         Focused              Two parties 
                         Joint  Equity  Non-equity/ 
                         venture                      non-joint venture 
       ‘Tight’                                                                                                 ‘Loose’ 
                   Degree of commitment and infrastructure linkage 
 
Source: Adapted from Faulkner (1995), Howarth et al. (1995), Clarke-Hill et al. (1998)  
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‘Tight’/‘Loose’ continuum  
 
Figure 3.2 shows that there are a variety of arrangements for strategic alliances, which can 
be classified on a ‘loose’ to ‘tight’ continuum based on the degree of commitment and 
infrastructure linkages, defined by the extent of asset management, asset separability and 
asset appropriability16
 
 (Clarke-Hill et al., 1998; Limerick, Cunnington & Crowther, 2002; 
Johnson & Scholes, 1999). Some may be much formalised inter-organisational relationships 
(i.e. joint ventures), while others may be very loose arrangements of co-operation and 
informal networking between organisations, with no shareholding or ownership involved 
[i.e. non-equity/non-joint ventures] (Johnson and Scholes, 1999). Therefore, it can be 
argued that different forms of alliances that organisations involve themselves in are largely 
distinguished by the level of asset separability and asset appropriability in the alliance. On 
this continuum are joint ventures, equity alliances and non-equity alliances which are 
further explained below. 
 
Joint Ventures 
 
These are arrangements where a new, legally separate company is created by the 
combination of the resources of the alliance partners (Faulkner, 1995; Bierly & Kessler, 
1998). Partners take active roles in formulation of the entity’s strategy and provide 
resources (financial, material and personnel), until the venture is able to develop on its own. 
According to Faulkner (1995), the aim of the joint venture is that the new company should 
become a self-standing entity with its own aims, employees and resources.  Howarth et al. 
(1995) see joint ventures as alliances motivated by an opportunity to gain an immediate 
competitive advantage and have also been seen as an effective mode of governance for 
transferring and integrating tacit knowledge, developing innovative capacity (through 
                                                 
16 Johnson and Scholes, (1999) define asset management as the extent to which assets (financial, physical, 
access to market, and intellectual capital) do or do not need to be managed jointly, while asset separability is 
seen as the extent to which it is possible to separate the assets between the parties involved. They define asset 
appropriability as the extent to which there is a risk of one or other of the parties involved appropriating the 
assets for themselves. 
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R&D), aligning the strategic goals of partners to minimise cheating, and developing a long 
term relationship (Bierly and Kessler, 1998).  
 
While joint ventures present new opportunities with risks that can be shared, they often limit 
the discretion, control, and profit potential of partners, while demanding managerial 
attention and other resources that might be directed toward the firm’s mainstream activities. 
Furthermore, the other risk in such ventures is the threat that partners may have different 
learning rates, such that one firm’s competitive advantage may erode as critical tacit 
knowledge is leaked (Bierly and Kessler, 1998), leading to possibilities that the company 
that has gained more may decide to move out of the venture and stand alone. In Figure 3.2, 
joint ventures have been classified at the extreme left of the ‘tight’ to ‘loose’ continuum, 
based on the degree of commitment and infrastructure linkages. Because they involve a high 
degree of commitment, they limit a firm’s strategic flexibility.  
 
A company can embark on various expansion options and types of alliances. It is important 
to note that joint ventures are more ‘tight’ than any other form of alliance option represented 
in Figure 3.2. They can take a variety of ways as indicated in Faulkner’s (1995) 
focus/complex alliance classification and can also either be international or domestic. 
 
 
Equity strategic alliances 
 
 
Equity participation as forms of strategic alliances are agreements involving one of the 
partners purchasing a portion of a partner’s equity capital (Terpstra & Simonin, 1993; Bierly 
& Kessler, 1998; Kauser & Shaw, 2004). While there is no new separate entity formed, 
either one of the parties or both may have an equity position in each other. Bierly and 
Kessler further argue that the firm taking the equity position has better access to 
information, can monitor performance and has more control. Terpstra and Simonin (1993) 
observe that equity strategic alliances differ from the traditional joint venture in that no new 
entity is created.  
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Instead, one firm buys a share of an existing firm, usually because of a desire for 
greater control than is available in a contractual arrangement. An equity stake 
alliance is favourable for the development of common projects, as it is a more 
durable relationship than contractual agreement and less subject to quick 
termination when problems arise (Terpstra & Simonin, 1993, p. 7). 
 
In Figure 3.2, equity alliances have been classified as moderate in the ‘tight’ to ‘loose’ 
continuum, because firms enjoy less commitment and more flexibility as compared to joint 
ventures. Just like joint ventures, they can take a variety of forms as indicated in Figure 3.2. 
They can range from focused to more complex arrangements. Conceptually that can involve 
more than two partners though their definition is limited to two partners as in Terpstra and 
Simonin (1993), Bierly and Kessler (1998) and Kauser & Shaw (2004). They have been 
identified as partial acquisitions and equity participating alliances by Clarke-Hill et al. 
(1998). Terpstra and Simonin (1993) cite Mitsubishi Heavy Industries buying of a 20 per 
cent stake of Beloit in the papermaking equipment industry as an example of an equity 
strategic alliance. Bierly and Kessler, see equity alliances as problematic since it is more 
difficult to transfer and integrate knowledge than when using a joint venture. 
 
 
Non-equity alliances 
 
These are contractual alliances that do not include an equity position.  In Figure 3.2, non-
equity alliances have been classified as ‘loose’ because they not only provide more 
flexibility for partners (less commitment), but are also less sophisticated and usually short-
term. Bierly and Kessler argue that non-equity alliances are very efficient for explicit, 
simple arrangements, but often fail because contracts cannot be written that provide 
adequate control of the partnership. It is important to note that these alliances are more 
‘loose’ than any other form of alliance option represented in Figure 3.2. They can take a 
variety of forms and can be either international or domestic.  
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International/Domestic 
 
The domestic and international dimension indicates whether or not the alliance transcends 
national boundaries. Organisations form both domestic and international alliances. Bleeke 
and Ernst (1995) report that both domestic and international alliances are growing at the rate 
of 25 per cent annually in the USA. International alliances are a useful vehicle for 
international strategy (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991; 1995; Dussauge & Garrette, 1999). They are 
established to speed entry into new markets, develop and commercialise new products, gain 
skill and share costs (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991). Dussage and Garrette (1999) observe that after 
establishing a dominant position in their domestic markets, companies can then successfully 
internationalise. This view is opposed by Etemad et al. (2001) who argue that while 
competition in global markets was traditionally the realm of large companies, with smaller 
businesses remaining local or regional, the global competitive environment has dramatically 
changed, allowing SMEs to compete globally by entering into cooperative relationships 
with larger, multinational enterprises, allowing SMEs to reach global markets and achieve 
economies of scale. It is therefore imperative to note that companies can enter into different 
types of alliances as shown in Table 3.2, at either domestic or international level, or both. A 
company can therefore be involved in a network of intricate alliances at domestic and 
international level at the same time, depending on which strategies are being pursued. 
 
 
Focused/Complex (Organic) Alliance 
 
This dimension indicates the complexity of alliance relationships a company involves itself 
in. The focused alliance has been defined by Faulkner (1995) as a collaborative arrangement 
between two or more companies, set up to meet a clearly defined set of circumstances in a 
particular way. “The precise form of arrangement may vary, but the nature of the alliance is 
focused, with clear remits and understanding of respective contributions and rewards” 
(Faulkner, 1995, p. 26). On the other hand, organic/complex alliances may display a number 
of characteristics. Firstly, a company may be involved in a bilateral alliance but involving 
certain parts or even the entire organisation of each partner (Faulkner, 1995). For example, 
such an alliance may include joint R&D, joint manufacturing, joint development and 
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sourcing of parts. Secondly, many organisations today are involved in multiple alliances, 
often with multiple partners (Doz and Hamel, 1998). “Many firms are involved in several 
alliances, …While some, such as Corning, find ways to keep their alliances separate and run 
them as portfolios of discrete bilateral relationships, others find themselves entangled in a 
complex web of interdependent relationships” (Doz and Hamel, 1998, p. 221). Astley and 
Fombrun (1983) see the organisational world as imbued with transitive relations that create 
a subtle and highly ramified interconnectedness among its elements. They further argue that 
“resource flows between apparently distant, but symbiotically related, sectors of the 
economy create, in effect, a giant corporate web” (Astley and Fombrun, 1983, p. 584). This 
creates a relationship of true interdependence, to the mutual advantage of all involved in the 
alliance network (Etemad et al., 2001). 
 
 
Two Party/consortium 
 
This dimension indicates the number of alliance partners. The number of alliance partners 
run from just two to many. Terpstra and Simonin (1993) argue that the distinction between 
two-partners and consortium cooperations is relevant particularly in the light of increased 
degree of complexity of alliance formations because this affects how a strategic alliance is 
managed. A consortium is a distinct form of strategic alliance among three or more parties, 
regardless of the equity structure (Terpstra & Simonin, 1993; Faulkner, 1995). Consortia are 
common in large projects where the resources and capabilities of any two firms are 
inadequate and may involve government agencies as partners (i.e. in the defence industry). 
The literature support the view that consortia are mostly prevalent in industries with very 
heavy development demands (Terpstra & Simonin, 1993).  For instance in the aircraft 
industry, a number of European shareholders set up Airbus Industries as an aircraft 
manufacturing company to compete with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas (Faulkner, 1995).  
In the electronic industry, Terpstra and Simonin (1993) observe that Toshiba (Japan), 
Siemens A.G. (Germany), and General Electric Co. (United States) agreed to combine their 
technologies in microchips into a ‘cell library’ where each participant researches and 
develops their own cell that are then added to the common library.  
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3.5  Focusing the strategic alliances debate 
 
The above discussion on strategic alliance options and classification does not offer solutions 
as to what form of classification (as listed in Table 3.2) should be termed strategic alliances. 
This is imperative because not all forms of inter-organisational collaborations are strategic 
alliances. However, as Table 3.2 shows, the debate and views on this subject is varied and 
not easily reconcilable. For instance, Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt (2001, p. 202) distinguishes 
strategic alliances from other collaborative arrangements (subcontracting, cross-licensing, 
consortia, joint venture and network) while a number of authors in Table 3.2 have listed 
some of these arrangements as strategic alliances.  
 
One perspective that attempts to consolidate these divergent arguments is proposed by 
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) and also adopted by Mockler et al. (1997) and Mockler (2001) 
as shown in Figure 3.3. Using the three necessary and sufficient characteristics of strategic 
alliances (discussed earlier in this chapter), Yoshino and Rangan (1995) set out to delineate 
the parameters of strategic alliances. They argue that mergers, acquisitions, licensing, and 
cross-licensing agreements, franchising, joint ventures subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations, and buy/sell and other contracts are not strategic alliances. However, 
considering arguments by Mockler et al. (1997) and Mockler (2001) mean that some of 
these collaborative arrangements which Yoshino and Rangan (1995) perceive not as 
alliances could still be considered as strategic alliances.  
 
While Mockler et al. (1997) and Mockler (1999; 2001) concur with Yoshino and Rangan’s 
(1995) characteristics of strategic alliances, and their itemisation of the same as indicated 
above, they differ in their categorisation of licensing and franchising agreements. Yoshino 
and Rangan, (1995, p. 6) maintain that “licensing and franchising agreements, because they 
do not call for continuous transfer of technology, products, or skills between partners, are 
not strategic alliances, nor are cross-licensing arrangements that involve continuing 
exchange of technology but not shared control over technology-related tasks.” On the other 
hand, Mockler, (1999, p. 6) see strategic alliances as ranging “…from those having minimal 
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interaction – as in licensing agreements that require only some updating of technologies – to 
large, highly interactive, and continuing joint ventures.”  
 
Strategic alliances come in many shapes, sizes and kinds, and can range from ‘tight’ (e.g. 
joint ventures) to ‘loose’ (e.g. non-equity ventures) arrangements entered into by domestic 
or international organisations. While strategic alliances are part of a whole range of 
collaborative agreements that organisations enter into, the discussion has shown that there is 
no common agreement among various authors on what is a strategic alliance. More 
confusing is the irreconcilable polarity of alliance categorisation, raising issues of whether 
some organisational arrangements which some authors perceive as strategic alliances are 
really alliances at all. Faced with this dilemma, this thesis relies on Yoshino and Rangan’s 
(1995) three necessary and sufficient characteristics of strategic alliances, to identify a range 
of collaborative arrangements, which could be, classified as strategic alliance. These include 
partnership contracts involving (research and development, product development, sourcing, 
manufacturing, marketing, distribution/service), existing equity (equity investments in joint 
ventures, equity exchange), non-subsidiary joint venture, joint ventures with varying 
percentages of partner ownership and consortia. Further investigation into the subject by 
Mockler (1999) shows that licensing and franchising can also be included as strategic 
alliances as they still can meet the three necessary and sufficient characteristics of strategic 
alliances, particularly in the tourism industry where there is evidence of a two-way 
information exchange between the franchisor and franchisee (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a).  
 
Licensing and franchising have been viewed as mostly relevant to be seen as strategic 
alliances, particularly in the tourism industry. Franchising has been defined as “…an 
organisational form in which the owner of a protected trademark grants to another person, 
for some consideration, the right to operate under this trademark for the purpose of 
producing or distributing a product or service” (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a, p. 29). The 
dilemma of whether or not licensing and franchising constitute a strategic alliance is best 
clarified by Contractor and Kundu (1998a)who argue that franchising in hotels goes beyond 
just simple involvement in competition based on brand but on differences in the business 
methods, procedures, and services offered to customers through strategic partnerships. They 
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call this process “business format franchising” defined by the U.S.A. Department of 
Commerce (1988) as cited by Contractor and Kundu (1998a, p. 29), as an on going business 
relationship between franchiser and franchisee that include not only the product, service, 
and trademark, but the entire business concept itself – a marketing strategy and plan, 
operating manuals and standards, quality control, and a continuing process of assistance and 
guidance. Contractor and Kundu (1998a, p. 29) therefore argue that: 
Hotel chains try to distinguish themselves from others by their brand names, 
architectural designs, levels of service, computerized reservation systems, and global 
logistics delivery. The hotel business involves as much ‘technology’ or proprietary 
competitive expertise, as manufacturing systems. In the hotel business, therefore, a 
franchise is not merely a matter of signing an arms-length contract and then passively 
raking in the royalties. Rather, it is an ongoing relationship that can include continuing 
injections of product developments from the franchisor to the franchisees, daily 
materials supplies, and continuous two-way exchange of marketing data and 
international strategy information. The legal form may be a contract, but the de facto 
organizational behaviour is an involving strategic partnership between franchisor and its 
franchisees. In the case of an international hotel company, each franchise comprises a 
piece of an overall global strategy. 
 
In order to address the research question and its sub-questions in Chapter One, it is 
necessary to understand what alliances are and their different types. This section does that. 
Figure 3.3 shows those collaborative arrangements, which are strategic alliances. These 
exclude contractual arrangements like buy/sell and other contracts, terminations 
arrangements like dissolution of entity and mergers and acquisitions, and new equity 
ventures like joint venture subsidiaries of multinational corporations. The following types 
from Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3 also listed by Pansiri (2005a) are accepted as strategic 
alliances: joint ventures; licensing; franchises; marketing and distribution agreements; 
production and manufacturing alliances; research and development contracts; technology 
development coalitions. However, since this study is in the tourism industry, which is 
essentially a service industry, production and manufacturing alliances, and research and 
development contracts, are excluded from strategic alliance types to be studied because they 
are not relevant to the travel sector. 
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Figure 3.3: Types of inter-enterprise collaborative relationships 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Yoshino and Rangan (1995, p. 9). 
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successful implementation of strategic alliances (Kanter, 1994; Brouthers & Wilkinson, 
1995; Faulkner, 1995; Mendleson & Polonsky, 1995; Medcof, 1997; Evans, 2001; Hagen, 
2002). Many authors have called for more empirical studies of the underlying causes of 
successful alliances (Smith, Carroll & Ashford, 1995; Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995; 
Saxton, 1997; Medina-Munoz & Garcia-Falcon, 2000). Saxton (1997, p. 444) argues that 
scholars know very little about the underlying causes of successful alliances and that “what 
is lacking is systematic analysis within a sample of alliances of the factors associated with 
those that are more satisfactory and beneficial to partner firms”. The response to this has 
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three relational predictors - competence, commitment and compatibility on partner firm’s 
evaluation of its alliance relationship on two aspects – satisfaction and continuity. They 
found that these predictors strongly influence alliance satisfaction and continuity.   
 
Past research also indicate that finding the right alliance partner is extremely important 
because the failure of many alliances can easily be traced to partner selection at the planning 
stage, because it is at this stage where risk minimisation should be addressed (Holtbrügge, 
2004). The emphasis on choosing the right partner suggests that social relationships play an 
important role in the control and coordination of strategic alliances (Jordan & Lowe, 2004). 
Geringer (1991) argues that the importance of partner selection is that it influences the 
overall mix of available skills and resources, the operating policies and procedures, and the 
short- and long-term viability of an alliance. Because of this, it is therefore critical for 
prospective alliance partners to understand the process of partner selection and the 
variables, which influence that process. In choosing appropriate partners, strategic alliance 
research identifies four Cs (compatibility, capability, commitment and control) as criteria 
for successful pre-selection of alliance partners (Kanter, 1994; Faulkner, 1995; Mendleson 
& Polonsky, 1995; Brouthers & Wilkinson, 1995; Medcof, 1997; Hagen, 2002). In addition 
many authors have also identified trust as an important variable determining whether an 
alliance can be maintained or not (Howarth et al., 1995; Hitt et al., 1996; Medcof, 1997; Das 
& Teng, 1998; García-Canal, Duarte, Crido & LIaneza, 2002). This variable is perceived as 
an important determinant of alliance continuity and has been taken into account in the 
research framework as shown in Figure 3.1. The following is a discussion of each of these 
factors: 
 
 
Compatibility 
 
Kanter (1994) observes that like relationships between people, organisation relationships 
begin with courtship, where organisations attracted to each other seek to discover their 
compatibilities. Compatibility is cited as one of the main ingredients for a successful 
alliance because the sophistication and expression of the strategy will not work if the 
 75 
relationship is not workable (Hagen, 2002). The degree of compatibility among partner 
firms has been found to be an important predictor of the success or failure of joint ventures 
(Shamdasani & Seth, 1995). Compatibility covers an array of issues including broad 
historical, philosophical, and strategic grounds, values and principles, and hopes for the 
future (Kanter, 1994), as well as cultural and organisational  issues (Shamdasani & Seth, 
1995). In strategic alliance research, compatibility has been viewed within the context of 
strategic compatibility, defined as “…the extent to which an alliance partner has 
complementary goals and shares similar orientations that facilitate coordination of alliance 
activities and execution of alliance strategies” (Shamdasani & Seth, 1995, p. 11). 
 
Studies linking strategic alliance formation to compatibility of partners in tourism are 
lacking. The literature cited above suggests that it is important for potential partners to find 
a certain level of compatibility between them in order to form an alliance. Therefore, the 
absence of tourism literature on compatibility of alliance members does not suggest that 
such a consideration is not done. This thesis takes the view of previous studies in strategic 
alliances in general by linking strategic alliance formation to compatibility of partners. 
 
 
Capability 
 
The ‘Resource-based view of the firm’ identifies an organisation as a collection of unique 
resources and capabilities that provide the basis for its strategy and is the primary source of 
its returns. Hitt et al. (1996) maintain that capabilities emerge over time through complex 
interactions between and among tangible and intangible resources, and they represent an 
organisation’s capacity to deploy resources that have been purposely integrated to achieve a 
desired end state. Hitt et al. (1996) further see skills and knowledge as the primary base of 
an organisation’s capabilities which are often developed in specific functional areas such as 
manufacturing, R&D, marketing and advertising. Therefore partner selection is also based 
on whether the operational capability in terms of resources and core-competencies is present 
for the respective partners (Hagen, 2002).  
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In general terms, competence has been referred to as the ability or fitness to perform 
(Shamdasani & Seth, 1995). Hence an organisation’s core-competencies represent the 
“…collective learning in the organisation, especially how to coordinate diverse skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies” (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, p. 82). In the context 
of strategic alliances therefore, the issue of capabilities concerns how complementary 
competencies between organisations can be coordinated effectively to maximise the 
partnership’s competitive advantage (Shamdasani & Seth, 1995). Shamdasani and Seth also 
argue that in ongoing strategic alliances, this could be determined by continuity decisions. 
These are decisions closely related to the overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
strategic alliance based on evaluation of outcomes and experiences received in the past and 
reflect expectations of future cooperation. 
 
Within the context of tourism, the general view has been that businesses form strategic 
alliances for defensive17 and innovative18
 
 objectives (Morrison, 1994). These objectives 
relate to capabilities as the basis for competitive strategy. The majority of tourism 
businesses are SMEs (Bolin & Greenwood, 2003) with limited capital investment, lack of 
specialist training and design and maintenance of ICT systems (Evans & Peacock, 1999). A 
study by Chen and Tseng (2005) supports the idea of partner selection based on capability. 
Their study assesses the performance of marketing alliances between the tourism industry 
(hotels, restaurants, travel agencies and entertainment establishments) and credit card 
issuing banks. Their findings show that ‘partners having excellent resources’ and ‘the 
potential for mutually beneficial relationship’ are the two major criteria tourism companies 
used in selecting alliance partners. 
 
                                                 
17 Morrison (1994, p. 26) observes that defensive objectives involve gaining “strength in competing against the 
corporate chains by achieving advantages through economies of scale and the fashioning of a common brand 
identity, thus seeking to replicate the strength of the corporate chains”.  
18 Morrison (1994, p. 26) observes that innovative objectives involve exploiting new opportunities presented 
by changes in communications technology and global markets in order to achieve competitive advantage 
through innovation, with new products and services.  
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Commitment 
 
Commitment to the alliance is the keystone to success (Hagen, 2002), and is an essential 
element in social exchange behaviour. Ohmae (1989, p. 151) warns against one-sided 
asymmetry of effort and attention that have doomed relationships, and pronounces that 
“…alliances are like marriage – they only work when both partners do.” Commitment has 
been described as a pledge by alliance members to undertake certain actions that will 
facilitate the attainment of the alliance’s strategic goals (Shamdasani and Seth, 1994). 
Morgan and Hunt (1994, p. 23) define relationship commitment as “…an exchange partner 
believing that an ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum 
efforts at maintaining it; that is, the committed party believes the relationship is worth 
working on to ensure that it endures indefinitely.” Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpandé 
(1992, p. 316) define commitment to the relationship as “…an enduring desire to maintain a 
valued relationship.” Therefore, a partner’s commitment is manifested by the extent to 
which a partner is willing and able to commit resources (time, tangible and intangible) to 
fulfil the goals and objectives of the alliance, and be able to display the desire and intent to 
maintain the alliance.  
 
Medina-Munoz and Garcia-Falcon’s (2000) study of inter-organisational relationships 
between hotels and travel agencies found that commitment has a positive effect on ‘overall 
success’ and ‘satisfaction with travel agent marketing support’. They argue that for hotels to 
have successful relationships with travel agencies, they should show more commitment or 
dedication to maintaining the relationships.    
 
 
Control 
 
The fourth partner selection variable cited by Medcof (1997) relates to the control of an 
alliance, and whether such control is likely to contribute to alliance effectiveness. Control is 
used in this thesis to refer to “…a regulatory process by which the elements of a system are 
made more predictable through the establishment of standards in the pursuit of some desired 
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objective or state” (Das & Teng, 1998, p. 493) or “…the process by which one entity 
influences, to varying degrees, the behaviour and output of another entity …through the use 
of power, authority …and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms” 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1989, pp. 236-237). Control is not only a crucial organisational 
process but also a complex and multidimensional concept that many researchers over the 
years have studied using different approaches (Geringer & Hebert, 1989).  The literature 
suggests that control is a key source of confidence in partner cooperation (Parkhe, 1993b; 
Gulati, 1995a), therefore organisations in alliances tend to be more confident about partner 
cooperation when they feel that they have adequate level of control over their partners (Das 
& Teng, 1998). At the same time, the very control that is supposed to enhance partner 
confidence in the alliance may stifle autonomy and flexibility of alliance members.   
 
While strategic alliances present new opportunities with risks that can be shared, they often 
limit the discretion, control, and profit potential of partners, while demanding managerial 
attention and other resources that might be directed toward the firm’s mainstream activities 
(Hitt, et al., 1996). Howarth et al. (1995) argue that strategic alliances also present costs and 
risks to partner organisations because of their organisational form, and they associate these 
with organisations’ loss of autonomy and flexibility accompanied with possible relegation 
to an inferior position in the alliance. Therefore, control challenges facing decision makers 
in alliances involves what level of authority one should have in using and developing 
alliance capabilities, and to what extent should it be shared among alliance partners through 
the various management committee meetings in order to prevent one partner becoming 
dominant (Gomes-Casseres 1997).  
 
Geringer and Hebert (1989) distinguish three complementary and interdependent 
dimensions through which alliance partners tend to conceive control: (a) the focus of 
control, i.e., the scope of activities over which alliance partners exercise control. (b) extent – 
the degree of control they wish to exercise, and (c) mechanisms – how they wish to exercise 
control, e.g. at board meeting, informally, or by retaining the right to make their own 
decisions on certain issues. However, researchers suggest that there is no one best way 
control can be exercised, therefore it differs from context to context and from alliance to 
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alliance taking into account varying considerations. For example, Evans (2001) suggests 
that in some cases, when strong focused leadership is required, and the interests of all 
members are closely aligned with those of the leading firm, control dominance by one firm 
might be desirable. However, in other circumstances, the leading firm’s actions might be 
perceived as opportunistic, making the power imbalance among partners a potential for 
conflict. The critical issue that needs attention, in Evans’ view is the assessment of alliance 
control in a way in which each partner is able to achieve the strategic objectives it has set 
when entering into an alliance relationship. A study by Medina-Muñoz, Medina-Muñoz and 
Garcia-Falcon (2003) suggest how important it is for tour operators to exercise control over 
the accommodation companies with which they deal.  It is equally true that accommodation 
companies should exert the same level of control on their strategic alliance partners for 
example, tour operators.  
 
 
Trust 
 
Trust is considered one of the core features of a relationship (Perry, Cavaye & Coote, 2002), 
and an important strategic asset in many strategic alliances because all aspects of a 
cooperative relationship cannot be specified in a contract (Hitt et al., 1996; García-Canal et 
al., 2002). The study of trust has occupied scholars from a number of disciplines.  What is 
notable in most of these studies is that there is no common definition of trust (Bhattacharya, 
Devinney & Pillitla, 1998) although it is clear that the efficiency, adjustment, and even 
survival of any social group depends upon the presence or absence of such trust (Rotter, 
1967). From the diverse body of scholarly work, Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) 
suggest that trust is a “meso” concept, integrating micro-level psychological processes and 
group dynamics with macro-level institutional arrangements. The Academy of Management 
Review (July 1998 issue) devoted much attention to the study of trust from diverse 
perspectives with differing definitions. The most commonly cited definition in this issue is 
one by Mayer and Davis (1995, p. 726) who see trust as “…a willingness to be vulnerable to 
another party”. This definition was adopted by McKnight, Cummings and Chervany (1998); 
Mishra and Spreitzer (1998) and Jones and George (1998). Doney, Cannon and Mullen 
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(1998, p. 604) define trust as “…a willingness to rely on another party and to take action in 
circumstances where such action makes one vulnerable”.  
 
The issue of vulnerability as an important aspect of trust has also been referred to by many 
scholars including Bigley and Pearce (1998), Lewicki, Mcallister and Bies (1998) Whitener, 
Brodt, Korsgaard and Werner (1998), and Bhattacharya et al.(1998). Trust exists when one 
party has confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity (Morgan & Hunt, 
1994) and is defined by Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395) as “…a psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behaviour of another.” From this perspective, Rotter (1967, p. 651) defines 
trust as “…an expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or 
written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon.” Moorman et al. (1992, 
p. 315) and Moorman, Deshpandé and Zaltman (1993, p. 82) develops upon Rotter’s 
definition to conceive trust as “…a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one 
has confidence.” This definition covers the two general approaches to trust in the literature 
(Moorman et al., 1992; 1993; Perry et al., 2002). 
First, trust has been viewed as a belief, sentiment, or expectation about an 
exchange partner’s trustworthiness that results from the partner’s expertise, 
reliability, or intentionality …Second, trust has been viewed as a behavioral 
intention or behavior that reflects a reliance on a partner and involves vulnerability 
and uncertainty on the part of the trustor (Moorman et al., 1992, p. 315). 
 
From these diverse definitions of trust, Bhattacharya et al. (1998) develop several themes of 
how trust can be viewed. These themes cast reflections on the relevance of trust to strategic 
alliances. They argue that trust:  
• Cannot exist in an environment of certainty. 
• Reflects an aspect of predictability. 
• Exists in an environment of mutuality. 
• Any definition of trust must account for the strength and importance of trust. 
• Trust is ‘good’.   
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There is a general agreement across disciplines that trust is important in a number of ways: 
it enables cooperative behaviour; promotes adaptive organisational forms, such as strategic 
alliances and network relations; reduces harmful conflict; decreases transaction costs; 
facilitates rapid formulation of ad hoc work groups; and promotes effective responses to 
crises. All of these reasons are relevant to the survival of strategic alliances.  
 
Trust has been seen as critical in organisational relationships (Perry et al., 2002) and 
strategic alliances in particular (Howarth et al., 1995; Hitt et al., 1996; Medcof, 1997; Das & 
Teng, 1998; García-Canal et al., 2002). There is evidence which suggests that firms entering 
strategic alliances are potentially vulnerable to the opportunistic behaviour of their partners 
(Hamel, Doz & Prahalad, 1989; Gulati, 1995b; 1995c). Das and Teng (1998) maintain that 
inter-firm trust is a source of confidence in partner cooperation and in strategic alliances, it 
seems wide ranging in character, including lowering transaction costs, inducing desirable 
behaviour, reducing the extent of formal contracts, and facilitating dispute resolution. Trust 
should not only be conceived as an input but also as an output – gradually developed and 
accumulated over time through the development of a relationship. Hence, García-Canal et 
al. (2002) argue that the trust generated by partners, in part due to the efforts of both with 
respect to the maintenance of personal contacts among the managers allows the alliance to 
overcome certain critical moments in its development. Therefore Hitt et al. (1996) cautions 
against opportunistic behaviour in strategic alliance, exemplified by cheating, shirking, 
distorting information, misleading partners, providing substandard products/services, and 
appropriating partners’ critical resources (Das and Teng, 1998). Such practices can only 
develop a reputation that will prevent future cooperative opportunities because the 
organisation will be considered untrustworthy by potential partners. While on the other 
hand, if an organisation has developed a strong reputation in cooperative relationships, 
potential partners know that a strategic alliance formed with such a firm is likely to be 
successful hence they will be willing to be involved in the strategic alliance. 
 
Citing a number of authors, Medina-Munoz and Garcia-Falcon (2000) observe that trust 
seems to be important in relationships between hotels and travel agents, to the extent that 
successful relationships can be identified by their participants’ trusting of each other and 
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meeting their commitments. This is confirmed by Medina-Munoz and Garcia-Falcon’s 
(2000) findings which show that ‘the extent to which the travel agent is trustworthy’ and 
‘overall trust in the relationship’ are positively associated with both ‘overall success’ and 
‘satisfaction with marketing support’. They conclude that “…more successful relationships 
with travel agents exhibited higher levels of trust, in comparison with the less successful 
relationships” (p. 753). 
 
In order to address sub-questions (c) and (f) in Chapter One effectively, it is necessary to 
understand how choice of alliance partners has been treated in the literature. This section 
has underscored the importance of choice of alliance partners in strategic alliance formation 
and further identified five broad factors - compatibility, capability, commitment, control and 
trust as criteria for successful pre-selection of alliance partners. This thesis investigates 
these factors with a view to relate them to company executive characteristics (sub-question 
c), and alliance performance evaluation (sub-question f). 
 
 
3.7  Strategic alliance scope 
 
Klint and Sjöberg (2003) underscores the importance of the subject of strategic alliance 
structure and scope maintaining that while performance of joint actions, e.g. general success 
in cooperation, profits achieved by individual companies, and the appreciation perceived by 
individual companies, are functions of conduct (e.g. integration, exchange of knowledge, 
adaptation), these factors are in turn governed by structural phenomena. Therefore, 
determining the structure and scope of a strategic alliance is very important and it requires 
detailed consideration of issues across a broad spectrum (Evans, 2001).   
 
Alliance scope is complex. Colombo (2003) measures it in terms of the number of partners, 
number of geographic areas, and operation activities (e.g. single value chain or full 
complement of value chain activities). Faulkner (1995) supports such a measure. Research 
has established that the scope of a collaboration affects its initial governance structure 
(Reuer, Zollo & Singh, 2002). Pisano (1989) as cited by Reuer et al. (2002) notes that 
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biotechnology alliances that entail multiple projects are more likely to be equity than non-
equity alliances. A study of North American, European and Japanese information 
technology industry alliances by Colombo (2003) found positive and statistically significant 
relationships between the number of partners in an alliance and alliances that span over 
several activities. In line with Oxley (1997), Colombo (2003) classifies alliances into three 
categories – equity joint ventures, non-equity bilateral forms19 and non-equity unilateral 
forms.20
 
 Positive and statistically significant relationships were found to exist between 
geographic scope and, equity joint ventures and non-equity unilateral forms.   
Mockler et al. (1997), whose study is based on the airline industry, is mostly relevant to this 
study since the airline industry is part of a broader tourism industry. They maintain that 
once a desired type or overall strategic structure has been selected there are several options 
available regarding the detailed structure of the alliance. They group these decisions into 
five categories relating to marketing, product/service, equipment and logistics.  
 
This thesis investigates alliance scope by considering the number of alliances an 
organisation is involved in and the number of geographic areas. The number of alliance 
partners was considered difficult to identify given the many types of alliances tourism 
businesses are involved in. In this manner, this section addresses sub-question (b) in 
Chapter One which relates to relationships between company and executive characteristics 
and alliance decisions.   
 
 
                                                 
19 According to Colombo (2003, p. 1216) these are strategic alliance arrangements which involve joint 
performance of activities, sharing, and/or exchange of resources among partners. They manage their 
interdependencies by incorporating control mechanisms such as the creation of a managerial hierarchy, joint 
work teams, and transfer of technical and managerial personnel that simulate to some extent the characteristics 
of equity forms. 
20 Colombo (2003, P. 1216) maintains that these alliances generally rely on the division of labour and the 
specialisation of tasks among partners; each partner is in charge of a specific activity and transfers the output 
to the other parties. The extent of the interaction between partners is low and coordination mechanisms are 
almost absent. 
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3.8  Performance of alliances 
 
Evaluation is an important aspect of management and collaborative strategies in particular 
(Harrigan, 1985; 1986). Harper (2001) observes that it is essential to evaluate alliance 
efforts because as an alliance progresses, it runs the risk of taking on a life of its own and 
evolving away from its original objectives. Studies on strategic alliances have reported 
unsatisfactory performance with few signs of improving especially in developed countries 
(Beamish & Delios, 1997), and very high failure rates (Gulati, 1998; Killing, 1982; 
Geringer & Herbert, 1991; Prevot & Meschi, 2006) due to management problems, 
conflicting cultures and different control systems. As a result many writers have sought to 
identify the recipe for alliance success e.g. (Ohmae, 1989a; Bleeke & Ernst, 1991; Kanter, 
1991; 1994; Frankel, Whipple & Frayer, 1996). The main aim has been to identify 
antecedent conditions and emergent processes that can influence performance. This is varied 
and includes, but not limited to: revealing questions about alliance progress (Harper, 2001); 
alliance strength, autonomy and flexibility (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991); a list of Dos for 
successful collaboration (Ohmae, 1989a); flexibility in management of the alliance, building 
trust with partners, regular information exchange with partners, constructive management of 
conflict, continuity of boundary personnel responsible for the interface between the firm and 
the alliance, and managing partner expectations (Gulati, 1998).   
 
Performance has been a central construct of study in research on alliances and in larger 
domains of study such as international business and strategic management (Beamish & 
Delios, 1997). Beamish and Delios (1997, p. 105) define performance as the survival, 
duration, instability or failure of an alliance; “…the degree of parental control; the 
effectiveness of technological transfer; the extent to which financial goals are realised; the 
degree of managerial satisfaction, and so forth.” However, research on alliance performance 
has been difficult to conduct due to research obstacles which include complexity of alliance 
performance, given the multifaceted objectives of many alliances (Evans, 2001), and 
measuring alliance performance in a consistent and appropriate manner and the logistical 
challenges of collecting the rich data necessary to assess performance (Gulati, 1998; Kale, 
Dyer & Singh, 2002). Although Hamel et al. (1989) argue that alliance agreements should 
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establish specific performance requirements, they concede that many of the skills that 
migrate between companies are not covered in the formal terms of collaboration. Gulati 
(1998) also argues that a further complication results from the dyadic nature of alliances. 
“Sometimes performance is asymmetric: one firm achieves its objectives while the other 
fails to do so” (Gulati, 1998, p. 307). This argument is supported by Hamel et al. (1989), 
Evans (2001), and Khanna, Gulati and Nohria (1998). For example, the research by Hamel 
et al. (1989) shows that Asian companies often learn more from their Western partners than 
vice-versa because they contribute difficult-to-unravel strengths, while Western partners 
contribute easy–to-imitate technology.  
 
A précis of past research on international joint ventures (IJV) by Geringer and Hebert 
(1991) shows significant differences in the operationalisation of IJV performance. They cite 
a number of studies, which used a variety of financial indicators such as profitability, 
growth and cost position; objective measures of performance such as the survival of IJV, its 
duration, instability of its ownership and renegotiation of the IJV contract. Luo, (2002) used 
archival data to measure IJV performance, including sales level and return on investment. 
Jennings, Artz, Gillin and Christodouloy (2000) also used governance costs, revenue 
growth, profitability and market value as measures for alliance performance. However, they 
argue that these financial and objective measures embody potential limitations that are 
critical to evaluation of IJV performance. Some of the problems they cite as associated with 
these measures include unavailability of data and the fact that IJV parents generate financial 
returns through other mechanisms than dividends “…including supply contracts, 
management fees, technology licensing fees, royalties and transfers” (Geringer and Hebert, 
1990, p. 251). 
 
The above cited measurement obstacles have not stopped researchers from inquiring 
rigorously on factors associated with the success of alliances. What it means is that the 
subject has been approached cautiously with varying methodological debates and 
fundamental differences. For example, Anand and Khanna (2000) used daily data on the 
stock market returns of each publicly listed firm to estimate the incremental amount of value 
creation for each firm in the alliance. They found strong evidence that firms learn to create 
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more value as they accumulate experience in joint venturing but their research found no 
evidence that firms learn to create value as they accumulate experience in licensing. Gulati 
(1998) maintains that detailed surveys or careful fieldwork on alliances is required in order 
to uncover the multiple facets of alliance performance and considers the perspectives of all 
the partners in the alliance. Gulati is supported by Kale et al. (2002) who caution against the 
use of traditional accounting or financial measures like sales growth, return on assets, or 
profitability as measures for alliance performance. They further contend that these measures 
of alliance performance have attracted criticism for their limited ability to provide 
information about collaboration effectiveness.   
 
There has been a growing trend in the literature towards multiple method research work that 
puts less emphasis on objective measures and toward perceptual managers’ assessments of 
performance (Killing, 1982; Harrigan, 1985; 1986; Parkhe, 1993a; Inkpen, 1995; Beamish 
& Delios, 1997). According to Kale et al. (2002), managers assess performance in terms of 
either their overall satisfaction with the alliance, or the extent to which an alliance has met 
its stated objectives. Such approaches enable the collection of a host of subjective and 
objective measures on which performance can be assessed, as well as an examination of 
dyadic asymmetries in perceptions (Gulati, 1998).  
 
Other researchers who have opted to use managerial assessments measuring both the 
perceived performance of and satisfaction with alliances have differed with Kale et al. 
(2002) view regarding financial indicators. They argue that their choice of managerial 
assessments over financial indicators does not imply that financial indicators are inadequate 
measures of alliance performance but rather access to financial data is often very difficult to 
obtain due to their commercial sensitivity (Taylor, 2005). In Kauser and Shaw’s (2004) 
case, the researchers were informed from the initial contact they made with the participating 
companies that financial information would be almost impossible to obtain.  
 
While managerial assessment of alliance performance has received some criticism for 
reasons of bias or inaccuracy of measures (Beamish & Delios, 1997; Kale et al., 2002), 
studies by Dess and Robinson (1984), and Geringer and Hebert (1991) demonstrate the 
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existence of correlation between objective and subjective measures. Dess and Robinson 
(1984) used both subjective and ‘self-reported’ objective measures of return on assets and 
growth in sales to measure the economic performance of manufacturing organisations. They 
found significant positive correlation between objective and subjective measures of both 
return on assets and sales growth. Geringer and Hebert’s (1991) study of IJV in the U.S.A. 
and Canada demonstrate the existence of a high correlation between subjective assessments 
of overall satisfaction with the IJV’s performance (use of 5-point Likert-type scales on the 
level of satisfaction, e.g. ‘In general, how satisfied has your firm been with the joint 
venture’s over all performance’ and objective measures (survival, stability and duration).   
 
A number of scholars have used managerial assessment, which many believe, if properly 
done can be a reasonable way to assess alliance performance (Geringer & Herbert, 1991; 
Anderson & Narus, 1990; Parkhe, 1993b; Inkpen, 1995; Kale et al., 2002). These 
assessments have concentrated on harmony between alliance partners, meeting alliance 
objectives, enhancement of parent firm’s competitiveness, level of critical skills or 
capabilities requirement from alliance partner (Kale et al., 2002); parent level of satisfaction 
with joint venture performance, rating of joint venture performance versus initial projections 
at the time of venture formation, survival, stability and duration of the venture (Geringer & 
Herbert, 1991); value creation, learning, protection of competencies, and retention of 
flexibility by alliance participants (Mockler, 1999); fulfilment of strategic needs and indirect 
performance indicators (Parkhe, 1993b); and perceived performance of and satisfaction with 
the alliance (Medina-Munoz & Garcia-Falcon, 2000; Kauser & Shaw, 2004; Taylor, 2005; 
Chen & Tseng, 2005). 
 
In tourism, alliance performance has been researched using managerial assessments. Two 
examples are those by Medina-Munoz and Garcia-Falcon (2000) and, Chen and Tseng 
(2005). Medina-Munoz and Garcia-Falcon (2000) investigated determinants of successful 
inter-organisational relationships between hotels and travel agencies. In their study, 
successful relationship was measured by ‘overall success’ and ‘satisfaction with marketing 
support’. They used hotel company managers to assess the success of these relationships. 
Chen and Tseng (2005) assess the performance of marketing alliances between the tourism 
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industry and credit card issuing banks, and further identify the underlying factors that would 
affect the performance of the alliance. In their study alliance performance was measured by 
total satisfaction, goal achievement, willingness of continuation, and profit satisfaction. 
They used tourism company managers to assess alliance performance. Similar to this thesis, 
they relate alliance performance to both choice of alliance partners (‘partners having 
excellent resources’ and ‘potential for a mutually beneficial relationship’), and company 
characteristics (industry type, age of company, capital, number of employees, ownership, 
number of allied banks, and alliance experience with banks).  
 
This is the perspective that has been missing in alliance literature. Therefore, this section of 
the literature review addresses research objectives (c) and (b), and sub-questions (e) and (f) 
in Chapter One which relate to relationships between company and executive characteristics 
and alliance performance.   
 
 
3.9  Strategic alliances in tourism 
 
Tourism is one of the highly integrated industries in the world. Dale (2000) illustrates this 
within the context of the UK tour operating industry where the major tour operators have 
followed strategies of consolidation, by integrating (both vertically and horizontally) their 
operations. Most of this integration has been mainly through mergers and acquisitions 
(Bullock, 1998; Dale, 2000). For example, Thomson acquired Horizon Holidays; Airtours 
purchased ASPRO Travel in 1993, also acquired Late Escapes in 1994; First Choice, 
acquired Eclipse, Olympic Holidays; and Thomas Cook, acquired Sunworld and a 14 per 
cent shareholding of First Choice (Bullock, 1998). Poon (1993) uses Porter’s (1987) model 
of the value chain to argue that major players in the tourism industry, particularly airlines, 
hotels, travel argents and tour operators have increasingly integrated in an industry whose 
boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred. She argues that “…it is no longer relevant 
whether a company is an airline, a travel agent, hotel or tour operator. As the boundaries 
among players are re-defined, what becomes more relevant are the activities along the value 
chain that they control” (Poon, 1993, p. 215).  
 89 
 
One defining characteristic of these relationships is the proliferation of strategic alliances 
within the tourism industry and between the industry and other sectors of the economy. Go 
and Hedges (1994) predicted the formation of more strategic alliances among a variety of 
partners as a way of meeting the needs of the traveller. Six years later, Peattie and Moutinho 
(2000) emphasised the need for various segments of the travel industry to stay linked via 
reservation systems, in order to provide the quality of service demanded by the increasingly 
sophisticated and demanding traveller. This is further buttressed by Go and Moutinho 
(2000) who argue that in this fiercely saturated and competitive operating environment, 
hospitality organisations are having to join forces to ensure that they harness the necessary 
resources, both financial and non-financial in order to penetrate the marketplace. The 
argument is that strategic alliances can be used effectively in order to achieve growth and 
competitiveness which, in this industry take a variety of forms, and occur across vertical, 
horizontal, and diagonal [a process whereby firms become involved in tightly related 
activities to reduce costs and to get closer to the customers] relationships (Poon, 1993; 
Bullock, 1998; Go & Appelman, 2001; Dale, 2003) This is so because tourism is a “highly 
complex compounded service brought about through the ‘assembly’ of different services 
that are being delivered by a network of companies that is often global in scope” (Go & 
Appelman, 2001, p. 184). Poon (1993) and Parttie and Mounho (2000) argue that these 
strategic alliances are maintained by information technology.  
Communication technology will encourage the formation of strategic alliances among 
segments of the travel industry. It will be increasingly important for airlines, hotels, 
surface transport providers, restaurants and communication firms to stay linked via 
reservation systems, in order to provide the quality of service demanded by the 
increasingly sophisticated and demanding traveller. As the technology continues to 
improve to facilitate these alliances it can be expected that those firms which have 
invested in the development of this technology will emerge as the players in the most 
successful alliances and thus are likely to become the most profitable. This type of 
investment has not been characteristic of the hospitality industry (Peattie & Moutinho, 
2000,  p. 28). 
 
Tourism companies are embedded in strategic alliances that create a web of networks. One 
important framework that seeks to explain this phenomenon is that designed by Tremblay 
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(1998). Based on economic network organisation, Tremblay’s conceptual framework gives 
a broad understanding of the types of strategic alliances and inter-organisational 
relationships common to tourism businesses. Tremblay identifies and divides future tourism 
strategic alliance networks into three groups, namely horizontal, vertical and local 
destination networks. Expanding on Richardson’s capabilities concept, Tremblay argues 
that firms can appropriate economic rents by undertaking the coordination of function-
specific capabilities, market-specific know-how, or destination-specific competences and 
resources by participating in a number of overlapping strategic alliance networks. However, 
firms have to take into consideration the resource cost of alternative investments in 
maintaining such collaborative relationships. The following is an assessment of strategic 
alliances in tourism which are in line with Tremblay’s framework of alliances. 
 
 
Horizontal strategic alliances (Type H) 
 
The first type of network found in tourism, according to Tremblay, extends horizontally 
across firms holding similar technological capabilities but serving various markets and 
operating in different destinations. These alliance networks invest in competences of the 
traditional industry- or function-specific type and involve many or multiple organisations. 
Tremblay argues that such strategic alliances appropriate the economic rents generated by 
scale-scope economies associated with information technology without requiring ownership 
integration (Figure 3.4, Type H). These types of alliances are mostly prevalent in the airline 
and accommodation sectors. Figure 3.4 depict multiple strategic alliance networks from at 
various locations. It shows that businesses in the tourism industry are involved in many 
strategic alliance types viewed within Tremblay’s network analysis. The first type, (Figure 
3.4, Type H) indicates horizontal strategic alliances between organisations in the same 
industry, i.e. hotels, air lines, tour operators, travel agents attractions and destinations 
operating in different locations.  
 
Morrison (1994) studied strategic alliance partners for the small hotel firms in the UK. 
These strategic alliance partners were selected from four identified categories, namely 
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public sector referral (Gulliver); airline (Galileo); reservation service (Utell); and marketing 
consortia (Best Western). Morrison and Harrison’s (1998) study of the Consort Hotel Group 
evaluates the effectiveness of small hotel firm’s membership of a marketing consortium as a 
strategy for addressing the needs of selectivity, interconnectivity and visibility emphasising 
on how such a hotel can use strategic alliance in order to achieve effective representation 
within electronic distribution systems. They further evaluated how such a hotel can access 
essential marketing skills, providing it with the potential to transform itself from a ‘corner 
shop’ operating mainly in a domestic market, to participation in an ‘electronic shopping 
mall’ with global reach. Morrison and Harrison (1998) conclude that membership to such a 
horizontal alliance is a ‘survival plan’ that enables the continuation of independent small 
firm ownership.  
 
One notable feature of this alliance is its ability to promote the facilities of its member 
hotels nationally and internationally by forming strategic alliances with other consortia 
representing European hotels, such as Neotel, in order to network a pan-European alliance. 
Its system is now linked into the four major GDS networks, Galileo, Sabre, Amadeus and 
Worldspan, offering its members to about 450 000 potential travel agency screens world-
wide (Morrison & Harrison, 1998).   
 
Contractor and Kundu’s (1998b, p. 326) study of more than 1131 hotels in more than one 
hundred nations, sort to answer the question: “For a particular foreign operation (a particular 
hotel in a foreign location), should a firm choose full ownership of the operation, an equity 
joint venture or contract-specified modes, such as franchising, or management service 
agreements?”. They argue that the choice is determined by both country characteristics or 
transaction-cost considerations, firm characteristics and its global strategy. Their study 
reveals that modern international companies have full operations and equity joint ventures, 
as well as non-equity alliances, which in the service sector include franchising and 
management service agreements. They show that for the world as a whole, 37 per cent of 
foreign properties were under management service contract, 34.6 per cent of foreign 
properties were fully or partially owned, while the remaining 28.4 per cent were franchised 
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(Contractor & Kundu, 1998a). In other words, they identify three forms of horizontal 
strategic alliances in international hotel operations, mainly: 
• joint venture; 
• management service agreement - a long term agreement or contract of up to ten 
years or more, whereby the legal owners of the property and real estate enter into 
a contract with the hotel chain to run and operate the hotel on a day to day basis, 
usually under the hotel chain’s internationally recognised name; and  
• franchising.  
 
Much research has also  been undertaken on horizontal strategic alliances in the airline 
industry (Go & Hedges, 1994; Glisson et al., 1996; Bennett, 1997; Evans, 2001; Park & 
Zhang, 2000; Chan, 2000; Mak & Go, 1995; Bissessur & Alamdari, 1998; Yang & Liu, 
2003; Long, Clark, Schiffman & McMellon, 2003). These studies show that these horizontal 
alliances have been formed in order to combine resources and offer more global coverage, 
and offer business flyers the opportunity to stay with one frequent flyer programme while 
still using many different airlines (Long et al., 2003). Bennett (1997) argues that within the 
airline industry, strategic alliances incorporate shared airport facilities (check-in, lounges), 
improved connections (synchronised schedules), reciprocity on frequent flyer programmes, 
freight coordination and marketing agreements (code-sharing and block selling). Glisson et 
al. (1996) see these strategic alliances as part of broader international marketing strategies 
airlines adopt and further categorises them into three, namely, marketing alliances, equity 
alliances, frequent flyer alliances. Star Alliance, Oneworld, SkyTeam and Northwest KLM 
(Wings group) are the major airline alliances which enjoy the participation of the main 
airlines in the world.  
 
Australian major airlines, Qantas and the now defunct Ansett have been major players in 
strategic alliance formations. By 1995 Qantas has already entered into strategic alliances 
with USAir, Japan Airlines and British Airways (BA). In 1998 American Airlines, BA, 
Cathay Pacific, Canadian Airlines and Qantas formed Oneworld, an alliance that connects 
routes and ties frequent flier programs (Ann, 1999). They were later joined by Iberia, Finn 
Air and the Swiss International Air Lines (Oneworld, 2003). While the airlines would 
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continue competing against each other except where they have regulatory approval not to, 
they would also cooperate to give passengers a global travel service between airports 
(Sandilands, 1998a; 1998b). As the then chief executive of American Airways, Don Carty 
maintained, Oneworld was revenue driven rather than cost driven: 
Our aim is to capture more business rather than cut costs by rolling our operations 
into each other, or blending out individual ways of serving passengers . . . Our 
vital concern was that Oneworld deliver benefits to our shareholders as well as to 
our passengers, and we have established that it will. We can do things with these 
arrangements that give us vastly improved scope and customer servicing, and 
when you deliver a better product you make better money” (Sandilands, 1998b, p. 
37). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Multiple strategic alliance networks  
 
Source: Adapted from Tremblay (1998)  
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Ansett’s counter Qantas strategy meant it becoming a member of Star Alliance, Oneworld’s 
main competing brand in global airline alliances, which included United, Air Canada, 
Lufthansa, Varig, Thai International and Scandinavian Air Systems. The former Ansett 
Executive Chairman, Ron Eddington argued that Ansett had to participate in globalization 
or decline; hence it became a ‘virtual’ player in the world airline game. However, 
Sandilands (1999) shows that Oneworld remained the dominant player in the Australian 
industry, commanding 49.6 per cent of Australia’s inbound and outbound air travel markets 
vis-à-vis 28.6 per cent for Star Alliance in 1998.   
 
Vertical lateral or diagonal quasi-integration strategic alliances networks (Type V) 
 
The second group of strategic alliance network Tremblay suggest (Figure 3.4, Type V) is 
one composed of firms sharing marketing know-how associated with specific customer 
groups in order to generate economic rents by connecting dissimilar competences into a 
consistent product, through space and synchronisation of activities. They also control 
service quality and sometimes even standardise the “service atmosphere”. These alliances 
often involve more or less integrated tourism business groups connecting complementary 
activities such as air transport services, tour operating retailing, and the management of 
hotel groups.  Location X stands for the fact that the tour operator and even the travel 
agency need not be in the same destination or country with, for instance a particular hotel 
chain. Tremblay refers to these strategic alliances as vertical, lateral or diagonal quasi-
integration. Figure 3.4, Type V shows relatively integrated tourism business groups 
connecting complementary activities such as air transport services, hotel in a particular 
location, tour operator and retailing. Its difference with Figure 3.4, Type H is that it includes 
businesses from different sectors within the tourism industry. According to Tremblay (1998, 
p. 852) the purpose is “…to ensure cross-functional coordination among differentiated 
businesses such as retailing, wholesaling and main services functions for a given market.” 
Poon (1993) perceives the expansion of ICT as the means by which differentiated 
businesses in the tourism industry can flexibly connect and adjust to consumer needs.  
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A number of scholars have shared this idea. For example, Brown and Pattison’s (1995) 
study shows how the Radisson Hotel group alliance is linked together by different types of 
communication media, particularly telephone, facsimile, email, Pierre reservation system 
and interactive linkage.  Electronic tourism intermediaries (eMediaries) have also been seen 
not only as intensifying competition (Buhalis, 2001), but also as supporting instruments that 
would add distinct aspects of value for the end customer by exchanging digital knowledge 
between alliance network members (Dale, 2003). 
 
Studies by Brown and Pattison, (1995), Morrison and Harrison, (1998), Vasudavan and 
standing, (1999), and Deng and Lawson, (2000) suggest a very strong association between 
various tourism sectors liked together by reservation systems of airlines, hotels, rental car 
firms, coach companies and entertainment services (Brown & Pattinson, 1995).  
 
 
The local destination network (Type L) 
 
The third group, which in Tremblay’s view ensures the coordination of complementary 
assets from the destination end of the service chain, is the local destination network (Figure 
3.4, Type L). This figure also shows that tourism organisations may form strategic alliances 
coordinated through a destination tourism marketing agency, but may also have direct one-
to-one relationships. Since tourism firms in a given destination share public infrastructures 
and attractions, there is need to cooperatively manage these resources and innovate while 
minimising negative externalities. Making reference to Palmer and Bejou (1995), Tremblay 
argues that destination marketing alliances involve firms cooperating to determine the size 
of the local tourism pie and simultaneously competing to increase their shares. Braun (2003) 
argues that tourism business can participate in one or various overlapping networks, 
depending on the potential measurable advantages such as lowering transaction costs and 
exploiting economies of scale.  
 
Studies analysing tourism destination networks are grounded on network theory and are 
mostly case-study based, concentrating on regional networks (Pavlovich, 2003) or 
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comparisons of various regional networks (Halme & Fadeeva, 1998; Halme, 2001). 
Pavlovich’s (2003) exploratory case study examines the formation and evolution of a 
tourism destination, the Waitomo Caves in New Zealand. The study takes a structured 
approach from network theory perspective and examines how the architectural patterns of 
linkages between organisations inform strategic leverage for destination contexts. Using a 
mixture of interviews, archival data and personal observations to gather information from 
twelve firms located within the destination over a five – year period (1996-2000), Pavlovich 
shows how complementary products of activities, accommodation, transport and food co-
exist alongside support activities and infrastructure to form a complex system of 
connections and interrelationships. “This more complex network structure with multiple 
nodes enables a structural choice that limits the extent of constraint an individual 
organisation may proffer within the network. This gives the network flexibility in its 
operating conditions” (Pavlovich, 2003, p. 213). Pavlovich’s study found that not only did 
the Waitomo destination structure have multiple organisational nodal positions with each 
node offering the network access to independent external ‘weak ties’, but also that a 
combination of ‘strong’ and ‘weak ties’ builds the foundation of knowledge-based 
capabilities for the destination.   
 
Hamel and Fadeeva (1998) use the grounded theory approach developed by Glaser and 
Strauses (1967) to examine how multi-party networks can strive towards sustainable 
development. They focus on SMEs’ role in eight tourism destination networks located in 
Finland, Ireland, Spain and Sweden. The study also identifies and explores value added by 
the networks for people, SMEs and society, and barriers to sustainable development in the 
network and success factors of these networks. All networks investigated cross the private-
public sector borders involving business authorities and occasionally, citizen groups. Their 
findings reveal a number of barriers and success factors of multi-party sustainability 
networks. Barriers include, conflicting goals, and short-term thinking of participants or false 
expectations (Halme & Fadeeva, 1998). Key success factors their study identifies include 
willingness of the members to invest in the network, the extensive expertise in the network 
and good contacts with important stakeholders outside the network. They also found that 
sustainable development goals are interwoven with other personal, firm, regional or societal 
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benefits provided by the network activity, and that such benefits have an important 
motivational role in the process in which sustainable development is implemented at a 
practical level.   
 
Using the same data used in Halme and Fadeeva (1998), Halme (2001) investigates learning 
toward sustainable development in multi-stakeholder public-private networks. His findings 
show that the process of cooperation appears more important vis-à-vis achievements 
regarding sustainable tourism than the structure of networks, and that this process 
determines the network's ability to become adept at explicating tacit knowledge among its 
actors, and to develop the network so it can facilitate the creation of sustainability outcomes. 
Halme also found that in instances where a leading public actor may assume a teacher's role 
in the network, the network runs the risk of becoming merely an information dissemination 
tool. This involves a trap of one-way communication and under-used knowledge utilisation 
opportunities. Receptivity of the teacher actor is low and the partners do not really 
collaborate. Halme then argues that the teacher actor should make a special effort to create 
feedback loops leading to two-way communication, so that a learning strategy of 
collaboration can take place.  
 
The relevance of the Halme and Fadeeva (1998); Halme (2001) and Pavlovich (2003) 
studies lie in the multiplicity of actors embedded in tourism networks. The fact that 
membership of such networks crosses the private-public sector borders, and that networks 
are broader than strategic alliances means that research on strategic alliances in tourism 
should be approached cautiously. While destinations are obviously networked, not all 
network nodes are strategic alliances. Strategic alliance researchers have failed to consider 
and analyse such alliance networks. Of course, the reason may be that to understand and 
develop a destination it is imperative that all networks within a region should be studied, but 
this should not relegate the study of strategic alliances. The other issue has been 
regionalisation of tourism networks, as exemplified by the above cited authors. This 
approach is important but does not distinguish the various types of networks, some of which 
could be strategic alliances. 
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3.10  Strategic alliances between tour operators and travel agents 
 
The link between tour operators and tourism suppliers has been established (March, 2000; 
Buhalis, 2000b; Medina-Muñoz et al., 2003). March (2000) explores how inbound 
operators, acting as buyers on behalf of overseas clients, make purchase decision for 
suppliers (hotels, restaurants and coach companies) while Buhalis (2000) explores the 
distribution of tourism and illustrates the power of imbalances that exist between members. 
In particular, Buhalis illustrates the problems that small hoteliers in the Greek islands face 
with powerful tour operators and further illustrates a wide range of methods used in order to 
increase their bargaining power. Medina-Muñoz et al. (2003) describes the control that 
German and British tour operators exercise over the accommodation companies with whom 
they do business and the characteristics of the two types of companies that influence that 
control. Similar relationships have also been found between tourism suppliers and travel 
agencies (Medina-Muñoz, García-Falcón & Medina-Muñoz, 2002). The study by Medina-
Muñoz et al. (2002) centres on the relationship between travel agents and hotel corporations 
operating in the USA. They developed four factors – extent to which the relationship is 
formalised, commitment to the relationship, conflict resolution, and inter-organisational 
dependence, trust and communication as factors that could establish satisfactory business 
relationships between travel agencies and hotels. Conducting their study from the hoteliers’ 
perspective, they concluded that: 
…travel agents should be trustworthy, show a cooperative attitude, and be 
committed to the relationship with the hotel company. Similarly, hotel companies 
that travel agents see as trustworthy, cooperative, and committed to their 
relationships with those agents can expect to receive more offers from travel 
agents to establish long-term business relationships (Medina-Muñoz et al., 2002, 
p. 52). 
 
  Tremblay’s framework shows possibilities of horizontal strategic alliances existing in the 
tour operators and travel agencies sectors, and further show possibilities of vertical or 
diagonal strategic alliances existing between the two sectors of tour operators and travel 
agencies. Little research has looked at these relationships. King and Choi (1999) and Pan 
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(2004)  studied relationships that exist between inbound tour operators in Australia and the 
Korean travel agency sector,  and Chinese travel agents. King and Choi (1999) studied the 
Korean outbound travel market to Australia and found that Korean-based travel agents rely 
on Australian-based inbound tour operators to handle their clients during the stay overseas. 
They also fond that Korean travel agents select inbound tour operator partners according to 
three criteria: the designated handling fee, technical competence, and reputation to carry out 
promises, while at the same time informal relationships were deemed important in selection 
partners.  
 
Pan’s (2004) exploratory study draws on applied marketing, management and cross-cultural 
theories on networking to explore the process of developing partnership relationships in the 
Chinese inbound tourism market to Australia. The study found that the process of 
developing partnerships relationships between Chinese travel agents and Australian inbound 
tour operators is highly culturally embedded. Although these studies are not exclusively on 
strategic alliances, they are fundamentally relevant to this thesis. The relevance of King and 
Choi (1999) is in their arguments in respect to partner selection and appraisal of partners 
performance while that of Pan is on the role of culture in developing business relationships. 
The gap identifiable in these studies concerns the absence of cognitive base – how it is 
influenced by culture in (Pan’s case) or how it influences partner selection and evaluation of 
partner performance (in King and Choi’s case). Such an approach would have further 
enriched these studies.  
 
 
3.11  Chapter conclusions  
 
This chapter has considered at length types of strategic alliances and perceived joint 
ventures; licensing; franchises; marketing and distribution agreements; production and 
manufacturing alliances; research and development contracts; technology development 
coalitions as examples of alliances. The brief discussion on strategic alliances in the tourism 
industry has identified three broad types of strategic alliances – horizontal, vertical and 
network types. Most of the past research on strategic alliances in tourism has concentrated 
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on airlines. These alliances have also been defined as marketing alliances - because of their 
emphasis on code-sharing, sharing airport facilities, synchronised programmes, fright 
coordination, joint marketing and maintaining a close relationship with customers. 
Horizontal alliances which could be classified as marketing alliances have also been noted 
in the hotel sector, taking the form of consortiums. Studies of strategic alliances in the hotel 
sector have put much emphasis on consortiums, and hotel chains, leaving out a number of 
independent accommodation establishments.   
 
Almost all studies evaluated in the literature on strategic alliances in tourism are from a 
marketing perspective. There is need for more studies from management perspectives that 
would emphasise strategic management, organisational behaviour and other management 
related fields. It is therefore not surprising to note that there is no research identified, that 
considers the role of executive characteristics in strategic alliances in the tourism industry. 
After all, only a few such studies have been identified in the strategic alliance literature in 
general.  
 
No research has thus far been identified that focuses on strategic alliances between and 
among the sectors of tour operators and travel agencies. Another limitation of most strategic 
alliance research is that very few of them consider the role of company characteristics and 
cognition of decision makers in forming, managing and evaluating strategic alliances. The 
following chapter develops this argument further by developing a framework of the 
influence of company and executive characteristics on strategic alliance forma. This 
framework brings into perspective the objectives of and research questions of this thesis.    
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_________________________________________ 
Chapter Four 
Upper echelon perspective and company characteristics 
perspective on strategic alliances 
 
 
 
4.0  Introduction 
 
This research extends the debate on management thinking by arguing that strategic alliance 
practices are reflections of both company and executive characteristics. The assumptions 
behind this view are firstly that, strategic alliance is a significant strategic decision. 
Secondly, that strategic alliances form a unique part of organisational strategy and are 
normally used either as a form of an international expansion strategy or as a business-level 
cooperative strategy (Hitt et al., 1996). Thirdly, following from the first assumption, that 
strategic decisions are nonprogrammable decisions that involve the commitment of 
substantial resources at the level of the total enterprise (Wally & Baum, 1994). Fourthly, 
that individual differences among strategic decision makers (Wally & Baum, 1994) as 
reflected by their individual characteristics (Pansiri, 2005a) and aspects of organisational 
structure (company characteristics) affect strategic decision-making. This requires analysis 
of both internal and environmental factors, choice of strategic alliance option and strategic 
alliance type, choice of strategic alliance partners and alliance scope, and strategic alliance 
evaluation. Fifthly, strategic alliances are human constructs, designed out of decisions 
reached by managers about how the organisation desires to deal with its environment. 
Lastly, that as human constructs, these strategic alliance decisions are reflections of 
different company and executive characteristics.  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to find out the role of company and executive characteristics 
in strategic alliance type selection, choice of alliance partners, and alliance performance 
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outcomes in the travel sector. In doing so, it seeks to address the research question as spelt 
out in Chapter One: “What are the effects of company and executive characteristics, on 
strategic alliance formation - strategic alliance selection, choice of alliance partners and 
alliance performance evaluation in the Australian travel sector?”  
 
In making this inquiry, both organisational structures (company characteristics) and the 
upper echelon (UE) standpoints are used as essential perspectives that can help researchers 
make linkages between managers’ cognitive orientations and strategic alliance practice. The 
following is a discussion that links these two perspectives to strategic alliance practice.  
 
 
4.1 Research framework 
 
A number of researchers have referred to aspects of contextual influence on strategic 
decision-making processes (Wally & Baum, 1994; Papadakis, Spyros & David, 1998). 
Wally and Baum (1994) provide a model of the determinants of strategic decision-making 
that incorporate the role of individual differences among executive decision makers, 
organisational structural characteristics and industry effects. In testing the model, they 
found that “…chief executive officers' cognitive ability, use of intuition, tolerance for risk, 
and propensity to act associated positively with speedy decisions (Wally & Baum, 1994, p. 
932). They observe that their results also suggest that their model, which is comprehensive 
by including organizational as well as cognitive aspects, is robust.  
 
Papadakis et al. (1998) provide a framework that integrates an ‘individual decision 
perspective’, strategic or management choice’ and ‘environmental determinism’, and ‘firm 
characteristics and resource availability perspective’. When testing the framework, they 
found that strategic decision processes are shaped by a multiplicity of these factors. These 
studies by Wally and Baum (1994) and Papadakis et al. (1998) attest to the fact that 
company as well as executive characteristics can be used to give a richer understanding of 
alliance formation and evaluation. The following sections discuss the theoretical 
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underpinnings of each perspective individually, and then go on to links them to strategic 
alliance formation. 
 
 
4.1.1  Executive characteristics (Upper Echelon perspective)  
 
Research on strategic alliances mostly use managerial assessments of internal and external 
drivers (motives) and alliance performance, and relies on managerial decisions on strategic 
alliance types and choice of partners. Researchers treat these assessments as objectively 
given and neglect the fact that strategic alliances are social constructs, which reflect the 
cognitive bases of those who construct them. Researchers from the upper echelon (UE) 
perspective linking executive characteristics and strategic options, and firms’ performance 
have also overlooked strategic alliances as strategic options. Their research has centred on 
the traditional strategic options such as product innovation, diversification, integration, 
financial leverage and administrative complexity. 
 
Decision making is one of the most fundamental processes in organisations and an essential 
task of management at all levels (Heracleous, 1994). Scholars have observed that strategic 
problems are almost by definition extremely complex. This suggests that complex decisions 
are largely the outcome of behavioural factors rather than a mechanical quest for economic 
optimisation (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Therefore the ‘rational’ decision-making model21
                                                 
21 The traditional/mainstream ‘rational’ decision making assumptions as summarised by Heracleous (1994, p. 
1) are that: decision makers have a clear and unambiguous understanding of the nature of the problem and of 
their objectives in relation to this problem; a comprehensive search for alternative courses of action and their 
consequences with respect to this problem is feasible and is carried out; each alternative is objectively 
evaluated with respect to its chances of achieving the desired objectives, and the alternative most likely to 
achieve these objectives is selected and then implemented; monitoring of consequences is continually and 
objectively carried out to determine success of chosen course of action with respect to objectives. The rational 
decision-making model makes no reference to the filtering and constraining influences of the organizational 
paradigm on the decision process as a whole. The model also ignores the significant effects of political 
behaviour on this process.  
 
that has dominated strategic management literature for decades has been dismissed as an 
inadequate guide to effective decision-making which does not necessarily bear an 
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appropriate reflection of how decisions are really made in organisations (Brunsson, 1982; 
Heracleous, 1994). Heracleous criticises the model for being too simplistic and only 
applicable to relatively simple problems, where objectives are clear, unambiguous and 
agreed, and cause-effect relations are clearly known. Heracleous (1994, p. 21) argues that in 
the real world of multiple decision makers, “…complex problems, fast moving markets, 
unpredictability and uncertainty, however, ‘objective’ rationality becomes inapplicable and 
decision making is influenced by what may be called ‘conditioned rationality’”  
 
Ever since Simon’s (1957a; 1957b) and March and Simon’s (1958) idea of bounded 
rationality, researchers in management have recognised that cognitive limitations affect 
decision making in organisations. Simon (1957a, p. 241) maintains that:  
…when the limits to rationality are viewed from the individual’s stand point, they fall 
into three categories: he is limited by his unconscious skills, habits, and reflexes; he is 
limited by his values and conceptions of purpose, which may differ from the 
organisation goals. He is limited by the extent of his knowledge and information. The 
individual can be rational in terms of the organisation’s goals only to the extent that he 
is able to pursue a particular course of action, he has a correct conception of the goal of 
action, and he is correctly informed about the conditions surrounding his action. Within 
the boundaries laid down by these factors his choices are rational-goal-oriented  
 
The cognitive approach maintains that conscious mental activities, such as thinking, 
knowing, and understanding, and mental concepts, such as attitudes, beliefs, and 
expectations, are major determinants of human behaviour (Reitz, 1977) which 
“…influences how people scan their environment for information, how they organise and 
interpret this information, and how they integrate their interpretations into the mental model 
and subjective theories that guide their actions” (Hayes & Allinson, 1998, p. 850). 
 
While there is a plethora of studies concerning strategic alliances, very few of these studies 
have considered the role of cognition of decision makers in forming, managing and 
evaluating strategic alliances. This narrowness of research on managerial thinking has 
occurred within the context of unprecedented burgeoning research and theory with cognitive 
science as a whole. Porac and Thomas (1989a, p. 323) argue that for decades, “…work by 
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linguists, psychologists, anthropologists, philosophers, computer scientists, and 
neurophysiologists has stimulated enormous efforts to understand how the human mind 
accepts, transforms, represents, and uses information”. Writers in the competitive strategy 
field have been criticised for either implicitly or explicitly assuming that firms behave like 
rational actors (Johnson & Hoopes, 2003). From this perspective, largely dominated by 
economics oriented strategy scholars, managers are perceived as ‘rational utility-
maximisers’ (Stubbart, 1989; Johnson & Hoopes, 2003) who “… all possess the same 
knowledge, all reason the same logical way, all notice the same threats and opportunities, 
and all pursue the same goals” (Stubbart, 1989, p. 326). While this view offers advantages 
in understanding organisations, it has been criticised for ignoring the limits of humans as 
mechanisms for computation and choice (Simon, 1957b). Simon (1957b) and March and 
Simon (1958) advance the idea of bounded rationality, arguing that managers’ cognitive 
abilities are sequential and limited in their capacity. For example, March and Simon (1958) 
argue that in most situations, the flow of information exceeds the processing capability of 
managers; or, the volume of information available at any one time exceeds the capabilities 
of any one person. It has been argued that under such conditions, individuals use heuristics 
or ‘rules of thumb’ to simplify complex problems with a view of scanning and organising 
their environment and reach decisions regarding strategic action (Schwenk, 1988; Stubbart, 
1989; Porac & Thomas, 1990; Johnson & Hoopes, 2003).  
 
Recently, management theorists and researchers have given attention to a wide range of 
managerial cognitive phenomena as a way of confronting the deficiencies of the literature 
on managerial thinking (Porac & Thomas, 1989a; Swan & Newell, 1994; Gallén, 1997). 
Most of these articles centre on the development of cognitive techniques and models which 
can be used to investigate cognitions in organisational settings (Porac, Thomas & Baden-
Fuller, 1989b; Swan & Newell, 1994; Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994; Yamin & 
Gulasekaran, 1999); the relationship between managers’ cognitive style (base) and strategic 
decisions (Gallén, 1997); relationships between group cognitive make-up, co-operation 
context, and the development of interpersonal trust (Roy & Dugal, 1998); relationships 
between enrolment change and organisational determinants (Neumann & Finaly-Neumann, 
1994); and examination of modern cognitive science (Stubbart, 1989). Wiersema and Bantel 
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(1992) argue that as top managers engage in the strategic decision-making process, each 
manager’s perceptions and interpretations will reflect his or her own cognitive base. 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992), and Hambrick and Mason (1984) further argue that managers 
cognitive style influences the perceptual process underlying decision making. According to 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992, p. 94):  
First it limits the manager’s field of vision, or the areas in the environment to which 
attention is directed. Second, selective perception occurs because the manager only pays 
attention to some of the stimuli in his or her field of vision. And third, the information 
that is processed is filtered through the lens of the cognitive base. 
 
The general view of most of these authors is that because strategic management research 
studies the activities of managers, managerial cognition must be explored in order to 
understand their role and impact in respect to environmental scanning and analysis, 
competitive strategy, strategy-making process, strategy implementation and evaluation. 
Some authors have suggested that a decision maker’s cognitive make-up (decision style) 
influences the selection among alternative courses of action (Henderson & Nutt, 1980) and 
that managers carry out decision making using distinctive processes (Nutt, 1990). Several 
frameworks which define decision style have been proposed (Henderson & Nutt, 1980), 
accompanied by a wide variety of instruments which have been developed to measure 
decision styles (Nutt, 1990). For example, Jung’s (1923) personality theory which was 
further developed as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), an instrument which has 
been designed to make Jung’s theory both understandable and usable. However, there has 
been growing dissatisfaction with the use of some of these frameworks.  
 
Studies dissatisfied with psychological dimensions have argued first, that the cognitive 
bases, values, and perceptions of upper level managers are not convenient to measure or 
even amenable to direct measurement. Second, that top executives are hesitant to participate 
in batteries  of surveys at least in the numbers needed for an ongoing research program 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Haley & Stumpf, 1989). Third, that some of the background 
characteristics of greatest a priori interest (e.g. tenure and functional background) do not 
have close psychological analogs, therefore restrictions to standard psychological 
dimensions could unnecessarily limit inquiries, and finally, that  with the eventual 
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application of the managerial characteristics perspective management 
selection/development would require observable background data on managers (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984, p. 196).  
 
These studies have focused on observable background characteristics, resting on the 
argument that they presented key proxies for managers’ cognitive orientation and 
knowledge base with important implications for strategic decision making. They emphasise 
such characteristics as age, tenure in organisation, functional background, education, 
socioeconomic roots and financial position (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) developed the UE model for understanding the influence of top managers on 
organisational strategy. This perspective is based on three central tenets:  
1. Strategic choices made in firms are reflections of the values and cognitive bases 
of powerful actors (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004). These values and 
cognitive bases limit the managers’ field of vision, or the areas in the 
environment to which attention is directed (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  
2. Values and cognitive bases of such actors are a function of their observable 
characteristics such as education, experience and background (Carpenter et al., 
2004). According to Wiersema and Bantel (1992), previous studies have used 
such characteristics as predictors of beliefs and values.  
2. As a result, this perspective argues that significant organisational outcomes are 
associated with the observable characteristics of those actors (Carpenter et al., 
2004).  
 
It is therefore argued that “…these three central tenets frame the UE proposition that an 
organisation and its performance will be a reflection of its top managers” (Carpenter et al., 
2004, p. 4). This model assumes that UE characteristics (psychological and observable) are 
determinants of strategic choices, and through these choices, or organisational performance. 
This approach argues that certain situational conditions (external and internal) and UE 
characteristics lead to strategic choices that cannot be predicted as strongly by knowing only 
one or the other. However, concern has been raised that particular characteristics seem 
unlikely to influence the diagnosis and development of strategic issues. Gallén (1997) 
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suggests  that instead of concentrating on observable characteristics, emphasis should also 
be placed on personality as a link between cognitive processes and strategic decisions. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) raised doubts if research on managers’ characteristics can 
progress far without greater attention to relevant literature in related fields, especially 
psychology and social psychology.  
 
The UE perspective as shown in previous studies leaves out two important managerial 
characteristics which Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) see as central to organisational 
effectiveness and strategy implementation – willingness to take risk and tolerance of 
ambiguity. Organisations often take on strategic alliance risk because they want to reduce 
risk in other areas, and this risk is of various types. Stanek (2004, p. 191) summarises Das 
and Teng (1999) and argue that alliances involve both relational risk (the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour of one of the partners having negative impacts on the other) and 
performance risk (the probability that an alliance may fail even when partners commit 
themselves fully to the alliance).  Relational elements include:  
• protecting firm resources while gaining access to new partner resources;  
• contractual control;  
• managerial control;  
• specificity of work share;  
• extent of communication;  
• alliance fit or tightness of fit; and 
• cooperation and competition.  
On the other hand, performance risk includes:  
• association with parent strategic vision;  
• degree to which agreements can be modified;  
• likelihood of losing investments (often non-recoverable);  
• exit provisions;  
• controls;  
• new learning applications;  
• compatible objectives; and  
• short- and long-term orientations.  
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Stanek (2004) further observes that strategic alliance risk may also include contextual 
(representing uncertainty in the market, including: political, ownership/control, price 
control, local content and transference problems) and transactional (risk associated with the 
arrangement, including not meeting established project objectives and returns) risk. Gupta 
and Govindarajan (1984) found that greater willingness to take risk and greater tolerance for 
ambiguity contribute to organisational effectiveness.  
 
Figure 4.1 indicates that the UE model is applicable in diverse contexts. Two dominant 
perspectives in this model are identifiable from previous research. The first is the executive 
characteristics-strategy-performance (ECSP) perspective. There are a number of studies that 
link managerial characteristics and strategic decision choice (Miller, Kets de Vries & 
Toulouse, 1982; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Szilagyi & Schweiger, 1984; Gallén, 1997). 
This perspective portrays UE characteristics as determinants of strategic choices, and 
through the strategic choices, of organisational performance. The second perspective links 
top management team  (TMT) characteristics and firm profiles (Carpenter et al., 2004) with 
strategic choices (Michel & Hambrick, 1992),  and firm performance  (Smith, Smith, Olian, 
Sims, O'Bannon & Scully, 1994; Hambrick & Cho, 1996; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). 
While an offshoot of the executive characteristics-strategy-performance perspective, it seeks 
to acknowledge the role of the TMT as a whole. In Figure 4.1, this perspective links as 
managerial characteristics-TMT-strategic choice-performance perspective.  
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Figure 4.1: Research framework incorporating UE and company characteristics perspectives of organisations 
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While it is noted that strategic alliances are risky since they are fertile breeding grounds for 
opportunistic behaviour (Das, 2004), no studies have drawn a link between managerial 
characteristics, risk and strategic alliances. The upper echelon perspective argues that top 
managers’ characteristics are determinants of strategic choices. Bearing in mind that 
strategic choices are associated with uncertain outcomes, managerial decisions do not 
necessarily reflect managerial characteristics but rather managerial risk taking associated 
with these characteristics. Studies linking UE characteristics with risk taking are 
inconclusive and contradictory. Wally and Baum (1994) found that chief executive officers’ 
cognitive ability, use of intuition, tolerance of risk, and propensity to act associated 
positively with speedy decisions. Emblemsvåg and Kjølstad (2002) maintain that risk is 
perceived differently in relation to gender, age, culture while Grable and Lytton (1999) 
found that above-average levels of financial risk tolerance were associated with increased 
levels of attained education, an increased knowledge of personal finance, higher levels of 
income, and being employed in a professional occupation. In their study Grable and Lytton 
(1999) found that gender, economic expectations, age, and marital status explained less 
variance in risk-tolerance scores. 
 
Figure 4.1 further develops the arguments of this thesis to indicate that a strategic alliance is 
a strategic choice option. What distinguishes it from the other strategic choices is that it is 
pursued as a form of cooperative strategy where more than one firm is involved vis-à-vis the 
strategies under ‘go it alone’ option. The strategic alliance option needs careful 
consideration, independent of the other options explained above, because there are many 
alternatives within the broader strategic alliance umbrella as shown in Figure 4.1. This 
strategic alliance option has suffered neglect in the UE research. It can also be broadened by 
looking at TMT characteristics in relation to alliance option and performance.  As it has 
been shown earlier in this study, strategic alliances now play a very prominent role in 
organisational competitive strategy.  
 
Models designed to help us understand strategic alliances therefore lack this important 
aspect of organisational reality – the role of cognitive orientations in strategic alliances, and 
the model by Evans (2001) is just one of them. Only two studies, which link strategic 
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alliance formation to executives’ cognitive orientations have been identified. Both these 
studies use the UE perspective. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven’s (1996) study of why firms 
form strategic alliances in the semiconductor industry found that while market conditions 
and risky firm strategies increased the rate of alliance formation, top management 
characteristics also affected the rate of alliance formation. They conclude that firms with top 
management teams that were large, experienced, and well-connected through former 
employees and high-level previous jobs formed product development alliances at higher 
rates. Tyler and Steensma’s (1998) study examines how top executives’ experiences and 
perceptions influence their attitudes toward technological alliance formation and the kinds 
of information they attend to when individually assessing potential technological alliance 
opportunities. Their behavioural decision theory suggests that “…executives’ cognitive 
orientations are reflected in (1) their age, educational background, and work experience; (2) 
their perceptions of their companies’ emphasis on technology and risk; and (3) their 
perceptions of their companies’ success in past technological collaborative efforts” (Tyler & 
Steensma, 1998, p. 940).  
 
Their findings support the view that top executives experiences and perceptions influence 
the way they process information when asked to assess potential alliances. “Age, technical 
education, technical work experience, and perceptions of firm success with other 
technological alliances were all directly related to top executives’ assessments of 
technological alliances” (Tyler and Steensma, 1998, p. 957).  
 
They also found that technical education and perceived firm technological emphasis, risk 
orientation, and previous success with collaborative activities all moderated executives’ 
weightings of alliance attributes when asked to evaluate potential technological alliance.  
Their study fits well into Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) model of UE perspective of 
organisations. Apart from concentrating on industries other than tourism, these studies are 
limited only to reasons for alliance formation. There is a need to broaden the scope into 
other areas of strategic alliances. This thesis argues that executives characteristics’ influence 
in strategic alliance practice is not only limited to reasons why firms form strategic alliances 
and attitudes towards alliances only. They influence an array of practices, which determines 
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not only the survival of the strategic alliance but also the survival of the firm in question. 
Issues concerning the type of the strategic alliance to be adopted and the number of alliance 
partners or alliances a firm may indulge in is of high concern for managers. Choice of 
alliance partners emphasising on trust, compatibility, capability, commitment and control 
cannot be subjected to objective calculation but largely depends on executives’ cognitive 
styles.  
 
Concern has also been raised regarding evaluation of strategic alliance performance 
(Geringer, 1991; Jennings et al., 2000; Pansiri, 2005a). Research on this area has raised 
concern over fundamental research obstacles arising from the complexity and dyadic nature 
of strategic alliances, provoking questions over the use of financial indicators as measures 
for alliance performance. As a result many authors have called for multiple methods 
research that puts less emphasis on objective measures and toward perceptual managers’ 
assessments of performance (Killing, 1982; Harrigan, 1985; 1986; Parkhe, 1993a; Inkpen, 
1995; Beamish & Delios, 1997) in terms of either their overall satisfaction with the alliance, 
or the extent to which an alliance has met its stated objectives. What these authors fail to 
address is the fact that perceptual assessment of performance raises questions of objectivity 
normally obscured by limits to rationality and the assessors’ cognitive styles. Managers 
working in the same firm are likely to assess performance differently because of their 
different characteristics. In view of these challenges, there is a need for a different approach 
that embraces behavioural elements in both alliance formation and evaluation. This thesis 
therefore argues that researchers should widen the scope of strategic alliance research with a 
view of considering these important managerial concerns. 
 
 
4.1.2 Company characteristics 
 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to find out the role of company characteristics in 
strategic alliance type selection, choice of alliance partners, and alliance performance 
outcomes in the travel sector. There is widespread agreement that structure can have a 
profound impact on strategy through its direct effect on the strategic decision-making 
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process (Fredrickson, 1986; McShane, 2003; Robbins, Millett & Maters-Marsh, 2004). In 
his overview of the strategy/structure debate, Fredrickson (1986) describes three dimensions 
of structure (centralisation, formalisation and complexity) that are most likely to affect 
strategic decision-making. These dimensions have been widely used by many decision-
making researchers (e.g. Wally & Baum, 1994; Kauser & Shaw, 2004). Different 
organisations subscribe to different structures ranging from centralised to decentralised, 
from formal to informal and from simple to complex. However, there are a number of 
contingency factors, which influence these organisations’ structural dimensions. The most 
cited of these contingency factors are technology, organisation size and environment 
(Robbins et al., 2004). This thesis argues that these factors include company characteristics. 
Company characteristics have received less attention from strategy decision-making 
reproachers.  Fulop (1992) identifies the following as company characteristics used in 
defining SMEs: legal entity, size (financial capital, annual turnover, number of employees) 
and ownership. Company characteristics are crucial to this thesis.  
 
Few researchers have studied relationships between company characteristics and firm 
strategy in the general business setting, and those that have conducted such study have 
presented mixed findings. For example, Dalton and Kesner (1983) mentioned organisational 
size as an influence on executive succession patterns. They argue that large organisations 
are more likely than small firms to replace top management from inside. Schwartz and 
Menon (1985, p. 685) found that although firm size did not influence decisions to make 
Chief Executive Officers’ (CEO) changes, the larger companies that failed and made such 
changes displayed a greater preference for external replacements than did the smaller ones. 
Miller et al. (1998) also found relationships between firm size and comprehensiveness of 
strategic decision processes and extensiveness of strategic planning. Wincent (2005) found 
that firm size can be an important determinant for firm performance, and for networking 
inside and outside the SME network.  
 
Temtime and Pansiri (2005) found that no relationships existed between organisational size, 
legal form of business, and industry, and perceived critical management factors (i.e. 
organisational design, HRM development, and competitive strategy), instead they found 
 115 
significant relationships between these critical factors and ownership status, managers’ 
experience and organisation’s age. A study by Entrialgo, Fernández and Vázquez (2001) 
suggests that the resources and competitive strategy of a firm influences its 
entrepreneurship. They found human and financial capital encourages entrepreneurship and 
concluded that “it is the firms which compete using differentiation which develop a greater 
degree of entrepreneurship, compared to the firms competing using cost leadership” (2001, 
p. 233). However, they failed to establish any linkage between firm age and size, and 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Figure 4.1 indicates possible ways through which research into strategic decision-making 
using company characteristics can be undertaken. Unlike the UE perspective, the limited 
researchers using company characteristics have not explored these characteristics’ 
relationships with diverse strategic options. Figure 4.1 also shows that theoretically, 
relationships between company characteristics, strategic decision-making options i.e. 
product innovation, and diversification, and company performance can be established. This 
company characteristics-strategy-performance perspective (CCSP) portrays company 
characteristics as determinants of strategic choices, and through the strategic choices, of 
organisational performance. Figure 4.1 shows that linkages are also possible between 
company characteristics, strategic alliance options, choice of alliance partners, alliance 
scope and alliance performance. This thesis investigates this line of reasoning.   
 
Studies following this approach incorporating strategic alliances are lacking. However, 
Todeva and Knoke (2005) argue that propensities to participate in strategic alliances vary 
across firms operating within the same organisational field due to diversity of company 
characteristics, raising possibilities of making such linkages between strategic alliance 
formation and company characteristics. Kauser and Shaw (2004) found that behavioural 
characteristics (coordination, interdependence, commitment, conflict, structure and control) 
play a more significant role in explaining overall alliance performance compared to 
organisational characteristics (centralisation, complexity and formalisation).  
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This thesis investigates five company characteristics – sub-sector, size as measured by both 
number of employees and annual turnover, form of business, and whether the business is 
family or non-family owned. 
 
(1) Sub-sector: The emphasis is on the travel agency services sector. Three broad sub-
sectors exist in this sector: travel agents, tour operators and tour wholesalers.  
 
(2)  Size: Bolin and Greenwood (2003, p. 5) found that 97 per cent of travel agency and 
tour operator services are micro and small businesses. The remaining three per cent 
are either medium or large. A number of attempts have been made to define SMEs 
(Loecher, 2000; ABS, 1997). Loecher (2000) argues that SMEs can be defined by 
quantitative criteria such as “number of employees” and “turnover”.  
a) Number of employees: Loecher (2000) observes that in the European Union 
SMEs are companies that have less than 250 workers. ABS (1997) has adopted 
only “number of employees” as the basis for classifying non-agricultural 
businesses by size and classify businesses into five categories: 
ii. micro businesses – which are defined as those businesses employing less 
than 5 people; 
iii. other small businesses – which are defined as those businesses employing 5 
or more, but less than 20 people; 
iv. small businesses – which are defined as those businesses employing less than 
20 people; 
v. Medium businesses – which are defined as those businesses employing 20 or 
more people, but less than 200; and 
vi. Large businesses - which are defined as those businesses employing 200 or 
more people. 
b) Annual turnover: Annual sales are increasingly being used as measures of  
business size (Graham, 1999; Loecher, 2000; Johnsen & McMahon, 2005). 
Loecher (2000) observes that in the European Union, SMEs are companies that 
have a maximum of 40 million euro annual turnover and a maximum of 27 
million euro annual balance-sheet total. While appropriate annual sales measures 
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are difficult to find in the Australian context, Graham (1999) makes reference to 
the Australian banking industry to argue that small businesses are defined as 
having an annual turnover of less than A$5 million. Businesses with annual 
turnover of between A$5 million and A$50 million are classified as medium, 
while those with annual sales of more than A50 million are large companies.  
 
The definition of SMEs is not universal. It varies from region to region, or from 
country to country. What can be termed SMEs in Europe (i.e. 250 employees, or 
turnover of 40 million euros) amount to large companies in Australia, and most 
Australian SMEs are large companies in Botswana where large companies are 
those employing 100 or more employees with annual turnover of more than 
PBW1.5m, an equivalence of A$300,000 (Temtime & Pansiri, 2003). 
 
(3) Form of business: This has been used as a determinant of effective  strategic 
decision making  (Temtime, Chinyoka & Shunda, 2003; 2004; Temtime & Pansiri, 
2005). For instance Temtime et al. (2004) observe it is generally assumed that small 
firms fail due to “poor management” which is largely affected by the legal form of 
organisation and ownership structure. They argue that: 
 the form of organization affects the competency and adequacy of management as 
most corporations, as opposed to sole proprietorship and partnership firms, are 
managed by employed professional manager rather than owners or part-owner 
managers. The problems of corporations are, for example, more complicated than 
partnership or sole proprietorship firms. However, this does not mean that shared 
ownership is always problematic (p. 566).  
 
Three forms of business are investigated in this thesis: sole proprietorship, 
partnership and corporation. Temtime et al. (2004) conclude that it is important to 
evaluate the impact of legal form of organisation on the managerial decision making 
process in the firm as this is pivotal to the survival and growth of the proposed firm. 
The extent to which the legal form of business affect strategic alliance formation has 
not yet been fully investigated. The interplay between company size, form of 
business, and the practice of alliance formation in tourism is a viable research area 
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that needs to be explored further in order to identify critical factors that influence 
alliance formation.  
  
(4) Family vis-à-vis non-family businesses: It is anticipated that since most of the 
businesses in this sector are SMEs, it is highly likely that most of them would be 
family owned. This is a business structure that is confusing. The confusion arises out 
of the lack of consensus surrounding the definition of a family firm. Since the 
emphasis of this thesis is not on family vis-à-vis non-family businesses, a simple 
definition of family businesses is adopted. They are defined as “businesses in which 
a single family exercises significant managerial and financial authority” (Harris, 
Reid & McAdam, 2004, p. 49). Studies on family-owned businesses show that 
unlike non-family owned businesses, there is always a tension between rational 
profit seeking activities and non-commercial objectives of the family business 
(Westhead & Cowling, 1997; Harris et al., 2004) because family-owned businesses 
are not solely profit maximisers (Westhead & Cowling, 1997). Ownership allows the 
family to pursue such non-commercial objectives as ensuring inert-generational 
employment for family members (Harris et al., 2004), and maintaining/enhancing 
the family lifestyle of owners (Westhead & Cowling, 1997).   
 
Harris et al. (2004) found that family-owned businesses engage in lower levels of 
employee involvement, and that they are more likely to report average or below 
average financial performance when compared to non-family-owned businesses. 
Westhead and Cowling (1997) found that the pursuance of non-financial objectives 
potentially impede performance of the company. This has ramifications for strategic 
alliance formation. Studies regarding the effects of family ownership on strategic 
alliance formation are virtually non-existent, yet this is a construct for scholarly 
interest since most of SMEs are family owned. 
 
There are some discussions incorporating organisational characteristics and decision-
making. These studies have mostly centred on the structure-strategy debate. However, this 
thesis goes a step further to consider the effects of company characteristics as contingency 
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factors (sub-sector, company size, form of business and whether the business family or non-
family owned) on the strategic alliance process shown in figure 4.1. 
 
  
4.2  Chapter conclusions 
 
Figure 4.1 shows possible ways through which research into strategic decision-making 
incorporating both executive and company characteristics can be done. The emphasis of this 
thesis is on how these characteristics influence strategic alliance formation and evaluation. 
The assumptions behind this framework have been discussed in the introduction of this 
chapter. Drawing from past studies on decision-making, this framework shows that 
environmental analysis, strategic choice, and subsequent choice of strategic alliance type, 
partners, scope and alliance evaluation is highly influenced by both executive and company 
characteristics. For instance, the choice of a particular type of an alliance or the evaluation 
of that alliance by an executive of a particular company is highly influenced by that 
executive’s experience and the size of that particular company.  
 
This chapter consolidates the linkages investigated in this thesis whose main objective is to 
find out the role of company and executive characteristics in strategic alliance type 
selection, choice of alliance partners, and alliance performance outcomes in the travel 
sector. In doing this, the thesis seeks to answer the research question and subsidiary 
questions set in the first chapter. These questions relate to relationships between company 
and executives characteristics, and alliances formation and evaluation. In this chapter, these 
relationships were theoretically outlined. This thesis empirically investigates these 
relationships in Chapter Six and seven. In doing so, the following chapter outlines how this 
empirical investigation was conducted, premised on the ideas of pragmatism.  
 
 120 
____________________________________________ 
Chapter Five 
Research methodology, design and procedure 
 
 
 
5.0  Introduction 
 
To address the research question, this chapter outlines the pragmatist approach to the study 
of strategic alliances. It further offers both the pragmatist’s ontological and epistemological 
position, and further justifies the methods used for gathering data. A model is developed 
which shows the way that this study was undertaken. This model can be used in any form of 
enquiry, particularly those related to organisational behaviour and culture where people’s 
experiences and perceptions can be deemed central to understanding the phenomenon under 
investigation.  
 
 
5.1  Research methodology 
 
A major challenge arises when one has to choose a methodological approach to 
management - or whatever subject - because it is obvious that such a choice deeply reflects 
not only the nature and exigencies of the work to be provided but also the researcher’s view 
of the social world. Every approach has its own interests and realm of application, in the 
organisation, in research and in everyday life. There is a plethora of texts, which present a 
wide range of research methodologies from which to select the most appropriate for a 
particular research project. For instance, there are various dimensions for theoretical and 
methodological choices most of which have been well captured by Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) whose abstract classification schema for understanding broad streams of social 
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science approaches to empirical research has inspired many scholars (Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 
1987; 1995).  
 
Two major social science paradigms have dominated claims regarding their superiority in 
research - 'positivist/functional' and 'interpretive' approaches22
 
 to research in management 
and tourism studies. Paradigms have been defined as “world-views that signal distinctive 
ontological (view of reality), epistemological (view of knowing and relationship between 
knower and to-be known), methodological (view of mode of inquiry), and axiological (view 
of what is valuable) positions” (Sandelowski, 2000, p. 247). They represent a worldview that 
defines, for its holders, “…the nature of the ‘world,’ the individual’s place in it, and the 
range of possible relationships to that world and its parts, as for examples, cosmologies and 
theologies do” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p. 200). It is therefore doubtful that one can hold 
multiple worldviews.   
Many authors have identified a number of different paradigms which largely depend on this 
positivist/interpretive dichotomy (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Laughlin, 1995; Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000). It is argued that "…to be located in a particular paradigm is to view the world 
in a particular way” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 24). Paradigms thus define different views 
of the social world based upon different meta-theoretical assumptions with regard to the 
nature of science and society. These methodological approaches are mostly relevant to 
strategy and tourism research. Jennings (2001) and Davies (2003) underscore the 
importance of these paradigms to tourism research. While evidence suggests that past 
tourism research has been largely dominated by quantitative methods (Dann, Nash & 
Pearce, 1988), there is growing indication of increasing diversity of methodologies adopted 
by tourism researchers (Morgan & Bischoff, 2003) and that discussion of research 
philosophies as they apply to tourism research can no longer be neglected.  
 
                                                 
22 Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the functionalist paradigm represents a perspective which is firmly 
rooted in the sociology of regulation and approaches its subject matter from an objectivist point of view. They 
argue that this paradigm tends to be “realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic” (p. 26) as opposed to the 
interpretive paradigm whose approach to social science tends to be “nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and 
idiographic” (p. 28). They argue that the interpretive paradigm sees the social world as an emergent social 
process which is created by the individuals concerned. 
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Traditionally, most of the work undertaken in management is positivistic and enhances the 
belief and commitment to using the natural scientific approach to understanding 
organisational life. Bettis (1991, p. 316) observes that “…current norms of the field 
[strategic management] seem strongly biased toward large sample multivariate statistical 
studies. This leads to a large database mentality, in which large-scale mail surveys and 
ready made databases such as Compustat, CRSP and PIMS are often favoured.” This is 
supported by Mendenhall, Beaty and Oddou (1993) whose research reveal that of the 
International Journal of Management issues between 1984-1990, only 14 percent were 
interpretive studies which utilised qualitative approaches, and only 4 percent used joint 
methodologies. Concern has been raised that the use of ‘hard’ data sources in management 
(particularly strategic alliance) research is unlikely to capture the soft core concepts such as 
motives for alliance formation, partner selection/characteristics, control/conflict and alliance 
stability/performance, which could be done more effectively through the use of qualitative 
research (Parkhe, 1993a). 
 
Recently there have been calls for management researchers to employ more mixed method 
approaches than just quantitative or qualitative research. The view is that a combination of 
research methods can serve mutual purposes because “…the relative strengths of qualitative 
and quantitative methods enable management and organisational researchers to address 
important questions at different stages of a research inquiry” thereby enhancing and 
enriching current knowledge by ‘filling in the gaps’ that studies adopting a singular 
approach are unable to do (Currell & Towler, 2003, p. 524). Few researchers have adopted 
mixed methods research in management (Andersson & Bateman, 2000; Bansal & Roth, 
2000; Egri & Herman, 2000). These studies have adopted a variety of forms. For example, 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) used both questionnaire and interviews in their exploratory 
empirical study of the effects of linking managerial characteristics to strategic business units 
(SBU) strategy on SBU effectiveness at strategy implementation. Bourgeois III and 
Eisenhardt (1988) combined observation, interviews and questionnaires to investigate how 
executives make strategic decisions in industries where the rate of technological and 
competitive change is so extreme that information is often unavailable or obsolete. Geringer 
and Herbert (1991) used pre-tested questionnaires followed by semi-structured interviews to 
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confirm responses in assessing international joint ventures performance. Other mixed 
method research in strategic alliances include combining quantitative and qualitative data 
collection (Thakur & Srivastava, 2000), interviews and archival data (García-Canal et al., 
2002; Yan & Duan, 2003). 
 
Discussions concerning tourism research methodologies have premised on the origins and 
epistemology of tourism. There is significant scholarly discussion concerning 
methodological issues, research orientations, and the most appropriate approaches to 
tourism studies. Citing a number of authors, Echtner and Jamal (1997) conclude that these 
discussions reveal that tourism scholars are divided in their opinions as to whether tourism 
should be studied as a distinctive discipline or as an area of specialisation within existing 
disciplines.  It has been observed that the academic analysis of tourism and hospitality has 
eclectic origins (Dann et al., 1988; Downward & Mearman, 2004; Tribe, 1997) which 
embraces disciplines such as geography, political science, law, economics, philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, strategy, human resource management, operations 
management, and marketing. It is this fragmentation of theory arising from the various 
disciplines from which tourism researchers were educated that is an impediment to any 
efforts to achieve any philosophical consistency (Downward and Mearman, 2004) or the 
establishment of a “common philosophy” (Morrison, 2002, p.164) in tourism and hospitality 
research. For this reason, most research in tourism has historically tended to emphasise 
either ‘quantitative’, ‘qualitative’ or ‘triangulation’ of methods without full philosophical 
justification. The following discussion centres on a few authors in tourism research who 
have adopted a philosophical position towards tourism research. 
 
Morrison (2002) argues that an awareness and appreciation of alternative philosophies, 
modes and methods of enquiry appears to be lacking in mainstream hospitality research. 
She argues that in general, “selected methodologies illustrate a positivistic epistemological 
bias, and would appear to have more to do with the personal ontological/epistemological 
preferences, or training, of individual scholars than legitimate scientific enquiry” (2002, p. 
164). While Walle (1997) argues that most tourism research lies on a continuum between 
positivist and interpretive epistemological paradigms, he concurs that techniques which bear 
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the imprints of logical positivism, statistical investigation, and the scientific method 
continue to dominate research in tourism. In his discussion, Walle (1997) traps himself in 
the ‘cage of scientism’.23
 
 His view of the scientific method, as a process through which 
“…the phenomenon under consideration must be empirically verifiable by both the 
researcher and larger scientific community” (Walle, 1997, p. 525) is only argued in the light 
of positivist methodologies. He seems to struggle to accept interpretive epistemological 
paradigms as social sciences. He prefers to refer to them as merely ‘artistic investigation’ 
which employs “less rigorous, but more flexible, tools of investigation” (Walle, 1997, p. 
528). However, his conclusions are important because he argues that while tourism research 
involves a series of tradeoffs between positivism and interpretivism with more emphasis on 
the former, the field of tourism needs to embrace a general recognition of the legitimacy of 
a variety of research strategies, in order to enhance the quest for human understanding.  
In contrast to Walle (1997), Jamal and Hollinshead (2001) favour more qualitative research. 
They question how the dominance of positivism and scientism can be overcome, making a 
plea that tourism research should undertake more qualitative enquiry because the tools of 
positivism are not equipped to deal effectively with tourism dynamics. In the view of Jamal 
and Hollinshead (2001, p. 69), “…‘[r]eality as it is known is lodged in narrative texts that 
mediate the real’ and truth ‘is fragile, a co-production, an interactional experience lodged in 
the moment that connects the reader-as-audience-member and co-performer to a 
performance text’” as opposed to some solid and unambiguous ‘truth’ or validity in the 
scientific/positivist sense. They maintain that qualitative research still struggles to gain 
legitimacy in several academic disciplines that are oriented towards human social 
phenomena and this is largely due to the historical baggage of debates and meanings 
attached to ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ research approaches. “Since ‘objective’ research is a 
requirement for validity in the natural sciences and those social science domains that pursue 
the positivistic model, interpretive approaches tend to be banished as ‘merely subjective’” 
(Jamal & Hollinshead, 2001, p. 69). Although in their conclusions they ask for a dialogue in 
tourism research on multiple approaches, theories, practices, methods and techniques that 
                                                 
23 Scientism is used to refer to “…the view that sound thinking demands that we follow methods of 
demonstration, forms of explanation and proof, that have been found appropriate in the basic natural sciences” 
(Machan, 1999, p. 600).  
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can assist researchers in tourism, it is obvious that they are biased towards qualitative 
research and are committed to a qualitative research agenda that would penetrate the 
‘forbidden zone’ of qualitative inquiry with a view to initiate new lines of thinking.  
 
Most qualitative tourism studies fall under this broad interpretive paradigm. For example, 
Anderson and Shaw’s (1999) research in tourism marketing management; Echtner’s  (1999) 
examination of the application of semiotics to tourism studies; Hollinshead’s (1999) 
Foucauldian study on the power of surveillance in tourism; Beverland and Bretherton’s 
(2001) study on reasons for strategic alliance formation in health (pharmaceutical and 
private healthcare), and tourism (winery and airlines), and Jarratt’s (1998) strategic 
classification of business alliances.  
 
Departing from Walle’s (1997) tradeoffs in choosing ‘qualitative’ or ‘scientific’ techniques 
and, Jamal and Hollinshead’s (2001) plea to penetrate the ‘forbidden zone’ of qualitative 
inquiry, Davies (2003)  investigates areas of methodology and epistemology concerned with 
the generation of a framework that embraces both quantitative and qualitative research.  
Davies (2003) criticises Walle’s argument that qualitative research lacks rigour compared to 
quantitative research – that “…‘less rigour’ could be interpreted to mean less accurate” 
(Davies, 2003, p. 99). He also takes issue with Walle’s idea of trade-offs between 
quantitative and qualitative research. He argues that “…although depending of the situation, 
the method preferred in the trade-off may have more appropriateness, the method rejected 
can still generate useful insights” (Davies, 2003, p. 99). He also criticises Jamal and 
Hollinshead (2001) for overemphasising qualitative approaches at the expense of an 
eclectic, holistic research approach. 
 
Davies (2003) sees complementarity of quantitative and qualitative data as important in 
tourism research. He therefore argues for the combination of the two methods in order to 
develop a sensible ‘logic of inference’ for tourism. He sees greater possibilities of mixing 
both methods (quantitative and qualitative) and “…the mixing of conflicting paradigms on 
which quantitative and qualitative methods are based” (Davies, 2003, p. 104). He presents 
an integrating framework for different paradigmic approaches which in his view “…ought 
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to encompass an alternative logic of inference, the changing nature of the business 
environment, and linking and bridging mechanisms” although he concurs that mixing 
paradigms may present serious philosophical obstacles (Davies, 2003, p. 107). However, his 
framework falls short of addressing ontological and methodological issues, which the 
previous authors addressed.  
 
The other paper which addresses the issue of mixing methods with a view to encompassing 
ontological and methodological issues is by Downward and Mearman (2004). In their 
argument, they maintain that clarifying the ontological basis of inferences and yielding a 
logically consistent triangulation of insights is made possible through embracing a critical 
realist perspective. While their argument has merits and is particularly valuable to tourism 
research, they fail to address Echtner and Jamal’s  (1997) and Davies’ (2003) concerns for 
possibilities of mixing of conflicting paradigms on which quantitative and qualitative 
methods are based. They adopt a critical realist perspective, raising concern about the 
feasibility of Davies’ (2003), and Echtner and Jamal’s (1997) quest for the integration of 
theories and philosophies from various disciplinary areas in tourism research. Although 
Davies makes reference to a developing literature on paradigmic triangulation based on the 
work of Geertz (1973), Denzin (1978), and Denzin and Lincoln (1994), this view has been 
rejected by many authors (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1995).  
 
Without that feasibility, one is inclined to adopt a paradigm, not because it is logically 
presented but looking at what extent he/she agrees with its basic assumptions. It is even 
doubtful whether philosophical consistency is achievable or desirable in tourism research. 
There is no ‘perfect’ and ‘universally agreed’ methodology, and there is still great debate 
about the meaning of science, procedures, protocol and epistemological claims. “The rules 
and procedures for research constantly change as scientists look for new methods and 
techniques of observation, inference, generalisation and analysis…a well-developed research 
methodology can provide an understanding of the products and processes of scientific 
enquiry” (Eldabi, Irani, Paul & Love, 2002, p. 64). 
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5.2  The argument for pragmatism  
 
Considering the current situation of modern society, the fields of both strategy and tourism, 
in which interaction between individuals, organisations, and society determines 
organisational survival, this section seeks to ‘clarify and justify’ the standpoint of 
pragmatism as a methodological approach to the study of organisational life, behaviour and 
strategy in tourism management. The choice of this approach has been influenced by 
various factors. These include the fact that most of the research in tourism is highly 
influenced by positivist research (Davies, 2003, p. 98) amidst a growing outcry for 
triangulation of methods in order to understand the dynamics of tourism which it is argued 
can be best handled through pragmatism. In addition, the fact that behavioural elements are 
central to this study makes the argument for a mixed method imperative.  
 
Pragmatism is a distinctive American philosophy (Aune, 1970; Blosch, 2001) traceable to 
the “Metaphysical Club” - the legendary, short-lived discussion group in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts in the early 1870s that brought together many of the "founding fathers" of 
American pragmatism - Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. [1841-1935], William James 
[1842-1910], Charles Sanders Peirce [1839-1914], Chauncey Wright [1850-1875] and 
Nicholas St. John Green  [1830–1876] (Stuhr, 2000; Purcell Jr. & Erlanger, 2002) and is 
also linked to the writings of Mead [1863-1931] (Laughlin, 1995) and other contemporary 
theorists including W.V.O. Quine, Richard Rorty, and Donald Davidson (Murphy & Ricard, 
1990; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Creswell, 2003). Their ideas are essentially premised on 
the reflections of the Kantean/Fichte/Dilthy philosophical thought of the “projection of our 
minds” (Laughlin, 1995, p. 72). These origins though not a subject for analysis in this thesis 
greatly influenced the shape of studies in pragmatism. Pragmatism is derived from the 
Greek word πραγμα (pragma) which means action, from which the words ‘practice’ and 
‘practical’ come (James, 2000).24
                                                 
24 The article “What pragmatism means”, appears in many philosophy websites and books. Citation of this 
work in this thesis is from Pragmatism and classical American philosophy, published in 2000 and edited by 
John J. Stuhr. Stuhr cite the source of this article as The Works of William James-Pragmatism, ed. Frederick 
Burkhardt (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975 [1907]), pp. 27-44. 
 Pragmatism was first introduced into philosophy by 
Charles Sanders Peirce in 1878 in his article “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”. James 
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summarises the significance of Peirce’s article to the pragmatist paradigm in the following 
manners: 
Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, 
to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted 
to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the 
root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them 
so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain 
perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what 
conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve - what sensations 
we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of 
these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our 
conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all 
(James, 2000, p. 194). 
 
Baert (2003), Snarey and Olson (2003) and Pansiri (2005b) argue that to talk about 
pragmatism does not suggest a unified doctrine with set principles shared by all members, 
and that in fact differences emerged even among its seminal thinkers. Nevertheless, 
common themes are identifiable. For example, Menand as cited by Snarey and Olson (2003, 
p. 92) argues that they – particularly the ‘founding fathers’: 
…all believed that ideas are not “out there” waiting to be discovered, but are 
tools—like forks and knives and microchips—that people devise to cope with the 
world in which they find themselves. They believed that ideas are produced not 
by individuals, but by groups of individuals—that ideas are social. They believed 
that ideas do not develop according to some inner logic of their own, but are 
entirely dependent, like germs, on their human carriers and the environment. And 
they believed that since ideas are provisional responses to particular and 
unreproducible circumstances, their survival depends not on their immutability 
but on their adaptability (pp. xi–xii). 
 
Some analysts have declared that “…the metaphor of the ‘paradigm wars’ is undoubtedly 
overdrawn” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p. 218) and that the “paradigm wars are over” 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p. 12). In making this statement, Tashakkori and Teddlie make 
the mistake of attributing pragmatism as a mitigating factor between the different paradigms 
since it mixes methods. Though fairly recent as compared to the others, pragmatism has 
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positioned itself as a contending paradigm. Recent debates between Powell’s (2001; 2002; 
2003) pragmatist views and those of essentially positivist scholars, Durand (2002) and Arend 
(2003) on the logical and philosophical foundations of the competitive advantage hypothesis 
show the contending position of pragmatism. To show pragmatism’s difference from the two 
main streams, Powell (2001, p. 884) argues that: 
The pragmatist epistemology stands in contrast to prevailing positivist and anti-
positivist views of scientific discovery. Whereas positivism emphasizes the 
objective, lawlike properties of a brute reality independent of observation 
(Donaldson, 1992; Wicks and Freeman, 1998), anti-positivism emphasizes the 
creative role of active, subjective participants, none of whom owns a privileged 
claim on truth (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Astley, 1985; Martin, 1990). 
Pragmatism, on the other hand, rejects positivism, on grounds that no theory can 
satisfy its demands (objectivity, falsify-ability, the crucial experiment, etc.); and 
rejects anti-positivism, because virtually any theory would satisfy them.  
 
Debates on the major distinctions between paradigms centres on methodological issues 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1995; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; 2003), 
levels of methodological sophistication and prior theorisation, and emphasis given to 
critique of status quo and the need for change (Laughlin, 1995; Dann et al., 1988). 
Furthermore, various paradigms differ on the basis of methods, logic, epistemology, 
axiology, casual linkages, and nature of knowledge. Pragmatists do not in anyway try to 
offer an emancipatory program as do critical theorists, and while they agree with 
positivists/post-positivists regarding the existence of an external world independent of 
people’s minds, they put emphasis on choosing explanations that best produce desired 
outcomes. 
 
The leading epistemological ideas in pragmatism are those of ‘belief’, ‘doubt’ and ‘habit’. 
Peirce (2000)25
                                                 
25 Charles Sanders Peirce’s work, “The Fixation of belief” was first published in Popular Science Monthly 12 
(November 1877), 1-15. It is also included in Pragmatism and classical American philosophy, published in 
2000 and edited by John J. Stuhr. The pages cited in this thesis are from the edited book rather than the 
original text. It was difficult to find the article as was published in Popular Science Monthly. Many electronic 
sources of the same article are available on many philosophy websites. 
 argues that: 
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Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions. […] The feeling of believing 
is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit 
which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect. […] Doubt is an 
uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass 
into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do 
not wish to avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else. […] Belief does not 
make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in some 
certain way, when the occasion arises. Doubt has not the least such active effect, 
but stimulates us to inquiry until it is destroyed. […] The irritation of doubt causes 
a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry, […] The 
irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief 
(Peirce, 2000, p. 70).  
 
In pragmatism, both knowledge and social reality is based on beliefs and habits which are 
socially constructed by the processes of institutionalisation,26 legitimation27 and 
socialisation28
                                                 
26 “Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors. Put 
differently, any such typification is an institution” (Berger and Luckman, 1967, p. 72). 
 (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Yefimov, 2003). Yefimov (2003) argues that 
knowledge and social reality is historical because “…institutions can not be created 
instantaneously. Institutions always have a history, of which they are the products.” Berger 
and Luckman (1967, p. 72) argue that it is impossible to understand an institution 
adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced. 
Therefore, pragmatists refute the idea that ‘truth’ can be determined once and for all. They 
see ‘truth’ as a normative concept, just like ‘good’ and they maintain that “truth is what 
works”, hence knowledge claims cannot be totally abstracted from contingent beliefs, 
interests and projections (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p. 28). For example, while James 
(2000, p. 197-201) argues that for pragmatists, ‘truth’ means the same thing as it means in 
science – that ideas (which themselves are but parts of experience) become true just in so far 
as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience, he 
27 “The institutional world requires legitimation, that is ways by which it can be explained and justified” (Berger and 
Luckman, 1967, p. 79). 
28 Socialisation may be defined as the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of 
a society or a sector of it. It happens when the individual achieves a capacity of the immediate apprehension or 
interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning (Berger and Luckman, 1967, p. 150). 
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maintains that ‘true’ “…is the name of whatever proves itself, and good, too, for definite, 
assignable reasons”.  
 
Powell (2001, p. 884) maintains that a true proposition is one that facilitates fruitful paths of 
human discovery, and should only be retained, deployed and improved as long as it provides a 
profitable leading. It will be abandoned for more attractive propositions, and be referred to as 
‘falls’ when “it begins to frustrate discovery”. In classical Peirce pragmatism, the way to 
understand these issues is via a process of enquiry through scientific investigation. Rorty 
puts it (1999, p. xxv) this way: 
[W]e pragmatists cannot make sense of the idea that we should pursue truth for 
its own sake. We cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. The purpose of inquiry 
is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, to bring about 
consensus on the ends to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those 
ends. Inquiry that does not achieve coordination of behaviour is not inquiry but 
simply wordplay. …There is no deep split between theory and practice, because 
on a pragmatist view all so-called ‘theory’ which is not wordplay is always 
already practice. 
 
The above statement is closely associated with Rorty’s definition of pragmatism. He (1991, 
p. 27) defines pragmatism as “the claim that the function of inquiry is, in Bacon’s words, to 
‘relieve and benefit the condition of man’ – to make us happier by enabling us to cope more 
successfully with the physical environment and with each other.” The mandate of science to 
pragmatists is not to find truth or reality, the existence of which are perpetually in dispute, 
but to facilitate human problem-solving (Powell, 2001), to help realise desirable human 
ends, and enhance the quality of life (Dwyer, 1987). This is based upon John Dewey’s idea 
(as cited by Powell, 2001, p. 884) that science should overthrow: 
the notion, which has ruled philosophy since the time of the Greeks, that the office of 
knowledge is to uncover the antecedently real, rather than, as is the case with our 
practical judgments, to gain the kind of understanding which is necessary to deal 
with problems as they arise. 
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Dwyer (1987, p. 25) argues that there are two ways which science can be of value to people: 
In the first place it can be of cognitive or epistemic value in helping us to improve 
our knowledge of the (natural and social) world, to understand its workings, to 
appreciate its underlying mechanisms. In the second place it can be of practical or 
technological value in helping us to exert control over the world in the service of 
people’s material needs. Once it is recognised that human welfare has both a 
cognitive dimension involving what might be called “intellectual satisfaction” and 
a practical dimension relating to man’s more material and social needs, 
pragmatists see no reason to limit the aims of scientific enquiry to promoting the 
former set of interests only.  
 
The objective of a pragmatist enquiry such as this is not to find truth, but to improve human 
knowledge of the social world and enhance the understanding of alliance relationships. This 
enables alliances to be of more value to tourism businesses. Understanding of alliance 
practice can bring value to tourism businesses in many ways. Such an understanding may 
lead to better management of inter-organisational relationships, reduction of transaction 
costs and improve productivity and profitability.  
 
In terms of the mode of enquiry, pragmatism embraces the two extremes normally espoused 
by positivists/post-positivists and those supported by interpretivists. Methodologically, 
positivism/post-positivism’s approach is nomothetic and is based on systematic protocol and 
technique methods which are employed in the natural sciences, which, according to Burrell 
and Morgan (1979), focus upon the processes of testing hypotheses in accordance with the 
canons of scientific rigour. It involves the development of a theory (the assumption, 
including the definition of variables and the logic that relate them and the set of substantive 
hypothesis) which is predictory in nature. As Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 8) observe, 
such propositions are concerned with how the world works, "they take the form 'If A then 
B'". Such predictions can then be refuted by evidence through a scientific test for the 
analysis of data. Surveys, questionnaires, personality tests and standards are predominantly 
among the sources of data, which comprise nomothetic methodology in management. This 
contrasts with interpretive/constructivism which is ideographic and observes that social 
science can only understand the social world by obtaining first hand knowledge of the 
subject under investigation. This approach stresses the importance of letting one's subject 
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unfold in nature and characteristics during the process of investigation. As Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) observe, the researcher has to understand from the 'inside' rather than the 
'outside'. However, it is difficult to specify precisely the procedures for conducting 
interpretive research, but as Chua (1986) observes, these researchers emphasise qualitative 
data collection (participant observation, case studies, awareness of linguistic cues and a 
careful attention to detail) and analysis (i.e. content analysis, emerging theme analysis, and 
narrative analysis). 
 
Pragmatism has been hailed as the foundation of mixed method research (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 1998; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003), and Maxcy (2003) outlines a discussion of the 
link between pragmatism and the use of mixed methods in the social and behavioural 
sciences. Mixed method studies have been defined as those studies involving “…the 
collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study in which 
the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the 
integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research” (Creswell et al., 
2003a, p. 212). A mixed method study has also been seen as one in which the researcher 
tends to base knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds, employs strategies of inquiry that 
involve collecting data either simultaneously or sequentially to understand best the research 
problem (Creswell, 2003). Different names are used to refer to the same concept of mixed 
methods studies, for instance, interrelating qualitative and quantitative data (Fielding & 
Fielding, 1986), between or cross-method triangulation (Denzin, 1970; Jick, 1979), 
multimethodology research (Hugentobler, Israel & Schurman, 1992), integrating qualitative 
and quantitative methods (Steckler, McLeroy, Goodman, Bird & McCormick, 1992), and 
multi-method study (Snow & Thomas, 1994). As Creswell et al. (2003a) observe, central to 
these terms is the thought of combining or integrating different research methods. The use 
of mixed method approach is gathering momentum in the social sciences (Creswell, 2003; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; 2003),  in management (Snow & Thomas, 1994; Currell & 
Towler, 2003) and in tourism research (Davies, 2003). 
 
The idea that knowledge claims arise out of actions, situations, and consequences rather 
than antecedent conditions (as in positivism) remains central to most pragmatists (Creswell, 
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2003) most of whom are concerned with applications – “What works” – and solutions to 
problems (Rorty, 1999; Powell, 2001; Creswell, 2003). Creswell further argues that instead 
of methods being important, the problem is most important and individual researchers have 
a freedom of choice regarding the methods, techniques, and procedures of research that best 
meet their needs and purposes. Pragmatism rejects the forced choice between positivism 
(including postpositivism) and interpretivism with regard to methods, logic, and 
epistemology. As Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) argue, pragmatism rejects the either-or of 
the incompatibility thesis and embraces both points of view, and is more oriented toward 
using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Positivism believes that inquiry is value-
free while interpretivism believes that enquiry is value-bound. For pragmatists, values play 
an important role in conducting research and interpreting results, and the researcher is 
advised to accept external reality and choose explanations that best produce desired 
outcomes.  
 
 
5.3  Justification of the methodology 
 
While the issue of mixing methods is emerging in tourism, very few authors have attempted 
to link the debate to philosophical issues. The few who have done so, for instance Davies 
(2003) and, Downward and Mearman (2004) fail to resolve major philosophical problems. 
Davies’ position fails to fully address the lack of ontological foundation and consequently 
does not fully resolve the methodological issues at stake (Downward & Mearman, 2004). 
Downward and Mearman present critical realism as a consistent research programme where 
triangulation of both qualitative and quantitative methods can be achieved. While their 
argument is inspirational, the issue of triangulation of methods is limited by the ideas of 
critical realism. Realism purports among other things, that the task of the social sciences is 
to get access to and unveil a social reality (that is stratified and exists independently of 
people’s perceptions) in all its complexity because as long as it operates according to the 
right methods, it is capable of accessing aspects of social reality that may not even be 
immediately accessible by observations (Baert, 2003). In the view of pragmatists, such an 
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approach is too simplistic and does not understand the social world in its totality. As Baert 
(2003, p. 98) argues:  
the main rationale underlying this [realism] position is that social systems are 
open, irreducibly so, and to such an extent that researchers cannot anticipate all 
possible mechanisms, structures or powers that may intervene in the research 
process. As such, substantial reliance on empirical testing (as falsification and 
corroboration) is a contentious means of establishing the truth content or cognitive 
validity of those propositions that state the nature of the existing mechanisms in 
operation. Likewise, I am highly sceptical about the realist argument that stylised 
facts (as observed regularities) are an essential step towards uncovering these 
mechanisms. Why would empirical regularities be a stepping stone towards 
revealing scientific laws if (as realists claim) various mechanisms are intervening 
with and affecting the surface level?  
 
Due to the limitations of critical realism identified by Baert (2003), it may be appropriate to 
examine other approaches to how mixed methods can be achieved successfully. Pragmatism 
offers a viable option to achieve this. Pragmatism has been hailed as the best paradigm for 
justifying the use of mixed methods research (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2003; Rallis & Rossman, 2003) and considers the research question to be more 
important than either the method used or the paradigm that underlies the method 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003).  
Methods are like the kaleidoscope - depending on how they are approached, held, 
and acted towards, different observations will be revealed. This is not to imply that 
reality has the shifting qualities of the colored prism, but that it too is an object that 
moves and that will not permit one interpretation to be stamped upon it (Denzin, 
1970, pp. 298-299). 
 
Any research method chosen has inherent flaws and the choice of that method obviously 
limits the conclusions that can be drawn (Scandura & Williams, 2000). It is therefore 
essential to obtain corroborating evidence from using a variety of methods in order to 
achieve validity. Mixed methods are therefore a way of achieving this through triangulation 
of methods. The idea of triangulation is not new. Denzin (1970, p. 291) defines triangulation 
as “…the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon.” Following 
Denzin’s (1970) seminal work on triangulation, four kinds of triangulation are identifiable 
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which many authors have discussed at length – data triangulation, investigator triangulation, 
theory triangulation and methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1970; Jick, 1979; 
Macdonald & Tipton, 1993).  
 
Methodological triangulation is the focus of this thesis – combining dissimilar methods to 
measure the same phenomenon. The rationale for this strategy is that the flaws of each 
single method will be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another, and by 
combining methods, observers can achieve the best of each, while overcoming their unique 
deficiencies (Denzin, 1970; Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar & Newton, 2002). Webb et al. 
(1966, pp. 173-174) as cited by Denzing (1970, p. 308) argues that:  
So long as one has only a single class of data collection, and that class is the 
questionnaire or interview, one has inadequate knowledge of the rival hypotheses 
grouped under the term “reactive measurement effects…” …As long as the 
research strategy is based on a single measurement class, some flanks will be 
exposed, and even if fewer are exposed with the choice of the questionnaire 
method, there is still insufficient justification for its use as the only approach. No 
single measurement class is perfect, neither is any scientifically useless.  
 
Amaratunga et al. (2002) looked at the strengths29 and weaknesses30
                                                 
29 Amaratunga et al. (2002, p. 20) summarise the strengths of positivist (quantitative research) paradigm as 
relating to the fact that: “They can provide wide coverage of the range of situations; They can be fast and 
economical; Where statistics are aggregated from large samples, they may be of considerable relevance to 
policy decisions”. On the other hand they list the strengths of phenomenological (qualitative research) 
paradigm as relating to the fact that: “Data-gathering methods seen more as natural than artificial; Ability to 
look at change processes over time; Ability to understand people’s meaning; Ability to adjust to new issues 
and ideas as they emerge; contribute to theory generation” 
 of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods and observed that the essence of mixed method is therefore to enable 
confirmation or corroboration of each other via triangulation; to enable or develop analysis, 
providing richer details; and to initiate new lines of thinking through attention to surprises 
or paradoxes, “turning ideas around”, and providing fresh insights. Oppermann (2000, p. 
30 Amaratunga et al. (2002, p. 20) summarise the weaknesses of positivist (quantitative research) paradigm as 
relating to the fact that: “The methods used tend to be rather inflexible and artificial; They are not very 
effective in understanding processes or the significance that people attach to actions; They are not very helpful 
in generating theories; Because they focus on what is, or what has been recently, they make it hard for policy 
makers to infer what changes and actions should take place in the future.” On the other hand they summarise 
the weaknesses of phenomenological (qualitative research) paradigm as relating to the fact that: “Data 
collection can be tedious and require more resources; Analysis and interpretation of data may be more 
difficult; harder to control the pace, progress and end-points of research process; Policy makers may give low 
credibility to results from qualitative approach.” 
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143) argues that by using one method especially interviewing with closed questions, “…the 
data are limited to responses to the given questions and especially the categories provided. 
Other, possibly more important, categories not included will not be detected and, therefore, 
the results will be biased towards the preconceived categories provided.” Therefore, other 
methods could be used in addition to surveys as a way of providing a more accurate picture. 
Amaratunga et al. (2002) observe that there is a strong suggestion within the research 
community that research, both quantitative and qualitative, is best thought of as 
complementary and should be mixed in research of many kinds. In this manner, the weaknesses in 
each single method is compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another. 
 
 
5.4  Model for researching strategic alliances in tourism 
 
The pragmatist idea that knowledge claims arise out of actions, situations and consequences, 
and is socially constructed by the processes of institutionalisation, legitimisation and 
socialisation places company and managerial characteristics at the core of any inquiry that 
seeks to understand organisational life. This is shown in Figure 5.1. Pansiri (2005a) 
developed a model for understanding the interplay between managerial characteristics and 
various strategic alliance practices, i.e. drivers for strategic alliance formation, alliance 
types, choice of alliance partners, and alliance evaluation (for further discussion see Pansiri, 
2005a). To Pansiri (2005a), company characteristics are added as a way of questioning if 
they also influence alliance formation and evaluation in the travel sub-sectors of travel 
agencies, tour operators and wholesalers. 
 
This model is a process that seeks to answer the research question and its subsidiary 
questions developed in Chapter One. Strategic alliance, company and executives 
characteristics form the theoretical basis for the entire research. Extensive literature review 
was undertaken to relate these theoretical issues. After permission was obtained to 
undertake the research, data were collected using both closed-ended mailed questionnaires 
and in-depth semi-structured interviews. This process led to data analysis, which 
subsequently fed back to both theory and industry through findings, implications and 
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recommendations.31
 
 Generating information and new ideas is the whole essence of research 
and this is in line with pragmatism’s emphasis on applications – “What works” – and 
solutions to problems (Creswell, 2003). Therefore research improves theory used for 
investigation, and in tourism, it is important that research should enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the industry. Data are analysed in Chapter Six, and the implications of these 
findings for both strategic alliances and tourism are then discussed in Chapter Seven, which 
further make recommendations to the tourism industry with specific emphasis on the three 
sub-sectors under investigation.  
 
5.5  Primary research design 
 
In line with the pragmatist paradigm discussed above, the method used to produce this 
thesis was a descriptive survey research and in-depth semi-structured interviews. As the 
general objective of the study was to examine the influence of company and executive 
characteristics on alliance type selection, choice of alliance partners, alliance structures, and 
alliance performance evaluation, the research was designed to describe effectively the 
current thinking and understanding of businesses about strategic alliances, and develop 
strategies for effective alliance formation and implementation. There are many mixed 
methods designs identified in the literature (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; 2003; Creswell et 
al., 2003b; Creswell, 2003; Pansiri, 2005b), however, this study adopted the sequential 
explanatory strategy (see Figure 5.2) with a view of using qualitative methods to explain 
quantitative results.  Figure 5.2 is a research process that started with quantitative data 
collection using a survey instrument (Appendix 2), followed by in-depth semi-structured 
interviews (Appendix 3). 
 
                                                 
31 One industry association had requested that the findings of the research be communicated to its members. A 
report has already been prepared to be given to the association and its members, and other executives who 
participated in the study. The report is to be sent after the thesis has been submitted.  
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Theory Development 
Industry Performance  
Figure 5.1: Research model into strategic alliance in tourism  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Pansiri (2005b, p. 200) 
 
Survey data were collected, coded and entered into Statistical Package for Social Scientists 
(SPSS). Preliminary analysis using averages, means, correlations and standard deviations 
determined the trend in responses. Inferential statistical analysis using tests to be discussed 
in Chapter Six was also performed. This gave the researcher ideas in terms of what to look 
for in conducting semi-structured interviews. Then qualitative data collection was done in 
the form of in-depth semi-interviews (Appendix 3). This data gave further understanding of 
the quantitative data. The two sets of data were then analysed concurrently to understand the 
phenomenon under investigation. Figure 5.2 should be understood as an extension of the 
broad research model into strategic alliances in tourism (Figure 5.1). Narrative analysis was 
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used to analyse quantitative data. Figure 5.2 illustrate how this data was analysed 
concurrently using different types of methods, which are explained further in Chapter Six.  
 
Figure 5.2: Primary Research Design32
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 5.6  Methods 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the relationships that drive strategic alliance 
formation. This thesis looks at the influence of company and executive characteristics, on 
strategic alliance type selection, choice of alliance partners, alliance structure and alliance 
evaluation in the Australian travel sector. The issues were addressed by gathering the 
opinions and experiences of top managers (CEOs, MDs) since it is not only they who are 
strategic alliance designers, but also the same people whose characteristics and perceptions 
influence alliance formation.   
                                                 
32 ‘qual’ stands for qualitative,  ‘quan’ stands for quantitative, capital letters – ‘QUAL’ and  ‘QUAN’ denote 
high priority or weight, and lower case letters – ‘qual’ and  ‘quan’ denote lower priority or weight. 
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The data collection instruments were a survey and in-depth semi-structured interviews. Both 
were directed at a random sample of top executives in the travel sectors of travel agents, 
tour wholesalers, and tour operators in Australia. Data gathered by the survey instrument 
was done over a six-month period (February –August in 2005), including a pilot study. A 
random sample of 700 tourism businesses was selected from a list of 4610.  
 
The primary source for original firm selection was the Travel Compensation Fund (TCF) 
industry website directory. These firms were checked against the Council of Australian 
Tour Operators (CATO) and the Australian Federation of Travel Agents (AFTA) lists 
(available in their websites) to verify if such firms were travel agents, tour operators or tour 
wholesalers. For those businesses that had listed websites, their websites were accessed to 
obtain the name of an executive likely to be able to complete the survey, and his or her title, 
and complete addresses (both physical and email). The CEO/MD was chosen unless another 
person more clearly matched the needs of this survey, for example, a director of the 
company. For those businesses whose names were corroborated between the TCF list and 
either of the other two organisations mentioned above, but did not have any website to 
identify appropriate executive details, a hard copy was sent to the address of the MD.  
 
Sending a hard copy to the MD was important because of the need to ensure that the sample 
was as representative as possible, even of those, which for one reason or another, had no 
websites. These processes yielded 600 organisations. Most of the organisations removed 
from the original list were either associations, airline owned travel centres (e.g. QANTAS), 
accommodation providers and different registered companies owned by the same person. 
Therefore 600 businesses were approached (435 by electronic and 165 by hard copy) to 
complete the survey. 
 
 
5.6.1  Instrument and procedures 
 
Construction of survey instrument: To generate measurement items, exploratory research 
can use several techniques, “including literature searches, experience surveys, and insight 
 142 
stimulating examples” (Churchill, 1979, p. 67), focus groups involving relevant actors, and 
analysis of critical incidents (Parkhe, 1993b). For this survey, extensive review of the 
literature with emphasis on generating a pool of items that tapped the core theoretical 
constructs was undertaken. This led to Figures 3.1 and 4.1, and the measurement items used 
for this study. These measurement items have been tested and verified for validity in 
previous studies (Henderson & Nutt, 1980; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Geringer & Herbert, 1991; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Faulkner, 1995; 
Shamdasani & Seth, 1995; Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996; Moore & Cunningham III, 1999; 
Tsang, 2002; Weber, Blais & Betz, 2002; Temtime & Pansiri, 2003) 
 
Once the items were generated, a pilot survey was conducted. This was undertaken to assess 
the length of the questionnaire, its readability and mode of distribution and not to test the 
reliability of the instrument since most of the items have already been used.  The pilot 
survey was conducted between February and April 2005.  
 
The original questionnaire included among others, two sets of questions where the 
respondents were to answer 25 questions evaluating the one strategic alliance that they 
perceived to be the best of all their strategic alliances on a Likert scale of 1 - 5. This was 
followed by 14 questions, which wanted respondents to rate on a Likert scale of 1 – 5 the 
effects that going into the best strategic alliance evaluated under the previous questions has 
had on their current company/firm performance versus its performance before joining the 
strategic alliance. The second set wanted the respondents to evaluate the same factors but 
this time of the one strategic alliance that they perceived to be the worst of all. The rationale 
behind this was to assess the worst types of alliances and how they differed from those 
perceived to be the best. This was later abandoned because the response rate of 6 per cent 
was very poor. Of the ones, which responded, 66.67 per cent did not complete the section 
on the worst alliance they had. The conclusion drawn from this was that that the 
questionnaire was too long. The final version of the questionnaire was shortened by 
removing questions on the worst strategic alliance. 
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5.6.2  The final questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire used in this study is made up of three sections (see Appendix 2). Section I 
deals with company characteristics variables such as firm size, industry sub-sector 
affiliation, and form of ownership. Section II evaluates various strategic alliance items 
presented under five major areas. Section III deals with executive characteristics.  
 
Section 1: Company characteristics: These are company/firm specific variables most of 
which have previously been used in management research. For example Tyler and Steensma 
(1998) used industry and firm size in their assessment of potential technological alliances, 
and Golden and Dollinger (1993) have confirmed relationships between firm size and 
alliance participation. Firm size was measured by the number of employees (Erramilli, 
1991) and an organisation’s annual turnover (Temtime & Pansiri, 2003). Industry variables 
included three travel sub-sectors – travel agents, tour wholesalers, and tour operators. Other 
variables under study included legal form of business and whether the company is a family 
owned business (Temtime & Pansiri, 2003). Variables used to measure company 
characteristics have been listed in Section 1 of Appendix 2. For Chi-square analysis, 
questions 6 and 8 were recoded because some cells had expected counts less than five33
 
 
(Coakes & Steed, 1999; Field, 2005). Question 6 was recoded (1) Less than 5, (2) Between 
5 – 49, and (3) 50 and above. Question 8 was recoded (1) Less than A$M, (2) Between 
A$1,000,001 – A$5M, and (3) Above A$5M. 
Section II: Strategic alliance practices: This was divided into five sections; types of 
alliances companies are engaged, drivers for strategic alliance formation in the tourism 
industry, choice of strategic alliance partners, and strategic alliance performance: 
 
Types of strategic alliances: Participants were asked to indicate which out of eight strategic 
alliance types their companies were involved in, both in Australia and abroad, and from 
which sectors in the tourism industry their alliance members came from. These alliances 
                                                 
33 According to Coakes and Steed (1999, p. 107), “when the number of cells is less than ten and particularly 
when the total sample size is small, the lowest expected frequency required for chi-square test is five. 
However, the observed frequencies can be any value including 0.” 
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types are Joint venture (JV), Equity participating alliance (EPA), Brand sharing (BSA), 
Franchises and licensing (FLA), Marketing and distribution agreements (MDA), Joint 
selling or distribution (JSA), Sharing information and communication technology (SICA), 
and Joint purchasing and equipment/office sharing (JPEA). Three broad sectors were also 
included in the questionnaire – accommodation, travel and transportation. Respondents 
without any alliances were asked to complete only sections I and III. 
 
Drivers of strategic alliance formation in the tourism industry: Various ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ drivers influence firms to form strategic alliances (Faulkner, 1995; Glaister & 
Buckley, 1996; Nielsen, 2002). Thirteen variables measure these drivers and have been 
listed in question 13 under Section II of Appendix 2. These variables were adapted from 
Faulkner (1995) and Tsang (2002). The variable “strength of personal relationships” was 
developed by the researcher. For each of the statements, respondents were asked to indicate 
on a 5-point scale [from (1) very low influence to (5) very high influence] the degree to 
which these factors were influential, leading to the formation of strategic alliances. 
 
Choice of strategic alliance partners: This is divided into five factors with a variety of 
items under each factor. The items are listed in Table 5.1. (i) Compatibility: Two 
dimensions used by Shamdasani and Seth, (1995) and two used by Faulkner (1995) were 
adapted to evaluate strategic alliance relationships. These give an indication as to whether 
alliance partners are compatible. (ii) Capability: This was measured by the level of 
complementarity as adapted from Faulkner (1995). (iii) Commitment: Measures for 
commitment were adapted from Moore and Cunningham III (1999). (iv) Trust: Variables 
for trust included four items assessing the respondent’s views on counting on the alliance 
partner to do what is right with high integrity (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), whether alliance 
partner makes false claims or promises and the partner’s honesty about problems when they 
arise (Moore & Cunningham III, 1999). (v) Control – two dimensions developed by the 
researcher from analysing a study by Medina-Muñoz et al. (2003). For all the 18 items, 
respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale [from (1) strongly disagree 
to (5) strongly agree] the level to which they agree with the statement. Respondents were 
asked to use an example of their best strategic alliance to evaluate the statements. 
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Table 5.1: Choice of alliance variables 
 
Theoretical 
themes 
Items 
Compatibility Our company is satisfied with the strategic alliance 
Our company is likely to continue with the strategic alliance  
We selected each other because we were of an approximately similar size and strength 
We selected each other because our culture was compatible 
We selected each other because there were possible synergies perceived in working 
together 
Capability We selected each other because we had complementary assets 
Commitment We selected each other because we were all very committed to the relationship 
Our partner is quite willing to make long-term investment in the alliance. 
Our partner has a strong sense of loyalty to the alliance 
Our partner is willing to dedicate whatever people and resources it takes to make the 
alliance a success 
This alliance is something our organisation intends to maintain in the future 
The alliance is based on a strong sense of loyalty to other alliance members 
The alliance deserves our organisation’s maximum effort to maintain. 
Trust Alliance partners can be counted on to do what is right 
Alliance partners do not make false claims or promises 
Alliance partners are honest about problems when they arise 
Alliance partners have high integrity 
Control We exert informal control over our alliance partners in order to achieve alliance 
objectives 
We exert formal control over our alliance partners in order to achieve alliance objectives 
 
Strategic alliance performance: Subjective measures were used to measure strategic 
alliance performance.  These measures were divided into two:  
 
(i) Perceived strategic alliance performance: A 14 -item scale adapted from Geringer and 
Hebert, (1991) was used to assess current firm/company performance versus its 
performance before joining the strategic alliance. As indicated in question 15 of Appendix 
2, respondents were asked to evaluate the strategic alliance actual performance by assessing 
their current company/firm performance versus its performance before joining the strategic 
alliance on 14 items. This assessment was done using a five point Likert scale ranging from 
(1) “much worse” to (5) “much better”. 
 
(ii) Perceived overall satisfaction with the alliance: A five-point Likert scale ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” was used to measure managerial perceptions using 
six items about the level of satisfaction with the alliance. Two items; (a) in general, my 
organisation is satisfied with the strategic alliance overall performance, and (b) in general, 
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our partner is satisfied the strategic alliance overall performance; were adopted from 
Geringer and Hebert (1991). The item “The alliance has enabled us to develop new 
technology processes” was adapted from Doz et al. (2000) while  “We have benefited from 
technology transfer from our partners” was adapted from Kotabe et al.(2003). “We have 
learned or benefited from our partners' specific skills and competencies” was adapted from 
Tsang (2002). The last item, “We have experienced an increase in the number of clients 
since we joined the alliance” was developed by the researcher in consultation with the 
principal supervisor. In assessing both ‘perceived strategic alliance performance’ and 
‘perceived overall satisfaction with the alliance’, respondents were asked to use an example 
of their best strategic alliance to evaluate the statements. 
 
Section III: Executive characteristics: Respondents were asked to report their age, gender 
and tenure of office [measured as the number of years the respondent had spent with a firm] 
(Michel & Hambrick, 1992, p. 21), educational level - measured on a seven-point scale 
based on the highest educational qualification earned by the respondent [1 = not completed 
high school, 2 = High school, 3 = TAFE, 4 = Undergraduate degree, 5 = MBA, 6 = Masters 
degree, and 7 = Doctorate] (Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996, p. 206),  past functional experience 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996) measured in terms of the number 
of years a respondent spent in any one of the following seven different functional categories 
[1 = production/operation, 2 = marketing, sales, and merchandising, 3 = finance/accounting, 
4 = human resource management, 5 = product R&D, and  6 = planning and general 
management] (Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996, p. 206).   
 
The other managerial characteristics of respondents investigated are: (a) Tolerance for 
ambiguity. This was measured by four items developed by Lorsch and Morse (1974) and 
adapted by Gupta and Govindarajan (1984, p. 33). For each of the statements, respondents 
were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale whether they (1) strongly disagree or (5) 
strongly agree. These items are listed in question 25 under Part III of Appendix 2. (b) 
Willingness to take risk. This was measured using six items from Weber, Blais and Betz’s 
(2002) domain-specific risk-attitude scale (see question 26 under Part III of Appendix 2). 
This scale contains five domains of risk: financial, health/safety, recreational, ethics and 
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social risk. It was beyond the scope of this thesis to consider all the domains. Only six items 
under financial risk were considered for this thesis. For each of the statements, respondents 
were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale whether it was (1) extremely unlikely or 
(5) extremely likely for them to engage in the activity.  (c) Respondents were also asked 
how they would rate (on a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) very low to (5) very 
high) their own willingness to undertake risky business propositions as compared to other 
executives at or near their level in their firm (see question 22 under Section III of Appendix 
2).  
 
The measures in the previous paragraph relate executives’ willingness to take risk and their 
tolerance for ambiguity to strategic alliances. The assumptions are; (i) that managers, whose 
companies have alliances, and form many strategic alliances face more uncertain task 
environments than do managers in charge of companies whose concerns are directly the 
opposite; (2) that strategic alliance adoption requires greater willingness to take risk and 
greater tolerance for ambiguity. Managers with such attitudes are also likely to be more 
optimistic about alliance performance. The single items on comparison meant to assess the 
level to which the executive think he/she is a risk taker as compared to other executives in 
his/her company.  
 
For Chi-square analysis, questions 17, 18, 20, 21 and 24 were recoded because some cells 
had expected counts less than five. Question 17 – age, was recoded (1) ‘Less than 50 years’ 
and (2) ‘50 and above’. Question 18 level of education, was recoded (1) 'Up to High 
School', (2) 'Tertiary Education' and (3) 'Post Graduate Education'. Question 20 – tenure, 
was recoded (1) ‘Low’ [Up to 5 years experience] and (2) ‘High’ [6 years and above]. 
Question 21 - experience, was recoded (1) ‘Up to Five years’, (2) ‘6 – 8 years’ and (3) ‘9 
years and above’. Question 24 – willingness to take risk as compared to other executive, 
was recorded (1) ‘Low’, (2) ‘Moderate’ and (3) ‘High’. 
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5.6.3  Administration and procedures of questionnaire 
 
For the pilot survey, a decision was made to distribute 50 per cent of the questionnaires by 
post and the other 50 per cent by electronic means (an email written directly to the potential 
respondent with a site linking to the electronic questionnaire). 
 
 
Electronic distribution 
 
During the pilot survey, this questionnaire was linked to a private website run by a staff 
member of the School of Business, University of Ballarat. The questionnaire was done with 
both WORD and Macromedia Dreamweaver MX for the electronic copy. From the six per 
cent response for the pilot survey, only two per cent were electronic responses which were 
distributed by way of emailing. A follow-up was made on both types of distribution three 
weeks later but there was only one per cent increase on this mode. It was possible that 
managers were deleting the emails before they read it for fear that it could just be junk email 
or computer viruses.  
 
The main survey was conducted between May and August 2005. One step taken for the 
main survey was to remove the questionnaire from a private website to the university one. 
The argument was that this would give the survey more credibility and legitimacy. The 
survey was then moved to The Centre for Electronic Commerce and Communications 
(CECC), a business unit of the School of Business, University of Ballarat. With this 
strategy, taking into account the fact that potential respondents might perceive emails sent to 
them as hoax, it was decided that hard copy letters be written to them indicating or directing 
them to the survey site (see Appendix 6). This letter written by the supervisor, also 
explained the nature of the research. A further explanation, almost identical to the one 
provided in the letter formed the introduction of the electronic questionnaire together with 
the survey instructions. Letters sent to potential respondents were then followed up with an 
email reminder two weeks later with the website linkage for the electronic survey provided. 
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Other two subsequent reminders were also done by email. The response rate for the survey 
from this mode of questionnaire distribution was 32 per cent.  
 
 
Mailed questionnaires 
 
Mailed questionnaires were accompanied by a covering letter written by the supervisor 
explaining the nature of the research (see Appendix 7). Included in the mailed questionnaire 
was a stamped School of Business paid envelope to allow the respondents to return the 
questionnaire. The first page of the questionnaire contained instructions about how to 
respond to the questionnaire, and addresses of the researcher in case they misplaced the 
return envelope. Two follow-ups were made. The last one included a copy of the 
questionnaire and the return envelope. The response rate for the main survey from this mode 
of questionnaire distribution was 22 per cent.  
 
 
General problems 
 
The response rate for both electronic distribution and hard copy questionnaires sent by post 
was the same. The main problem with these two modes of questionnaire distribution was 
non delivery to some recipients. Seven hard copy letters were returned while only 76.7 per 
cent of the emails were delivered. Some letters were returned because the business had 
changed either address or location, or stopped operations. About 33.3 per cent of the email 
addresses to which the electronic survey was sent were not operational. Either the addresses 
“had permanent fatal errors” or the delivery to the recipients “failed”. The other category 
was of those businesses, which have ceased operations or closed down. Therefore, mailed 
(both electronic and post) questionnaires had the problem that the information used to send 
the questionnaire might be outdated. Overall, it is insufficient to argue that the response rate 
was low because the respondents were not interested. For many, it might be because the 
mail never reached them.   
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The other problem was that the industry is over-researched. The advantage of the electronic 
mail was that it gave the respondents the opportunity to respond without necessarily filling 
the questionnaire. Their responses showed that the industry might be over researched, and 
given that our target was top executives, the responses also indicate that these people do not 
have time. Furthermore, the researcher received many auto replies indicating that the 
recipient was either on leave, business trip, had closed operations and that the potential 
respondents were overburdened with many research activities. The following are examples 
of many responses received from people who did not want to participate in the survey.  
Jaloni 
Josie is currently on annual leave, she did receive your survey however we receive 
many of these and respond [only] to direct industry related ones or from VECCI.  Please 
delete us from your database. 
*********** 
Dear Jaloni 
Please stop sending me emails in regards to this, also please take us [out] of your data 
base for this and any future emails we do not want to take part in any future "research".   
*********** 
Hi Jaloni, 
I would appreciate you removing me from your list. Thanks for your assistance. 
 
 
5.6.4  Approach to interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in ways designed to capture human lived 
experiences. Polkinghorne (2005, p. 138) cite the work of Schwandt who argues that 
“qualitative inquiry deals with human lived experience. It is the life-world as it is lived, felt, 
undergone, made sense of, and accomplished by human beings that is the object of study.” 
Qualitative methods are constructed to take account of particular characteristics of human 
experience and to facilitate the investigation of experience.  
 
There is debate over the number of cases that could be said to constitute a large enough 
sample for qualitative research (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005; Perry, 1998). For instance, 
Hedges (1885) suggests between two and twelve cases while Perry (1998) sets an upper 
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limit of fifty. The decision on the number of cases is left to the researcher (Romano, 1989) 
who should add cases until theoretical saturation is reached (Perry, 1998) or “to the point of 
redundancy” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The other view held by scholars such as Patton 
(1990), and Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005) emphasise sufficiency of responses to meet the 
aims and objectives of enquiry. Patton (1990, p. 184) argues that the sample size depends on 
“…what you want to find out, why you want to find out, how the findings will be used, and 
what resources you have for the study.” According to Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005, 49) the 
answer to appropriate number of cases is simple: 
When the researcher is satisfied that the data are rich enough and cover enough of 
the dimensions they are interested in, then the sample is large enough. In 
quantitative methods, required sample sizes can be calculated on the basis of the 
type of analysis that is anticipated. In qualitative analysis, it is difficult to predict 
accurately what the sample size will be. The sample is large enough when it can 
support the desired analysis.   
 
It was impossible to fulfil the dictates of Perry’s (1998), and Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) 
ambitious approach due to both time and financial resource constraints. Instead, Patton’s 
(1990), and  Liamputtong and Ezzy’s (2005, 49)  approach was adopted. Therefore six cases 
were used which provided sufficient information for this study. According to Patton (1990, 
p. 185) “…the validity, meaningfulness and insights generated from qualitative inquiry have 
more to do with the information-richness of the cases selected and the observation/analytical 
capabilities of the researcher than with sample size.” 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 25) define a case as “…a phenomenon of some sort 
occurring in a bounded context” which could be an individual, a small group, an 
organisation, a community or a nation. Pan (2004) argues that a case is a unit of analysis 
with a focus on the study and a boundary which defines the edge of the case. In line with 
Patton (1990) and Pan (2004), this study defines a case as an individual who was 
interviewed as a representative of an organisation. 
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Researchers using mixed methods have used different numbers of cases obviously guided 
by the above reasoning.34
 
 In their study identifying mixed methods studies published in 
counselling-related journal articles written in English, Hanson, Creswell, Plano, Petska and 
Creswell (2005) identified 22 studies which used different numbers of respondents. The 
significance of their research is that the question of the number of cases for qualitative 
research is not even an issue among mixed-method researchers. Therefore the number of 
cases in mixed-method research is as varied as those in purely qualitative research. For 
instance, in his study of gender differences in career maturity and perceived barriers to 
career development, Luzzo (1995) implemented data collection concurrently (QUAN and 
QUAL at the same time) to investigate 401 undergraduate students who participated in the 
quantitative part of the study, and 128 participated in the qualitative part. Taylor’s (2005) 
study of alliance managers’ perceptions of the most significant determinants of strategic 
alliance success in the software sector was based on 30 interviews  and a survey of 143 
alliance managers. Data collection was done sequentially (qual and QUAN).    
 
Sampling and sample size of interviews 
 
Polkinghorne (2005) argues that although the term ‘sampling’ is generally used in 
quantitative research to refer to the selection of participants and documents, the term must 
be used with care in qualitative research because it carries the connotation that those chosen 
are not only a representative of a population but also that the purpose of their selection is to 
enable findings to be applied to a population, which is not the case with qualitative research. 
He prefers to call this process ‘selection’. Many selection methods have been suggested 
(Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005).  
 
This study adopted purposive selection. This is deemed an important qualitative sampling 
method because the researcher decides which members of the population are most likely to 
provide the answers to the research questions and then deliberately includes them in the 
                                                 
34 Mixed methods writers (i.e. Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Creswell, 2003) who identify with pragmatism are 
silent on the issue of the number of cases for interviews in mixed methods research.   
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sample. This involves choosing people from which the researcher can substantially learn 
about the experience (Polkinghorne, 2005).  
Because the focus of qualitative research differs from the focus of statistical 
research, it requires a set of principles for the selection of data sources. The focus 
of statistical research is to make claims about a population on the basis of the study 
of a sample of that population. Thus, it requires a random or representative 
selection of data sources from a population. The focus of qualitative inquiries is on 
describing, understanding, and clarifying a human experience. It requires 
collecting a series of intense, full, and saturated descriptions of the experience 
under investigation (Polkinghorne, 2005, p. 140). 
 
Shaw (1999) argues that the lengthy and detailed study of data-rich cases involved in 
purposive sampling has implications for the number of participating cases because 
purposive sampling “…demands that if the researcher is to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the research problem, the number of cases involved must be significantly 
less than when using probabilistic sampling” (Shaw, 1999, p. 63). In this method, the 
number of participating cases is not determined in advance of the researcher’s entry to the 
field of investigation but by the research progress and the extent to which additional cases 
contribute to the understanding of common themes and patterns emerging with a view to 
understand further the research problem. It became obvious during the interviews that some 
of the stories told were similar, apart from them being told differently. Qualitative data used 
in this thesis were rich for a number of reasons: 
a. All the executives who participated in the interviews were personally interested 
in the study outcome. 
b. All the interviewees were asked the same questions, what differed were follow-
ups to their answers when ever it was deemed necessary for further clarification. 
c. Responses did not have serious variations/differences to warrant more 
interviews. Findings from the interviews were meant to be used to illuminate the 
quantitative data. That is why no coding of this data was done. 
d. The form of analysis employed (narrative analysis) makes it difficult for use 
when there is large data. 
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e. Given limited resources for this thesis, it was almost impossible to undertake 
many interviews, in any case, it would have been a waste of resources if many 
interviews were held since all dimensions under investigation were fully covered 
by the six interviews 
 
A question in the quantitative survey requested those respondents interested in participating 
in a personal interview to provide their addresses for contact. This was deemed an essential 
step because through responses to this question, the researcher had access to top executives 
who were not only interested in the subject but also willing to provide relevant descriptions 
of their experiences. Thirteen respondents indicated their willingness to participate in a 
personal interview. All of them were men. Seven of them later declined, citing work 
commitments as the main problem. An example of this is two executives who were based in 
Sydney. Interviews were arranged on two occasions. When the interviewer phoned to 
confirm the interviews before leaving Ballarat, their secretaries informed him that they have 
travelled either overseas or inter-state. One executive based in Sydney even offered that the 
interview be held in Melbourne where he had gone to attend a business meeting, but later 
declined on that particular day because of fatigue due to travelling and the meeting he had 
attended. Only six interviewees finally participated in the interviews. All the six 
interviewees were interested in the subject and provided rich information. After all, the 
essence of these interviews was not on ‘how much’ or ‘how often’, but they sought to 
understand the meaning of alliance practice from the perspectives of those who design, and 
manage them. 
 
The interviews were based on twenty questions which were divided into four themes; 
alliance types and reasons for alliance formation, strategic alliance performance, choosing 
alliance partners, and whether alliances were perceived as a risky form of business. The 
interview questions were piloted with one tour operator to see if they are well understood, 
and changes were made appropriately. Interviews ranged from 30 to 45 minutes in length. 
All the interviewees were open in answering the questions, exploring the issues at length. 
The richness of this data is therefore reflected in the extent to which the twenty questions 
were explored to the point that the last two interviews were mostly repetitive of what the 
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previous ones have provided. It was helpful that each interview was immediately 
transcribed. This gave the interviewer the opportunity to make an assessment of the extent 
to which answers for the questions had been exhausted. All the interviews were tape-
recorded and transcribed for textual analysis. Data were then categorised according to the 
various questions which were asked in the interview and a pattern of function began to 
emerge. 
 
Interviews were held from October to December 2005. All the participants had responded to 
the survey. Out of fifteen respondents who showed interest, only six respondents finally 
agreed and participated in the interview. Most of those who declined cited workload (which 
involves a lot of travelling) as the main reason for their decision to decline. Four interviews 
were held at the interviewees’ offices all of which were protected from other employees 
listening to what the interview was all about. The latter two were held at the interviewees’ 
residence. Although one of these interviews was held in the presence of the interviewee’s 
wife and two children, they did not influence the responses. Both were owner-managers of 
tour companies. 
 
 
5.7  Mixed-method approach 
 
The methods used in this study, as indicated above, linked well with the philosophy and 
methodology of pragmatism and an attempt was made as far as possible to take a  ‘down-to-
earth’ approach to the study of human group life and human conduct, and to examine 
directly the empirical social world with a view of meeting most of the basic requirements of 
an empirical science: “…to confront an empirical world that is available for observation and 
analysis; to raise abstract problems with regard to that world; to gather necessary data 
through careful and disciplined examination of that world; and to unearth relations between 
categories of such data” (Blumer, 1969, p. 48).  It is on the basis of this rich insight that the 
researcher used mixed methods to uncover executives’ own meanings and perceptions, and 
how they are created and sustained through an open direct examination of actual human 
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lived experiences. These accounts were analysed and reported in the following chapter of 
this study. 
 
 
5.8  Chapter conclusions 
 
This chapter reviewed research methodologies in tourism and found that although most of 
the tourism researchers use quantitative methods, tourism’s eclectic origins certainly 
hamper any attempt for philosophical consistency. Responding to calls for more mixed 
methods research in tourism, the chapter critiqued Downward and Mearman’s (2004, p. 
119) conclusion that “…clarifying the ontological basis of inferences and yielding a 
logically consistent triangulation of methods is made possible through embracing a critical-
realist perspective.” While sharing their concern and acknowledging their framework as a 
“…coherent and rigorous logical basis upon which triangulation can proceed in tourism and 
hospitality research” (p. 117), this chapter challenges their view of pragmatism as a ‘vague’ 
philosophy that should not be relied upon. Instead, pragmatism is hailed as the foundation of 
mixed methods, that depending on the nature of research, it can be adopted to yield better 
outcomes. From this standpoint, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 were developed to illustrate how such a 
research program is followed.  
 
It was upon this background that a sequential explanatory research process (QUAN-qual) 
was done. Although it was an ambitious research program to follow, the following chapter 
on data analysis shows how data collected in the manner discussed above is finally 
integrated together using qualitative data to further explain quantitative analysis. It cannot 
be claimed that this program is best nor can it be upheld that the manner in which data was 
collected fitted like nut and bolt with the theoretical road map in Figure 5.1. There is always 
a gap between theory and practice. However, in this thesis theory guided practice 
significantly.
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____________________________________________ 
Chapter Six 
Data analysis 
 
 
 
6.0  Introduction 
 
In this sequential explanatory research process (QUAN-qual), quantitative data was 
collected and analysed, followed by qualitative data, which was collected to augment 
quantitative data. This chapter focuses on the analysis of these two sets of data, which was 
done to provide an empirical understanding of alliance practices in the travel sector.    
 
For quantitative data analysis, both descriptive and inferential statistics were used. Firstly, 
company and UE characteristics were tabulated and presented to show distribution of the 
sample firms in different demographic variables. Secondly, the travel sub-sectors (travel 
agents, tour wholesalers and tour operators) were tabulated against sub-sectors of the three 
selected sectors of tourism (accommodation, travel and transportation) under investigation 
to identify the major sub-sectors the travel sector had alliances with. Thirdly, relationships 
between both company and UE characteristics, and alliance factors (decision of whether to 
form strategic alliance or not, strategic alliance types, number of strategic alliances a 
company has, and location - whether the company has domestic or international alliances or 
both, choice of alliance partners, and alliance performance) were assessed using both 
Pearson’s chi-square35 and Cramer’s V tests36
                                                 
35 Pearson’s Chi-squire tests for independence or relatedness of two categorical variables forming a 
contingency table. Field (2005, p. 682) agues that Pearson’s chi-square test “…is an extremely elegant statistic 
based on the simple idea of comparing the frequencies you observe in certain categories to the frequencies you 
might expect to get in those categories by chance.” 
. Pearson chi-squire test was preferred because 
36 The Cramer’s V tests is “…a measure of the strength of association between two categorical variables used 
when one of these variables has more than two categories. It is a variant of phi used because when one or both 
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these variables were categorical.37 The main purpose of this study, as set out in the research 
objectives and research question, is to determine whether there are any relationships 
between company and UE characteristics, and alliance formation. Pearson’s chi-square test 
achieves these objectives without relying on assumptions such as having continuous 
normally distributed data like most of the other tests.  Pearson’s chi-square’s limitation is 
that it does not say anything about how strong the association between variables might be. 
Therefore, Field (2005) maintains that Phi and/or Cramer’s V could be used because they 
are measures of the strength of association between categorical variables. However, Phi is 
used with 2 x 2 contingency tables and Cramer’s V is preferable if one of the two 
categorical variables contains more than two categories, as is the case with data from this 
research. It is on the basis of this that Cramer’s V was conducted in addition to Pearson’s 
chi-square test. Fourthly, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to assess 
relationships between company and UE characteristics, and strategic alliance factors (choice 
of alliance partners, and strategic alliance performance). ANOVA is used to test for 
significant differences between the means of two or more groups. Levene’s test was used to 
test violation of assumption of homogeneity of variance. Field (2005) suggests that instead 
of correcting violations of homogeneity of variance by transformation of all the data, 
Welch’s F-ratio38
                                                                                                                                                     
of the categorical variables contain more than two categories phi fails to reach its minimum value of 0 
(indicating no association)”  (Field, 2005, 727). 
 can be reported. For this analysis, independent variables (company and 
UE characteristics) were categorical while dependent variables (choice of alliance partners, 
and strategic alliance performance) were continuous. This made use of values generated by 
factor analysis, which will be discussed at length later in this chapter. Fifthly, multiple 
regression analysis was undertaken to assess relationships between choice of alliance 
partners’ variables, and strategic alliance performance variables. In performing this 
regression analysis, choice of partners was treated as the independent variable. The 
importance of multiple regression is that it seeks to predict an outcome from several 
37 A categorical variable is any variable made up of any categories of objects/entities (Field, 2005). 
38 Field (2005) argues that in many circumstances data transformation doesn’t help at all, therefore suggesting 
reporting the Welch’s F-ratio because of its utility. He suggests the Welch’s F-ratio over that Brown_Forsyth 
F-ratio, unless there is an extreme mean that is also causing the problem with the variances. The Welch’s is a 
version of the F-ratio designed to be accurate when the assumption of homogeneity of variance has been 
violated. 
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predictors. Field (2005, p. 144) argues that this is “…an incredibly useful tool because it 
allows us to go a step beyond the data that we actually possess.” 
 
Three different levels of significance are used. These are 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, although a 
level of 0.001 was used for multiple regression. Conventionally, if the significance value is 
small enough (less than 0.05) the null hypothesis is rejected, for instance that the variables 
are independent and accept the hypothesis that they are in some way related. Recent social 
science  research has accepted the 0.10 level of significance (Papadakis & Barwise, 2002). 
 
For qualitative data, narrative analysis was adopted. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) 
argue that there are many qualitative research traditions with the result that there are also 
many different strategies to deal with the qualitative data collected. Many of these strategies 
have been identified in the literature (Saunders et al., 2003; Punch, 2005; Liamputtong & 
Ezzy, 2005). While qualitative data analysis approaches such as grounded theory (based on 
segmenting, coding and categorisation) are valuable for data analysis (Punch, 2005), they 
have been criticised for inappropriately fragmenting data into small pieces. Coffey and 
Atkinson (1996, 52) argue that: 
Our interview informants may tell us long and complicated accounts and 
reminiscences. When we chop them into separate coded segments, we are in 
danger of losing the sense that they are accounts. We lose sight, if we are not 
careful, of the fact that they are often couched in terms of stories – as narratives – 
or that they have other formal properties in terms of their discourse structure. 
Segmenting and coding may be an important, even an indispensable, part of the 
research process, but it is not the whole story.  
 
More interpretive approaches advocate for researchers to retain the integrity of the data that 
they collect and begin analysis from the basis of the verbatim transcripts that are produced 
(Saunders et al., 2003). Narrative analysis has been seen as a method that can help 
researchers to achieve this (Saunders et al., 2003; Punch, 2005; Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005; 
Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). Narrative analysis is defined as “…doing research with first-
person accounts of experience” (Riessman, 1993, p. 17) or “…the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data that preserves the integrity and narrative value of data collected, thereby 
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avoiding their fragmentation” (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 482). Distinguishing narrative 
analysis from the many other methods used in social research, Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005, 
p. 125) observe that: 
Narrative analysis is distinguished from other qualitative research methodologies 
by its attention to the structure of narratives as a whole. Many qualitative 
methodologies fragment texts, or people, through the process of observation and 
analysis. Narrative analysis typically works with large units of analysis, such as an 
interview as a whole or a person’s biography as a whole. An emphasis on narrative 
also allows a researcher to draw on studies of narrative in literary theory. This 
typically shifts the focus of a qualitative research project further away from 
positivistic methodologies and closer to hermeneutic or poststructuralist 
orientation. 
 
Qualitative data for this thesis was based on executives’ accounts of their experiences, the 
ways in which they explained these accounts through their subjective interpretations, and 
how they related these accounts to constructions of the social world in which they live. 
Narrative analysis was adopted in order to remain sensitive to interviewees’ social 
construction and meanings (Saunders et al., 2003). While form and content were studied 
together looking at how interviewees used language to convey particular meanings and 
experiences (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Punch, 2005), descriptions and quotations were 
mostly used to emphasise arguments. Patton (1990, p. 427-428) observes that 
“…description and quotation are the essential ingredients of qualitative inquiry. Sufficient 
description and direct quotations should be included to allow the reader to enter into the 
situation and thoughts of the people represented in the report.” This approach has been used 
in management research (Gbadamosi, 2005; Taylor, 2005) and tourism (Sørensen, 2003) 
and is important for this study in the sense that the use of selected interview quotations in 
mixed methods illuminate (Taylor, 2005) and augment (Hanson et al., 2005; Palmer & 
Cochran, 1988) quantitative analysis. 
 
For this thesis, executives were asked the same questions. Although some of these questions 
were developed during the time when the research proposal was written, most of them were 
changed after preliminary analysis of the quantitative data. The questions therefore reflected 
the major themes picked during quantitative analysis and were structured and arranged in 
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such a way that they helped the researcher to enquire into different alliance practices. 
Emphasis was on meanings, which executives gave for strategic alliances as unit of 
analysis.39 The premise of this thinking is that executives act towards strategic alliances40 
based on meanings that they give to alliances and that such meanings are derived from (or 
arise out of) the social interaction that executives have with other executives.41
 
 Blumer sees 
meaning as arising from the process of interaction between people. Meanings are seen as a 
social product formed in and through the defining activities of people as they interact 
(Blumer, 1966; Blumer, 1969).  
In analysing these meanings, data were categorised according to the questions asked during 
the interviews. Overlaps in answering questions were noted and responses were then placed 
under what the researcher regarded as the most appropriate question. This allowed the 
researcher to note the differences in the underlying meanings and see how specific 
phenomena under investigation were perceived. The intention was not to fragment data 
through coding but rather to use actual narratives, descriptions and quotations when 
analysing the data. 
 
 
                                                 
39 Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005) describe a unit of analysis as a tool used by a researcher in scrutinising his/her 
data log, and this unit may be meanings, practices, encounters, narrative structures, organisations or lifestyles. 
40 Following Herbert Blumer’s thinking, strategic alliances could be seen as “objects” which executives 
interact with. Adhering to George Herbert Mead’s thinking quite closely, Blumer brings in the notion of “the 
nature of objects”, that human beings live in a world of “objects” and their activities are formed around 
“objects.” According to Blumer (1969, p. 79), objects are products of interaction and are defined as anything 
that can be indicated, designated or referred to. “They are human constructs and not self-existing entities with 
intrinsic nature.” Their nature, Blumer (1969, p. 79) observes, “..consist of the meaning that it has for the 
person for whom it is an object,” and such meaning does not only set the way in which he/she sees the object 
but also the way in which he/she is prepared towards it, “and the way in which he is ready to talk about it.” 
Viewed in the light of the above conception, an object may therefore be seen as having different meanings to 
different individuals. Therefore, objects are social products, which have been formed and transformed by the 
defining process that takes place in social interaction. Therefore people act toward an object based on the 
meaning of the object for them (Blumer, 1966, p. 539). 
41 Blumer (1969, p. 2) argues that “…these meanings are handled in and modified through an interpretative 
process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters,” and this process has two distinct steps. 
(a) The actors indicate to themselves the things toward which they are acting, those that have meaning for 
themselves, and this is an internalised, social process in that the actors are interacting with themselves. (b) 
Then “the actor selects, checks, suspends, regroups, and transforms the meanings in the light of the situation in 
which he is placed and the direction of his action.” Blumer (1969, p. 5) refers to this process as “self-
interaction.” 
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6.1  Demographic characteristics  
 
A random sample of 600 businesses was approached (435 electronic and 165 hard copies) in 
Australia to complete the survey. Out of 165 hardcopies sent out to potential respondents, 
seven hardcopies did not reach the desired respondents and they were returned to the 
researchers. Out of the 435 electronic copies sent out by email, 145 were returned because 
either the recipient’s email address had “permanent fatal errors”, the delivery to the 
recipient “failed”, or the business had ceased operations. It is therefore assumed that 444 
(290 electronic and 158 hard copies) reached the desired respondents. A total of 127 
completed surveys were returned during the four months (May – August 2005) of data 
collection. Using Dillman’s (1978) more direct indicator of a method’s response rate 
calculation, this represents a 28.35 per cent response rate.42
 
 Out of these, 117 (92 per cent) 
were found useable for the study. Thirteen respondents did not have strategic alliances. Of 
the 104 respondents who reported having strategic alliances, 55.8 per cent had a low (1-2) 
number, 26 per cent had a medium (3-4) number while 18.2 per cent recorded a high (5 and 
above) number of alliance types. Only 12.6 per cent of the companies, which participated in 
the survey, had both domestic and international alliances. The majority (50.5 per cent) only 
had domestic alliances. 
Table 6.1 summarises demographic variables of companies, which participated in the 
survey. As shown in Table 6.1, the majority (75.4 per cent) of the sample firms were small 
with less than 20 employees while 57.3 per cent were family owned and 72.8 per cent had 
annual turnover not exceeding A$3M. Respondents did not have similar status. Although 
72.5 per cent of the companies participating in the survey were managed by founder 
members, 68.4 per cent of the respondents were either CEOs/MDs, and 67.3 per cent were 
                                                 
42 Dillman (1978) observes that despite the importance given to response rate comparisons, they are very 
difficult to make because researchers use various methods to compute them. Dillman compares two methods, 
one where calculation of response rates is determined as the percentage of people in the original sample from 
whom completed questionnaires are obtained, and the alternative method where the response rate is calculated 
from as the percentage of contacts with eligible respondents that result in competed interviews or 
questionnaires. The formula for this latter calculation is: 
100])[(Re XlenonreachabenoneligiblsampleinnumberreturnedofnumberRatesponse +−=          
It is this latter formula which is used in this thesis                                                               
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owner managers. Only 14 .4 per cent of the managers of the participating firms had up to 5 
years experience while 53.9 per cent had worked for the same company for more than 10 
years. The majority of the respondents (53.5 per cent) were below 51 years of age. Table 6.2 
reports the demographic characteristics of the six interviewees. All of them were male and only 
two out of six were executives of non-family businesses. Most of the characteristics of the 
interviewees were representative of the characteristics of the respondents who participated in 
the survey, except that no female executives participated. This lack of participation by female 
executives has been discussed as one of the limitations of the study in the last chapter of this 
thesis.  
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Table 6.1: Demographic variable of travel companies – Raw survey data. 
 
Variable of strategic 
alliances 
No % Variables of 
company 
characteristics 
No % Variables of 
Respondents 
No % 
         
Alliances  
Yes 
No 
 
104 
13 
 
88.9 
11.1 
Sector  
Travel agent 
Tour wholesaler 
Tour operator 
 
43 
24 
50 
 
36.8 
20.5 
42.7 
Age  
Below 30 years 
31 - 40 years 
41 - 50 years 
51 - 60 years 
Above 61 years 
 
4 
23 
35 
40 
14 
 
3.4 
19.8 
30.2 
34.5 
12.1 
Number of alliances 
None 
Low (1-2) 
Medium (3-4) 
High (5 and above) 
 
13 
58 
27 
19 
 
11.1 
49.6 
23.1 
16.2 
Legal Form  
Sole proprietorship 
Partnership 
Corporation 
 
39 
24 
54 
 
33.3 
20.5 
46.2 
Education  
Below high school 
High school 
TAFE 
Undergraduate  
Post graduate  
 
5 
36 
25 
34 
15 
 
4.3 
31.3 
21.7 
29.6 
13.0 
Alliance with relatives 
owned 
Yes 
No 
 
 
2 
99 
 
 
2.0 
98.0 
Employees  
Less than 5 
Between 5 - 19 
Between 20 - 49 
Between 50 - 99 
Between 100 - 199 
200 or more 
 
50 
37 
12 
7 
4 
5 
 
43.2 
32.2 
10.4 
6.1 
3.5 
4.3 
Experience  
Up to 5 years 
6 to 10 years 
11 to 15 years 
16 to 20 years 
21 years and above 
 
16 
24 
22 
18 
31 
 
14.4 
21.6 
19.8 
16.2 
27.9 
Location of alliances 
Australia 
Abroad 
Both 
 
52 
38 
13 
 
50.5 
36.9 
12.6 
Annual Turnover 
Under $500,000 
$500,000 - $1M 
$1000,001 - 3M 
$3000,001 - $5M 
$5000,001 - 7M 
Over $7000,001 
39 
11 
21 
6 
9 
27 
34.5 
9.7 
18.6 
5.3 
8.0 
23.9 
Tenure  
0-2 years 
3 - 5 years 
6 - 8 years 
9 -11 
12 and above 
 
20 
22 
14 
12 
46 
 
17.5 
19.3 
12.3 
10.5 
40.4 
   Category  
Family Business 
Non-family Business 
 
67 
50 
 
57.3 
42.7 
Ownership  
Owner Manager 
Employed Executive 
 
76 
37 
 
67.3 
32.7 
   CEO as founder  
Yes 
No 
 
85 
32 
 
72.6 
27.4 
Gender  
Male 
Female 
 
74 
41 
 
64.3 
35.7 
      Position  
CEO 
Managing Director 
Director  
 
29 
49 
36 
 
25.4 
43.0 
31.6 
      Risk  
Very Low 
Low 
Moderate 
High 
very High 
 
13 
15 
40 
31 
8 
 
12.1 
14.0 
37.4 
29.0 
7.5 
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Table 6.2: Summary of interview participants43
 
 
Case  C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
       
Company characteristics       
Sub-sector Travel agent Tour operator Tour operator Wholesaler Wholesaler Tour operator 
Form of Business Partnership Partnership Sole proprietorship Sole proprietorship Corporation Corporation 
Employees 5-19 5-19 >5 50-99  5-19 <200 
Turnover <$AU7 M >$AU500,000.00 >$AU500,000.00 <$AU7 M $AU5-7M $AU5-7M 
Category Non-family Family  Family Family Family Non-family 
       
UE characteristics       
Gender Male Male Male Male Male Male 
Age 41-50 years 31-40 Years 61-71 years 31-40 Years 51-60 years 41-50 
Education TAFE TAFE High school Undergraduate MBA Undergraduate 
Experience <12 years <12 years <12 years 3-5 years <12 years <12 years 
Tenure <12 years <12 years <12 years 3-5 years <12 years <12 years 
Position Travel Manager CEO MD General Manager CEO CEO 
Ownership Employed executive Owner manager Owner manager Employed executive Owner manager Owner manager 
Risk level (see question 24 
of appendix 2) 
Moderate Very High Very High Low High Very High 
                                                 
43 These characteristics were taken from the questionnaire which the respondents filled during the survey. C1 is missing from this table because he/she was 
used to pilot the interview questions. Since some questions were changed after the first interview, it was deemed appropriate to remove C1 from the 
analysis.  
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6.2  Network of alliances in tourism 
 
A network of strategic alliances exists between travel and other tourism sectors in Australia, 
particularly those of accommodation and transportation. The survey conducted reveals in 
Table 6.3 the number of alliance relationships between the three sectors of tourism - 
accommodation, travel and transportation. These alliances are reported from the perspective 
of the travel sector. Travel agents reported a high number of alliances with other tourism 
sub-sectors while tour operators reported the least. Travel agents have higher alliances with 
hotels, tour operators, tour wholesalers, airlines and cruise (all above 70 per cent). Low-
level alliances were reported between transportation and tour operators. More important is the 
level of partnerships among the travel sub-sectors (travel agents, tour operators and 
wholesalers) with travel agents reporting more alliances with other sub-sectors than 
wholesalers and operators.  
 
Table 6.3: Strategic alliances between travel and selected sectors of tourism 
 
 
 
SECTORS 
 
 
Travel agents 
 
 
Tour wholesalers 
 
 
Tour Operators 
 
 
Total 
 No % No % No % No % 
Accommodation         
Hotels 34 81.0 16 66.7 20 43.5 70 62.5 
Resorts 27 64.3 13 54.2 17 37.0 57 50.9 
Motels & Guest Houses 21 50.0 4 19.0 20 44.4 45 41.7 
Bed & Breakfast 12 28.6 6 28.6 15 33.3 33 30.7 
Self Catering  12 28.6 7 33.3 14 31.1 33 30.6 
Travel          
Travel agents 18 42.9 16 76.2 20 44.4 54 50.0 
Tour operator 33 78.6 16 76.2 23 51`.1 72 66.7 
Tour wholesalers 37 88.1 12 57.1 14 31.1 63 58.3 
Transportation         
Airlines 36 85.7 14 66.7 6 13.3 56 51.9 
Cruise 36 85.7 8 38.1 4 8.9 48 44.4 
Coach or bus 28 66.7 10 47.6 11 24.4 49 45.4 
Car Rental services 33 78.6 10 47.6 8 17.8 51 47.2 
Taxi 3 7.1 1 4.8 3 6.7 7 6.5 
 
Interviewees were asked, “In your opinion, which sectors do you think your business has 
most alliances with, i.e. accommodation, travel and/or transportation? Which in particular? 
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Why?” Comments from the following three executives underline alliance networks between 
these tourism sectors: 
 
C2: Which one do we have most alliances with? Probably tour operators first, then 
accommodation, and then airlines. I guess the main reason we have those products 
(pointing at the shelf) would be one ‘brand recognition’, that some of them are 
very well known brands. We have multiple destination brands because it creates a 
bit of choice for the client because some people may want to book this and others 
that one. Even though they are all very similar products, there are some price 
variations in there. And another reason we enter alliances with those products is 
because we get override benefits. I guess price advantage is another one. 
*********** 
C4: There is an opportunity there because their offering tends to be more bland. 
They tend to be offering rooms and in a tourist environment – they may be right 
for the City of Sydney for business people, but on the Peninsula it’s hopeless. You 
really need a much broader offering to distinguish yourself from others so if you 
go ahead and you offer sailing, pampering, accommodation packages your offer 
looks a lot better to the people who are looking to come down. 
 
Have a look at it. If you are up in the Weston Hotel in Sydney, You are from the 
US, you wanna go sailing, you ask a few questions and you find the only real place 
to sail is down here. Is not much you trying to sail in Melbourne, so they gonna get 
back and there is no public transport, well sort of very slow bus and train public 
transport, so we need limos to pick them at the hotel, bring them here and take 
them back. 
*********** 
C6 All three (travel, accommodation and transport). We have associations with 
transportation companies i.e. In the field of air travel because without them we 
can’t transport our customers. We have very good developed strategies and 
synergies with grand transportation companies, coaches, buses, infrastructure, sort 
of different components of travel, i.e. public services, special cards, you know, 
these game cards, this and that, that is very much developed there, then of course 
accommodation. 
 
Interviewees indicate interaction between travel, accommodation and transport. However, 
only the travel agent executive (C2) and tour wholesaler executive (C6) reported such 
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linkages with airlines. Executives C4 and C3 did not indicate having alliances with airlines. 
Apart from these tour operators being small, their strategies are localised, within their 
immediate geographical location. However, C4 reports his company having alliances with 
hotels and taxis in the form of limousines. Alliances with accommodation and transport are 
also a major issue with tour wholesalers. Travel agents could be said to have alliances with 
accommodation, airlines, tour operators and wholesalers. Reasons for these alliance 
formations include brand recognition, offering customers choice, enriching product 
offerings, and making sure that customers receive the best experience. Travel agents 
reported more alliances with tour operators (78.6 per cent), tour wholesalers (88.1 per cent) 
and airlines (85.7 per cent), while tour operator generally reported low alliances with all the 
other sectors as reported in Table 6.3.  
  
Figure 6.1 shows the ranking of strategic alliances according to the perceived best, and the 
overall percentage of the number of companies reported having such alliances. Marketing 
and distribution agreements are not only the most popular but also the best, according to 
industry practitioners, while Equity participating alliances are the least popular. 
 
During the interview, interviewees were asked:  
Interviewer: The most popular alliances from our study so far seem to be 
Marketing and Distribution Agreements [MDA] (ranked No. 1), Sharing 
Information and Communication Technology [SICA] (ranked No. 2), Franchising 
and Licensing Agreements [FLA] (ranked No. 4). How do you react to these 
figures? Do they surprise you? Why is it that FLA are so popular among travel 
agents in particular? 
 
Company executives made the following comments regarding some of the most common 
alliances in the travel sector: 
 
C2 on FLAs: The importance of the franchise I think is because it comes back to 
that buying power. If we were an independent agent we have to go individually to 
each of those producers - tour operators and airlines, to try and negotiate better 
deals for money, for corporate advertising. Yet when you deal with a franchise 
group like we are in the XXX, they do a lot of that ground work for you. They go 
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out and they negotiate all the preferred deals. They have a marketing budget that 
basically secures resources from its franchise members [and] they pull the 
marketing budget from all those agencies and we sort of work together 
cooperatively. So I think that’s why the franchise is important. It just gives the 
small agencies more strength I suppose. 
*********** 
C5 on MDAs: [Having MDAs] is probably due to the nature of the product that is 
being sold. Because there is no physical product to sell, it’s a distribution business. 
Certainly among retail agencies you know, franchising is probably the most viable 
business model because it gives an opportunity to run their own business with 
obviously to benefit from the branding and marketing assistance of a more widely 
recognised corporation. You know quite often JVs will give people or 
organisations the opportunity to partake in schemes or ventures that is not their 
core business without necessarily having to resource themselves completely to be 
able to participate in most opportunities. 
*********** 
C7 on MDAs: I guess as for MDA, again it goes back to what we are doing, 
because we are a tour operator we focus the energies on the operations of the tour. 
For us, the alliance or partnership or whatever has to be with distributors in order 
to get people on the tour itself because about a third of our passengers comes to us 
directly, the other two third from other forms of distribution – wholesaler and 
traveller agencies, and so forth. Yes, we form those national alliances to get the 
size of the marketing alliance to get passengers 
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Figure 6.1: Summary of strategic alliance types 
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Generally executives interviewed agreed that the popularity of MDAs and SICAs is linked 
to the “nature of the product that is being sold” because they are the most important 
components of service delivery. Information technology was identified as an important 
agent for such alliances since it allows alliance partners to be able to access information in 
their delivery of service to customers. FLAs were identified as important for small travel 
agencies because it does not only give them the “opportunity to run their business” but also 
“buying power”. Brand recognition and marketing assistance were identified as some of the 
reasons for entering FLAs. EPAs and JVs were dismissed by executives for being too 
expensive. The majority of firms in the survey were SMEs, and which could be argued that 
as they already suffer from inadequate finances, forming either EPAs or JVs would further 
stretch their limited resources. BSAs were also dismissed because “not any two people can 
just think alike. There are always significant differences.” BSAs are normally formed to 
enhance corporate image. Such a motive is often difficult to achieve because individually, 
companies forge to enhance their individual corporate images and these could clash. As C6 
argues, “To align ourselves with another corporate image may not necessarily be the right 
thing to do because within that corporate image on the other side there could be some 
differences and that can create, in my opinion, confusion rather than any strategic alliances”. 
 
 
6.2.1  Conclusion on network of alliances 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, tourism companies are embedded in strategic alliances that 
create networks and Tremblay’s (1998) network theory was used to explain the extent of 
these relationships. This thesis is the first of its kind to consider eight different types of 
alliances in tourism and found alliance relationships within the travel sector and between the 
travel sector and those of transport and accommodation. The four most dominant alliances 
identified in this study were Marketing and distribution agreements, Sharing information 
and communication technology, Joint selling or distribution agreements, and Franchises and 
licensing. All these four alliance types deal with marketing, distribution and selling of 
products. As C5 argues this is “…probably due to the nature of the product that is being 
sold. Because there is no physical product to sell, it’s a distribution business.” This explains 
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why past research on strategic alliances in tourism has concentrated on marketing alliances, 
e.g. Morrison (1994), Palmer and Bejou (1995) and Pan (2004). 
 
 
6.3  Data reduction through factor analysis 
 
Survey questions 14, 15, 25 and 26 (see Appendix 2) were further prepared for statistical 
analysis. These questions were made up of latent variables.44
 
 Data reduction through 
exploratory factor analysis using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as the extraction 
method and varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisation was conducted on four blocks of 
items in order to identify the most critical factors in each category. This was done on (i) 
tolerance of ambiguity and risk factors that influence managers when adopting certain 
strategic alliance practices as shown in Table 6.4. (ii) Choice of alliance partners, shown in 
Table 6.5. (iii) The same analysis was also conducted on the 14-item scale of firm/company 
performance versus its performance before joining the strategic alliance (Table 6.6) and (iv) 
overall satisfaction with the strategic alliance under investigation as shown in Table 6.7.  
This was done not only to find out if these different variables are driven by the same 
underlying variable but also “…to reduce the data set to a more manageable size while 
retaining as much of the original information as possible” (Field, 2005, p. 619). PCA was 
done on these four separate data sets because these items were designed to measure different 
constructs. All components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were extracted as indicated in 
Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7. Items with loadings below 0.512 were excluded (Field, 2000). 
Hence the item “Lending a friend an amount of money equivalent to one month's income at 
no interest” (factor loading 0.40) under risk factors and “the alliance is based on a strong 
sense of loyalty to other alliance members” (factor loading 0.46) under choice of alliance 
members were excluded from the analysis since they had factor loadings below the 
recommended 0.512.  
                                                 
44 According to Field (2005, p. 736) latent variables are variables that cannot be directly measured, but are 
assumed to be related to several variables that can be measured. This is common in the social sciences where 
researchers often try to measure things that cannot be measured directly. For example, choice of alliance 
partners is measured by many variables. 
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Table 6.4 shows that the nine tolerance of ambiguity and risk items were reduced to four 
themes – Investment risk, Income risk, Adventure and Un-adventure. Table 6.5 shows that 
for choice of partners, 18 items were reduced to four themes namely Commitment, Trust, 
Compatibility, and Control. Capability variables were loaded onto Commitment. This did 
not come as a surprise because there still has to be a willingness to commit whatever 
capabilities exist. Theoretical arguments as to why it is justified to load capability are 
further argued in Chapter Seven. In Table 6.6 the 14 performance item scale was reduced to 
three themes - Overall alliance performance, Operational performance, and Market share 
and profitability. In Table 6.7, six items measuring overall satisfaction with the strategic 
alliance were reduced to two themes – General satisfaction, and Technology transfer and 
development. 
 
Reliability analysis was then conducted on the various sets of items to measure the internal 
consistency of the items loaded onto each factor. Cronbach’s alpha (or reliability 
coefficient) shows the internal homogeneity among the nine items comprising the four 
derived factors.  In other words, it reveals the extent to which the same set of respondents 
replied in a consistent manner to similar items (Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmich, 1997). 
The Cronbach’s alpha values for each item are shown in Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7. 
Cronbach’s alpha values for most of the components were in excess of the required 0.5 
criterion for reliability, which according to Nunally (1978) meets the requirements for basic 
survey research.  Thus, a cut-off value of 0.50 was used to measure reliability and Income 
Risk in Table 6.4 was excluded from the analysis because its Cronbach’s alpha was 0.2284. 
Investment Risk, Adventure, Un-adventure and Willingness to undertake risky business 
propositions as compared to other executives (this was a single item as shown in question 
24, Appendix 2) formed part of UE characteristics, while Overall alliance performance, 
Operational performance, Market share & profitability, General satisfaction and Technology 
transfer and development were used to assess alliance performance and satisfaction. 
 
Exploratory factor analysis generated quantitative values. Tolerances of ambiguity and risk 
factors from Table 6.4 were recoded into categorical variables. For Adventure and Un-
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adventure, negative values were coded as 1 = ‘intolerant of ambiguity’, and positive values 
as 2 = ‘tolerant of ambiguity’. For Investment Risk, negative values were coded as 1 = ‘risk 
averse’, while positive values were coded as 2 = ‘risk taker’. As for choice of alliance 
partners and alliance performance themes, quantitative values were used in analysing these 
themes’ relationships with organisational factors and UE characteristics. Factors for choice 
of alliance partners and alliance performance and satisfaction were left as quantitative 
values.   
 
 
Table 6.4: Results of PCA with Varimax Rotation for tolerance of ambiguity and risk 
factors (Questions 25 and 26 in the survey, see Appendix 2)  
 
 
 
Factors 
M SD  
Eigen 
Value 
Cumulative 
per cent 
variance 
 
Factor 
loadings 
 
Cronbach 
α 
Investment Risk   2.368 26.309  .7343 
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in a blue chip stock. 
2.68 1.234   .857  
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in a very speculative stock. 
2.07 1.106   .783   
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in government bonds or treasury bills. 
2.17 1.008   .744  
Adventure   1.410 41.973  .6054 
The most interesting life is to live 
under rapidly changing conditions 
3.55 0.967   .846  
Adventurous and exploratory people 
go farther in this world than do 
systematic and orderly people 
3.59 0.929   .760  
Income Risk   1.276 55.744  .2284 
Taking a day's income to play the 
poker -machines at a nearby club. 
1.10 0.357   .808  
Taking a job where you get paid 
exclusively on a commission basis 
1.92 1.142   .690  
Un-adventure   1.076 67.701  .8494 
When planning a holiday, a person 
should have a schedule to follow if 
he/she is really going to enjoy 
himself/herself 
2.77 1.015   .830   
Doing the same thing in the same 
places for a long period of time makes 
for a happy life. 
3.06 1.106   .731  
Notes: Bartlett's Test of Sphericity - Approx. Chi-Square = 125.461, df = 45, p < 0.001; and KMO 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .553. M = Mean; Mean calculated from a minimum of 1 and a 
maximum of 5. 
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Table 6.5: Results of PCA with Varimax Rotation for choice of alliance partners 
(Questions 14 in the survey, see Appendix 2)  
 
 
 
ITEMS 
 
 
M 
 
 
SD 
Factor 
loadings 
 
Eigen 
Value 
Cumulative 
per cent 
variance 
Cronbach 
α 
COMMITMENT    8.121 45.114 .9108 
Our company is likely to continue with the 
strategic alliance. 
4.14 .752 .691      
This alliance is something our organisation 
intends to maintain in the future. 
3.98 .785 .589      
We selected each other because there were 
possible synergies perceived in working 
together. 
3.89 .805 .672      
Our company is satisfied with the strategic 
alliance. 
3.84 .790 .723      
We selected each other because we were all 
very committed to the relationship. 
3.71 .999 .653      
The alliance deserves our organisation's 
maximum effort to maintain. 
3.69 .946 .655      
We selected each other because we had 
complementary assets. 
3.63 1.092 .645      
Our partner has a strong sense of loyalty to 
the alliance. 
3.62 1.023 .690      
Our partner is quite willing to make long-
term investment in the alliance. 
3.47 1.184 .640      
Our partner is willing to dedicate whatever 
people and resources it takes to make the 
alliance a success. 
3.40 .916 .639      
TRUST    2.109 56.831 .9193 
Alliance partners have high integrity. 3.83 .907 .861     
Alliance partners are honest about problems 
when they arise. 
3.64 .933 .868     
Alliance partners do not make false claims 
or promises. 
3.64 .956 .827     
Alliance partners can be counted on to do 
what is right. 
3.56 .942 .588     
CONTROL    1.704 66.295 .9142 
We exert informal control over our alliance 
partners in order to achieve alliance 
objectives. 
2.79 1.148 .907     
We exert formal control over our alliance 
partners in order to achieve alliance 
objectives. 
2.61 1.142 .887     
CULTURE    1.045 72.100 .6990 
We selected each other because we were of 
an approximately similar size and strength. 
2.58 1.217 .659      
We selected each other because our culture 
was compatible. 
3.39 1.232 .626      
Notes: Bartlett's Test of Sphericity - Approx. Chi-Square = 1186.985, df = 153,  p < 0.000; and KMO 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .878; M = Mean; Mean calculated from a minimum of 1 and a 
maximum of 5. 
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Table 6.6: Results of PCA with Varimax Rotation for 14-item scale of firm/company performance 
versus its performance before joining the strategic alliance (Questions 15 in the survey, see Appendix 2)  
  Eigen 
Value 
Cumulative per 
cent variance 
Factor Loadings Cronbach 
α 
Overall alliance 
performance 
6.736 48.116  .8750 
Overall performance   .688  
Value creation   .676  
Customer service   .664  
Reputation   .639  
Marketing   .632  
Distribution   .631  
Operational Performance 1.476 58.656  .8401 
Labour productivity    .735  
Quality control    .690  
Cost control    .575  
Accessibility to skills    .574  
Technology development    .536  
Market share & profitability 1.176 67.058   
Market Share     .848 .8803 
Sales Level     .835  
Profitability     .570  
Notes: Bartlett's Test of Sphericity – Approx. Chi-Square = 801.206, df = 91, p < 0.000; and KMO 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .834. 
 
 
Table 6.7: Results of PCA with Varimax Rotation for satisfaction with the strategic alliance (Questions 
15 in the survey, see Appendix 2)  
 Eigen 
Value 
Cumulative 
per cent 
variance 
Factor 
Loadings 
Cronbach 
α 
General satisfaction 3.475 
 
57.909 
 
 .8749 
In general, our partners are satisfied with the strategic 
alliance overall performance (Partner satisfaction) 
  .912   
In general, my organisation is satisfied with the strategic 
alliance overall performance (Firm/company satisfaction) 
  .901   
We have learned or benefited from our partners' specific 
skills and competencies (Learning from partner’s skills) 
  .763   
We have experienced an increase in the number of clients 
since we joined the alliance (Increase of clients) 
  .565   
Technology transfer and development 1.353 80.461  .8624 
The alliance has enabled us to develop new technology 
processes (Develop new technology) 
  .955  
We have benefited from technology transfer from our 
partners (Technology transfer) 
  .756  
Notes: Bartlett's Test of Sphericity - Approx. Chi-Square = 359.069, df = 15, p < 0.000; and KMO Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy = .730.  
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6.4  Strategic motives for alliances in the travel sector 
 
Strategic alliances are an important part of business. Comments from executives narrated 
below, underscore this fact. In addition to factors identified in the survey, the interviews 
show that alliances enhance companies’ profitability and are an important tool for 
marketing, promotion and distribution. C5 cautions company executives from ‘losing sight’ 
of the importance of alliances because the results could be detrimental to company 
performance. Three executives’ comments on these issues are that: 
 
C2: Profitability is the main thing. We get better pricing on fares and products. And, 
which probably be the main thing I’m trying to get at is buying power, is why they 
would go into an alliance. Increase buying power. 
*********** 
C4: We have tried everything in terms of promotion and promoting our sales, building 
ourselves through various kinds of promotion and by far the most popular medium is the 
internet for us because we have a small percentage of the population who are interested 
in what we do, and we need to get up very wise in order to pick up that small percentage 
across a wide area of both geographics and psychographics. …The internet will be those 
relationships, those partnerships, those alliances. Now some of them are already moving 
quite well but we can see that those ones that are moving well will move much, much 
stronger. It’s gonna be a very key part of their business to offer our service on top of 
what they do because it makes their offering more rich. You know, instead of just 
saying “Hoh yes, we can put you up for a night”, they can say “we can give you a 
holiday experience in a short period of time”.  
*********** 
C5: Alliance is an extremely important part of business. And I think the minute that you 
lose sight of the importance of those relationships and the importance of that goodwill, 
in a kind of business like us which is a very social business, your business will suffer as 
a result and I think of course you need to be focused upon the figures and the 
commercial realities of running a business and the bottom line has to be profitable, but I 
think I would never want to lose sight of the importance of those relationships and those 
alliances because I believe they bring an awful great deal of value to the business.  
 
This study has identified a number of motives leading to formation of strategic alliances. 
These are classified as ‘internal organisational’ and ‘external environmental’ drivers. Based 
on past studies, the survey set out to assess 13 motives, which influence strategic alliance 
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formation as indicated in Appendix 2, question 13. Table 6.8 presents the rank order of the 
strategic motivations for the strategic alliances based on the mean measure of the 
importance of the motive. This ranking shows that ‘internal drivers’ are perceived as more 
important than ‘external drivers’. The first group of motives (those ranked from 1 to 5) are 
internal drivers. From Table 6.8, the highest ranked strategic motives are concerned with 
strategic resources necessary for competitiveness. Given that most of these organisations are 
SMEs employing less than 20 employees (75.4 per cent) suggest that they cannot achieve 
their individual objectives alone due to scarcity of resources. The first two are intangible 
resources of reputation and corporate image (mean = 3.95) and strength of personal 
relationships (mean = 3.93). Becoming part of a marketing or joint selling and distribution 
alliance enhances a business’ reputation. While such membership is also driven by strength 
of personal relationships, it could be argued that it further strengthens such relationships 
through good reputation of individual businesses. The major remaining motives for strategic 
alliance formation are developing/creating new markets (mean = 3.55), economies of scale 
(mean = 3.41) and learning from each other (mean = 3.33). 
 
Table 6.8 also indicates the level to which these items are correlated. Churchill (1979, p. 68) 
argues that “…if all items in a measure are drawn from the domain of a single construct, 
responses to those items should be highly intercorrelated.” Most of these items are 
correlated at 99 per cent significance level. The largest correlation between these 13 items is 
between learning from each other and rapid technological change (r = .740, p. < .01), 
followed by the correlation between general economic uncertainty and volatility in the 
tourism market (r = .697, p. < .01), and globalisation of the tourism industry and entering 
new international markets (r = .612, p. < .01). Significant correlations at (p. < 01) also exist 
between most of the 13 items. Only developing/creating new markets has no significant 
associations with learning from each other, general economic uncertainty, and legal 
requirements. Learning from each other also has no association with entering new domestic 
markets.   
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Table 6.8: Descriptive Statistics and Spearman correlation metrics of strategic motivation for alliance formation: Motives 
ranked by mean measure of importance (Question 13 in the survey, see Appendix 2). 
 
   M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.  Reputation and corporate image 3.95 1.074 1       
2.  Strength of personal relationships 3.93 1.091 .561** 1      
3.  Developing/creating new markets 3.55 1.152 .319** .323** 1     
4.  Economies of scale 3.41 1.167 .551** .302** .385** 1    
5.  Learning from each other 3.33 1.166 .566** .446** .117 .322** 1   
6.  Rapid technological change. 3.27 1.283 .419** .342** .196* .504** .740** 1  
7.  Volatility in the tourism market 3.25 1.311 .463** .315** .237** .393** .428** .454** 1 
8.  Brand names 3.15 1.339 .556** .247** .294** .557** .342** .464** .417** 
9.  General economic uncertainty 2.98 1.196 .411** .284** .157 .378** .434** .536** .697** 
10. Legal requirements 2.89 1.264 .383** .146 .157 .178* .461** .435** .367** 
11. Globalisation of the tourism industry 2.77 1.399 .240** .061 .261** .297** .251** .356** .522** 
12. Entering new domestic markets 2.62 1.277 .207* .140 .386** .185* .239** .291** .279** 
13. Entering new international markets 2.61 1.399 .188* .107 .468** .350** .116 .221* .316** 
Notes: †p<0.10; *p<0.05 and **p<0.01; SD = Standard deviation, M = Mean; Mean calculated from a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5. 
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Table 6.8 Continued 
 
   M SD 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.  Reputation and corporate image 3.95 1.074       
2.  Strength of personal relationships 3.93 1.091       
3.  Developing/creating new markets 3.55 1.152       
4.  Economies of scale 3.41 1.167       
5.  Learning from each other 3.33 1.166       
6.  Rapid technological change. 3.27 1.283       
7.  Volatility in the tourism market 3.25 1.311       
8.  Brand names 3.15 1.339 1      
9.  General economic uncertainty 2.98 1.196 .360** 1     
10. Legal requirements 2.89 1.264 .240** .406** 1    
11. Globalisation of the tourism industry 2.77 1.399 .430** .309** .252** 1   
12. Entering new domestic markets 2.62 1.277 .243** .338** .267** .376** 1  
13. Entering new international markets 2.61 1.399 .419** .221* .267** .612** .449** 1 
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The results in Table 6.8 show that although strategic alliance motives are ranked differently, 
there is a strong association between them. The extremely high inter-correlation between 
these motives indicates that executives evaluate these motives holistically instead of seeing 
them as individual isolated motives when faced with factors forcing them to form alliances. 
Companies are not influenced by one factor to form alliances, but by a host of them. For 
example, a decision to form an alliance because of economies of scale is made because 
companies are facing general economic uncertainty (p < 0.01) and the volatility of the 
tourism market (p < 0.01). Executives perceive that forming alliances will also help in 
developing/creating new markets (p < 0.01), and learning from each other (alliance partners) 
(p < 0.01) in rapidly changing technological environment (p < 0.01). At the same time, 
companies are mindful of reputation and corporate image (p < 0.01). As such, they prefer to 
take advantage of the strength of personal relationships (p < 0.01) which is important in the 
sense that they are forming alliances with companies run by executives whose reputation 
they already know.  
 
 
6.4.1  Differences in importance of motives by travel sub-sector 
 
There are slight differences in the motives for entering an alliance based on the travel sub-
sector from which a particular business is associated. For Table 6.9, case summaries were 
produced by using question one as the grouping variable for the 13 strategic alliances 
motives (see Appendix 2). This split the motives in Table 6.8 by the three travel sub-sectors. 
The mean scores and standard deviations for each motive by sub-sector are summarised in 
Table 6.9, showing the differences in alliance formation motives.  
 
Travel agents: Seven per cent of travel agents in the survey have no alliances. The majority 
of the travel agents (51.2 per cent) have low (1-2) number of alliances and most of these 
alliances are domestic (52.5%). Top five motives for travel agents forming alliances are 
reputation and corporate image (mean = 3.97), strength of personal relationships (mean = 
3.80), rapid technological change (mean = 3.68), brand names (mean = 3.60) and learning 
from each other (mean = 3.55). The two least important moves are entering new domestic 
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markets (mean = 2.89) and entering new international markets (mean = 2.39). Generally, 
this means that travel agents place less emphasis on entering new markets. Travel agents 
form alliances to be able to enhance their corporate image, sometimes using a common 
brand name. Such alliances help them to access technology, which could have been very 
expensive when bought by a small independent operator. An interview with a travel agent 
executive confirmed this. He emphasised that joining the alliance has helped his business to 
access new technology and training for staff, however, his business is not intending (at least 
in the near future) to expand beyond the State of Victoria. 
 
Tour wholesalers: Top five motives for wholesalers are strength of personal relationships 
(mean = 4.21), developing/creating new markets (mean = 4.04), reputation and corporate 
image (mean = 3.92), economies of scale (mean = 3.79) and rapid technological change 
(mean = 3.61). The two least important moves are entering new domestic markets (mean = 
2.45) and legal requirements (mean = 2.82). All wholesalers in the survey have alliances, 
with 62.5 per cent of these alliances being either medium (3-4) number or high (above 5) 
number.  Only 20.8 per cent of wholesale businesses have domestic alliances. The majority 
of these businesses participated in international alliances (50.0 per cent) or both domestic 
and international alliances at the same time (29.2 per cent). This is reflected by a low mean 
on the motive for entering domestic alliances.  
 
Tour operators: Top five alliance motives for tour operators are reputation and corporate 
image (mean = 3.95), strength of personal relationships (mean = 3.90) developing/creating 
new markets (mean = 3.55), economies of scale (mean = 3.15) and learning from each other 
(3.05). The two least important moves are globalisation of the tourism industry (mean = 
3.23) and entering new international markets (mean = 2.36). This is not surprising given the 
fact that 20 per cent of tour operators in the survey do not have alliances and 66.7 per cent 
of those, which have alliances, only have domestic ones. Their scope of operation is mainly 
local. 
 
It is clear from Table 6.9 that reputation and corporate image, strength of personal 
relationships and rapid technological change are perceived as important motives across all 
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sub-sectors. While tour operators and wholesalers ranked economies of scale as an 
important motive, travel agents view volatility in the tourism market and brand names as 
important motives warranting them to form alliances. Globalisation of the tourism industry 
is perceived as a major factor by both travel agents (mean = 3.28) and tour wholesalers 
(mean = 3.08). Tour operators ranked it as the least important factor (mean = 2.23). Tour 
operators only ranked highly the top five motives in Table 6.9 as the most important 
motives. This is related to the fact that the majority of tour operators emphasise domestic 
alliances compared to the other two sub-sectors. Table 6.12 shows that a significant 
association exists between size (turnover) and international alliances (p < 0.05). Most tour 
operators (85.4 per cent) had annual turnover less than A$1M. This compares sharply with 
travel agents (36.6 per cent) and tour operators (70.8 per cent) which had annual turnover 
exceeding A$5M. Therefore most of the external motives i.e. from 6-11 were felt more by 
medium to large firms which had connections with global markets and partners. 
 
There are also noticeable differences of motives for entering into a particular type of 
alliance as illustrated in Table 6.10. For this table, case summaries were produced by using 
strategic alliance types in question nine as the grouping variables for the 13 strategic 
alliances motives (see Appendix 2). This split the motives in Table 6.8 by the eight strategic 
alliance types. The mean scores and standard deviations for each motive by alliance types 
are summarised in Table 6.10, showing the influence of motives in forming particular 
alliance types. For example, volatility in the tourism market appears to be a stronger motive 
for forming JV, EPA, BSA, FLA, MDA and JSA while legal requirements is only strong 
when forming JV, EPA FLA, and SICA. However, the top five motives appear to be 
relevant to most of strategic alliance types, though their rating slightly differ. Entering new 
international markets is a stronger motive to businesses forming EPAs than all other 
alliance types.  
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Table 6.9: Strategic alliance motives by travel sub-sector 
 
 Travel agents Tour wholesalers Tour operators 
   Mean SD Maxi 
Mean 
Mini 
Mean 
N Mean SD Maxi 
Mean 
Mini 
Mean 
N Mean SD Maxi 
Mean 
Mini 
Mean 
N 
1.  Reputation and corporate image 3.97 1.03 5 1 40 3.92 1.18 5 1 24 3.95 1.09 5 1 40 
2.  Strength of personal relationships 3.80 1.20 5 1 40 4.21 0.78 5 3 24 3.90 1.13 5 1 40 
3.  Developing/creating new markets 3.26 1.19 5 1 39 4.04 0.80 5 2 24 3.55 1.22 5 1 40 
4.  Economies of scale 3.44 1.02 5 1 39 3.79 1.18 5 1 24 3.15 1.25 5 1 40 
5.  Learning from each other 3.55 1.09 5 1 40 3.43 0.99 5 1 23 3.05 1.30 5 1 40 
6.  Rapid technological change 3.68 2.00 5 1 40 3.61 1.12 5 1 23 2.67 1.34 5 1 39 
7.  Volatility in the tourism market 3.51 1.39 5 1 39 3.58 1.06 5 1 24 2.80 1.17 5 1 40 
8.  Brand names 3.60 1.17 5 1 40 3.50 1.22 5 1 24 2.46 1.32 5 1 39 
9.  General economic uncertainty 3.28 1.19 5 1 39 3.08 1.06 5 1 24 2.63 1.21 5 1 40 
10. Legal requirements 3.05 1.26 5 1 39 2.82 1.26 5 1 22 2.78 1.29 5 1 40 
11. Globalisation of the tourism industry 3.08 1.32 5 1 39 3.22 1.35 5 1 23 2.23 1.35 5 1 40 
12. Entering new domestic markets 2.89 1.27 5 1 38 2.45 1.37 5 1 22 2.45 1.22 5 1 40 
13. Entering new international markets 2.39 1.31 5 1 38 3.39 1.20 5 1 23 2.36 1.46 5 1 39 
Notes: SD = Standard deviation; N = Number of respondents; Mean calculated from a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5. 
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Table 6.10: Alliance motives according to strategic alliance type 
 
  JV EPA BSA FLA MDA JSA SICA JPEA 
   M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Reputation and corporate image 4.16 1.036 3.63 1.302 3.87 0.815 4.03 1.121 3.96 0.895 3.58 1.105 3.92 0.977 3.81 1.123 
Strength of personal relationships 4.16 1.036 4.00 1.069 3.78 0.951 3.75 1.107 3.90 1.009 3.75 0.996 3.92 0.956 4.00 0.837 
Developing/creating new markets 3.74 1.125 3.13 1.356 3.74 1.010 3.61 1.174 3.72 1.051 3.75 1.025 3.39 1.041 3.52 0.981 
Economies of scale 3.55 1.150 3.38 1.061 3.83 0.834 3.45 1.121 3.54 1.125 3.39 1.248 3.35 1.180 3.62 1.161 
Learning from each other 3.32 1.166 3.38 1.302 3.39 0.941 3.59 1.012 3.28 1.111 2.89 0.963 3.43 1.044 3.38 0.865 
Rapid technological change 3.27 1.311 3.63 1.188 3.52 0.994 3.75 1.078 3.29 1.298 3.11 1.323 3.42 1.295 3.62 1.203 
Volatility in the tourism market 3.39 1.334 3.13 1.553 3.52 1.201 3.45 1.287 3.46 1.174 3.06 1.264 3.29 1.171 3.38 1.071 
Brand names 3.10 1.375 3.38 1.188 3.83 0.778 3.66 1.310 3.25 1.306 3.03 1.207 3.10 1.221 3.40 1.188 
General economic uncertainty 2.97 1.329 3.00 1.309 3.22 1.126 3.03 1.197 3.07 1.130 2.81 1.064 3.12 1.107 3.19 .928 
Legal requirements 3.13 1.284 3.00 1.414 3.35 1.071 3.06 1.209 2.96 1.245 2.91 1.147 3.02 1.175 3.29 1.271 
Globalisation of the tourism industry 2.97 1.494 3.63 1.188 3.35 1.335 3.35 1.226 2.94 1.362 2.71 1.384 3.00 1.327 2.90 1.221 
Entering new domestic markets 2.81 1.400 3.25 1.488 2.83 1.267 2.80 1.215 2.77 1.319 2.49 1.147 2.62 1.210 2.76 1.179 
Entering new international markets 2.67 1.516 2.57 1.272 3.26 1.287 2.50 1.383 2.84 1.431 2.77 1.330 2.82 1.304 2.81 1.327 
Notes: M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation; Mean calculated from a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5. 
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Due to limited time, in-depth interviews with executives were based on the first five factors 
and the last two factors – entering new markets (domestic/international) from the list in 
Table 6.8. These interviews underscored the importance of alliances in the travel sector 
given the various drivers that propel companies into forming these relationships. This 
identified a few important issues: better market share and subsequently, profitability – as the 
main objectives for alliance formation. Environmental factors (internal and external drivers) 
can make achievement of these objectives very difficult. Although in a way these interviews 
confirmed the quantitative data, they also unearthed diverse thoughts and interpretations 
executives give to these factors. Disagreements were widespread regarding the importance 
of individual items. For instance, on the one hand we have C2 and C4 who maintain the 
importance of corporate image: 
C2: Corporate image would be one. Definitely, the association with XXX and how 
well it is known worldwide and with people having XXX cardholders is a 
corporate image – would be one of them.  
*********** 
C4: All quite valid. Yes, precisely. Exactly those reasons. 
 
On the other hand, C6 and C7 do not perceive reputation and corporate image as an 
important factor despite its top ranking in Table 6.8: 
C6: The alliances may be formed – corporate image, I would say I would have 
great difficulty because it’s a situation where we’ve got a corporate image, we’ve 
got an expectation in the marketplace. To align ourselves with another corporate 
image may not necessarily be the right thing to do because within that corporate 
image on the other side there could be some differences and that …create in my 
opinion confusion rather than any strategic alliances. 
*********** 
C7: We didn’t really care about their reputation as such because we are labelling 
ours as AAA product. Obviously, the product has to be involved, but in terms of 
their public image, or their public reputation, that wasn’t particularly important. 
 
Another disagreement was on both entering new markets and developing/creating new 
markets in relation to company size. When the following question was put to the 
interviewees: “Entering new markets (both domestic and international) seem to be the least 
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important motives, would this be associated with the fact that most of your businesses are 
small?” C2, C3 and C4 said that: 
C2: That would be probably right. This organisation has three offices within 
Victoria itself. But to be opening up offices inter-state or overseas, no. It would be 
too costly an undertaking. 
*********** 
C3: Is [Developing/creating new markets] not relevant to a business as small as 
ours? Not relevant. You know I can see it as being relevant to a bigger business 
but for us we are so happy with the level of activity that we have, not interested in 
going to New Zealand or New South Wales or Egypt or anywhere else.  
 
On the other hand, C6 and C7 said: 
C6: The alliances have got nothing to do with it (size). The alliances are formed to 
be able to develop a competitive market environment. If those alliances are not 
there, we cannot deliver the product, we cannot turn around and say to you that we 
can deliver this product at this particular price, because the contacts are not there. 
When the contacts are not there, then you are subject to the discretion of the 
hotelier or the service provider who doesn’t know you and so on and so forth, and 
that’s when everything falls apart. So a business is developed on contacts. 
*********** 
C7: No, not really. We have always had alliances from our initial basis, from our 
first year. So I don’t think size has been a determinant. It has been much more just 
you know, bringing two companies, you know, if you bring two companies 
together you are going to get better result. That has always been our thinking, have 
been far more too philosophical over size based or company based or whatever. 
 
The above statements are from four executives managing companies of different sizes. 
While small companies (as represented by executives C2 and C3) see size as a factor, 
medium and large companies (as represented by C7) do not see size as a factor. The fact that 
a company managed by C2, which is the same size as that of C6, see size as a factor means 
that other factors could be important to such interpretations. Few distinctions are 
identifiable. The first being travel sub-sector – C2 being a travel agent while C6 is a 
wholesaler. Another important distinction points to managerial characteristics – C2’s 
highest qualification is TAFE while C6’s is an MBA. Using the UE perspective, this may 
account for why these two executives perceive organisational size and the drive for 
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internationalisation so differently. The following statements from C6 and C7 further put the 
issue of creating new markets and internationalisation through strategic alliances an 
important organisational strategy: 
 
C6: That (Developing/creating new markets) is possible because jointly, especially by 
specialising in specific geographic areas, we can pull our resources to be able to develop 
and also synergies to be able to develop, new markets like combination arrangements 
where we are very strong in Austria, Switzerland, Germany and Europe points, but we 
are not as strong on the Mediterranean and Egyptian sort of areas or the African 
subcontinent. You know, sort of those areas. So what happens is that if you had a 
product and it is very strong on one side but not that strong on the other, and you can 
align yourself with a company that is very strong on that and you have cross selling that 
takes place. OK, and also so you can have ways you can then sell, and the normal 
circumstances is that you will be only selling in Austria and now you are able to sell 
Austria with Africa. OK! That’s how it works, and that’s how you are then developing 
new markets. 
*********** 
C7: For us in that particular company, creating new markets will certainly be the 
number one and two aspects of that from AAA point of view, we knew that there was a 
new market for our services by outsourcing our Latin American programs and so that 
was a key driver but from the flip side, we knew through selling our product to XXX in 
Canada, they could access new markets for our own products, so that was absolutely the 
biggest driver. 
 
It is clear that organisational size and industry sub-sector are the main determinants for 
entering new markets through strategic alliances. Although C4 and C7 are both tour 
operator executives, C7’s company employs more than 200 staff with an annual turnover 
between A$5M-A$7M compared to C4’s company which is very small. While small 
businesses see size as a factor for alliance formation, large businesses do not, mainly 
because since they have the size, it is no longer an issue to them. While C6 says, “[t]he 
alliances have got nothing to do with it [size],” C4 argues that entering new markets through 
alliances “[i]s not relevant to a business as small as ours.” 
 
There was general agreement on strength of personal relationships, economies of scale and 
learning from each other. One of the main reasons for entering into strategic alliance that 
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was strongly referred to was economies of scale. This becomes an important factor 
considering the size of most tourism businesses. C3 observed that: 
C3: Well, I see alliances as critical for expanding our business. We are expanding 
our business in so far as ah! Economies of scale you could call it, where you are 
wanting to keep your core business some of times. And I have seen alliances as a 
key to that. And why I saw alliances are a key to that is that if I have got another 
business that is similar in nature to us, and they would like to see our business 
being available to them to fill in the void, or under their banner, or in our own 
right, that doesn’t worry me.  I don’t mind working under someone else’s banner if 
we got to work there. And also I have been asked to offer a whole range of 
products by another business that has experience in that area. We complement 
what they are doing. So I would say they (alliances) are critical for sustainability 
and growth and diversity. 
 
Economies of scale was closely related to “core competencies” of all potential alliance 
partners which if combined could produce synergy. C3, C6 and C7 argued that:  
C3: You try to pick someone that has a strong personality with people, who could 
complement what you are doing, who could be an asset to your business. 
*********** 
C6: It’s like synergies, basically you find that companies of the same standard, for 
example you see another company which very much works like us but specialises 
in a different geographical area. We sometimes form alliances to incorporate or put 
in resources to be able to achieve certain objectives, and the distribution aspect is 
one that can easily be shared because it does not in any particular way interfere 
with the objectives or the operations of these companies. But actually by just 
pulling the resources you achieve a better saturation of the marketplace because 
the travel industry nowadays is in such a way that there a certain market-
lockdowns, which means that you cannot willy-nilly send your brochure out and 
expect each particular agency to display it and sell it. There are certain issues 
there. So by pulling the resources, if one brochure is accepted then the other has 
got a back-door entry so to speak. So those are the alliances that are formed, to be 
able to effectively market products. 
*********** 
C7: The main reason was a recognition of what it is you actually do, and what it is 
your potential alliance partner does. Sticking to your core competencies, and so, I 
guess our core competency is to be a tour operator in Asia particularly, but other 
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areas as well, and so, we look for alliance partners that in someway complement 
our core competencies through their own. Yes, it’s matching of competencies 
[clapping hand to emphasise a point] and not for us trying to be all things to all 
people. You know, we have to realise that we are really good at some things and 
not so good with other things or, you know, we have to scale in different area or 
whatever. 
 
 The travel sector as a “personality driven,” “lifestyle” or “social” business reverberated 
throughout the interviews, with the impressions of pride and commitment that goes beyond 
the search for profits into the area of excellence. This largely embodies the approach to 
which alliances in the travel sector are formed and managed. Only C2, a franchise travel 
agent executive, said strength of personal relationships was not a factor in determining 
alliance partners. “Friendship” with alliance partners was echoed from C4’s statement; “In 
fact, unless you are alliance partners you are not friends. I have friends in all our alliance 
partners. We had really have no time for anyone else. We have no time for friends who are 
just friends,” to C3’s statement about the initial formation of alliances: 
C3: The reason for that …it’s quite a social lifestyle type of business, so good 
friendships are often formed. I mean at times conventional but good friendships 
are formed, and out of those friendships opportunities to share ideas and then to 
sort of understand that if you share costs with the ideas, there is gonna be again, 
opportunities of scale, would be the factors for it. Ah, but why operators in this 
area? It’s not unusual for us to meet once or twice a year, and have a meal together 
and chat about things, and try some ideas up. (But) there is a lot of competitiveness 
there as well, but there are obvious things that we can do together. 
 
Apart from the thirteen reasons investigated for alliance formation, C5’s statement 
embodies the significance of friendship in alliance management. He revealed that: 
C5: The strength of that relationship will determine how well your customers are 
looked after as opposed to maybe somebody else’s customers. Strength of that 
relationship will give key people in organisations the opportunity to pick up the 
phone and say “I need some help. I have got some customers who are stranded in a 
particular destination, their flight was cancelled. Can you look after them?” Those 
relationships will buy time and patience and goodwill if for some reason we have 
to alter somebody’s travel arrangements. Those relationships are extremely 
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important because it’s hard to quantify their commercial value but if you don’t 
have strong relationships with people, doors generally don’t open for you. 
 
 The significance of these interviews is that they unearth differences of interpretations and 
emphasis on alliance motives which the quantitative data failed to show.  
 
 
6.4.2  Conclusion on the motives for alliance formation 
 
This section seeks to answer the first sub-question set out in Chapter One, “what are the 
major motives for strategic alliance formation?” The conclusion drawn from this analysis is 
that no single study can capture all the motives for alliance formation. In addition, motives 
are emphasised differently depending upon the sector, and to a certain extent, upon the type 
of alliance entered into. However, reputation and corporate image, strength of personal 
relationships, developing/creating new markets, economies of scale and learning from each 
other remain the most important drivers identified by this study. The importance of these 
motives has not only been identified through the ranking of their means, but has also been 
echoed by almost all the executives who participated in the interview. It is apparent that 
strength of personal relationships has featured more prominently in the travel sector where 
emphasis is on a “personality” or “friends” driven industry. This factor remains under-
researched as compared to the other factors which have been dealt with in previous studies 
(Glaister & Buckley, 1996; Whipple & Gentry, 2000). Further research is necessary to find 
out how this factor drives and influences alliance formation, choice of partners and alliance 
management. 
 
 
6.5  Strategic alliance decisions and alliance types  
 
This section tests whether there are any significant associations between the decisions to 
form strategic alliances, alliance types, number of alliances, and the geographical locations 
of these alliances; with company and UE characteristics. Past research has demonstrated 
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existence of significant relationships between strategy and UE characteristics (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Tyler & Steensma, 1998) and organisational factors (Temtime and Pansiri 
(2005). This Thesis goes beyond previous studies by arguing that strategic alliances are a 
form of organisational strategy and there exists different forms of strategic alliances, which 
could be linked to both company and UE characteristics. To undertake this analysis, 
information from question nine was cross-tabulated with company characteristics in section 
I and UE characteristics in Section III of Appendix 2. Strategic alliance decision was based 
on whether or not the respondent has indicated having any alliance type, and number of 
alliances was an addition of all the alliance types the respondent has indicated. Domestic 
alliances and international alliances variables were based on information gathered from 
respondents by asking them to indicate whether the alliance types their organisations have 
were in Australia or abroad. The last variable, both domestic and international alliances 
was from whether the respondent has indicated alliances as in Australia and abroad, or 
otherwise. All these variables were constructed from question 9 of Appendix 2. These 
variables were all categorical; 1 = yes, 2 = no. These variables were cross-tabulated with 
company and UE characteristics to create Table 6.11. Cross-tabulating company and UE 
characteristics created Table 6.12 from the eight alliance types in question 9 (Appendix 2). 
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 report the Pearson chi-square and its associated degrees of freedom 
and Cramer’s V statistic in relation to the survey results. 
 
Company characteristics: As can be shown in Table 6.11, company characteristics, which 
best explain the adoption of strategic alliances are sub-sector (p < 0.05) and turnover (p < 
0.01).  Table 6.11 shows that significant associations exist between number of alliances and 
employees, and turnover (p < 0.01), sub-sector, and category (p < 0.05). Domestic alliances 
are significantly associated with number of employees (p < 0.01), turnover and category (p 
< 0.05). Similarly there exists a significant relationship between the decision to form 
international alliances and sub-sector, and number of employees (p < 0.05), and turnover (p 
< 0.01). A business’s participation in both domestic and international alliances is 
significantly associated with sub-sector, category (p < 0.05), number of employees, and 
turnover (p < 0.01). 
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Table 6.12 shows associations between company characteristics and strategic alliance types. 
The study found significant association between sub-sector and FLA, JSA (p < 0.01), BSA, 
MDA and JPEA (p <0.05), number of employees and BSA, MDA, JPEA (p < 0.01), EPA, 
SICA (p < 0.05), JV and JSA (p < 0.10). Turnover has significant association with BSA and 
FLA (p < 0.01), and JV (p < 0.10). Category of business is also significantly associated with 
JV, EPA, BSA, MDA (p < 0.05), and JPEA (p < 0.01). No significant associations were 
found to exist between legal form of business and any strategic alliance type. 
 
UE characteristics: As shown in Table 6.11, UE characteristics, which best explain the 
adoption of strategic alliances are experience, adventure and investment risk. Number of 
alliances an organisation has is significantly association with ownership (p < 0.01), and 
adventure (p < 0.05). Participation in domestic alliances is significantly associated with 
ownership, and willingness to take risk (p < 0.10). Similarly, there exists a significant 
relation between forming international alliances and ownership (p < 0.01). No significant 
associations were found to exist between UE characteristics and businesses participating in 
both domestic and international alliances 
 
Table 6.12 also shows that most of the UE characteristics are not significantly associated 
with strategic alliance types. The exceptions are age, willingness to take risk and ownership. 
Age of top managers is closely associated with JPEA (p < 0.05) and willingness to take risk 
is significantly associated with EPA, BSA and MDA (p < 0.05). Ownership is significantly 
associated with most of the strategic alliance types, namely BSA, JSA, JPEA (p < 0.01), 
MDA (p < 0.05), JV and SICA (p < 0.10). 
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Table 6.11: Relationships between strategic alliance decisions, and company and UE characteristics 
 
 
 Strategic alliance decision Number of alliance types Domestic alliances 
Company 
characteristics 
No df χ ² Cramers 
V 
No df χ ² Cramers 
V 
No df χ ² Cramers 
V 
Sub-Sector 117 2 7.74* 0.26 117 6 15.28* 0.36 104 4 4.93 0.22 
Legal form 117 2 3.21 0.17 117 6 8.01 0.18 104 4 5.01 0.16 
Employees 115 2 3.96 0.19 115 6 24.85** 0.33 102 4 13.82** 0.26 
Turnover 113 2 15.36** 0.37 113 6 26.10** 0.34 102 4 12.73* 0.25 
Category 117 1 2.31 0.14 117 3 9.71* 0.29 104 2 8.15* 0.28 
             
UE characteristics             
Age 116 1 0.17 0.03 116 3 0.36 0.06 104 2 0.17 0.04 
Education 115 2 0.51 0.07 115 6 4.67 0.14 103 4 2.97 0.12 
Experience 111 2 6.42* 0.24 111 6 9.25 0.20 97 4 3.80 0.14 
Tenure 114 1 2.35 0.14 114 3 4.24 0.19 102 2 1.00 0.10 
Ownership 113 1 0.37 0.06 113 3 12.33** 0.33 101 2 4.92† 0.22 
Risk willingness 107 2 3.24 0.17 107 6 9.03 0.21 99 4 8.27† 0.20 
Investment Risk 109 1 3.31† 0.17 109 3 6.45† 0.24 98 2 0.62 0.08 
Adventure 109 1 5.40* 0.22 109 3 7.75* 0.27 98 2 3.52 0.19 
Un-adventure 109 1 0.37 0.06 109 3 0.48 0.07 98 2 0.40 0.06 
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Table 6.11 continued 
 
 International alliances Both domestic and international 
alliances 
Company 
characteristics 
No df χ ² Cramers V No df χ ² Cramers V 
Sub-Sector 104 4 13.90** 0.37 104 2 8.381* 0.28 
Legal form 104 4 0.57 0.52 104 2 1.93 0.14 
Employees 102 4 12.73* 0.25 102 2 18.53** 0.43 
Turnover 102 4 10.16* 0.22 103 2 11.55** 0.34 
Category 104 2 4.15 0.20 104 1 3.76* 0.190 
         
UE 
characteristics 
        
Age 104 2 3.27 0.18 104 1 0.00 0.00 
Education 103 4 1.70 0.09 103 1 0.93 0.10 
Experience 101 4 7.60 0.19 101 2 1.15 0.11 
Tenure 102 2 2.64 0.16 103 1 1.41 0.12 
Ownership 101 2 15.19** 0.39 102 1 1.70 0.13 
Risk willingness 99 4 5.98 0.17 99 2 0.86 0.09 
Investment Risk 98 2 3.50 0.19 99 1 0.08 0.03 
Adventure 98 2 2.09 0.15 99 1 0.00 0.00 
Un-adventure 98 2 0.09 0.03 99 1 0.04 0.02 
Notes: df = Degree of freedom; †p<0.10; *p<0.05 and **p<0.01 
 
 196 
Table 6.12: Relationships between strategic alliance types, and company and UE characteristics 
 
Company 
characteristics  
JV EPA BSA FLA 
 No df χ ² Cramers V No df χ ² Cramers V No df χ ² Cramers V No df χ ² Cramers V 
Sub-Sector 104 2 1.04 0.10 104 2 0.162 0.04 104 2 6.36* 0.25 104 2 17.33** 0.41 
Legal form 104 2 2.03 0.14 104 2 2.04 0.14 104 2 0.54 0.07 104 2 3.60 0.19 
Employees 102 2 2.68† 0.16 102 2 7.03* 0.26 102 2 19.60** 0.44 102 2 1.98 0.14 
Turnover 102 2 5.26† 0.23 102 2 3.22 0.18 102 2 12.61** 0.35 102 2 13.38** 0.36 
Category 104 1 2.28* 0.15 104 1 4.54* 0.20 104 1 5.81* 0.24 104 1 0.78 0.09 
UE characteristics                 
Age 104 1 1.76 0.13 104 1 0.28 0.16 104 1 1.16 0.11 104 1 0.05 0.02 
Education 103 2 1.93 0.14 104 2 2.56 0.16 104 2 2.00 0.14 104 2 0.87 0.09 
Experience 101 2 4.30 0.21 9101 2 0.82 0.09 101 2 3.00 0.17 101 2 1.62 0.13 
Tenure 102 1 0.66 0.08 102 1 1.11 0.10 102 1 0.58 0.08 102 1 0.46 0.07 
Ownership 101 1 3.23† 0.18 101 1 1.04 0.10 101 1 11.32** 0.34 101 1 0.07 0.03 
Risk willingness 99 2 1.79 0.14 99 2 8.51* 0.29 99 2 6.08* 0.25 99 2 1.94 0.14 
Investment Risk 98 1 1.95 0.14 98 1 0.45 0.07 98 1 1.68 0.13 98 1 0.37 0.06 
Adventure 98 1 0.04 0.02 98 1 1.90 0.14 98 1 0.84 0.09 98 1 0.00 0.00 
Un-adventure 98 1 0.42 0.07 98 1 0.00 0.00 98 1 0.84 0.09 98 1 0.22 0.05 
Company 
Characteristics  
MDA JSA SICA JPEA 
 No df χ ² Cramers V No df χ ² Cramers V No df χ ² Cramers V No df χ ² Cramers V 
Sub-Sector 104 2 6.64* 0.25 104 2 15.05** 0.38 104 2 4.33 0.20 104 2 6.11* 0.24 
Legal form 104 2 0.17 0.04 104 2 2.18 0.15 104 2 2.05 0.14 104 2 1.09 0.10 
Employees 102 2 11.73** 0.34 102 2 5.30† 0.29 102 2 6.82* 0.26 102 2 11.89** 0.34 
Turnover 102 2 3.84 0.19 102 2 2.22 0.15 102 2 4.00 0.20 102 2 4.16 0.20 
Category 104 1 3.93* 0.19 104 1 1.28 0.11 104 1 1.35 0.11 104 1 7.31** 0.27 
UE Characteristics                 
Age 104 1 0.65 0.08 104 1 0.66 0.08 104 1 0.00 0.00 104 1 3.6.3* 0.19 
Education 104 2 1.53 0.12 104 2 2.41 0.15 104 2 0.29 0.05 104 2 3.14 0.18 
Experience 101 2 1.67 0.11 101 2 2.35 0.15 101 2 1.57 0.13 101 2 1.35 0.12 
Tenure 102 1 2.81 0.17 102 1 2.72 0.16 102 1 1.98 0.14 102 1 0.78 0.09 
Ownership 101 1 4.91* 0.22 101 1 9.15** 0.30 101 1 3.08† 0.18 101 1 9.46** 0.31 
Risk willingness 99 2 6.66* 0.26 99 2 1.93 0.14 99 2 0.04 0.02 99 2 2.84 0.17 
Investment Risk 98 1 1.68 0.13 98 1 1.39 0.12 98 1 1.43 0.12 98 1 0.15 0.04 
Adventure 98 1 0.16 0.04 98 1 1.60 0.08 98 1 1.96 0.14 98 1 0.00 0.00 
Un-adventure 98 1 0.73 0.09 98 1 0.00 0.00 98 1 0.03 0.02 98 1 0.26 0.05 
Notes: df = Degree of freedom; †p<0.10; *p<0.05 and **p<0.01 
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6.5.1  Conclusion on strategic alliance decisions and alliance types 
 
As discussed earlier, research on strategic alliances has neglected the role played by top 
managers’ characteristics and to a certain extent, company characteristics. This section links 
strategic alliances to company and UE characteristics, an area that is both theoretically and 
empirically underdeveloped. In doing so, this section sought to answer sub-question (b) in 
Chapter One, “what are the relationships between company and executive characteristics, 
and alliance decisions & alliance type selection?”  This investigation found that company 
characteristics are more influential in both strategic alliance decisions and the types of 
alliances adopted than do UE characteristics. The findings link strategic alliance decisions 
and strategic alliance types more with company characteristics than UE characteristics. The 
most important company characteristics which influence strategic alliance decisions 
(decision to form alliances, number of alliances and their geographic spread) are company 
size (as defined by both the number of employees and annual turnover). For instance, 81.3 
per cent of the companies employing more than 50 employees had medium (3-4) to high (5 
and above) number of alliances while small companies employing less than five employees 
had less number of alliances. Of the total companies, which did not have alliances, 69.2 per 
cent of them were small companies. Turnover was significantly associated with all alliance 
variables in Table 6.11, suggesting that when companies make decisions i.e. to 
form/participate in strategic alliances, they are largely influenced by the availability of 
financial resources. For instance, all companies which reported not having alliances had 
annual turnover below $1M, while all companies which reported having alliances had 
annual turnover above $1M. The larger the company, the more likely it participated in many 
strategic alliances, and the more likely it participated in both domestic and international 
strategic alliances.  
 
Another important company characteristics variable is sub-sector. This study found that 
more travel agents (93 per cent) and wholesalers (100 per cent) had alliances as compared to 
tour operators (80 per cent). More wholesalers (62.5 per cent) had medium and high number 
of alliances as compared to travel agents (31.3 per cent) and tour operators (26 per cent), 
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and 41.7 per cent of wholesalers had medium and high number of international alliances as 
opposed to travel agents (12.5 per cent) and tour operators (7.5 per cent).  
 
Most UE characteristics were not significantly associated with alliance decisions. However, 
the decision to form alliances is closely associated with experience, investment risk and 
adventure. For instance, the more experienced the executive is, the more likely his/her 
company works with strategic alliances. The results show that 98 per cent of companies 
managed by executives with more than 16 years of experience had alliances as compared to 
82 per cent of those managed by executives with less than 10 years of experience. The more 
adventurous the executives are the more likely their companies would participate in 
alliances. The majority of companies managed by executives who tolerate ambiguity (96 per 
cent) had alliances as compared to 81.8 per cent of the companies, which did not have 
alliances, which were managed by executives who are intolerant of ambiguity.  
 
The other UE characteristic, which had significant associations with alliance decisions, is 
ownership. For instance, companies run by owner-managers had fewer alliances than those 
operated by employed executives did. For instance, only 30.3 per cent of the companies 
managed by owner-managers had medium and high alliances while 56.7 per cent of those 
operated by employed executives had medium and high alliances. This is closely associated 
with whether a company is family-owned or not. More non-family owned companies had 
alliances and most of them were involved in both domestic and international alliances as 
compared to family owned.  
 
Results of strategic alliance types reflect the same trend where most alliance types are 
associated with company characteristics than with UE characteristics. The only UE 
characteristics, which are significantly associated with some of the alliance types, are age, 
willingness to take risk and ownership. Ownership is the main determining factor since it is 
significantly associated with six of the eight alliance types. For instance, companies 
managed by their owners had less JVs (23.9 per cent) compared to 43.2 per cent of those 
managed by employed executives. Although MDAs are the most popular form of alliances, 
only 64.2 per cent of companies managed by their owners have this type of alliance as 
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compared to 85 per cent of those managed by employed executives. In all the alliance types 
where there are significant associations between the alliance type and ownership, more 
companies managed by employed executives have more alliances compared to those 
companies managed by their owners. Thus, the evidence in this study shows that UE 
characteristics shape executive attitudes, but company characteristics determine the way 
alliances are structured. 
 
 
6.6  Choice of strategic alliance partners 
 
Past research has linked success of strategic alliances to choice of the right partner 
(Holtbrügge, 2004). The emphasis on choosing the right partner suggests that social 
relationships play an important role in the control and coordination of strategic alliances 
(Jordan & Lowe, 2004). Geringer (1991) argues that the importance of partner selection is 
that  it influences the overall mix of available skills and resources, the operating policies and 
procedures, and the short- and long-term viability of an alliance. Because of this, it is 
therefore critical for prospective alliance partners to understand the process of partner 
selection and the variables which influence that process.  
 
Developing from past research, this study addresses five critical areas of  partner selection; 
compatibility (Shamdasani & Seth, 1995); capability (Faulkner, 1995); commitment (Moore 
& Cunningham III, 1999); trust  (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Moore & Cunningham III, 1999) 
and control (Parkhe, 1993b; Gulati, 1995a; Medina-Muñoz et al., 2003). Table 6.5 shows 
how the choice of partners 18 items were reduced to four themes using factor analysis, 
namely: commitment, trust, compatibility, and control. Interviewees were then asked how 
they identified their would-be business partners, and how important these four themes were 
in their final decisions to form those alliances. What emerged was an intricate development 
of relationships between companies, which fit the equivalence of human love relationships. 
After all, companies do not cooperate or compete, but human beings who are members of 
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companies do (Zineldin, 2002). Like a man or woman who takes a journey to find a dream 
partner, so too do companies.  
 
Respondents voiced strong support for a description of the evolution of strategic alliances as 
a relation between people like a love affair with a commitment which is ideally based on 
shared interests, mutual trustworthiness, and commitment to continue the relationship 
(Zineldin, 2002). “Like romance, alliances are built on hopes and dreams – what might 
happen if certain opportunities are pursued” (Kanter, 1994, p. 99). Many scholars have 
compared organisational relationship process and survival to that of marriage (Kanter, 1994; 
Zineldin, 2002; 2004; Zineldin & Bredenlöw, 2003; Zineldin & Dodourova, 2005). Kanter 
(1994, p. 98) says: “relationships between companies begin, grow and develop – or fail – in 
ways similar to relationships between people”. Respondents indicated that they identify 
potential alliance partners, and approach them with a view to having a business relationship. 
For instance, C4 maintains that:  
C4: Nothing happens by chance in that area. We know people that we gonna be 
doing business with in six months or twelve months in a big way that don’t even 
know we exist. We know who the people are who fit our profile. They aren’t too 
many you know – professional, customer focused and fun to be with. …I really 
can’t distinguish; you will have to tick every one of those boxes (of choice of 
alliance partners). They are all sort of end-gate. You know, everyone has to be 
right or there is no partnership.  
   
The choice of alliance partners is based on criteria, which varies from company to company, 
usually on both the company’s values and the development of friendship between 
companies’ executives. Executives observe that: 
C4: There are a thousand operators in the Peninsula, from those there are about a 
hundred who are actually business people, so we only want to deal with 
professionals and we will only deal with people who we really like to spend time 
with, no matter what their economic motivation is, it does not count. …They have 
to be professionals and customer focused, and good fun to be with. These are our 
criteria. 
*********** 
C6: Let’s put it this way, the business model that we work with is based on certain 
principles and these principles are honesty, good communication and openness. 
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We have to be open. Once that happens because a certain level of trust has to 
develop for companies to be able to form good strategic alliances. You find a 
partner who is equally honest, upfront with what they got in hand, communicates 
efficiently in terms of interpreting what has happened, and so on and so forth, then 
you can therefore form certain alliances so that you can open your cards and say 
“ok, we have got a situation here, what are your thoughts” and they come back and 
say “look we think this has happened”  …based on that criteria, it’s very difficult 
to find companies who will open up or are prepared to open up as much as we are 
to form that strategic alliance. Ok, you will find them up to a certain level but they 
can be also significantly different. 
*********** 
C7: Unless you have a fairly good matching of those sort of values45
 
 for our 
organisation, never got to match well with or work that well with another 
organisation. It’s a very big advantage to have matching values yes. 
The above quotes indicate that in choosing partners, companies follow different criteria. 
These include ‘professionalism’ not only in handling inter-company relationships but also in 
dealing with customers – that partners must be customer focused. Some of the principles 
include good communication, openness, and honesty, passion in serving customers, 
creativity and innovation. These principles are central in forming alliances and are seen as 
‘end gates’ to trust and commitment. However, this study does not explore all the factors 
that lead to good choice of partners. It is limited to the four themes identified during the 
quantitative analysis phase of the study, namely commitment, trust, control and 
compatibility. Interviews on choice of partner centred on these four. Therefore, interviewees 
were asked, “If you were to rank commitment, trust, cultural compatibility and control of 
alliance partners, which would you say were the most important factors you look for when 
deciding on an alliance partner? Why?” 
C2: Probably from the perspective of the alliance, I would rank commitment, I 
would expect trust – I would rank them in that order actually (pointing at how I 
have ranked them). 
*********** 
                                                 
45 Before going for the interview, I had accessed the company’s website to see what information they had 
regarding both their operations and partnerships. In the website they had listed the following as their core 
purpose and core values: “We act with integrity; We are passionate about what we do; We encourage personal; 
growth; We have fun; We are creative and innovative”.   
 202 
C4: I really can’t distinguish. You will have to tick every one of those boxes. They 
are all sort of end-gate. You know, everyone has to be right or there is no 
partnership. We wouldn’t do business with anyone that wouldn’t control 
partnership situation where say, they partner with us and then they partner with 
two other yachteries. They wouldn’t have control of their franchise, of their 
relationship, of their alliance or partnership. So that couldn’t work if they are not 
fun to be with – they got no cultural compatibility. We wouldn’t be in there. We 
wouldn’t do business with them. There is no way. There is plenty there we can 
afford if all those four criteria being met. So there is no ranking. They are all 
essential.  
*********** 
C5: Cultural similarity is probably the least because we have partners all over the 
globe. That’s not really an issue. I think trust is committed over a period of time, 
so it wouldn’t be something that you could say is a pre-requisite because you don’t 
know. You have to make a judgement based on what is available to you that trust 
is gonna be one of the things that you gonna get as a result of the partnership. I 
think that a lot of partnerships are made on the basis of probably a dual assessment 
on compatibility and quality of what’s on offer. There has to be something tangible 
there, there has to be a product that can be sold at a competitive price, and support 
the client and that sort of things. There has to be a quality proposed, a quality 
offering and a willingness, and a kind of a connection if you like. 
*********** 
C6: To me is commitment because if you are not committed, forget it. Trust is 
number two, but commitment comes with trust because if they are committed and 
they want us to present their products and services here then that’s the most 
important thing and they have to be committed because when we form an alliance 
with a particular company, like, I will just give you an example, we are developing 
a program in Hungary, ok, we have been looking for at least 18 months now to 
find a partner there, the term partner is used loosely referring to a partnership but a 
cooperative form of an alliance, and now we have found that person and you can 
immediately see that nurturing …which is the person point of communication, is 
what is missing from that first level of understanding. If the follow-up doesn’t 
carry based on promises made at that meeting and you will find that 80% of the 
time that will not work. …A typical example is the American culture. You go to 
America, you make a deal. Great. They are very much behind the deal, you leave 
the door, four minutes later you ring them back, they have difficulty in 
remembering your name. Ok! That doesn’t work. That’s exactly the situation we 
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are talking about and that’s where it separates the true business people – the people 
who can develop business strategies with alliances which can hold. Bang, bang, off 
you go, “yee man no problems we will do it”. And in the past 26 years I have seen 
a heck of a lot. 
*********** 
C7: Control will be the least. We don’t aim to control them, let alone to control us. 
Trust is very high, commitment is very high. They are almost the same thing trust 
and commitment. Cultural compatibility is probably lower. I think trust and 
commitment are the top two. 
 
The importance of commitment, trust, compatibility and control varies depending on 
managerial perceptions. While others say that these themes are equally important (C4), 
others think that there is a variation between the themes. C2 suggest that these themes be 
ranked in order of importance as commitment, trust, compatibility and control. C5 and C6 
offer a much broader understanding of these issues. For a wholesaler such as that 
represented by C5, emphasis is on “compatibility and quality of what is on offer (product)”. 
The idea is that commitment and trust cannot be determined at the initial stages of partners’ 
selection but is developed over time. However, for tour operators with international 
alliances such as that represented by C6, commitment is the foundation of partners 
selection, and it should not be seen as independent from trust because commitment has to be 
based on trust, that a partner would deliver what he/she said he/she would deliver. These 
themes are assessed during the pre-alliance agreement discussions. Executives develop their 
opinions regarding a potential alliance partner based on the perceived commitment, 
compatibility and trust of the company during the planning stage. Out of six executives, five 
said that commitment and trust are the most important factors while control is the least. This 
does not mean that control is not an essential element of partner selection. It is covered by 
commitment and trust, which are determinants of continued partnership. One executive sees 
them as equally important.  
 
Commitment: Table 6.5 also presents order of the means and standard deviations of all 
variables measuring choice of alliance partners, subdivided into the four categories 
discussed above. This table indicates that when forming alliances, businesses are more 
concerned about continuity of the alliance (mean = 4.14) and see the alliance as something 
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to be maintained in the future (mean = 3.98). This means that commitment to the alliance by 
both parties (mean = 3.71) becomes something of great importance in partner selection.  The 
other important factors in partner selection is possible synergies perceived in working 
together (mean = 3.89) and complementarity of assets (mean = 3.63). For businesses to 
select partners, they should have been convinced that the above factors would be achieved. 
To do so, they should be convinced that the partner would be loyal to the relationship (mean 
= 3.62) by showing willingness to make long-term investment in the alliance (mean = 3.47) 
and to dedicate whatever resources it has to make the alliance a success (mean = 3.40). 
Executives observed that: 
C2: If I’m going to deal with an alliance partner, I want them to be committed to 
looking after me – provide good service, I need commitment from them to do that. 
 
C2: I know that preferred products like XXX definitely look for commitment in 
supporting their products. If they are going to give us some sale prices benefit in 
product, they would definitely want commitment to be at the top of the list. 
*********** 
C3 Then if I could rank them, commitment, an obvious one because you need 
them to put as much effort into the alliance as you do. [but] …Their commitment 
to the alliance might be a small part of their business compared to your business, 
like its more important for that alliance to work from your side than it is for their 
side, so you need to weigh up the effort and reward so to speak. 
*********** 
C6: If you are not committed, forget it. 
 
 
Commitment is the basis for partner selection and there is an expectation that the other 
partner is equally looking for the same. While a company looks for commitment from the 
other partner in fulfilling its obligations in the alliance, there is a possibility, particularly in 
multiple alliances, that the other partner might not be as committed to that particular 
alliance much as the other member. This is because the contribution that the alliance makes 
to its business might be less in comparison to other alliances. Under such circumstances, 
continuance on the alliance by the partner who perceives the alliance as important but 
receiving less commitment from the partner is based on the contribution that the alliance 
makes to its own business.  
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Trust: Table 6.5 also shows that businesses are concerned about trust when selecting 
partners. This study measured trust based on “partners’ high integrity” (mean = 3.83); 
partners’ honesty about problems when they arise in the alliance (mean = 3.64); partners not 
making false claims (mean = 3.64); and being counted to do what is right (mean = 3.56). 
One executive observes: 
C2: With Trust I want to be able to trust them that they are representable.  But we 
pay a fairly big fee to be within this alliance, so I want to see a bit of trust that they 
do the right thing for that money and as far as marketing and what they do to make 
the brand – give it more strength. 
 
Most executives who participated in the interviews maintained that “commitment comes 
with trust”, thus trust develops over a period. Therefore, it is difficult to say that trust is a 
“pre-requisite” for partner selection because one doesn’t know whether it would be there. 
Company executives can only speculate about the trustworthiness of a potential alliance 
partner on their judgements of the level of their commitment to the proposed alliance 
because, as C6 notes, “a certain level of trust has to develop for companies to be able to 
form good strategic alliances.” Ideally, companies are looking for what C6 describes as “a 
partner who is equally honest, upfront with what they got in hand, communicates efficiently 
in terms of interpreting what has happened, and so on”. 
 
Control: Descriptive statistics show less emphasis on control, both informal (mean = 2.79); 
and formal (mean = 2.61). All the interviewed executives support this and the following 
statements emphasise the point: 
C7: Control will be the least. We don’t aim to control them, let alone to control 
us. 
*********** 
C2: Control of the alliance partner is important, but …I don’t want people to start 
controlling me too much as well. I want to remain independent. 
 
Interviewed executives argue that once commitment and trust have been established, control 
becomes an obvious outcome. Interviews also indicate that ‘informal control’ and ‘market 
control’ are very high with serious implications if conditions are not met. Interviewed 
executives shared their views of control in the following statements: 
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C2: I suppose having the ability to select that product and use it (is a form of 
control). If we are not happy with the product, we could probably not use it I 
suppose.  
*********** 
C4: I see that people think that they control their business and they think they 
control their supplier, they think they control their staff and they aren’t controlling 
anything. The customer controls everything.  
*********** 
C5: The issue of control in my view is not about draconian enforcement. Is about 
if the product has relevance to the agent, the agent will use it. So the best form of 
control is really to make sure that your product is desirable, that your product is 
competitive, then people would by definition want to use it. If it doesn’t then no 
amount of reverting back to a commercial contract will change that.  
*********** 
C6: No. I don’t need to because to me, as long as there is commitment, as long as 
there is trust, there is no need for control. They know what I want, and they deliver 
what I want, and they know that if they don’t deliver, then they loose big business, 
simple. I don’t have to control them; they can do whatever they like as long as they 
deliver the quality of the product that I expect. 
*********** 
C7: Certainly, there has to be a level of expectations that are met. We don’t want 
to tell them “you got to do this, you got to do that.” And we don’t want them to tell 
us that, however they have every right to say this certain product’s standard have 
to be met. You know if they request reservations that we respond in an appropriate 
amount of time, that we pay our bills in an appropriate amount of time. Those 
things – that is just normal business practice, I don’t think that’s control as such. 
 
 
Examples drawn from C2 and C6 show how informal and market controls work to control 
the activities of alliance members. In C2’s view, their company, a travel agent, has a 
selection of multiple products to sell to customers from many service providers including 
hotels, tour operators and wholesalers. If there is a certain product that their company is not 
happy with, their control of that service provider normally include not selling it any more if 
they have had a bad experience with that company’s product. “If they don’t fix that problem 
we would obviously take their brochure off the shelf,” he says emphatically. 
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C6 takes the same approach of using service quality as a form of control and he links it 
closely with a partner’s profitability. He observes that as a wholesaler, his company has “the 
power to be able to shift large chunks of business”, from one partner to another, or by 
moving out of a partnership altogether. He passionately related this example to me. “Ok, 
you have half a million Euros from us this year, that’s a chunk in your balance-sheet. No 
matter what you say, once I take that chunk from you, you don’t have half a million Euros, 
you got to find that, and move somewhere else. So don’t do what I don’t expect you to do, 
and just deliver the product”. However, he emphasised that such a control mechanism 
should not be mistaken for “a bargaining tool” but as a way of making an alliance partner 
meet his/her obligation. In doing so, he argues that, both parties should be as honest as 
possible.  
 
These observations confirm past research on control of partners. Although Medina-Muñoz 
et al. (2003) cite a number of authors to argue that the tour operators’ dominance is reflected 
in the control they exercise over the accommodation companies, which are subject to 
control in different ways and varying degrees; they confirm that there is no empirical 
evidence in the literature on tourism and hospitality management to back this claim. 
Medina-Muñoz et al. (2003, p. 144) found that the degree of control exercised by tour 
operators over accommodation companies is “medium” and that some operators exercise 
hardly any control, while others use a high degree of control. They also found that there is 
greater use of “informal control” than “formal”. In their study of the relationship between 
tour operators and accommodation companies, Medina-Munoz and Medina-Munoz (2004, 
p. 97) found that overall success of inter-organisational relationships is greater when there is 
increased “(a) control over the internal operations and conditions, the economic and 
financial aspects, and the establishments and facilities of the accommodation company; (b) 
behavioural, results and social control; and (c) control mechanisms comprising soft 
influence strategies, supervision and direct integrative mechanisms.” The findings of this 
thesis contradicts Medina-Munoz and Medina-Munoz (2004) because of the lack of formal 
control that tourism businesses in Australia have over alliance partners. Interviews with 
executives suggest that although control is the least important of the four themes under 
investigation, it is practiced in a variety of ways. For instance, both travel agents and 
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wholesalers can use their ability to select a product and sell it to customers as a way of 
controlling product quality and service providers because they “have the power to be able to 
shift large chunks of business” from a partner they think is no longer committed and 
trustworthy.  
 
Compatibility: Two items measured this. This study shows that there is less emphasis on 
basing partner selection on similar size and strengths (mean = 2.58) while there is 
recognition that in order to have an alliance that could be maintained for the longer term, 
businesses cultures should be compatible (mean = 3.39). Previous studies have highlighted 
the impact of cultural distance on alliance stability (Lewis, 1990). Lewis’ study support 
Rodríguez’s (2005) argument that strategic alliances are characterised by the presence of at 
least two cultures from two organisations that interact and build interdependency. Lewis 
further argues that as the relationship develops between organisations that have formed an 
alliance, a third culture emerges, suggesting renegotiations and synthesis of deep 
components of the original cultures – attitudes, values, and mores. Two executives observed 
that:  
C3: In all three alliances the culture is different. In terms of the culture of the other 
[the first alliance member] their culture is probably more adventurous than our 
culture. Their culture is more inclined to take risk, to push the boundaries further 
with their clients than our culture is. It’s an interesting mould and, what that 
means, businesses we are having relationships with comes back a pick and we go 
up a pick. We meet half way because that’s the market we are looking at. It’s a 
blending of the cultures, not a similar culture. Can the cultures blend? Can the 
cultures meet? Can they compromise? That was the issue there. 
*********** 
C5: Cultural similarity is probably the least because we have partners all over the 
globe …That’s not really an issue. 
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6.6.1 Relationship between choice of alliance partners and, company & UE 
characteristics 
 
This section tests whether there are any significant associations between choices of alliance 
partners, and company and UE characteristics. Table 6.13 presents the results of one way 
ANOVA for company and UE characteristics’ influence on choice of alliance partners.  
 
Table 6.13: Results of ANOVA for company and UE characteristics’ influence on 
choice of alliance partners 
 
Company 
Characteristics  
Commitment Trust Compatibility Control 
 df F df F df F df F 
Sub-sector 2 2.037 2 1.568 2 0.057 2 4.090* 
Legal form 2 0.636 2 .134 2 0.154 2 0.198 
Employees 2 0.654 2 0.086 2 0.605 2 0.262 
Turnover 2 4.538* 2 0.528 2 2.898 † 2 0.466 
Category 1 8.062** 1 0.293 1 4.114* 1 0.188 
         
UE Characteristics         
Age 4 0.445 4 .349 4 .553 4 1.543 
Education 4 0.969 4 .907 4 1.267 4 1.004 
Experience 4 .777 4 .870 4 .336 4 1.349 
Tenure 4 1.317 4 .804 4 1.498 4 0.143 
Ownership 1 1.766 1 .766 1 1.249 1 1.735 
Risk willingness 4 2.161 4 1.165 4 0.586 4 0.751 
Investment Risk 1 0.290 1 0.410 1 0.368 1 0.068 
Adventure 1 7.726** 1 0.884 1 2.016 1 0.006 
Un-adventure 1 2.602 1 0.004 1 3.929† 1 0.112 
Notes: df = Degree of freedom; †p<0.10; *p<0.05 and **p<0.01; Numbers in bold reports the Welch’s F when the 
Levene’s test for variance was found significant. See Appendix 4. 
 
Company characteristics: As shown in Table 6.13, company characteristics variables, 
which best explain choice of alliance partners are sub-sector, turnover and category. This 
table indicates that significant associations exists between commitment and turnover (p < 
0.05), and category (p < 0.01). Compatibility is significantly associated with turnover (p < 
0.10), and category (p < 05) while control has a significant relationship with sub-sector (p < 
0.05). There were no significant associations between trust and any of the company 
characteristics. 
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UE characteristics – Table 6.13 further shows that only two UE characteristics explain 
choice of alliance partners. Adventure is significantly associated with commitment (p < 
0.01) while un-adventure is significantly associated with compatibility (p < 0.10). Trust and 
control were not significantly associated with any of the UE characteristics. 
 
This section answers sub-question (c) in Chapter One, “what are the relationships between 
company and executive characteristics, and choice of alliance partners?” These results 
show that there are some relationships between choice of alliance partners and company and 
executive characteristics. However, the relationship between choice of alliance partners and 
executive characteristics is not as strong as that between choice of alliance partners and 
company characteristics. What this means is that when making assessments of potential 
alliance partners, company executives are more influenced by their company size 
(turnover), and whether the company is family owned or not. It is highly likely that smaller 
companies are not as stringent as larger companies in making these assessments due to their 
limited resources and the fact that they must depend on alliances and networks for survival, 
perhaps more than larger one. In Chapter Two, it was argued that family owned companies 
pursue objectives like enhancing lifestyle, which might not necessarily reflect choice of 
alliance partners in the manner in which non-family owned companies (which sorely pursue 
profitability) would. These differences can be reflected in the different meanings the two 
forms of businesses give to commitment and compatibility. Table 6.13 also shows a 
significant relationship between control and sub-sector. Interviews indicate that travel 
agents and wholesalers, as represented by C2 and C6 examples exert more control than tour 
operators do in relation to their alliance partners. C3 and C4 who are owner-managers of 
small tour operators have shown more flexibility in controlling alliance partners. C3 
observed that if the alliance is more important to his business than it is to the alliance 
partner, he has to learn to live with it. When asked about controlling alliances partners, C4 
had said, “the market controls everything” and there is no need for him to.  
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6.6.2  Conclusion on choice of alliance partners 
 
Choice of alliance partners is a dynamic process equated to relationships between human 
beings (Kanter, 1994; Zineldin, 2002). However, in businesses, company characteristics 
play a more significant role in shaping executives’ attitudes towards choosing alliance 
partners on the basis of commitment, trust, compatibility and control than, executives’ 
characteristics. Using choice of alliance partners as a dependent variable, this thesis 
demonstrates that the association between choice of alliance partners and UE characteristics 
is very weak. Only commitment and compatibility has positive significant associations with 
two of the UE characteristics. Interviews with executives did not support the UE’s influence 
on choice of alliance partners. Choice of alliance partners has some association with 
company characteristics particularly sub-sector, category and turnover. Interviews have 
underscored the importance of choice of alliance partners, which, in a way, determines the 
longevity of an alliance. 
 
 
6.7  Strategic alliance performance 
 
Table 6.14 presents the mean, standard deviation, and correlation among all variables 
measuring alliance performance. Table 6.16 presents the results of ANOVA for company 
and UE characteristics’ influence on strategic alliance performance evaluation. No single 
item is likely to provide a perfect representation of alliance performance. Therefore, 
performance can be viewed from multiple perspectives (Pett & Wolff, 2003), where each 
item is expected to have a certain amount of distinctiveness even though it relates to the 
same concept. For this reason, alliance performance was measured with 20 items under two 
themes – overall performance and overall satisfaction in respect to performance. The first 
fourteen variables are the 14 items adopted from Geringer and Herbert (1991) and have 
been ranked according to the highest mean. What this indicates is that forming strategic 
alliances have led to better sales level (mean = 4.00), marketing (mean = 3.96), market 
share (3.95) and overall performance (mean = 3.95). However, alliances have made less 
contribution to technology development (mean = 3.45), quality control (mean = 3.34), cost 
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control (mean = 3.29 and labour productivity (mean = 3.25). In respect to overall 
satisfaction with the strategic alliance (which are in bold in Table 6.14, number 15-20), 
respondents showed great satisfaction with the alliance (company satisfaction [mean = 3.87] 
and partner satisfaction [mean = 3.81]), though these alliances contribute less in terms of 
technology transfer (mean = 3.30) and developing new technology (mean = 3.20). 
 
Table 6.14 also indicates the level to which these items are correlated. Most of these items 
are correlated at 99 per cent significance level. The largest correlation between the 14 items 
was found between sales level and market share (r = .806, p. < .01), followed by the 
correlation between reputation and value creation (r = .690, p. < .01). Significant 
correlations have also been found between satisfaction variables with largest correlation 
between partner satisfaction and company satisfaction (r = .861, p. < .01), followed by the 
correlation between technology transfer and developing new technology (r = .759, p. < .01). 
Noteworthy are significant correlations between the 14 items on performance and 
satisfaction variables with large correlations between technology development and 
developing new technology (r = .604, p. < .01), and technology transfer (r = .591, p. < .01). 
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Table 6.14: Descriptive statistics and Spearman correlation metrics between the 14-item scale items and the variables 
constituting overall satisfaction with the strategic alliance firm/company performance versus its performance before 
joining the strategic alliance (Questions 15 in the survey see Appendix 2) 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.   Sales Level 4.00 0.83 1          
2.   Marketing 3.96 0.91 .445** 1         
3.   Market Share 3.95 0.83 .806** .504** 1        
4.   Overall performance 3.95 0.76 .537** .541** .580** 1       
5.   Distribution 3.92 0.84 .424** .650** .486** .537** 1      
6.   Reputation 3.91 0.77 .432** .472** .564** .587** .541** 1     
7.   Profitability 3.89 0.78 .655** .450** .667** .630** .450** .456** 1    
8.   Value creation 3.76 0.75 .428** .536** .432** .680** .468** .690** .457** 1   
9.   Accessibility to skills 3.50 0.83 .191* .386** .288** .408** .285** .452** .413** .547** 1  
10. Customer service 3.49 0.85 .200* .428** .237* .641** .450** .447** .364** .490** .339** 1 
11. Technology development 3.45 0.93 .268** .332** .297** .362** .304** .399** .319** .368** .497** .308** 
12. Quality control 3.34 0.87 .376** .243** .413** .395** .299** .459** .339** .451** .487** .390** 
13. Cost control 3.29 0.88 .342** .419** .404** .526** .303** .274** .570** .441** .473** .554** 
14. Labour productivity 3.25 0.92 .191* .163 .221* .306** .175** .168** .379** .318** .564** .186** 
15. Company satisfaction 3.87 0.77 .415** .298** .434** .385** .373** .282** .366** .374** .230* .135 
16. Partner satisfaction 3.81 0.81 .334** .254** .365** .347** .411** .226* .323** .303** .133 .169 
17. Learning from partner 3.74 0.84 .401** .303** .432** .384** .375** .290** .252** .386** .289** .080 
18. Increase of Clients 3.59 1.04 .477** .419** .429** .478** .258** .289** .405** .363** .277** .275** 
19.  Technology transfer  3.30 1.09 .055 .138 .069 .251** .085 .140 .138 .187* .362** .096 
20.  Develop new 
technology 
3.20 1.14 .144 .227* .208* .235* .105 .291** .143 .263** .402** .103 
Notes: M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation; †p<0.10; *p<0.05 and **p<0.01; Mean calculated from a minimum of 1 and a 
maximum of 5. 
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Table 6.14 Continued 
 Mean SD 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1.   Sales Level 4.00 0.83           
2.   Marketing 3.96 0.91           
3.   Market Share 3.95 0.83           
4.   Overall performance 3.95 0.76           
5.   Distribution 3.92 0.84           
6.   Reputation 3.91 0.77           
7.   Profitability 3.89 0.78           
8.   Value creation 3.76 0.75           
9.   Accessibility to skills 3.50 0.83           
10. Customer service 3.49 0.85           
11. Technology development 3.45 0.93 1          
12. Quality control 3.34 0.87 .630** 1         
13. Cost control 3.29 0.88 .456** .583** 1        
14. Labour productivity 3.25 0.92 .410** .564** .481** 1       
15. Partner satisfaction 3.87 0.77 .227* .364** .303** .142 1      
16. Company satisfaction 3.81 0.81 .121 .343** .283** .167 .861** 1     
17. Learning from partner 3.74 0.84 .229* .309** .159 .176* .723** .687** 1    
18. Increase of Clients 3.59 1.04 .291** .286** .330** .181* .506** .535** .624** 1   
19.  Develop new technology 3.30 1.09 .604** .308** .287** .317** .224* .220* .331** .369** 1  
20.  Technology transfer 3.20 1.14 .591** .416** .243** .299** .316** .234* .452** .462** .759** 1 
 
 
 215 
Table 6.6 shows that the 14 performance item scale was reduced to three themes - overall 
alliance performance, operational performance, and market share & profitability, while 
Table 6.7 shows that the six items measuring overall satisfaction with the strategic alliance 
were reduced to two themes – general satisfaction, and technology transfer and 
development. Table 6.15 shows the overall means, minimum and minimum means of these 
items. The table also show the number of items forming each theme. Strategic alliances help 
in achieving market share & profitability, and respondents were generally satisfied with 
alliance performance. However, alliances in the travel sector do not very much enhance 
internal organisational operational performance, and technology transfer and development.  
 
 
Table 6.15: Ranking of performance and satisfaction factors 
 
   No of items Overall 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum  
Market share & 
profitability 
3 3.949 3.887 4.010 
Overall alliance 
performance 
6 3.833 3.495 3.958 
Operational 
Performance 
5 3.371 3.253 3.505 
General satisfaction 4 3.755 3.604 3.864 
Technology transfer 
and development 
2 3.250 3.198 3.302 
 
Although comments regarding alliance performance and satisfaction were mixed, the 
interviews supported the above observations: 
 
 Market share & profitability (mean = 3.949): Strategic alliances enhance market share. 
One executive commentated that “Yes, I now have better market share” because of 
alliances. This was particularly important for companies with international alliances, which 
help them not only to access international markets, but also to have an understanding of the 
way those markets operate. As C6 and C7 say: 
C6: In areas of market share, definitely because when you align yourself with 
companies in big different areas, and they will know the market, and they can 
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really sit down and negotiate very good deals with the big hotels which under 
normal circumstances you will not be able to do so and then as a result you are 
able to provide very competitive pricing on the market place. Definitely, the 
market is price driven and therefore you develop the market share as you benefit 
on the market share aspect of it definitely.   
*********** 
C6: Our profitability had definitely improved with the growth of this alliance. 
 
Overall alliance performance (mean = 3.833) and General satisfaction (mean = 3.755): 
Given the responses of the interviewed executives, alliances will be part of organisational 
practice for a long time. As C5 observes “Alliance is an extremely important part of 
business. …I think I would never want to lose sight of the importance of those relationships 
and those alliances because I believe they bring an awful great deal of value to the 
business.”  C5 goes on to say that: 
C5: You think a company can exist without partnerships? The point really that 
needs to be understood is that there is no opportunity to distribute without 
alliances. Those alliances really provide the channels for distribution both in terms 
of access to product and things to distribute those products, and without those 
alliances, really you have no relevance in that chain. 
 
Satisfaction with alliance performance ranged from ‘reasonably satisfied’ to ‘very satisfied’. 
The interviewer asked the question; “If you were asked to make a general statement about 
how satisfied are you with the overall strategic alliance performance what would you say?” 
and comments were: 
C2: Reasonably satisfied. Yes. Not totally satisfied but just reasonably. I think the 
reason will be, coming down to brand recognition. 
*********** 
C3: Very satisfied. Yes from my point of view. I drive it, make it very satisfying. 
Go into it, work harder to make it very satisfying and to date the alliance partners 
have delivered what they said they want to deliver, and from there I’m very 
satisfied.  
*********** 
 217 
C4: So, you know, that’s how important it is to us, that’s how it is unfolding, it’s 
very satisfactory. It’s relentless. It’s just irresistible. We will kill them with this. 
It’s all alliances.  
*********** 
C5: Very satisfied. That has just proven to be very successful for us. As I have 
said, alliances have to be mutually beneficial, and I think we have delivered value 
to our partners and they our partners have delivered value for us. On top of that 
there is a significant amount of goodwill which exists between this organisation 
and the partners of this organisation, and that’s a very healthy position in my view 
to be in. 
*********** 
C6: I would say I’m never satisfied but generally speaking, there are levels of 
satisfaction I would say is close to 80 per cent if you were to put it at that level. 
There are always areas where you need to improve on, or you have to make ends 
meet 
*********** 
C7: Mixed satisfaction. In some regards we are working incredibly well together, 
the value of the relationship has increased to about 60 per cent a year for about 
five years in a row. So there is very high growth in the dollar value of the 
relationship. So that’s good. On the negative side, as the business grows, we are 
finding we need to put more energy into maintaining the relationship and to ensure 
the smooth operation of the relationship, and so, we are just about to sign an 
agreement so that we have a clear, very clear expectations of what the mutual 
obligations are between each of the two parties, so things as simple as reservation 
procedures, timing issues, payment issues, product quality standards, you know.  
 
Technology transfer and development (mean = 3.250): Companies reported relatively low 
levels of technology transfer and development. Reasons for this varied considerably as 
indicated by most of the comments executives made during the interview. The main reason 
being that the travel sector is as C3 argues, “not a very technology based industry” though 
technologies reported included “website design”, designing “advertising materials”, 
“databases” and “reservation systems”. Commenting on the lack of technology transfer and 
development in their alliances, two executives observed that:  
C4: There might be for them, there wouldn’t be for us. …I really can’t see us 
getting much. We get our bits and pieces from anyone. You know, you are always 
learning, but there is not a substantial thing for us. The other way probably, we can 
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teach them about managing data basis and marketing and sales things but I don’t 
think we have got much to learn from any Peninsula operators. 
*********** 
C6: I do not consider the European market that we are involved in to be 
technological advanced as we are. In some areas they are but, overall we do have 
much superior technology here in hand.  
 
Some executives reported that their companies have benefited from technology transfer and 
development due to alliances their companies are involved in, particularly with respect to 
reservation systems. 
 
C2: There are things that being part of the alliance does – they provide training for 
staff, access to better and new technology is all available as well. Yeah, the 
alliance we are part of has setup recently a better airfare database. Just one of the 
main ones they recently setup. They have setup a comprehensive airfare database 
which is able to allow us very quickly to search for the best airfares anywhere in 
the world. 
*********** 
C5: The alliances that we have with technology companies would certainly benefit 
our capacity to deliver.  
*********** 
C7: We are about to launch a new reservation system and that system was 
developed by XXX in house. They had a team of eight people writing the code for 
the reservation system for two years and now that is fully operational, and that 
system is going to be put in place here. So that’s a really major piece of technology 
sharing. Similarly we share operational standards and procedures.  
 
 
6.7.1  Problems that hinder alliance satisfaction 
 
Pragmatism emphasises the issue of surprise as the research unfolds. This surprise 
phenomenon arises out of data that point to issues, which were not part of the original 
objectives of the study. One such surprise, which could not be ignored in this thesis, relates 
to problems which hinder alliance performance. Though they are not exhaustive, they point 
to the fact that alliances could be a challenge. The first problem is that of “brand 
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recognition’. One executive pointed to the fact that his organisation’s dissatisfaction with 
the alliance group is in the fact that the brand is not as recognised as other brands in the 
travel industry. Other problems relate to national culture, communication and alliances 
becoming more expensive to maintain as they develop. C7 says that: 
C7: …we are finding we need to put more energy into maintaining the relationship 
and to ensure the smooth operation of the relationship, and so, we are just about to 
sign an agreement so that we have a clear, very clear expectations of what the 
mutual obligations are between each of the two parties, so things as simple as 
reservation procedures, timing issues, payment issues, product quality standards, 
you know.  
 
On national culture and communication, C6 maintains that “…the reason why sometimes 
alliances such as this may or may not necessarily work is due not because of the business 
processes but actually cultural differences.” Therefore, cultural differences should be 
resolved “…before any strategic alliance can develop between two different companies 
working in two different central places of a geographical world.” The following statement 
by C6 identifies crucial issues in the cultural differences discussion: 
 
C6: Unless you resolve to understand the person, the company, what’s their 
strategies, what’s their views, how they interpret things – that’s when you resolve 
most of your problems, and the difficulties arise when those cultural differences 
are not resolved. You are sending a message, they are understanding totally 
different thing and they are sending it back and forth, back and forth, it doesn’t get 
resolved until such time they understand what happens and this is only resolved by 
just getting on the plane, going and visit them, sitting down and talking to the 
accountant officers who are handling your inquiries or whatever, and say “this is 
how we expect things to happen.” Just a couple of days ago, there has been a 
switchover, a staff member we had dealt with for a couple of years had left, a new 
one came in, of course we are talking about Austria, different mentality all 
together, ok! Nothing wrong with the person, but could not understand, so I have 
sent a message yesterday and say “well, look, its pointless for you to respond to 
each particular question I have asked. You have to think two or three steps ahead 
as to what I’m really asking, and try to deliver it on one go, otherwise we have 
been communicating as you can see for three days and we still haven’t resolved 
the same problem.” I said under normal circumstances this is ok if we are not 
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under pressure but when there is a customer at the end expecting the service, we 
are regarded to be very quick, and very responsive to our customers needs. I said 
you spent already 72 hours and we still haven’t resolved this issue. So from now 
on you must do this, this, this and yes that’s how it is resolved. But that’s the result 
of cultural differences, not understanding what the question is. It is also linguistic, 
they all speak English but I’m sure, “what is your mother tongue?” … You have to 
be careful with this because you put the wrong words, they interpret it literally. 
You are just sort of speaking metaphorically. You see this short email that comes 
back because they totally misunderstood you. You need to just develop that. But 
once that is resolved, there are no problems. And that’s how it works, but it’s 
already 80 per cent, it can never be 100 per cent because there are a lot of 
variables. 
 
This sections answers sub-question (d) in Chapter One, “Are strategic alliances in the travel 
sector effective? These results show that although there are a number of cultural and 
communication problems, which sometimes face companies involved in strategic alliances, 
these forms of business collaboration, are an effective way of enhancing business 
operations. Table 6.14 shows a general satisfaction with the performance of alliance. Means 
for all the twenty items is above three, suggesting high level of executives’ satisfaction with 
alliance performance. Interviews with executives underscore the importance of these 
alliances in the travel sector.   
 
 
6.7.2  The influence of company and UE Characteristics on strategic alliance 
performance evaluation 
 
ANOVA analysis was also employed to assess the degree to which managers’ perceptions 
towards alliance performance are related to company and UE characteristics.  The first set 
of ANOVAs compares company factors (sub-sector, legal form, number of employees, 
turnover and category – whether it’s a family or non-family owned business) with overall 
alliance performance, operational performance, market share & profitability, general 
satisfaction with alliance performance, and technology transfer and development.  
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Table 6.16: Results of ANOVA for company and UE characteristics’ influence on 
strategic alliance performance evaluation 
 
 
 
Variables 
General 
satisfaction with 
performance 
Satisfaction 
with technology 
transfer 
Overall 
alliance 
performance 
Operational 
Performance 
Market share 
& profitability 
Company 
Characteristics 
          
 df F df F df F df F df F 
Sector 2 1.599 2 6.222** 2 0.252 2 0.190 2 12.138** 
Legal form 2 0.318 2 1.414 2 0.138 2 0.187 2 4.758* 
Employees 2 0.538 2 .394 2 3.413* 2 0.571 2 4.651* 
Turnover 2 1.579 2 1.683 2 0.648 2 1.130 2 7.430** 
Category 1 5.592* 1 1.609 1 5.744* 1 1.471 1 9.878** 
           
UE Characteristics           
Age 4 0.630 4 0.753 4 0.732 4 0.380 4 0.298 
Education 4 0.855 4 1.806 4 0.328 4 0.474 4 0.878 
Experience 4 0.464 4 .316 4 0.944 4 2.800* 4 1.508 
Tenure 4 0.917 4 2.439† 4 3.073* 4 2.564* 4 0.557 
Ownership 1 0.090 1 0.013 1 1.490 1 0.293 1 4.968* 
Risk willingness 4 2.124† 4 1.723 4 1.651 4 0.746 4 1.987 
Investment Risk 1 0.108 1 0.175 1 0.978 1 0.099 1 0.035 
Adventure 1 0.588 1 3.789† 1 6.229* 1 0.672 1 2.165 
Un-adventure 1 1.593 1 0.035 1 0.006 1 0.787 1 0.162 
Notes: df = Degree of freedom; †p<0.10; *p<0.05 and **p<0.01; Numbers in bold reports the Welch’s F when the 
Levene’s test for variance was found significant. See Appendix 5. 
 
The F-test result in the ANOVA table above shows that there are significant relationships 
between performance themes and company characteristics. While some of these factors are 
not significantly related, Table 6.16 shows that general satisfaction with performance is 
significantly related to category (p < 0.05), and satisfaction with technology transfer and 
development is significantly related to sub-sector (p < 0.01). Overall alliance performance 
is significantly related to two company characteristics, number of employees (p < 0.05) and 
category (p < 0.05). Market share and profitability is significantly related to all company 
characteristics – sub-sector (p < 0.01), legal form of business (p <.05), number of employees 
(p < 0.05), turnover (p < 0.01) and category (p < 0.01). 
 
The second set of ANOVAs compares UE characteristics with overall alliance 
performance, operational performance, market share & profitability, general satisfaction 
with alliance performance, and technology transfer and development. The F-test results in 
the ANOVA table above shows that there are no significant relationships between age, level 
of education, investment risk and un-adventure, and any of the performance items. 
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However, significant relationships were found between general satisfaction with 
performance and risk willingness (p < 0.10), and satisfaction with technology transfer and 
development is significantly related to tenure (p < 0.10) and adventure (p < 0.10). Overall 
alliance performance is significantly related tenure (p < 0.05) and adventure (p < 0.05). 
Operational performance is also significantly related to two UE characteristics – experience 
(p < 0.05) and tenure (p < 0.05), while market share and profitability is significantly related 
to ownership (p < 0.05). 
 
This sections answers sub-question (e) in Chapter One, “what are the relationships between 
company and executive characteristics, and strategic alliance performance evaluation?” 
These results show that there are some relationships between alliance performance 
evaluation and company and executive characteristics. The relationship between alliance 
performance evaluation and executive characteristics is not very strong. However, all 
alliance performance themes are in some way significantly associated with one or two UE 
characteristics. With the exception of operational performance, company characteristic 
influences all alliance performance themes. What this means is that, for instance, a company 
executive’s assessment of his/her general satisfaction with performance of an alliance is 
influenced by whether that company is a family-owned or non-family-owned business, and 
executives’ assessments of their company’s satisfaction with technology transfer would vary 
according to whether that particular company is a travel agency, tour operator or wholesaler.   
 
According to Kale et al. (2002) managers can assess alliance performance in terms of either 
their overall satisfaction with the alliance, or the extent to which an alliance has met its 
stated objectives. The above findings challenge the use of perceptual managers’ assessments 
of performance of strategic alliances without due regard to their characteristics and the 
extent to which their environments (i.e. company characteristics) influence such 
assessments. Findings of this thesis suggest that the objectivity of these managers’ 
assessments of alliance performance should be viewed within the confines of managers’ and 
companies’ characteristics.  
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6.7.3  The relationship between choice of alliance partners and alliance performance 
evaluation 
In Table 6.17, choice of alliance partners was treated as the independent variable. 
Regression tests sought to find out if there are any significant relationships between the 
choice of alliance partners and assessment of alliance performance. Table 6.17 presents 
results for multiple regression analysis of choice of alliance partners and alliance 
performance. The results indicate that choice of alliance partners influences alliance 
performance and executives’ satisfaction with performance: 
 
Commitment: Beta values and t-tests indicate that commitment had a positive effect on 
general satisfaction with alliance performance and market share and profitability (p < 
0.001), and overall alliance performance (p < 0.05). This means that more successful 
alliances, which tour operators, tour wholesalers and travel agents are involved in exhibited 
higher levels of commitment. However, the association between commitment and 
satisfaction with technology transfer and alliance operational performance was not 
significant. 
 
Trust: As shown in Table 6.17, general satisfaction with alliance performance was 
influenced positively by trust. This table also reveal no significant association between trust 
and satisfaction with technology transfer, overall alliance performance, alliance 
operational performance and market share and profitability. 
 
Control: Results in Table 6.17 further reveal that control had a positive effect on 
satisfaction with technology transfer (p < 0.001) and alliance operational performance (p < 
0.05).  
 
Compatibility: Results of multiple regression analysis indicated in Table 6.17 reveal no 
significant association between compatibility and satisfaction with technology transfer, 
overall alliance performance, alliance operational performance and market share and 
profitability. Compatibility was only positively associated with general satisfaction with 
alliance performance. 
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Table 6.17: Multiple regression results for choice of alliance partners influence on strategic alliance performance 
evaluation 
 
 General satisfaction with 
alliance performance1 
Satisfaction with 
technology transfer2 
Overall alliance 
performance3 
Alliance operational 
performance4 
Market share and 
profitability5 
b Beta t b Beta t b Beta t b Beta t b Beta T 
Independent 
Variable 
               
Constant -0.003  -0.053 0.002  0.019 0.002  0.023 0.005  0.059 0.015  0.170 
Commitment 0.638 0.620 10.641*** 0.134 0.128 1.443 0.217 0.229 2.187* 0.136 0.145 1.1455 0.451 0.445 4.668*** 
Trust 0.464 0.461 7.946*** 0.114 0.112 1.266 0.118 0.121 1.156 0.138 0.142 1.430 0.094 0.090 0.098 
Control 0.007 0.007 0.117 0.535 0.521 5.897*** -0.063 -0.067 -0.646 0.298 0.320 3.236* -0.142 -0.142 -1.494 
Compatibility 0.230 0.200 0.422** 0.015 0.013 0.143 -0.68 0.065 -0.621 0.112 0.107 1.076 -0.052 -0.046 -0.483 
R2 0.698 0.303 0.078 0.164 0.234 
df 4 4 4 4 4 
F 51.968*** 9.772*** 1.826 4.228** 6.560*** 
 
Notes:  1, 2 n = 95; 3, 4, 5n = 91; b = Unstandardised coefficients; df = Degree of freedom; *p<0.05, **p<0.01 and ***p<0.001; 
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Empirical results from this study give support for the majority of dimensions suggested in 
existing strategic alliance and inter-organisational relationships literature as determining 
factors for relationship success: commitment, control, trust and compatibility. The 
interviews support the above findings. The interviewer asked the question; “Would you say 
that good choice of alliance partners enhances alliance performance?” Comments were:  
C5: I completely agree. I mean business is just ah, if you like, a component of 
society. …For business to be successful and survive it needs to position itself in 
such a way that it operates within the law and against certain moral code, that it 
operates in such a way that it attracts goodwill, that it affiliates itself with bodies 
that either gonna have commercial benefits or skill sharing, or access to skills 
which are not necessarily available within the business. 
*********** 
C6: Definitely. Very much so. It is the key because when I have a problem I just 
pick up and just talk to them. …that’s very important, so that I can, based on that 
information, go in and make an offer to customers and say “this is it, this is done, 
you can do this and the other” and I know, because of the trust I have, they don’t 
misinterpret the facts, That’s important. 
*********** 
C7: I think that’s very valid and I think you know for instance, if you choose a 
partner which doesn’t have fitting values, the chance of that partner’s performance 
in the alliance wouldn’t be good. Yeah, I think it sound a very valid issue. 
 
This section answers sub-question (f) in Chapter One, “what are the relationships between 
choice of alliance partners and alliance performance evaluation?” Results show positive 
significant relationships between choice of alliance partners and alliance performance 
evaluation. This suggests that alliances based on commitment, trust, control and 
compatibility are likely to be more successful. In making choices of alliance partners, 
company executive need to assess potential partner’s trustworthiness, commitment and 
compatibility in terms of cultural practices and values.  
 
 
6.7.4  Conclusion on strategic alliance performance  
 
The aim of section 6.7 was to evaluate the performance of strategic alliances between 
tourism businesses, with a focus on the travel sector. The results indicate a high level of 
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satisfaction with alliance performance as shown by the mean ranking of both the perceived 
alliance performance and perceived overall satisfaction with the alliance variables. A 
further mean ranking of the five themes generated from factor analysis shows that strategic 
alliances contribute significantly towards companies’ Market share and profitability, 
Overall alliance performance and General satisfaction.  
 
Further analysis shows that assessment of alliance performance is not necessarily objective. 
There are significant associations between strategic alliance performance variables and both 
company and UE characteristics. However, performance is more associated with company 
characteristics than with UE characteristics. A linkage is further made between choice of 
alliance (as independent variables) and alliance performance. Interviews support the above 
with most of the interviewed executives agreeing that they are satisfied with their alliance 
performance and that a good choice of alliance partners leads to better alliance performance. 
 
 
6.8  Chapter conclusions 
 
Four objectives were set in Chapter One. The first objective was achieved in Chapters Two 
and Three. These chapters reviewed the related literature on strategic alliance formations in 
the tourism industry (and where relevant, in other industries) with a view of identifying 
common alliance formation practices and how they are formed. The second, third and fourth 
objectives were achieved in this chapter. This was done by answering six subsidiary 
questions set in the first chapter. These questions relate to (a) the major motives for strategic 
alliance formation; (b) the relationships between company and executive characteristics, and 
four crucial strategic alliance issues: decision-making, selection type, choice of partners, 
and performance evaluation; (c) the effectiveness of strategic alliances in the travel sector, 
and (d) the relationships between choice of alliance partners and alliance performance 
evaluation. 
 
In answering these questions, this chapter analysed both quantitative and qualitative data. In 
doing so, attempts were made to integrate the analysis in such a way that the two sets of 
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data related and complemented each other. In addressing the first question, the study found 
that all the motives were important. However, using mean ranking, the five most important 
motives for alliance formation in the travel sector were identified as reputation and 
corporate image, strength of personal relationships, developing/creating new markets, 
economies of scale, and learning from each other. In answering sub questions (b), (c) and 
(d), ANOVA was used to assess relationships between company and UE characteristics, and 
decisions to form domestic and/or international alliances, selection type, choice of partners 
and alliance performance. In doing so, the study found that strategic alliances formation has 
significant relationships with company characteristics more than with UE characteristics.  
 
Among the UE characteristics, which were investigated but did not have much influence on 
alliance formation was risk. Few strategic alliance researchers have included this variable 
(Tyler & Steensma, 1998). This study aimed to broaden this investigation further by 
including tolerance for ambiguity (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984) and  willingness to take 
risk (Weber et al., 2002) items. It was anticipated that alliance formation factors would have 
significant relationships with these risk domains. Only Investment risk and Adventure were 
significantly associated with the decision to form strategic alliances and the number of 
alliance. There were no relationships between all the risk factors and alliance types. Given 
the fact that most of the executives who participated in the quantitative survey indicated that 
they are intolerant of ambiguity as much as they are risk averse as shown in Table 6.4, it 
was also expected that associations would be found between risk factors and alliance type. 
Answers to this confusion were revealed during the interview where only one executive said 
that alliances are risky. C6 maintains that: 
C6: Of course everything is a risk. There are no certainties. Things could turn on 
you. The key is to be able to identify it before it goes real bad. That’s where 
internal controls and quality controls come in. When you get a bit of a vibe that 
things are not going right, you should not keep it to yourself, that’s my strategy. 
Get on the phone, bang, “this is what is happening, what’s your answer? Convince 
me that I’m thinking incorrectly.” But if you let it fester and they think they can 
get away with it, it can only work against you. It’s always a risk. Business is a risk. 
If I just walk outside the door is a risk [We all laugh]. True. There are no 
guarantees.  
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The majority of the executives interviewed said that alliances are not risky. For instance C2 
said, “risky, probably not. I can’t see risks” even though he strategic alliances like JVs can 
be more risky than other types. He maintains that “joint ventures, obviously going to mean 
some sort of partnership which might involve money, so there is risk there because of some 
capital investment”. When asked if alliances are a risky form of business, C5 said “No I 
don’t think so’, C6 “not really” and C3 said, “I would say no. I would say they are a 
valuable direction to take if you want to expand or develop your business. I don’t see it as 
risk, I see it as opportunity”. Although this thesis is not on risk associated with strategic 
alliances, the above statements contradict previous studies on alliance risk (Das, 2004; 
2005; Das & Teng, 1998; 2001; Stanek, 2004).   
 
The other characteristics widely referred to in the UE literature as determinants of firm 
strategy (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) were not as influential as it was 
hoped. While these characteristics have been applied in organisational strategies, Pansiri 
(2005a) argues that theoretically, these characteristics could also be influential in strategic 
alliance formation since alliances are widely seen as part of organisation strategies. Further 
research is necessarily in this area.  
 
In addressing sub-question (d) relating to alliance performance, this thesis found that 
executives perceive alliances as effective ways of enhancing business. Multiple regression 
analysis was then performed to assess the relationship between alliance performance and 
choice of alliance partners. This was done to answer sub-question (f). Positive significant 
relationships between choice of alliance partners and alliance performance evaluation were 
found to exist, suggesting that alliances based on commitment, trust, control and 
compatibility are likely to be more successful.  
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____________________________________________ 
Chapter Seven 
Principal findings, limitation and future directions 
 
 
 
7.0  Introduction 
 
The central research question in this study was “what are the effects of company and 
executive characteristics, on strategic alliance formation - strategic alliance selection, 
choice of alliance partners and alliance performance evaluation in the Australian travel 
sector?” By addressing this question through six subsidiary questions, this study achieved 
three of its fundamental objectives. The study addressed this question by gathering 
information from company executives through a sequential mixed-method research process 
(QUAN-qual) where interviews were conducted after a survey that was sent out to company 
executives in the tourism sector of travel. This method is premised on the ideas of 
pragmatism, a tourism research agenda whose framework was laid down in Pansiri (2005b) 
and further explained in Chapter Five.  
 
Based on 117 responses from company executives who participated in the study through a 
survey and six interviews with executives, data analysis was conducted in the previous 
chapter. This chapter seeks to conclude the theoretical ideas and findings of this study. In 
doing so, the emphasis is on the development of a more practical understanding of alliance 
formation, and how tourism organisations and management practitioners could further 
enhance organisational efficiency through alliances. Avenues for further research are also 
explored. In this attempt, reflection on the philosophy that guided this research from the 
beginning is essential. In the fifth chapter, and in Pansiri (2005b), an argument for 
pragmatism as an essential philosophy for tourism research was made. The same argument 
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could be extended to any social science research. In Chapter Five, the most pragmatist 
doctrine – the pragmatist theory of truth, was briefly discussed and linked to the goal of 
enquiry.  
 
Dwyer’s (1987) and Rorty’s (1999) claims regarding the role of inquiry sets the scene for 
this chapter. The intention of this study was never to find some truth out there because as 
pragmatists insist “there is little to be said about truth” (Rorty, 1999, p. 32). Needless to say, 
this study is not about philosophy, though philosophical paradigms help researchers to 
establish relevance by understanding where they come from. Therefore the reader should 
understand that the goal of this study was not to unearth truth nor come up with some 
general laws that seek to explain human conduct and behaviour, but rather to find ways 
through which human beings can enhance their capacity to trust and cooperate with others 
in order to work together so as to improve their future (Rorty, 1999). Like other pragmatist 
projects, this study “…aim[s] at improving our institutions in such a way that our 
descendents will be still better able to trust and cooperate, and will be more decent people 
than we ourselves have managed to be” (Rorty, 1999, pp. xiii-xiv). This is achievable 
through what Dwyer (1987) calls providing cognitive or epistemic, and practical or 
technological value. This chapter emphasises better ways in which organisations could 
cooperate through strategic alliance, and offers more opportunities for further research in 
the area. In doing so, a new framework for strategic alliance formation is developed from 
which the conclusions are based. 
 
 
7.1  Towards a new framework for strategic alliance formation 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of company and executives 
characteristics on the adoption of strategic alliances, alliance selection, choice of alliance 
partners and alliance performance in the Australian tourism sector of travel. In this manner, 
the study sought to address a key gap in the literature in both the field of strategy and 
strategic alliances. As shown earlier, research on strategic alliances has neglected the role 
played by top executives’ characteristics and to a certain extent, company characteristics. 
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For instance UE research has overlooked strategic alliances as strategic options which 
organisations can opt for, concentrating only on the traditional strategic options such as 
product innovation, diversification, integration, financial leverage and administrative 
complexity (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Carpenter et al., 2004). On the other hand, company 
characteristics studies have barely progressed beyond the structure-strategy debate ever 
since Chandler (1962). This debate can be broadened to consider the influence of company 
characteristics on strategic choices, something the UE perspective has already done. This 
left the link between strategic alliances, top management characteristics and company 
characteristics both theoretically and empirically underdeveloped. In order to address this 
gap, this study examined these relationships from the perspective of top executives, using 
three travel sub-sectors, namely travel agents, tour operators and tour wholesalers.  
 
This thesis is among the first of its kind to investigate a combination of company 
characteristics, along with Evans’ (2001) model of the strategic management processes 
involved in the formation and evaluation of strategic alliances, and Hambrick and Mason’s 
(1984) UE perspectives of organisations. Review of the relevant literature led to the 
research framework incorporating the UE and company characteristics perspectives as 
outlined in Figure 4.1. This framework is based on two streams of theory – company 
characteristics and the UE perspective. Some of the linkages, particularly the company 
characteristics and decision-making linkages are under-researched and evidence barely 
exists to suggest that strategic decision options are influenced by company characteristics. 
This thesis investigates strategic alliance options as decision-making alternatives rather than 
the traditional options like product innovation and diversification. Using both quantitative 
and qualitative data, analysis in the previous chapter indicates that this framework can no 
longer be accepted as it is. It can be re-designed to provide a more meaningful 
understanding of strategic alliance practice. Figure 7.1 is the new framework, which 
consolidates the findings of this research.  
 
Figure 7.1 shows that environmental analysis and decision outcomes are highly influenced 
by both company and managerial characteristics. The literature does not say to what extent 
managers ever pause to think, “how do company strategic decisions reflect my own 
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characteristics or to what extent do such decisions reflect the nature of the company?”  
More often management literature and business schools in many universities emphasise 
rationality and rational decision-making in their programs as if company executives are 
rational calculating instruments devoid of human limitations. This study found that 
company characteristics (sub-sector, number of employees, turnover and category) are 
important factors in determining alliance options, choice of alliance partners and assessing 
alliance performance. Legal form of business did not have any influence and can therefore 
be dropped from the framework. Similar studies have found this factor less influential in 
decision-making (Temtime & Pansiri, 2003; 2005). Using observable characteristics as 
managerial cognitive base, this study found little evidence of executives’ characteristics 
influence on strategic alliance formation. This is not surprising. Although Gallén (1997) 
laments that the cognitive style of managers seems to be the missing link when differences 
in strategic choices are explained, the author maintains that based on observable 
characteristics such as age, socioeconomic background and education, it has not been 
possible for researchers to explain fully different strategic choices managers make based on 
their different individual characteristics.  
 
Executive characteristics cannot be dropped from this framework because previous studies 
after Gallén (1997) have found some relationships between strategic choice and managerial 
characteristics. For example, Tyler and Steensma (1998) found that age, technical education 
and technical work experience were directly related to executives’ assessments of 
technological alliances, while Papadakis and Barwise’s (2002) study also supports the view 
that CEOs influence the strategic decision-making process, over and above the influence of 
the broader context such as external environment, firm size and decision characteristics. 
While these studies were based on different industries from that of this thesis, the sharp 
distinction is one of organisation size. For Tyler and Steensma (1998), the annual firm sales 
for their study averaged $728 million (American dollars) while Papadakis and Barwise’s 
(2002) study was based on manufacturing enterprises with more than 300 employees, a 
sharp contrast with this study which had only 4.3 per cent of companies investigated having 
more than 200 employees and only 23.9 per cent having annual turnover exceeding A$7M. 
Strategic decision-making is difficult for SMEs because of lack of availability of resources. 
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These factors overshadow managerial characteristics to the extent that they become less 
important in making strategic choices. There is need for further studies on CEO 
characteristics and strategic decision making with particular relevance to SMEs. 
 
 
7.2  Strategic alliance motives 
 
The discussion on strategic alliance motives centred on the first part (internal & external 
drivers) of the framework for conceptualisation of the collaborative strategy process as 
depicted in Figure 7.1. While not much work has been done on this subject with particular 
reference to the tourism industry, a wealth of knowledge has been drawn from the general 
literature with a view to understanding these factors further. The review of the literature in 
Chapter Three of this thesis underscores the need for further research particularly in tourism 
in order to understand how strongly tourism industry participants see these motives as 
important when forming strategic alliances, rather than just using findings of research from 
different industries.   
 
Most of the motives in this study have been studied before but not necessarily in one single 
study or industry. These studies include Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995), Glaister and 
Buckley (1996), Jarratt (1998), Whipple and Gentry (2000), and  Beverland and Bretherton 
(2001). The conclusion drawn from analysis of past research and findings of this thesis 
point to the fact that no single study can capture all the motives for strategic alliance 
formation. In addition, motives are emphasised differently depending on the sub-sector and 
to a certain extent, upon the type of alliance entered into. However, through mean ranking, 
reputation and corporate image, strength of personal relationships, developing/creating 
new markets, economies of scale and learning from each other were found to be the most 
important motives for alliance formation in the travel sector of tourism. Most executives 
who participated in the interview further confirmed the importance of these motives. 
Strength of personal relationships has also featured more prominently with emphasis of the 
travel sector as a “personality” or “friends” driven industry.  
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 Figure 7.1: Elements of the UE and company characteristics framework that are relevant in the tourism 
study   
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 235 
Motives such as developing/creating new markets, economies of scale and entering new 
domestic and international markets have been found to be some of the main driving forces 
for alliance formation in previous studies (Glaister & Buckley, 1996). Glaister and Buckley 
argue that these motives reflect the nature of market development including the influence of 
host government policy. While this thesis found no significant correlations between legal 
requirements and developing/creating new markets, legal requirements has significant 
correlations with entering both domestic and international markets.  
 
Factors such as rapid technological change, volatility of the tourism industry and brand 
names have been identified as important motives for alliance formation. The significance of 
information communication technology (ICT) has been identified in the literature (Buhalis, 
1996; 1998; Buhalis, 1999; Buhalis & Licata, 2002; Morrison & Harrison, 1998; Palmer & 
McCole, 2000). Morrison and Harrison (1998) link strategic alliance formation and 
membership to Consort Hotels by small independently owned and operated hotels in 
accessing technologies and essential markets. Buhalis and Licata (2002) observe that ICT 
has affected the way in which tourism and travel businesses conduct their operations and 
compete. As a result, tourism suppliers such as airlines and hotel chains, as well as 
destinations and intermediaries such as travel agencies and tour operators form alliances that 
enhance image and increase market share. Identifying and forming alliances with powerful 
brand names is an important aspect of alliance formation because well-managed brands 
differentiate the organisation from its competitors, particularly taking into account the 
volatility of the tourism industry in Australia. The Australian Government Tourism White 
Paper [tourism white paper] (2003) outlines various factors which have exposed weaknesses 
in the capacity of the Australian tourism industry to maintain sustained growth and respond 
quickly and effectively to major challenges. Results of this thesis suggest that one way in 
which tourism businesses are responding to the volatility of the tourism industry is through 
strategic alliances.     
 
Of interest are the two most important motives of reputation and corporate image and 
strength of personal relationships. Research by Sherwood, Saxton and Inkpen (2006) 
indicate that alliance partners are more willing to allow for coordination of tasks if their 
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counterparts are perceived as having solid managerial and partnering reputation, because 
this reduces the amount of risk and uncertainty. This is the likely reason why alliances in 
tourism for formed due to strength of personal relationships. While seeking reputation by 
participating in franchises where reputation has already established by big and reputable 
franchise agencies like Harvey World travel, Traveland and Jet Tours Ltd, other SMEs in 
tourism, which desire to be independent, may form alliances with companies owned or 
managed by friends whose reputation is already known to them. This has a potential to 
enhance the competitiveness of the alliance, where compatibility is obvious and capabilities, 
trust and commitment is already known. However, this approach also has the potential to 
destroy the friendships that already exist.  
 
What the findings of this thesis mean is that while tourism businesses are faced with most of 
the pressures identified in the literature in Chapter Three, there is a quest by Australian 
businesses for providing quality and value in tourism products and experiences. The tourism 
white paper (2003) noted that Australian tourism businesses must maintain a reputation for 
quality, value and variety if they are to attract repeat visitation. Unethical practices of 
tourism businesses (wholesalers, travel agents and tour operators) in China, for examples 
have been identified as a major problem that could seriously undermine the ambition of the 
Australian government to portray Australia as premium, high-yield and ‘platinum plus’ 
destination (King, Dwyer & Prideaux, 2006) and this could cost Australia’s tourism industry 
tens of millions of dollars per year in the future (Commonwealth of Australian, 2003). This 
thesis shows that tourism businesses rely on informal control to manage the conduct of 
alliance partners. In the absence of formal control, tourism businesses rely on reputation 
and corporate image and strength of personal relationships in making choice of partners. 
The quality of this reliance is crucial for the health of Australian tourism. 
 
While companies ranked the top three motives as important, there is a slight variation on the 
importance of the other ten motives depending on the sub-sector (travel agents, tour 
operators and wholesalers), suggesting that these motives do not equally exert the same 
pressure on all companies. It depends on the sub-sector the company is in. Previous studies 
have emphasised the economic and efficiency motives for alliance formation. As observed 
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by Beverland and Bretherton (2001) consistent throughout the literature on motives for 
alliance formation is that companies are merely reacting to changes in their environment as 
businesses, particularly SMEs, struggle to defend against the impact of economic downturn 
(Jarratt, 1998). What this thesis discovered which previous ones have overlooked is the 
emphasis on strength of personal relationships in a sector, which is “personality” or 
“friends” driven. The implication of this is that alliances may be formed not necessarily for 
economic gain but to enhance friendships. This is more important considering the fact that 
most companies in this study are family-owned, managed by owner-managers.  
 
Studies on family-owned businesses show that there is always a tension between rational 
profit seeking activities and non-commercial objectives in family-owned business 
(Westhead & Cowling, 1997; Harris et al., 2004). Westhead and Cowling (1997) observe 
that because family-owned businesses are not solely profit maximisers, they also pursue 
such non-commercial objectives as maintaining/enhancing the family lifestyle of owners. 
Do these non-commercial objectives include forming and enhancing friendship through 
business strategic alliances? There is need for more research on this area with a view to 
understand further the implication of personal friendships on alliance formation, 
management and performance. 
 
 
7.3  Strategic alliance types, structure and scope 
 
This thesis also investigates the influence of company and UE characteristics on the 
adoption of strategic alliances in the travel sector and presents a mixture of results. In line 
with past research, the study supports the UE perspective by linking strategic decisions to 
executive characteristics. However, such a linkage is by no means conclusive. Central UE 
characteristics such as age and education which Tyler and Steensma (1998) found to have 
relationships with decisions to form alliances did not find any support in this thesis. While 
Tyler and Steensma (1998) emphasised technical education, this study adopted general 
education background. Earlier studies by Storey (1994) found that entrepreneurial education 
was one of the few factors unambiguously and positively associated with small business 
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growth. While Roper (1998) found little effect of age of entrepreneur on strategic choices, 
he concluded that firms run by better educated or trained entrepreneurs were more likely to 
take strategic initiatives than those run by less educated entrepreneurs. 
 
The findings of this thesis are counter to the most popular perspective on the role of UE 
characteristics in strategy adoption. There was high expectation regarding the role played by 
managerial characteristics as this has been confirmed previously by most researchers of the 
UE School. The concentration of these researchers may shed light on why our particular 
research is different. Firstly, none of the UE research has been conducted in the tourism 
industry.  Secondly, that most of the UE researchers have never really considered strategic 
alliances as strategies in the traditional sense (Pansiri, 2005a) and lastly because previous 
studies were based on relatively large organisations (e.g. Tyler & Steensma, 1998; 
Papadakis & Barwise, 2002).  
 
Implication of the UE characteristics for management practice is with emphasis first on 
recruitment. That is, recruitment of top managers should place emphasis on experience and 
risk taking. In this thesis, 98.8 per cent of the businesses run by managers with experience 
exceeding sixteen years had alliances as compared to 82.4 per cent of those run by managers 
with experience not exceeding ten years. Businesses managed by adventurous and risk-
taking managers had more alliances than those managed by less adventurous managers. Past 
studies show that alliances involve risk (see Das & Teng, 2001; 2004; Stanek, 2004). 
Managers whose businesses can effectively participate in alliance are risk takers. Gupta and 
Govindarajan (1984) found that greater willingness to take risk and greater tolerance for 
ambiguity contribute to organisational effectiveness. Table 6.4 shows that most executives 
who participated in the survey are risk averse. While risk factors did not have significant 
relationships with alliance types, this thesis found that these factors are important in the 
initial decisions of alliance formation (whether to have an alliance and the number of those 
alliances). Companies managed by ‘risk takers’ had more alliances (94.8 per cent) as 
compared to 84.3 per cent of those managed by ‘risk averse’ executives, and 96.4 per cent 
of companies managed by executives who tolerate ambiguity had alliances compared to 83 
per cent of those managed by executives who are intolerant of ambiguity.  
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Category of business (family or non-family owned) has significant bearing on domestic 
alliances and the number of alliances an organisation is involved in, and ownership is 
significantly associated with most alliance factors. This implies that decisions regarding 
strategic choices are likely to be centred on the owner-managers. Previous studies have 
found that SMEs particularly family businesses are highly dependent on a single-decision 
maker, the owner (Feltham, Feltham & Barnett, 2005) who is reluctant to delegate 
responsibilities to staff because he/she desires to maintain personal control of the business 
(Gilmore, Carson & O'Donnell, 2004). Poutziouris (2003) says that it has been recognised 
that personal aspirations of managers of entrepreneurial growth-ambitious firms impact 
positively on business development and performance. This thesis found that businesses 
managed by employed executives had more alliances (59.7 per cent had medium to high 
number of alliances) as compared to those run by owner managers (30.3 per cent). Owner-
managed businesses also reported low participation in international alliances (92.5 per cent) 
compared to 61.8 per cent of those run by employed executives. More employed executives 
are risk takers (67.6 per cent) and tolerate ambiguity (55.9 per cent) compared to owner 
managers who are less risk takers (47.3 per cent) and tolerate ambiguity less (50.0 per cent). 
There is therefore need for risk taking and management training particularly for owner-
managers. Gilmore et al. (2004) suggest that SMEs owner-managers could manage risk 
through networking and using managerial competencies. Owner-managers could be trained 
to acquire skills necessary for networking and competency skills that could help them to 
form and manage effective strategic alliances.  
 
The findings of this study also imply that once a decision has been taken to form alliances, 
managerial characteristics cease becoming important factors in determining either the form, 
location or the number of alliances an organisation participates in. Chi-square statistics 
shown in Table 6.12 suggest that the adoption of strategic alliance types in the travel sector 
of tourism is more closely associated with company characteristics than with UE 
characteristics. Table 6.3 shows the extent to which the travel sector is interwoven with 
other sectors of tourism, partially confirming Tremblay (1998) as summarised in Figure 3.4. 
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These findings support most of the theoretical observations and research made so far 
concerning networks in tourism (Poon, 1993; Tremblay, 1998; Pavlovich, 2003).  
 
Firm size as defined by both the number of employees and annual turnover is prominent as a 
determinant of decisions taken to form strategic alliances, number of alliances and an 
organisation’s participation in domestic and international alliances. An important 
consideration is the fact that the majority of these organisations are SMEs employing less 
than 50 employees (91.4 per cent) with annual turnover less than AU$3M (62.8 per cent). A 
majority of them are first generation family owned businesses (58.4 per cent) with 73.5 per 
cent of them run by founder members.  
 
The fact that the majority of these organisations are SMEs has far reaching consequences in 
respect to alliance formation and participation. For instance, companies employing less than 
five people accounted for 69.2 per cent of businesses which did not have alliances, while 60 
per cent of those employing less than five people which reported having alliances had low 
levels (1-2)  of alliances. At the same time, 100 per cent of businesses, which did not have 
alliances, had annual turnover less than A$1M while 100 per cent of all businesses with 
turnover exceeding A$5m had alliances. The number of alliances a business participated in 
was also highly influenced by annual turnover.   
 
Awareness campaigns by tourism bodies and associations at local, regional, state and 
federal level are necessary in order to encourage SMEs to form, or participate in both 
domestic and international strategic alliances in order to enhance synergy, organisational 
performance, and market share and profitability. Studies of tourism networks (Poon, 1993; 
Halme & Fadeeva, 1998; Tremblay, 1998; Pavlovich, 2003) show the difficulty of surviving 
as “lone wolf entrepreneurs” (Leiper et al., 2004). 
 
These findings show that the smaller the business the less it participates in alliances, and if 
it does, the less the number of those alliances and the more likely it will not participate in 
international alliances. However, managers of all businesses in tourism should acknowledge 
the fact that tourism is a highly globalised industry. The pressure to survive in such an 
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increasingly competitive, dynamic and complex environment with limited resources does in 
a way force organisations to explore strategic alliances, networks, and other hybrid 
organisational arrangements as alternatives to the more traditional internal development and 
diversification (Dev et al., 1996). Therefore, organisations, irrespective of size should enter 
into strategic alliances in order to match and respond to the uncertainties and complexities 
of today’s highly competitive globalised and technological driven business environment.  
 
Australian authorities may need to encourage and support tourism SMEs to participate in 
strategic alliances at regional, domestic and international levels. Tourism Australia46
                                                 
46 Tourism Australia is the Australian federal government statutory authority responsible for international and 
domestic tourism marketing as well as the delivery of research and forecasts for the sector. It was created by 
the 
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been mandated by the Tourism Australia Act (2004), among other things, with marketing 
Brand Australia and developing strategies “to promote growth in the domestic tourism 
industry and encourage regional dispersal of international tourists” (Commonwealth of 
Australian, 2003, p. 2). In doing so, one of their strategies has been identifying opportunities 
to develop new markets in regions such as Asia and South America. Tourism Australia, in 
its worldwide marketing campaigns, may need to include in their entourage representatives 
from tourism associations such as The Australia Tourism Export Council (ATEC), 
Australian Hotels Association (AHA) and Australian Federation of Travel Agents (AFTA). 
Such bodies should use Tourism Australia marketing platforms to identify potential alliance 
partners for their members and explain the values and expectations of doing business with 
Australian tourism companies. Further to this, Tourism Australia may need to develop 
training modules directed at how Australian tourism businesses can effectively participate in 
international markets, including effective participation in international alliances and other 
Tourism Australia Act 2004 as a major tourism policy reform. It encompasses the functions of 
organisations, which operated before the 2003 government white paper. These organisations included the 
Australia tourism Commission, See Australia, the Bureau of tourism Research and the Tourism Forecasting 
Council. Its main objectives are to: influence people to travel to Australia, including for events; influence 
people travelling to Australia to also travel throughout Australia; influence Australians to travel throughout 
Australia, including for events; help foster a sustainable tourism industry in Australia; and help increase the 
economic benefits to Australia from tourism. 
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forms of inter-organisational relationships. This support and encouragement of tourism 
businesses can be expanded further to the Federal Government’s initiative of using tourism 
to provide important connections between regional and metropolitan Australia. This can be 
achieved by linking regional and metropolitan businesses.   
 
Another implication of company characteristics to management practice is with regard to 
which travel sub-sector they exist in. Of the businesses, which did not have alliances, 76.9 
per cent of them were tour operators while all tour wholesalers reported having alliances. 
Tour operators also recorded low levels of alliances and their participation in international 
alliances was very low. Interviews show that tour operators were mainly interested in their 
immediate local market and had no ambition for expansion. This has considerable 
ramifications for company growth. 
 
In order to enhance their competitiveness, tourism businesses need to market themselves 
beyond their immediate geographical borders. One way of achieving this is through both 
domestic and international strategic alliances. In doing so, they should consider strategic 
alliances that are relatively less risky financially. The findings on the number of alliances 
companies participate in and the dominant alliance types cast some reflections on the 
structure and scope of these alliances. While alliance scope is complex, past research has 
measured it  in terms of the number of partners, number of geographic areas, and operation 
activities (Colombo, 2003). Using the same measures, this thesis argues that tourism 
companies are involved in multiple alliances with multiple partners. Their geographic scope 
is wide, depending upon the size of the company. Most of these companies have alliances 
that transcend geographical boundaries. Such international alliances are aided by 
information technology, which allows companies to be linked and to market their products 
internationally. While Reuer et al. (2002) cites the work of Pisano and observe that 
biotechnology alliances that entail multiple projects are more likely to be equity than non-
equity alliances, this thesis found that alliances in tourism that entail multiple partners are 
more likely to be non-equity alliances.  
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This thesis investigated eight strategic alliance types. In Chapter Three, eleven alliance 
types were identified. However, production and manufacturing alliances, research and 
development coalitions, and technology development coalitions were left out from the study 
because the tourism industry is service oriented and not related to the production of goods. 
Evaluation of the eight alliance types showed that the travel sector of tourism is more 
inclined towards flexible, less financial investment and marketing oriented alliances 
structures (I.e. SICA, JSA MDA and FLA). This might be related to the fact that most 
Australian tourism businesses are SMEs with insufficient resources that could enable them 
to participate effectively in alliances such as joint ventures, which require high financial 
investments. These forms of alliances require high levels of compatibility, trust and 
commitment if they are to be sustainable. Investing more time by tourism businesses in 
identifying and negotiating with potential alliance partners is necessary. Of course, most 
SMEs do not have adequate resources to do this, particularly when negotiating with multiple 
potential international partners, however attempts should always be made to study and 
understand what their values are, and the manner in which they do business.  
 
 
7.4 Choice of alliance partners - Towards a new framework of 
partner selection critical success factors 
 
Mendleson and Polonsky (1995) argue that not only do firms analyse carefully the type of 
strategic alliance to enter, they also determine the most appropriate partner(s). Past studies 
suggest that the failure of many strategic alliances can be traced to the partner selection and 
planning stages and identify the four Cs of compatibility, capability, commitment and 
control as critical for successful pre-selection of alliance partners (Hagen, 2002; 
Holtbrügge, 2004; Jamali, 2004). This thesis confirms past research on choice of alliance 
partners. However, there is need to shift away from the four Cs (compatibility, capability, 
commitment and control) to Trust – Three Cs [T-TCs] (trust, compatibility, commitment 
and control). In Chapter Three, section 3.6, these factors were discussed at length. In 
chapter six, all items measuring trust and the four Cs were reduced through exploratory 
factor analysis to four themes where were named as trust, compatibility, commitment and 
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control. This was done to identify the most critical factors. Such a process was necessary 
since no study including these factors in this manner has been undertaken before.  
 
Through factor analysis, capability variables were loaded onto commitment. This did not 
come as a surprise because there still has to be a willingness to commit whatever 
capabilities exist. Hagen (2002) argues that alliance partner selection is also based on 
whether the operational capability in terms of resources and core-competencies is present 
for the respective partners. However, this becomes a big issue in highly integrated industries 
like tourism where companies may be involved in multiple alliances which are both 
domestic and international (Pansiri, 2006a). To what extent effective analysis of capabilities 
of potential partners can be carried out by SMEs which already have limited recourses is 
questionable. 
 
In Chapter Three, different types of strategic alliances were discussed, taking into account 
different alliance classifications (Faulkner, 1995; Howarth et al., 1995; Bierly & Kessler, 
1998; Dussauge & Garrette, 1999). A summary is provided in Figure 3.2. This thesis shows 
that most alliances in the travel sector are ‘loose’ (e.g. non-equity/non-joint ventures) 
complex/organic multi-partner collaborations which cut across travel, transport and 
accommodation sectors, and are international as well as domestic. These organisations 
belong to multiple alliances because of the multiplicity of actions they engage in and the 
relationships they must have (Astley & Fombrun, 1983, p. 581). The issue of 
internationalisation of SMEs is supported. Etemad et al. (2001) argue that while competition 
in global markets was traditionally the realm of large companies, with smaller businesses 
remaining local or regional, the global competitive environment has dramatically changed, 
allowing SMEs to compete globally by entering into cooperative relationships with larger, 
multinational enterprises, giving SMEs the opportunity to reach global markets and achieve 
economies of scale. However, this thesis did not investigate the size of alliance partners. 
 
These arguments justify why capability is dropped in favour of the T-TCs, which are more 
behavioural oriented. In their study of the influence of behavioural and organisational 
characteristics on the success of international strategic alliances, Kauser and Shaw (2004) 
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found that behavioural characteristics (high levels of commitment, trust, coordination, 
interdependence and communication) have a strong impact on performance and managers’ 
satisfaction with international strategic alliances. Jamali (2004, p. 421) argues that, 
“[p]articularly important are the notions of compatibility, which entails identifying 
complementary strengths and weaknesses and commitment as reflected in the formalised 
commitment of necessary time energy and resources.” The importance of these behavioural 
factors is emphasised by one of the executives (C6) who says that alliances are formed 
when there is commitment to deliver “no matter how difficult the request is.” Through 
discussions of possibilities of potential partners forming alliances, commitment is 
established “that is based on trust because they have to deliver and have to say to you ‘look, 
this is the best we can get.’ Right! And then they say that, and I always say to them, ‘don’t 
fool me because I can always find out.’” Details of the T-TCs have been provided in both 
Chapters Three, Five and Six, and are further reflected in the following section, which links 
them to alliance performance.  
 
 
7.5  Strategic alliance performance 
 
Tourism companies are embedded in strategic alliances that create networks (Pansiri, 
2006b). At the same time, these alliances have a life span determined by their effectiveness. 
Results of this thesis suggest that alliances are effective tools of business strategy. Table 
5.14 indicates a relatively high level of satisfaction with alliance performance. This thesis 
further confirms past research that has used some of these items, which found high 
correlation between them (Geringer and Hebert, 1990). Furthermore, this thesis' results 
suggest that both company and UE characteristics have a certain level of influence on 
performance evaluation. This is not surprising. For example, a study by Entrialgo, 
Fernández and Vázquez, (2001) found that company characteristics (availability of 
resources, financial capital and competitive strategy) have a significant influence on 
entrepreneurship while they did not find any significant relations between firm size and age, 
and  entrepreneurship. 
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Strategic alliance performance evaluation is also influenced by choice of alliance partners. 
Analysing relationships between choice of alliance partners and performance of an alliance 
is an area that has been the concern to many studies. Some of these studies have found 
mixed results (e.g. Medina-Munoz & Garcia-Falcon, 2000; Bennett, 1997).  
 
Using both quantitative and qualitative data, this thesis in a way confirms Medina-Munoz 
and Garcia-Falcon’s study (2000). The findings of this study are also consistent with some 
past research which has examined one or more of these constructs in other inter-
organisational contexts such as alliances (Shamdasani & Seth, 1995), joint ventures and 
networking (Babakus, Yavas & Haahti, 2006; Harrigan, 1985; 1986) and inter-
organisational relationships (Crotts & Turner, 1999; Medina-Munoz & Garcia-Falcon, 
2000). From the extensive literature search that was conducted, it can be argued that this 
thesis is the first attempt to  assess the effects of choice of alliance partners on Geringer and 
Herbert’s (1991) subjective measures of alliance performance. The results confirm the 
importance of commitment, trust, control and compatibility in both choosing alliance 
partners (Hagen, 2002; Pansiri, 2005a) and effectively managing on-going strategic 
alliances since they strongly influence alliance performance and satisfaction (Shamdasani & 
Seth, 1995; Crotts & Turner, 1999; Medina-Munoz & Garcia-Falcon, 2000). Strategic 
alliances need to be nurtured and managed in order for all parties to derive benefits (Crotts 
& Turner, 1999) through continued commitment, trust and control of all the partners while 
at the same time organisational cultures should be blended to minimise conflict. In the 
words of one executive (C5): 
 
C5: Time is the key to any relationship. If you don’t commit time to the 
relationship, the relationship will suffer as a result, and that’s any kind of 
relationship – be it a strategic alliance, be it a relationship with your staff, be it a 
relationship with your suppliers, your customers, you know, you have to commit 
the time and resources to those relationships and to nurture them. …if you walk 
into a travel agency in Australia there is preferably three to four alternatives that 
you could book from and therefore if we have a strong relationship with that 
agency there is a greater chance that they will recommend our products over some 
other products that might be available, and so that relationship then becomes 
critical to the success of our business. 
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In this thesis, commitment was found to positively influence executives’ general 
satisfaction with alliance performance (p < 0.001), overall alliance performance (p < 0.05) 
and market share and profitability (p < 0.001). This is in line with past research which 
found significant relationships between commitment and satisfaction with alliance 
performance (Julian & O'Cass, 2004). Sharma (1998) found that commitment in strategic 
alliances creates specifically, and shows a desire by, the alliance partners to rely on “voice” 
rather than ‘exit”. Sharma (1998, p. 517) maintains that in strategic alliances, “…partners 
resolve their differences through discussions rather than by leaving the alliance. Empirical 
evidence suggests that committed partners are willing to invest valuable resources in a 
cooperative agreement and can be relied on to perform essential functions in the 
cooperation.” Shamdasani and Seth (1995) found commitment of an alliance partner to be 
the strongest determinant of both relationship satisfaction and continuity. They concluded 
that “[c]ommitment influences strongly both existing (i.e. satisfaction) and future (i.e. 
continuity) evaluation of the alliance relationship” (Shamdasani & Seth, 1995, p. 17). 
Kauser and Shaw (2004) found commitment to positively influence international strategic 
alliance performance and managers’ satisfaction with the relationship, and Medina-Munoz 
and Garcia-Falcon (2000) found that commitment had a positive effect on both overall 
success and satisfaction with travel agent marketing support.  
 
Leiper (2004) argues that as intrinsic components of tourism industries, tour wholesalers, 
travel agents, and [tour operators] have core activities that depend on cooperation with 
others in the same or related lines of business. The results of this thesis are encouraging as it 
shows that success of such cooperation occurs because partners manage their relationships 
through mutual consent rather than relying on coercion through written agreements (Kauser 
& Shaw, 2004) 
 
Trust was found to positively influence executives’ general satisfaction (p < 0.001). This 
result supports previous research on this issue. For example, Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) 
empirical research supported the theory that commitment and trust are key mediating 
variables that contribute to relationship success, while Moore and Cunningham III’s (1999) 
finding suggest that trust and commitment are major distinguishing social exchange 
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behavioural characteristics of logistics alliances. Kauser and Shaw (2004) found that trust 
positively related to international strategic alliance performance and managers’ satisfaction 
and thus a good predictor of alliance success. Mohr and Spekman (1994) also found that 
relationships between suppliers and dealers based on trust served to calm the dealer’s fear of 
opportunistic behaviour, resulting in a successful partnership. Medina-Munoz and Garcia-
Falcon (2000) found that trust (the extent to which the travel agent is trustworthy, and 
overall trust in relationship) was positively associated with both “overall success” and 
“satisfaction with marketing support”. This means that for executives to build trusting 
relationships, they must act with high integrity, they should be honest about problems when 
they arise in relation to their obligations in the alliance, should not make false claims or 
promises and they should be counted on to do what is right. 
 
Control was found to positively influence executives’ satisfaction with technology (p < 
0.001), and alliance operational performance (p < 0.05). These findings are similar to past 
empirical research which has found inter-organisational control as a strong predictor for 
economic performance and satisfaction with overall marketing performance of alliances 
(Julian & O'Cass, 2004). Medina-Munoz and Medina-Munoz (2004) found significant 
positive relationships between the overall success of the business relationship and types of 
control and control mechanisms. An earlier study by Medina-Muñoz et al. (2003) on the 
control that German and British tour operators exercise over the accommodation companies 
with whom they do business found that tour operators’ control over accommodation 
companies is "medium" and can be described as "neither low nor considerable". They 
conclude that “there does appear to be great variation in the degree of control, which 
suggests that some tour operators exercise hardly any control, while others use a high 
degree of control” (2003, p. 144). This thesis supports the above given that the travel sector 
companies exercise more informal control (mean = 2.79) than formal control (mean = 2.61). 
Interviews underscored this fact by showing how respondents put more emphasis on 
informal control. Major practical implications of control to the success of strategic alliances 
in tourism is that some form of control of alliance partners is necessary for providing quality 
and value to customers, and minimising unethical operations by alliance partners. In trying 
to finding ways of dealing with these problems, Australian authorities may need to come up 
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with control checklists as a way of helping tourism businesses, which find it difficult to 
control partners, particularly in international alliances. Most SMEs may not have the 
capacity and skills of identified control mechanisms that may limit problems associated with 
controlling partners.  
 
Compatibility of cooperative businesses is another important criterion for partner selection 
studied in this thesis. There exists a significant positive relationship between compatibility 
and executives’ general satisfaction with alliance performance (p < 0.01). This thesis 
confirms past research on this area. Several empirical studies (e.g., Vaara, 2000; 
Holtbrügge, 2004) demonstrate that this factor has a strong influence on efficiency and 
stability. Julian and O'Cass (2004) underscore the importance of compatibility as a strong 
predictor for economic performance and satisfaction with overall marketing performance of 
alliances, and Holtbrügge (2004, p. 265) argues that “…[p]artners with similar corporate 
cultures tend to have similar objectives, values and decision-making structures.”  
 
Empirical results of this thesis provide support for the majority of dimensions suggested in 
the alliance literature as determining factors for successful alliances (Medina-Munoz & 
Garcia-Falcon, 2000). However, this link is by no means conclusive. Practical implications 
to be drawn from this linkage are concerned with the manner in which travel agencies, tour 
wholesalers and operators’ managers should confront the realities of future competitive 
strategies. While tourism businesses should fiercely compete against each other, 
partnerships and alliances should also form part of their strategies. There is no doubt that 
most tourism companies are small. They therefore lack the adequate resources for both 
marketing and market penetration. To overcome these inadequacies there is need to join 
forces. This means having multiple alliances and alliance partners who meet a variety of 
needs. Closely associated with this is the need to identify the most effective, yet less 
expensive forms of alliances. This is related to lack of finance associated with the smallness 
of most of the companies. Four most effective and less expensive alliance types identified 
are MDA, SICA, JSA and FLA. These offer companies a variety of choice. Managers in the 
travel sector and the whole tourism industry need to be aware of factors that could yield 
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better alliance results and should put more effort in making themselves better alliance 
partners.  
 
This thesis also highlights the problems associated with alliance evaluation. Modern 
organisations are involved in multiple alliances most of which their single contribution to an 
organisation’s performance cannot be easily evaluated. This raises challenges for alliance 
management. Firstly, it means that greater care should be taken when deciding whether to 
continue with an alliance. Secondly, there is need to acknowledge that perceptual managers’ 
assessments of performance are influenced by a variety of factors including company 
characteristics, characteristics of the assessor and choice of alliance partners. Furthermore, 
tourism companies from different sectors are likely to assess the same alliance differently, 
and this assessment could be greatly influenced by the businesses’ size and whether it is a 
family owned business or not. These areas should be addressed to have a more balanced 
view of alliance performance.  
 
Thirdly, the research design, operationalisation and conceptualisation of alliance 
performance measures need to be re-explored. Geringer and Hebert (1991) have provided a 
springboard upon which this could be done. This thesis has adapted their performance 
measurement items with some modifications, and has further shown strong correlations of 
these items. This thesis goes further by identifying perceived alliance performance and 
perceived overall satisfaction with the alliance factors, which could assist future evaluation 
of alliance performance. The classification according to these two dimensions brings more 
robustness to alliance evaluation and management. Travel sector managers could use this 
classification not only to assess the value of a potential alliance but also the performance of 
an existing alliance with a view to continue or terminate it. Table 6.14 suggests that these 
subjective measures are related; meaning that these two set of items should always be used 
together in order to make a rigorous assessment of an alliance. Future research must focus 
on the development, testing and validation of these measures in order to help both 
academicians and practitioners to assess alliance performance.  
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Fourthly, the link between alliance performance factors and both company characteristics 
and UE characteristics is by no means conclusive. However, this thesis highlights the need 
to put subjective assessments in a proper context – that those who assess performance of 
whatever kind have limited rationality and their assessments are largely influenced by their 
cognitive base and environmental factors.  
 
 
7.6  Limitations of the study  
 
The findings presented here must be understood in the context of the following study 
limitations: 
 
Firstly, this study is limited to empirical data collected in 2005 from travel sector 
organisations in Australia, most of which were SMEs. The smallness of businesses which 
participated in this survey is indicative of travel agency and tour operator services in 
Australia where 97 per cent of them are SMEs (Bolin & Greenwood, 2003, p. 5). However, 
lack of availability of data on company sizes meant that better sampling frameworks that 
would have made the sample more representative of large companies were not employed. In 
addition, it is not yet clear whether generalisations to other industries and countries could be 
made. Further research is necessary to investigate whether such behaviour is only peculiar 
to the travel sector. Such studies could benefit more from cross-industry and cross-country 
research, which is deliberately designed to include both large companies and SMEs to 
investigate differences between these two dimensions. 
 
Secondly, the number of questionnaires returned may have reduced external validity.  
Hundred and twenty seven out of 600 potential respondents completed and returned the 
survey. The return rate was difficult to control because as a mail survey, the participants 
were responsible for their return. There is need for better ways of enhancing questionnaire 
retention in future research. These include, but not limited to, hiring research assistants or 
indicating certain benefits for returning completed questionnaires. The first option is 
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preferable since it gives assistant researchers the opportunity to explain questions to the 
participants. These methods are likely to raise many ethical issues in social research. 
 
Thirdly, it was difficult to identify organisations, which had some form of strategic alliances 
before distribution of the questionnaire. Had this identification been done, more appropriate 
sampling techniques such as stratified random sampling would have been adopted. Hence, it 
is not clear as to whether poor retention of questionnaires, particularly from those 
companies, which did not have strategic alliances, was because they were not interested or 
that very few of them were contacted.  
 
Fourthly, the selection of participants for interviews did not generate enough participants as 
was expected. The approach of asking survey respondents to indicate whether they were 
willing to participate in the interview meant that only a few responded. Of those who 
responded, half of them latter declined. The approach also meant that the people who 
participated in the interview were not totally representative of those who responded to the 
interview. Although selected group for interviews need not be representative of the total 
sample in qualitative research (Polkinghorne, 2005), this study could have been enhanced 
by the participation of women in the interviews since 35.7 per cent of them had responded 
to the survey. None of the women who responded to the survey indicated a willingness to 
participate in the interview. This is also a limitation of the upper echelon perspective, which 
could be criticised for being gender blind. None of the upper echelon studies identified in 
the literature had taken gender as a variable that need special attention just like age and 
experience. Further studies that incorporate gender as an executive characteristic are 
necessary.    
 
Fifthly, respondents who participated in the survey were asked to use an example of their 
best strategic alliance to evaluate both the partner characteristics and performance variables. 
Therefore, the analysis and results regarding choice of alliance partners and alliance 
performance should be understood as applying to successful alliances and not alliances and 
alliance performance in general.  
 
 253 
Lastly, although the study does not fully support most of the relationships between strategic 
alliance formation and UE characteristics, this is argued only in the context of its focus at 
the individual level. To this extent, the study does not capture the enactment process that 
takes place at the organisational level when top executives as a group or team assess and 
adopt particular strategic alliance(s) vis-à-vis other organisational strategies and alliance 
options in particular. Hence, the managerial characteristics - top management team - 
strategic choice theoretical offshoot of the UE perspective discussed in Chapter Three, and 
in Pansiri (2005a) may be more important in researching this topic. A number of UE studies 
have adopted this approach in studying organisation strategies (Michel & Hambrick, 1992; 
Smith et al., 1994; Hambrick & Cho, 1996; Carpenter et al., 2004). Papadakis and Barwise’s 
study (2002) results are of interest not only to this study but to the UE perspective in 
general. Their study explored the influence of both CEO and TMT characteristics on the 
process of making strategic decisions. They found that TMT characteristics were better 
predictors of strategic decision-making behaviour than CEO characteristics. They relate 
these finding to lack of dominance over decision-making to their sample, which was 
relatively medium-sized, and larger organisation, assuming these organisations’ CEOs and 
other individuals have less freedom. It could be interesting to see if the same could be 
extended to SMEs in the travel sector where the majority of the firms are family owned and 
run by their founders.  
 
 
7.7  Future research and directions 
 
This thesis used a sequential explanatory (QUAN-qual) mixed methods approach to solicit 
the views of top executives whose businesses are involved in strategic alliances. 
Quantitative data analysis formed the basis upon which semi-structures interviews were 
based. Using Pansiri’s (2005b) research framework, This thesis responded to a call for the 
use of mixed methods techniques in tourism research as a way of enhancing triangulation 
(Oppermann, 2000; Davies, 2003; Downward & Mearman, 2004). The use of selected 
interview quotations to elucidate the quantitative analysis has contributed to a deeper 
understanding of alliance formation and performance evaluation in the travel sector, and 
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reduced ambiguity about which factors are most influential. Having interviews to 
complement statistical data was important because sometimes surveys come up with items 
which respondents do not feel comfortable with. For instance, in the survey, control was 
deemed an important factor for choice of partners, but interviewed executives were often 
uncomfortable in discriminating between formal and informal control. The same approach 
of using qualitative data to illuminate quantitative analysis was recently found to have 
contributed to a deeper understanding of strategic alliances by Taylor (2005). More studies 
of this nature are essential to further academic research in tourism.  
 
What is learnt from this thesis is that an industry-wide study has to grapple with the idea of 
sampling for interviews. In this thesis, the view was that only interested executives should 
be interviewed. Their interest was indicated by way of responding to a question in the 
survey, which asked respondents to indicate if they would like to be approached for an 
interview. This generated more information in the sense that executives were equally 
interested. However, such an approach can become a difficult task if only a few of the 
respondents show interest. Of course, it can be argued that quality is far better than quantity 
in this case, but better ways of making the interview method more broad based should form 
part of a constant investigation by mixed method researchers. 
 
The other issue meriting attention is that the concept of SME does not suggest homogeneity 
of companies. This thesis shows that within SMEs, there are specific company 
characteristics, which make these organisations different. These factors need to be explored 
further to see how they relate to other areas of study. Wincent (2005) asked the question 
“does size matter?” In answering this question through an empirical study, Wincent 
concluded that firm size can be an important determinant of firm performance and for 
networking inside and outside the SME network. This thesis broadens this scope. A 
question to be asked is “does industry, size and ownership (whether a company is family or 
non-family owned) matter?” The results of this thesis contribute to answering this question. 
This thesis found significant relationships between these three company characteristics and 
strategic alliance decisions (forming alliances, number of alliances, participating in 
domestic and international alliances, alliance types, choice of alliance partners, and 
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evaluation of alliance performance). This thesis is by no means conclusive and further 
avenues for research still exist. Other company factors i.e. organisational characteristics like 
formalisation, centralisation and complexity  used by Kauser and Shaw (2004) could be 
added to the list of company characteristics which have been used in this thesis. These are 
structural variables, which have been commonly used to analyse the structure of an 
organisation. Kauser and Shaw (2004) found these variables not to influence international 
strategic alliance performance and managers’ satisfaction. Whether these variables 
influence strategic alliance formation or not, such investigation would broaden the study 
and understanding of both strategic alliances and SME behaviour.   
 
This thesis also investigated motives for alliance formation and found that all the 13 items 
under study were important reasons for alliance formation although their importance 
slightly varied by travel sub-sector. These have ramifications for both tourism-businesses 
and SMEs in general. Recently, Chung et al. (2006, p. 210) suggested that the time has 
matured for the research community to examine and ascertain the potential of strategic 
alliances among SMEs because these enterprises “…are often characterized by tight 
resources, limited access to capital, and specialization in niche markets, along with 
increased globalization and rapid technological change, they face even more severe 
competition than large organizations”. Although this statement was made in relation to 
‘knowledge-based firms’, it is also relevant for tourism companies because they operate 
under the same conditions. The questions for tourism business and SME executives in 
general should be “How can we compensate for our smallness through strategic alliances in 
a way that would enhance our resources and competitiveness? In what ways can we enhance 
synergy and learning through strategic alliances? What should I look for in a potential 
alliance partner? How can I know when my alliance has gone bad? What skills do I need to 
be an effective alliance partners?” These questions also offer research opportunities for 
tourism and SME experts.  
 
Descriptive statistics were used to assess strategic alliance types and alliance motives. There 
is need to broaden the analysis further by investigating the relationship between these 
themes with executive and company characteristics. While this was possible, limitations 
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relating to the length of the thesis were taken into account. Future research should therefore 
look at the influence of executive and company characteristics in environmental analysis 
(motives for alliance formation) and the choices of strategic alliance by executives. Further 
to this, future research should also consider the influence of strategic alliance motives in 
executives’ choices of these strategic alliance types. 
 
Interviews on choice of alliance partners have hinted on strategic alliance evolution. This 
was not well captured in this thesis since it was a bit outside the scope of the study. The 
survey did not have variables assessing strategic alliance evolution. Evolutionary studies 
suggest that strategic alliances evolve from emergence to growth as firms strategically adapt 
and align their alliances to gain the resources they need to ensure success (Hite & Hesterly, 
2001) Also, repeat collaborators are less likely to adopt contractual provisions that are 
informational in nature and they are geared to the collaboration of the alliance (Reuer & 
Ariño, 2007). Future research in tourism alliances should investigate the role of internal and 
external evolution processes (Prevot & Meschi, 2006) on strategic alliance formation, 
alliance options and performance in relation to SMEs.  
 
This thesis shows that strategic alliances can be used to enhance a company’s overall 
performance, operational performance, and market share & profitability, and can lead to 
both satisfaction with alliance performance and technology transfer. Strategic alliances help 
in overcoming weaknesses associated with company size and poor financial position, and 
low levels of expertise in marketing and management (Jarratt, 1998). Tourism businesses 
can collaborate through a broad range of alliance options. Popular alliance options include 
marketing and distribution, sharing information and communication technology, joint 
selling and distribution, and franchising and licensing. What is common with all these 
alliances is their ability to market products and services through sharing of expenses and 
being able to effectively distribute products. Though there are expenses involved, these 
alliances are relatively cheap as compared to joint ventures and equity participating 
alliances, which need substantial amounts of investments.  
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With SMEs unable to access resources internally in order to develop all the capabilities 
necessary to compete effectively in their regional markets (Jarratt, 1998), strategic alliances 
have become a major vehicle through which tourism companies enhance their 
competitiveness. The issue of regionalisation is another contentious issue. This thesis found 
significant relationships between turnover and participation in international alliances, and 
the number of strategic alliances a company is involved in. Companies with high turnover 
not only have international alliances but also have multiple ones. Tourism is one of the most 
highly integrated industries in the world (Bullock, 1998; Dale, 2000). There is need for 
tourism companies to be linked internationally. This can be done effectively through 
alliance networks, which in turn would promote particular destinations. Future research in 
strategic alliances and networks should consider the role and effectiveness of international 
strategic alliances and identify success factors for managing such alliances. 
 
While alliance networks are important, their management become even more central as 
managerial skills in dealing with both human relations and intercultural values takes centre 
stage. However, cultural similarities are less important as companies in multiple alliances 
strive more to integrate cultures than seeking cultural compatibility between companies.  As 
C4 observes, “It’s a blending of the cultures, not a similar culture. Can the cultures blend? 
Can the cultures meet? Can they compromise? That was the issue there”. C5 confirms this 
by saying that “cultural similarity is probably the least because we have partners all over the 
globe …That’s not really an issue.” This means that tourism education would have to take 
be cognisant of the global and multicultural nature of the environment within which tourism 
companies are involved. 
 
Trust and commitment are the main engines for alliance sustenance and stability. It is 
important that alliance relationships be mutual and collegial as opposed to much reliance on 
legal contracts. Be as it may, there is need to strike a balance between control and its 
absence, because whichever way the pendulum swings has significant implications for 
alliance performance and satisfaction. The three main alliance types in this thesis can be 
classified as ‘loose’, which means that they would not last if based on stringent formal 
controls. If this were the case, a lot of movements by companies from one alliance to 
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another can be expected. Such moves would be counter productive since there would be 
serious lack of stability. Such alliances can only last if they are built on commitment. 
Commitment ensures stability and builds trust.   
 
The number of international tourist arrivals worldwide continues to grow, reaching an all-
time record of 763 million in 2004. The main purpose for these arrivals have been leisure, 
recreation and holidays (52 per cent), business travel (16 per cent) and visiting friends and 
relatives, religious purposes and health treatments (24 per cent). Most of these travellers 
have used air (43 per cent) and road (45 per cent) (UNWTO, 2005). This has far-reaching 
implications for tourism-based businesses and puts travel agencies, tour operators and 
wholesalers at the centre stage of service delivery. Tourists need confidence in tourism 
businesses if the industry is to continue growing. Unfortunately, not a single business can 
meet the needs of a tourist traveller alone. There is need for collaboration that would 
enhance utilisation of scarce resources and make tourist experiences exceptional. Strategic 
alliances are an effective way to be able to deliver up to a tourist’s expectation. As C6 
observes: 
C6: Alliances are formed to be able to develop a competitive market environment. 
If those alliances are not there, we cannot deliver the product, we cannot turn 
around and say to you that we can deliver this product at this particular price, 
because the contacts are not there. When the contacts are not there, then you are 
subject to the discretion of the service provider who does not know you, and that is 
when everything falls apart. So a business is developed on contacts. 
 
Previous studies on networks suggests that larger firms are valuable for holding SME 
networks together (Buttery & Alan, 1994; Etemad et al., 2001; Wincent, 2005). For 
instance, Buttery and Alan (1994) refer to “kingdom network”, which they argue, ties small 
suppliers to a large corporate customer in a vertical supplier chain, under the strategic 
direction of the large company. While disapproving the “traditional option” of smaller firms 
“piggy-backing” on larger firms at the behest of these larger firms’ discretion; Etemad et al. 
(2001) still emphasise the necessary symbiotic relationship between large and small firms 
that should exist for both firms to attain world-class competitiveness. Bolin and Greenwood 
(2003) observe that 91 per cent of all tourism related businesses in Australia are small. This 
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is supported by ABS (1997) which puts the total number of SMEs in Australia at 90 per 
cent. To imagine that SMEs have to depend on large firms for survival is an exaggeration. 
Researchers must be more realistic and focus on how SMEs and tourism companies form 
strategic alliances to compensate for their size in order to overcome their resource 
disadvantages and to increase their overall competitiveness. SMEs may also form alliances 
with larger firms for synergistic rather than dependence reasons.   
 
 
7.8  Conclusion 
 
This thesis has observed and reported on the influence of company and executive 
characteristics on strategic alliance formation (alliance type selection and choice of alliance 
partners) and performance evaluation of alliances. In this way, it has looked at strategic 
alliances from the perspective of which decision makers in companies best understand 
strategic alliances and the factors that influence these alliances. Out of the eight alliance 
types investigated, this thesis found that the three most important ones (marketing and 
distribution agreements, sharing information and communication technology and joint 
selling or distribution) are marketing based alliances. While this thesis is by no means 
conclusive, it found that significant relationships exist between both company and executive 
characteristics, and strategic alliance decisions on alliance formation and evaluation.  
 
To this end, this thesis has contributed significantly to three broad fields of study: (i) 
Tourism studies – this thesis has made a major contribution in understanding the ways in 
which tourism based companies deal with environmental factors through alliances. Tourism 
studies have ignored this linkage and more importantly how tourism business alliances and 
networks can be evaluated. (ii) Strategic management – this thesis is among the first to 
make a linkage between the upper echelon perspective and decision-making in tourism. The 
argument in this thesis is that strategic alliances are strategic options just like diversification 
and acquisitions, hence, the need to evaluate the influence of executive characteristics in 
respect to decisions relating to strategic alliances. This thesis has moreover broadened the 
issue by identifying company characteristics as influential in executive decision-making, 
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which is also a major field of study in strategic management. (iii) SMEs studies – given the 
nature of tourism businesses in Australia, it was inconceivable that such a study could 
neglect the conceptualisation of SMEs, more so that most of the company characteristics for 
the participating companies in this thesis had SME characteristics. This thesis has 
demonstrated how SMEs effectively participate in strategic alliances in order to overcome 
their inherent weaknesses. This thesis has also provided a springboard upon which SMEs 
can effectively evaluate their potential alliance partners and ongoing alliances. 
 
The areas of study identified above, and the policy issues alluded to can be clearly analysed 
in terms of strategy and their implications by the use of the strategic alliance formation and 
evaluation framework developed. It is from the use of such a framework that the effective 
development of strong tourism alliances especially in small businesses can be created.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Project Time Table 
 
Project Schedule                                      Start and finish months [Oct 2004-Oct.2006] 
      2004                                     2005                               2006 
Months (Oct 2004 – Sep 2005) Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mrh Apr My Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mah Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
Activities                         
Confirmation of candidature                         
Ethics Approval                         
Case studies                         
Pilot survey                         
Data collection and coding (questionnaire)                         
Data analysis (questionnaire)                         
Data collection (Structured Interview)                         
Data analysis/Interpretation                         
Compilation of thesis                         
Submission of thesis                         
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire (Quantitative) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions 
Eligibility to answer this survey 
To respond to each question you are 
required to mark with an X in the bracket ([ x]) that 
is appropriate to your answer, or fill in the space 
that is provided for those questions requiring you 
to do so.   
Where there are several options ranging 
from 1 -5 in a row, this indicates a scale where you 
are required to circle one option, which is most 
appropriate to your response.  
For example: 
Strategic alliances are very important. 
Strongly  disagree   moderate    Agree     Strongly 
disagree             agree 
    1         2                3       4  5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire has 3 sections, labelled Part I – 
III.  Part I will ask questions regarding the 
characteristics of your firm/company. Part II will 
ask questions about strategic alliances your firm is 
engaged in. Part III will ask questions regarding 
your details. 
For purposes of this questionnaire, 
strategic alliances are arrangements between two 
or more independent organisations which are 
mutual beneficial. These include relationships 
such as joint ventures; equity participating 
alliances; brand sharing; franchises and licensing; 
marketing and distribution agreements; joint 
selling or distribution; sharing information and 
communication technology; and joint purchasing 
and equipment/office sharing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Ballarat 
School of Business 
 
Strategic Alliances in the Australian 
Tourism Industry – Managers’ 
Characteristics and Perceptions 
Survey 
 
 
 
 
When completed return this survey to: 
Jaloni Pansiri  
School of Business,  
University of Ballarat,  
Mt Helen Campus,  
PO Box 663,   
BALLARAT, VIC 3353 
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1. Industry sector your company is involved in. 
[   ]    Travel agent  [   ]   Tour wholesaler/ticket consolidators [   ]   Tour   operator 
[   ]   Local tour operator  [   ]   Travel management [   ]   Business events         
Other (Specify)   ____________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Company location. 
[   ]    ACT  [   ]   New South Wales    [   ]   Northern territory [   ]    Queensland 
[   ]   South Australia [   ]   Tasmania      [   ]    Victoria  [   ]   Western Australia 
2. Legal form of business. 
[   ] Sole proprietorship    
[   ] Partnership    
[   ] Corporation 
3. How would you categorise the company you work for? 
   [   ] Family Business   
[   ] Non-family business 
4. Is the present CEO (or Managing Director) the founder of the company?   
[   ] Yes  
[   ] No 
5. What is the per centage of managers who are relatives to the present CEO (or Managing Director)? 
[   ] 0%   [   ] 1 -25%  [   ] 26 – 50%   
[   ] 51 – 75%  [   ] 76 – 99%  [   ] 100% 
6. Number of paid employees in the company.  
[   ] Less than 5    [   ]  Between 5 - 19   [   ]  Between 20 – 49 
[   ]  Between 50 - 99   [   ]  Between 100 - 199   [   ] 200 or more 
7. How would you classify the company’s annual returns for 2003? 
   [   ] Below average  [   ] Average  [   ] Above average 
8. What is the annual business turnover (in Australian Dollars)?  
[   ] > $500, 000   [   ]  $500,001 – $1M   [   ] $1,000,001 – 3M 
[   ] $3,000,001 - $5M   [   ]  $5,000,001 – 7M   [   ] $7,000,001+ 
 
 
 
 
Section I: Company Details 
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9. Indicate by a mark [ x ] the alliances your company is involved in both in Australia and abroad. 
Alliance Types Australia Abroad 
a)   Joint ventures     
b)   Equity participating alliances   
c)   Brand sharing   
d)   Franchises and licensing   
e)   Marketing and distribution agreements   
f)   Joint selling or distribution   
g)   Sharing information and communication technology, e.g. reservation systems.   
h)   Joint purchasing and equipment/office sharing   
i)   Others (specify)_____________________________   
10. Does your company have any strategic alliances with companies owned by your relatives? 
[   ]  Yes     [   ]  No 
11. If yes, what per centage of the alliances indicated in 9 above are involved in this way?  
[   ] 1 -25% [   ] 26 – 50% [   ] 51 – 75%    [   ]       76 – 99%   [   ] 100% 
12. Indicate by way of a mark [ x ] the sectors with whom your company has alliances with. 
13. Indicate the degree to which these factors are influential to your company participating in strategic 
alliances.  
Very Low 
Influence 
 
Low 
     
Moderate 
        
High  
Very High 
Influence 
a) Globalisation of the tourism industry 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Entering a new international market 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Entering a new geographical market in Australia 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Volatility in the tourism market 1 2 3 4 5 
e) General economic uncertainty. 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Development/creating a new market 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Economies of scale 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Brand names 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Reputation and general image 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Legal requirements 1 2 3 4 5 
k) Learning from each other e.g. technology  transfer 1 2 3 4 5 
l) Rapid technological change. 1 2 3 4 5 
m) Strength of personal relationships 1 2 3 4 5 
Section II: Strategic Alliance practices 
a)  Accommodation 
[   ]  Hotels 
[   ]  Resorts 
[   ]  Motels and guest houses 
[   ]  Bed and Breakfast 
[   ]  Self catering accommodation 
[   ]  Caravan parks 
       Other (specify) ___________ 
       ________________________ 
b)  Travel 
[   ]   Travel agents 
[   ]   Tour operators 
[   ]   Tourist bureaus 
[   ]   Tour wholesalers/ticket 
        consolidators 
[   ]   Local tour operators 
       Other (specify) _______ 
       ____________________ 
c)    Transportation 
[   ]   Airlines 
[   ]   Cruise 
[   ]   Coach or bus transport 
[   ]   Taxi services 
[   ]   Rental services  of passenger cars 
       Other (specify) ___________ 
       ________________________ 
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14. To respond to the following, please evaluate the one strategic alliance that you perceive to be the 
best of all
 
 your strategic alliances by way of circling the level to which you agree with the following 
statements. 1 = Strongly Disagree;  2 = Disagree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree 
Name of the best strategic alliance type (See question 9): _________________________________ 
 
Strongly 
Disagree  
  Strongly 
Agree 
a) Our company is satisfied with the strategic alliance. 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Our company is likely to continue with the strategic alliance. 1 2 3 4 5 
c) We selected each other because we had complementary assets. 1 2 3 4 5 
d) We selected each other because there were possible synergies perceived in working 
together. 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) We selected each other because we were of an approximately similar size and 
strength. 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) We selected each other because our culture was compatible. 1 2 3 4 5 
g) We selected each other because we were all very committed to the relationship. 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Our partner is quite willing to make long-term investment in the alliance. 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Our partner has a strong sense of loyalty to the alliance. 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Our partner is willing to dedicate whatever people and resources it takes to make the 
alliance a success. 
1 2 3 4 5 
k) This alliance is something our organisation intends to maintain in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 
l) The alliance is based on a strong sense of loyalty to other alliance members. 1 2 3 4 5 
m) The alliance deserves our organisation’s maximum effort to maintain.   1 2 3 4 5 
n) Alliance partners can be counted on to do what is right. 1 2 3 4 5 
o) Alliance partners do not make false claims or promises. 1 2 3 4 5 
p) Alliance partners are honest about problems when they arise. 1 2 3 4 5 
q) Alliance partners have high integrity. 1 2 3 4 5 
r) In general, my organisation is satisfied with the strategic alliance overall performance. 1 2 3 4 5 
s) In general, our partners are satisfied with the strategic alliance overall performance. 1 2 3 4 5 
t) We have learned or benefited from our partners’ specific skills and competencies. 1 2 3 4 5 
u) We have benefited from technology transfer from our partners. 1 2 3 4 5 
v) The alliance has enabled us to develop new technology processes. 1 2 3 4 5 
w) We exert informal control over our alliance partners in order to achieve alliance 
objectives. 
1 2 3 4 5 
x) We exert formal control over our alliance partners in order to achieve alliance 
objectives. 
1 2 3 4 5 
y) We have experienced an increase in the number of clients since we joined the alliance 1 2 3 4 5 
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15. For each of the following, please rate the effects that going into the best strategic alliance
Much 
Worse 
 evaluated 
under question 14 has had on your current company/firm performance versus its performance 
before joining the strategic alliance. (Circle the number which best describes how you think about each 
statement) 
Slightly 
Worse 
     No 
Change 
Slightly 
Better 
Much 
Better 
a) Sales Level 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Market Share 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Profitability 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Cost control 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Technology development 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Quality control 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Labour productivity 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Marketing 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Distribution 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Reputation 1 2 3 4 5 
k) Value creation 1 2 3 4 5 
l) Accessibility to skills 1 2 3 4 5 
m) Customer service 1 2 3 4 5 
n) Overall performance 1 2 3 4 5 
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This information is anonymous and cannot be linked to you personally 
16. Your gender [   ] Male  [   ] Female 
17. Your Age.  
[   ] Below 20 years  [   ] 20 – 30 years  [   ]   31- 40years  
[   ]   41 – 50 years   [   ]   51 - 60 years   [   ]   61 – 70 years   
[   ]   Above 70 years 
18. Your highest educational level. 
[   ] Not completed high school   [   ] High school   [   ] TAFE 
[   ] Undergraduate degree   [   ] MBA    [   ] Masters Degree 
[   ] Doctorate    Other (specify) ______________________________________ 
19. Indicate the number of years you have spent during your career in any of these functional 
categories. 
 Production/operation     Marketing, sales, and merchandising 
 Finance/accounting    Human resource management 
 Product R&D     Planning and general management 
 Consultancy    Others (specify) _______________________________ 
20. Number of years you have been employed in the company. 
[   ] 0 – 2 years   [   ] 3 – 5 years  [   ]   6 – 8 years  
[   ]   9 - 11 years   [   ]   More than 12 years   
21.   How many of these years have been spent in managerial positions?  
[   ] 0 – 2 years   [   ] 3 – 5 years  [   ]   6 – 8 years  
[   ]   9 - 11 years   [   ]   more than 12 years   
22.   What is your current position in the company? 
[      ] CEO      [      ] Managing Director     
[      ] Director (Production/operation)   [      ] Director (Marketing, sales, and merchandising) 
[      ] Director (Finance/accounting) [      ] Director (Human resource management) 
[      ] Director (Product R&D)  [      ] Director (Planning and general management) 
[      ] Senior consultant/Consultant   Others (specify) __________________________ 
23.   Are you an:  [   ]  Owner manager  [   ] Employed executive?  
Other (Specify) ________________________________________________________________ 
24.  How would you rate your own willingness to undertake risky business propositions as compared to 
other executives at or near your level in your firm? (Please put an X in the most appropriate box).  
[   ]    Very low  [   ]    Low   [   ]    Moderate  [   ]    High  [   ]   Very high 
25. Please indicate the level to which you agree with the following statements. 
Section III: Participants Details 
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Strongly  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. The most interesting life is to live under rapidly 
changing conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Adventurous and exploratory people go farther in 
this world than do systematic and orderly people 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. When planning a holiday, a person should have a 
schedule to follow if he/she is really going to enjoy 
himself/herself 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Doing the same thing in the same places for a long 
period of time makes for a happy life. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. For each of the following statements, please circle the number that best indicates the likelihood of 
you engaging in each activity.  
Extremely 
unlikely 
   
Unlikely  
 
Neutral 
          
Likely 
Extremely 
likely 
a. Investing 10% of your annual income in a blue 
chip stock. 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Investing 10% of your annual income in a very 
speculative stock. 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Investing 10% of your annual income in 
government bonds or treasury bills. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Lending a friend an amount of money 
equivalent to one month’s income at no interest. 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. Taking a day’s income to play the poker -
machines at a nearby club. 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Taking a job where you get paid exclusively on 
a commission basis 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. If you have any other comments on this survey please write them below.  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________ 
28. Are you available in future for a personal interview?  [   ]  Yes   [   ]   No 
29. If yes, please provide your postal and email addresses. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your answers are invaluable to our 
research. Please send the completed questionnaire in the envelope provided. 
 
Postal Address: Email Address: 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire (semi-structured interviews) 
 
A) Alliance types and reasons for alliance formation  
1. Would you like to start this discussion by telling me about the strategic alliances your 
business is involved in? What influenced your company/firm into forming or 
becoming involved in strategic alliances? And what influenced your selection of 
partners (complementary assets, are possible synergies perceived in working together, 
similar size and strength, compatible with each other)?  
2. Our study so far indicate that “Reputation and corporate image; Strength of personal 
relationships; Developing/creating new markets; Economies of scale and Learning 
from each other” are the most important motives for alliance formation, what is your 
view on each of these motives? Do these reflect why your business entered into 
alliances? 
3. Entering new markets (both domestic and international) seem to be the least 
important motives, would this be associated with the fact that most of the businesses 
are small. What’s your view on this? 
4. If you were to comment on the number of alliances and their geographical location 
(domestic or international) what would you say were the main reasons influencing 
your company to form such alliances? What would you say were the main reasons for 
going or no going into such alliances? 
5. Would you say the nature of business (travel agents or tour operator) and its size were 
strong determinants or reasons influencing alliance formation?  
6. In your opinion, which sectors do you think your business has most alliances with, i.e. 
accommodation, travel and/or transportation? Which in particular? Why?”  
Interviewer: The most popular alliances from our study so far seem to be Marketing 
and Distribution Agreements [MDA] (ranked No. 1), Sharing Information and 
Communication Technology [SICA] (ranked No. 2), Franchising and licensing 
Agreements [FLA] (ranked No. 4). How do you react to these figures? Do they 
surprise you? Why is it that FLA are so popular among travel agents in particular? 
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B) Strategic Alliance performance 
 
7. Let’s talk about alliance performance – If you were asked to make a general statement 
about how satisfied are you with the overall strategic alliance performance what 
would you say?  Probe for issues, i.e. why are you satisfied or not?  
8. Would you say your company’s performance is much better now than before it joined 
the strategic alliance? In what ways? (Do you think you have an advantage being in a 
strategic alliance than your competitor?)  
9. In general, how satisfied do you think, has your partners been with the overall 
performance of the strategic alliance?  
10. The extent to which your company has learned or benefited from this alliance 
experience in the following; marketing skills, helping to adapt to new technology 
systems, transferring of technologies, and others, state.  
11. In what ways has alliances improved your business performance? E.g. general 
satisfaction, satisfaction with technology, overall alliance performance, operational 
performance and market share and profitability. 
 
 
C) Choosing Alliance partners 
12. Let’s talk about choosing alliance partners – to what extent is this an important issue 
with respect to your business? 
13. If you were to rank commitment, trust, cultural compatibility and control of alliance 
partners, which would you say are the most important issues you would look for when 
deciding on an alliance partner? Why? 
14. Would you say that good choice of alliance partners enhances alliance performance? 
In what ways? 
15. Would you then say that you are willing to continue with the strategic alliance? 
16. Let’s now talk about issues of commitment and trust. Would you say you are 
committed to the alliance and trusted by other alliance partners? How about your 
partners to the alliance – are they in your view committed and trustworthy as you are? 
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17. Do you have any control over the way your partners participate in the alliance? 
Which form of control would you say you find mostly effective? 
18. Are alliances a risky form of business operation? Why? 
19. Which alliances would you say are more risky? 
 
After the interview, the demographic data will then be collected from the interviewee. 
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Appendix 4 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances for Choice of alliance Partners 
  
Organisation Factors  Commitment Trust Compatibility Control 
 df LS df LS df LS df LS 
Sector 2 3.03 2 0.20 2 0.65 2 1.67 
Legal form 2 4.21* 2 2.56 2 .028 2 0.37 
Employees 2 .38 2 2.38 2 2.08 2 0.16 
Turnover 2 0.82 2 1.38 2 0.21 2 0.74 
Category 1 0.27 1 0.33 1 0.31 1 0.54 
         
UE Characteristics         
Age 4 0.34 4 1.36 4 2.34 4 1.22 
Education 4 0.24 4 0.80 4 2.28 4 1.05 
Experience 4 0.21 4 1.36 4 1.48 4 0.22 
Tenure 4 0.55 4 1.46 4 0.65 4 0.27 
Ownership 1 1.42 1 0.09 1 0.52 1 0.89 
Risk willingness 4 4.29** 4 0.70 4 0.68 4 0.49 
Investment Risk 1 1.08 1 0.30 1 2.83 1 0.01 
Adventure 1 0.61 1 0.00 1 0.08 1 0.12 
Un-adventure 1 5.57* 1 2.20 1 0.01 1 5.92* 
Notes: df = Degree of freedom; LS = Levene Statistic; *p<0.05 and **p<0.01 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances for Performance Evaluation 
 
 
 
Variables 
General 
satisfaction with 
performance 
Satisfaction 
with technology 
transfer 
Overall alliance 
performance 
Operational 
Performance 
Market share & 
profitability 
Organisation Factors           
 df LS df LS df LS df LS df LS 
Sector 2 1.19 2 .36 2 1.02 2 1.48 2 .16 
Legal form 2 5.67** 2 .33 2 .55 2 .98 2 .30 
Employees 2 4.00* 2 .09 2 1.79 2 .36 2 .96 
Turnover 2 2.1 2 .46 2 6.38** 2 .88 2 1.22 
Category 1 4.44* 1 .050 1 0.51 1 0.05 1 0.62 
           
UE Characteristics           
Age 4 0.39 4 1.11 4 0.78 4 0.09 4 1.46 
Education 4 2.69 4 0.43 4 1.10 4 0.17 4 2.35 
Experience 4 1.35 4 0.39 4 1.65 4 0.25 4 0.97 
Tenure 4 0.87 4 1.28 4 1.49 4 1.43 4 1.11 
Ownership 1 4.08* 1 .03 1 0.34 1 0.63 1 2.55 
Risk willingness 4 1.98 4 1.38 4 0.38 4 1.01 4 1.56 
Investment Risk 1 1.04 1 2.53 1 .03 1 3.15 1 .00 
Adventure 1 3.34 1 .06 1 .00 1 3.39 1 .02 
Un-adventure 1 1.98 1 8.01** 1 .48 1 .58 1 .33 
Notes: df = Degree of freedom; LS = Levene Statistic; *p<0.05 and **p<0.01 
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Appendix 6 – Letter to potential participants 
 
XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXX 
 
 
Dear XXXXX 
 
RE: Research on Strategic Alliances in the Australian Tourism Industry  
 
We are currently investigating relationships that drive strategic alliance formation 
with emphasis on strategic alliance selection, choice of alliance partners and alliance 
structures in the Australian tourism industry.  A summary of our findings will be distributed 
to all managers in the study, which could be beneficial in terms of effectively managing their 
networking and strategic alliances in the future.   
Names of companies and individuals who participate in this survey have been 
collected from the many promising and prominent tourism businesses websites in Australia. 
We would appreciate your response to this letter by way of logging into our on-line 
questionnaire at http://www.cecc.com.au/surveys/j_pansiri/ at your earliest convenience. We 
have obtained encouraging survey data from others who participated. The more data we can 
collect from the survey the more robust the results and the better information we can provide 
about strategic alliances in tourism. Your participation is highly valued. Contact and any 
queries can be made by post, email to j.courvisanos@ballarat.edu.au, or phone 03 53179417. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
Dr. Jerry Courvisanos 
Senior Lecturer 
School of Business 
 
Link to Questionnaire: http://www.cecc.com.au/surveys/j_pansiri/ 
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Appendix 7 – Letter to potential participants 
 
XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXX 
 
Dear XXXXX 
 
 
RE: Research on Strategic Alliances in the Australian Tourism Industry – Managers’ 
Characteristics and Perceptions 
 
We are undertaking research on strategic alliances in the Australian tourism. The 
purpose of this research is to investigate the relationships that drive strategic alliance 
formation and explore the effects of managers’ characteristics and perceptions on strategic 
alliance selection, choice of alliance partners and alliance structures in the Australian tourism 
industry. The attached survey aims to collect data on this issue. A summary of our findings 
will be provided, which could be beneficial to you in terms of effectively managing your 
company’s strategic alliances in the future. 
Please assist this research by completing the questionnaire. We anticipate that the 
filling of the questionnaire will take approximately 20 minutes.  
All information provided will be treated with strict confidentiality. Participation in 
this research is voluntary. You are free to withdraw consent and to discontinue participation 
in the study at any time. Any unprocessed data supplied by you will not be used if consent is 
withdrawn. All information you provide (including questionnaires) will be treated with the 
strictest confidence and data will be stored separately from any listing that includes your 
name and address. Aggregated results will be used for research purposes and may be reported 
in scientific and academic journals. Once such information has been aggregated it is unable 
to be identified, and from this point it is not possible to withdraw consent to participate. By 
completing the questionnaire and returning it to Jaloni, you are implicitly providing your 
consent to participate in this survey.  
If you have any questions concerning this project, or the procedures associated with 
this research, please contact the principal supervisor, Dr. Jerry Courvisanos at (03) 53 
279417 or email him at j.courvisanos@ballarat.edu.au,.  Or the researcher, Mr. Jaloni Pansiri 
at (03) 53 279059 or email him at j.pansiri@ballarat.edu.au 
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To be eligible to answer this survey you must be the major decision maker/controller 
of your business.  If you are not the appropriate person to complete this questionnaire, then 
we ask that you forward this to the appropriate person.  Thank you for agreeing to participate 
in this survey.  
When completed return this survey with the envelope provided 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
Dr. Jerry Courvisanos       
Senior Lecturer       
School of Business       
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Glossary 
 
 A$M  Australian Dollars in Millions 
 AAA  The Company interviewed 
 ABS  Australian Bureau of Statistics 
 ANZSIC Australia and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification  
 ATSA   Australian Tourism Satellite Accounts  
 BSA  Brand sharing 
 CATO   Council of Australian Tour Operators  
 CEO   Chief Executive Officer 
 EPA   Equity participating alliance 
 FLA   Franchises and licensing 
 GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
 GVA   Gross Value Added 
 JSA   Joint selling or distribution 
 JV   Joint venture  
 JPEA   Joint purchasing and equipment/office sharing 
 MDA   Marketing and distribution agreements 
 PCA   Principal Component Analysis 
 SICA   Sharing information and communication technology 
 SMEs  Small and Medium Enterprises 
 TCF  Travel Compensation Fund 
 TFC  Tourism Forecasting Committee 
 TMT  Top Management Team 
 XXX   Company that the interviewed company has an alliance with 
 TSA   Tourism Satellite Accounts  
 ICTs  Information and Communication Technologies 
 CRS   Computer Reservation Systems  
 GDSs  Global Distribution Systems  
 MNEs   Multinational enterprises  
 UNWTO  World Tourism Organization 
 
